1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	RAVIDATH LAWRENCE RAGBIR,	
4	Petitioner,	
5	V.	18 CV 236 (KBF)
6	JEFFERSON SESSIONS III, ET AL,	
7	Respondents.	ARGUMENT
8	x	
9		New York, N.Y. January 16, 2018 4:02 p.m.
10	Defense	1
11	Before:	
12	HON. KATHERINE B. F	ORREST,
		District Judge
13	APPEARANCES	
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14 15	WASHINGTON SQUARE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC	
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15	WASHINGTON SQUARE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC Attorneys for Petitioner BY: ALINA DAS JESSICA ROFÉ	
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1	(Case called)	
2	MS. DAS: My name is Alina Das with Washington Square	
3	Legal Services, Immigrant Rights Clinic, for Mr. Ragbir.	
4	THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Das.	
5	MS. ROFÉ: My name is Jessica Rofé with the immigrant	
6	rights, with Washington Square Legal Services, Immigrant Rights	
7	Clinic, for petitioner, Mr. Ragbir.	
8	THE COURT: Okay.	
9	MS. CASTLE: My name is Brittany Castle with	
10	Washington Square Legal Services, on behalf of Mr. Ragbir.	
11	THE COURT: All right.	
12	MR. CUTTING: My name is Jeremy Cutting with	
13	Washington Square Legal Services for Mr. Ragbir.	
14	THE COURT: All right.	
15	Now, let me just make sure that I have the status of	
16	Ms. Rofé, Ms. Castle, and Mr. Cutting correctly in mind. Are	
17	you three students or are you not all students?	
18	Ms. Rofé, you're not? You're on staff?	
19	MS. ROFÉ: I'm on staff.	
20	THE COURT: Okay. You're on staff.	
21	Are you a student, Ms. Castle?	
22	MS. CASTLE: Yes, I am.	
23	THE COURT: Okay.	
24	Mr. Cutting, you are?	
25	MR. CUTTING: Yes, I am.	

THE COURT: That's fine.

Ms. Das, Ms. Rofé, are you folks going to be doing the argument or is it going to be done by either of the two students? Which will be fine, I just want to make sure that I understand how we are going to be proceeding.

MS. DAS: For today, your Honor, with the Court's permission, Ms. Rofé and myself will be doing the arguing.

THE COURT: Okay. Terrific. It would be fine in any event; I just want to make sure that I have got it correctly in mind. You can take care of that.

Now, turning to Mr. Waterman.

MR. WATERMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor.

Brandon Waterman, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

To my left is Joseph Cordaro, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on behalf of the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, folks.

We are here on petitioner's motion to enforce the Court's order of January 11th, 2018.

I want to just back up and tell you folks from my review of the filings in this case so far what I think this habeas petition is about and what I think the issues are that are before me. I'm going to give you an initial reaction to them, because I think it will help direct our time.

So the habeas petition seeks redress for the revocation of the release status of the petitioner, and that

followed a final order of removal. So there had been a final order of removal, subsequent to which there were a number of stays of that order that had been issued, but there was a final order of removal.

The most recent stay was issued in January 2016. That stay of removal, by its terms, would have expired Friday, January 19th, 2018.

The current detention of petitioner is really based upon the application of petitioner not to be deported and to prevent that immediately. Therefore, he is put on an airplane, there are issues about the timing. As I understand it, he would have not gone necessarily straight to Trinidad, but would have gone to Trinidad within that day or so. He ended up stopping in Krome and staying in Krome, which is the Florida facility. That detention, as I understand it, is essentially occurring as part and parcel of his petition relating to the revocation of the stay. So you folks will tell me how I've gotten that incorrect, but that is my takeaway from these papers.

Now, as I understand it, there's a threshold question as to whether or not I have subject matter jurisdiction. I think I do, because under the procedural posture of this case, this is not an attack on a final order of removal over which I would not have subject matter jurisdiction; that would have to go straight to the Second Circuit.

Because the nature of the due process right that petitioner is seeking redress for is the revocation of his liberty on January 11th; and that because his assertion is that he did not have notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with that January 11th revocation, he asserts that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, and that this is not at all a collateral attack or an attack on the final order of removal.

Given that posture, I think I do have subject matter jurisdiction. But when I do that, I then reach the question of today's motion, which is the petition to enforce the Court's order, which is essentially to get the grant of a mandatory injunction to have the petitioner brought back to New York. For that I need to look at a couple of different factors; of course, likelihood of success on the merits is one, irreparable injury is another, irreparable injury is laid out.

Likelihood of success, let me just go to that.

I think that in front of me, in light of the history of this case, I think that there is not a high likelihood of success. So let me explain to you why. And that is because at ECF document number 1-17, there is a January 20th, 2016 -- it's the stay order. So the petitioner would have been under an immediate -- he would have been immediately subject to deportation had that January 20th, 2016 stay not been issued. That followed other stays.

