Professors John Ferejohn and Lewis Kornhauser
Tuesday, 4:00-5:50 p.m.
Vanderbilt Hall, Room 208
The course will investigate a wide variety of topics ranging from the foundations of rational choice theory (an inquiry important to the evaluation of the use of the theory in understanding law) to applications to questions of immediate interest. Economists and political scientists have used the theory to investigate a number of topics of central interest to the law such as (a) how the organization of Congress affects the nature and content of legislation enacted; (b) the relation between courts and Congress; (c) Congressional and judicial control of administrative agencies; (d) federalism; and (e) the structure of adjudication.
Fall 2019 Schedule of Presenters
Katherine Strandburg, (New York University School of Law) and Ignacio Cofone (McGill University, Faculty of Law)
"Strategic Games and Algorithmic Transparency"
Nate Persily (Stanford Law School)
"The Internet's Challenge to Democracy"
Jon Eguia (Michigan State University, Department of Economics)
"Artificial Partisan Advantage in Redistricting"
Katerina Linos (University of California, Berkeley, Law School)
"Fundraising for Stigmatized Groups: A Text Message Donation Experiment" (with Laura Jakli, UC Berkeley, Political Science and Melissa Carlson, UC Berkeley, Political Science)
Tom Palfrey (California Institute of Technology)
This paper is not available.
Lewis Kornhauser (NYU School of Law)
"A Theory of Claim Resolution"(with Scott Baker, Washington University, St. Louis)
Sepehr Shahshahani (Fordham Law School)
"Hard Cases Make Bad Law? A Theoretical Investigation"
Colloquium questions: Máire Kimble at email@example.com or (212) 998-6179