So petitioner had notice that on January 19th, 2018, he would be subject to immediate deportation. So he did have notice of that. That's on the face of the letter itself.

And then in terms of opportunity to be heard, he put in a submission on November 16th, 2017, that sought to extend that timing. Why DHS ICE needed to do it on January 11th, I don't know. I think that, frankly, if ICE had rendered its decision on January 19th, 2018, we wouldn't be here, at least you wouldn't be in front of me, because if ICE had denied the extension, the petitioner would have been subject to immediate deportation. I don't know that there would have been a liberty interest as to which he had a reasonable expectation of. I do think he had a reasonable expectation of a liberty interest for the period of eight days between January 11th and January 19th. But I think his case is mooted in three days.

I think the case in front of me is mooted on the 19th of January. As a result of that, I don't find that when we are looking at all of the factors for the mandatory injunction, before I even get to some of the other issues, I'm not sure — and I'm inclined to say that there's not enough to issue a mandatory injunction.

Now, I would also say I've received a copy -- where did we get this from?

THE LAW CLERK: That was in the initial petition.

THE COURT: In the initial petition. This is the

photograph of the January 11th, 2018, denial by the field office of the stay extension, of the request for the stay extension, which, from my reading of the statute, I think the field office was entitled to make that determination in an exercise of its discretion.

So that's where I come out, the bottom line of which is I think that I have jurisdiction because I don't think that this is a collateral attack -- I don't think this is a direct attack; I don't think it's an attack on the final deportation order. I think that has been de facto in place since whenever it was put in place.

But I do think that there are other serious issues.

Ms. Das, it's your motion. That's how I understand this issue. I know the relief that you've sought has been about detention in one place, about revocation of the stay in another place. I'm really putting it in terms of revocation of the stay as the primary issue. The stay there is not the stay I issued; it's not the stay that's now been issued in New Jersey. It's the stay that the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement had issued in 2016 that was set to expire by its own terms on January 19th of this month. So hopefully that gives you some targets to shoot at.

MS. DAS: Well, thank you, your Honor. I appreciate that. I appreciate you laying out the points of concern for this Court, because it does help us get to the core issues.

And there are areas in which, respectfully, we disagree.

The core issue in this case is about the unlawful arrest and detention of Ravi Ragbir. He's a husband, a father --

THE COURT: Let me just ask you about the unlawful arrest and retention.

The detention, as I understand it -- let's just assume for the moment -- I want to understand if we have any common ground -- that this was January 20th. Assume it's January 20th and he did not get a stay; and so the January 20th, 2016 stay expires by its own terms. Assume that he's then taken to the airport and put on an airplane. In your view, is that unlawful detention at that point as of January 20th, 2018?

MS. DAS: Yes, your Honor. And that's because the key issue is not actually about the ICE stay, which is highly unusual; many people are living in this country with an order — fight an order of removal and don't have a ICE stay of removal. The key issue is about the revocation of the order of supervision.

Mr. Ragbir has been living in this country since 2008, after already being detained for 22 months, far from his family and his loved ones here in New York, when he was given an order of supervision by ICE. That order of supervision states in its own terms that there are conditions that he has to comply with; that he can't be rearrested, that he can't have another problem

with the law. And it also says that they will continue to make good-faith efforts to get a travel document. And at some point, if that is obtained and they decide to actually remove him, he will be required to surrender to ICE for removal, and at that time being given an opportunity to prepare for his orderly departure.

THE COURT: I just want to make sure that I follow -I've been trying to thread my way through statutes which you
folks are experts in and follow a lot of things.

So I'm looking at ECF document 1-17, and then I'm looking at page 1 of 4, 2 of 4, 3 of 4, and 4 of 4, which are the stay orders.

So the January 20th, 2016 says that the stay of removal will expire. Is it the statute that provides -- the CFR that provides these other provisions that you're talking about?

MS. DAS: There are provisions in the statute as well as in the federal regulations, which I'll point your Honor to.

The order of supervision is at Exhibit IM, ECF number 14, which is the actual order of supervision. And this is part of a process actually that Supreme Court laid out in Zadvydas, when they talked about people who are facing prolonged periods of detention after a final order of removal.

It stated that, yes, there is a question as to whether or not removal will be reasonably foreseeable; and that there's

also a question as to whether or not the person is a flight risk or a danger. Those determinations do need to be made. Those determinations were made in 2008; an order was issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and there are specific rules that are specified, particularly in federal regulations 8 CFR 241.4(1), as well as 8 CFR 241.13(i), that specify procedures, both in terms of who is allowed to make the decision to revoke an order of supervision -- which actually is not the field office director, it is the executive associate commissioner of the service, which is now ICE -- and what factors they need to consider.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me just have you walk me through two separate things, in your view, the difference between a stay of removal and an order of supervision. As I understand it, a stay of removal means that you're under an order of supervision under 241.4, 8 CFR 241.4. And that if you're under a stay, then you have to comply with the various terms and conditions of your supervision; and that that supervision can't be — it can be withdrawn, but only under certain circumstances.

Do I have that right?

MS. DAS: No, your Honor.

So the administrative stay of removal is provided for in 8 CFR 241.6. It is a discretionary act. It provides an individual with essentially a promise, an understanding, an

ability to rely upon the fact that they won't be removed for a certain period of time.

THE COURT: Hold on one second, if you would, Ms. Das.

I just want to have -- Joe, I need somebody to print for me -
I have 241.4, I've got 241.3. I've got all kinds of 241s, but

I don't have 241.6. So I need 241.6, all right?

Go ahead.

MS. DAS: And that regulation simply states that the immigration service can issue an order that's a stay; and that they can do so for a reasonable period of time; and that's pretty much all it provides. That gives people an opportunity to know that they won't be deported during that period, and they can make plans and such related to that stay.

But very few people get an ICE stay of removal; it's a very rare thing. The order of supervised release itself is a separate act. It is a decision that is made when a person is initially detained. And then it says, We are releasing you. We recognize that you are not a danger; we recognize that you are not a flight risk; we recognize that you are pursuing relief from deportation, and so we are going to put conditions on it. Those conditions, again, are laid out at the exhibit that I mentioned and in the regulations. Then there's a separate set of regulations that govern whether or not that order of supervision can be released.

And Mr. Ragbir has --

THE COURT: And the regulations that govern whether or not the order of supervision can be revoked, you mean, that is under 241.4, like either (1) or (k) or (i).

MS. DAS: Yes. It's 241.4(1), which has to do with revocation of release. And then 241.13(i), which is specific to whether there's a significant likelihood of removing someone who's detained in the reasonably foreseeable future, so the traffic document issue.

I should state for the record we have yet to be told or see that there is a travel document in this case; so we certainly don't concede that they would be able to lawfully put him on a plane out of this country tomorrow, because we have not seen any valid travel document. But putting that aside, there are still requirements that are supposed to be followed.

THE COURT: Let me just ask you, because I want to understand your view as to what the meaning of the January 20th, 2016 letter is. It sounds like, from your perspective for petitioner, once a stay was issued, let alone multiple stays, but once a stay was issued, his supervision could not be revoked without a number of additional procedures. So if that's the case, then what is the effect of the January 20th, 2016 -- what could have happened, if anything, on January 20th, 2018, based on this letter?

MS. DAS: So at that point they could say, We are in a position to remove you because we no longer have a stay of

removal in place, and we decline to extend the stay, so that we can remove you. But that doesn't mean that he has to be detained.

THE COURT: So tell me how that would have occurred. Granted that this is an unusual circumstance, but you're arguing that ICE could not take him into custody to bring him to the airport to force him to get on an airplane. ICE would have to just what?

MS. DAS: So hundreds of thousands of people -- from our perspective, very unjustly, but hundreds of thousands of people are deported from this country each year, and they are not detained; they are given letters that say that they are ordered to deport by a period of time. ICE officers can go and observe or they sometimes are supposed to report to the consulate after they have been deported. They are given the opportunity to do this because there's a recognition that when there are any manner of kinds of immigration violations, that there's still an opportunity for people to be able to put their affairs in order, to make decisions for their life, and then to deport according to the law.

For Mr. Ragbir, again, he is somebody who is facing deportation because of a single criminal conviction that he received as a green card holder. He has never been accused of having any sort of separate immigration violation. He has come to all of his reporting requirements, including this one,

knowing that there were possibilities of these types of actions. He's never not complied with the law. According to ICE's own findings in his case, he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community.

So the order to the supervision requirements, the orders of supervised release and the regulations in and of themselves provide for a process by which decisions have to be made that once ICE made a determination to release someone, to say that, We know that you are going to follow our other rules, that detention is unnecessary and unjustified in your case, if they are going to change their mind and say detention is suddenly necessary, they have to go through a process.

THE COURT: But he only was detained —— so talk to me about the detention here, because I see it in two pieces.

There's the detention on January 11th, between the time that Mr. Ragbir was at the offices of ICE and was brought to the airport, put on the airplane, probably accompanied, I assume, on the airplane, and so was not free to leave during that entire period of time. And then there's the process of detention which has occurred since then as a result of his putting a halt on his deportation.

MS. DAS: Well, your Honor, we certainly don't concede that the reason that he's in detention is because we sought a stay from this Court. He's in detention because ICE put him in detention. They haven't actually given us any reasons or

indication to state that they have the ability to remove him. As I stated before, they need a valid travel document. That has not been provided to us and, as far as we know, does not exist. To us it looks very much like they've detained him at this check-in, partially because of the work that he does as an outspoken immigrant rights leader; and that they are going to keep him in detention until they are able to get a travel document.

THE COURT: Well, now, at this point in time, the coram nobis, this New Jersey court has also acted, so you've got a separate forum where you're also proceeding. But if I were to vacate my order of the other day, I think the effect — and there was nothing else, I think the effect of that would be that he would be then transferred to Trinidad, as opposed to returned to New York. And I think that what you want is returned to New York.

MS. DAS: Yes, your Honor, we do want his return to New York, because he is facing irreparable harm by this transfer, particularly because of the difficulties with accessing counsel, as well as his family.

Just before I go to that, I just want to underscore that essentially this Court is the only court that can address this concern about the revocation of the order of supervision.

A very instructive case on this point that also addressed this right and this due process right to have an

orderly way of being deported, that you don't have to be detained, that you can't be snatched out from your home with no process and no notice, is a recent case out of the District of Massachusetts, *Rombot v. Souza*, which we cite in our memorandum of law that I know there's a lot of papers. It's a recent case, so the Supp. cite isn't out yet; but the Westlaw cite is 2017 Westlaw 5178789.

And in a similar manner, an individual who had been living in the country for a very long time, having an order of supervision, was suddenly taken into custody and there was an attempt to deport him. In that case he had an order of supervision that had the exact same language as Mr. Ragbir's order. "You will be given an opportunity to prepare for an orderly departure." Not that we will detain you, not that we will take you away from your family, not that we will move you 1,000 miles away.

In the last four days I have been given one ten-minute legal phone call to speak to Mr. Ragbir, to prepare and learn even what documents he's received. This is causing an irreparable harm to him, as well as to his family. His wife, Amy Gottlieb, who is here, had to pay for a ticket, over \$700 for a ticket and hotel, to go to Miami for the one hour on a Sunday morning that she was allowed to see him based on how they categorized family visits by the last name of the detainee, and had to see him through Plexiglas on a phone.

That's what she was given there.

While we are figuring out the kind of process that the Constitution requires before an order of supervision is revoked, he deserves to be here in this region, where there are three facilities that ICE could place him in, with minimal cost to them over and above what they are already doing, so that we can make sure that Mr. Ragbir's rights are protected. And the claims that will be addressed at the January 29th hearing before your Honor, those claims deserve to be heard, and those claims can't be brought by any other court. The district court in New Jersey is addressing post-conviction relief. We do have a pending BIA motion. We try and reopen his removal order, but the question of what happens when they want to execute the deportation order, what process he deserves can only be decided by this Court.

THE COURT: Analytically it helps me to separate out the various issues.

So one is the question of orderly deportation.

MS. DAS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What constitutes an orderly deportation and what constitutes a nonorderly deportation.

The second is whether or not his supervision was revoked improperly in some manner.

And the third -- and I'm not suggesting that these are not related. The third is the legal effect of the expiration

of the stay of removal.

Would you agree that these are the three issues that we're trying to sort through?

MS. DAS: Yes, your Honor. I think the way we would frame it is, first, whether he's entitled to release because of the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory violations; second, whether the revocation of the order of supervision was proper and, if not, what protections, what type of hearing due process requires.

We certainly think the minimal regulations haven't been followed here. We don't concede that those would comport with due process because they are post hoc kinds of review processes that don't involve counsel. So we would be seeking a true hearing in front of an impartial adjudicator on the order — the revocation of the order of supervision.

Finally, if there is a decision that the order of supervision is properly revoked, that would bring us to the question of what kind of opportunity to prepare for an orderly departure — not deportation, an orderly departure, which is the language of the order — would be necessary. Would it be we have individuals who are given letters saying that they can report in six months, with an airline ticket, that they report in 30 days. So that would be another set of issues.

But they are complicated issues. I understand why they are complicated; they are issues that we certainly would

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want to brief and I know the government would want to brief.

While that is happening, we agree with your Honor that you have jurisdiction over this case. As part of that jurisdiction, you did have the inherent authority to issue the orders that you did on January 11th. That asking the government to keep someone here so that they have access to their counsel, because that's where they detained him; he did not make a choice to go down to Florida to fight out his case, that was the government's choice after they detained him and after they knew that we would be filing this habeas petition. Even though I see that there is disagreement about the timing of the flight in the judge's order, they certainly knew that this would be what we would be seeking. And that inherent authority also to issue a stay of removal pending this proceeding to protect this Court's jurisdiction because, again, this is the only court that can determine whether Mr. Ragbir, a husband, a father, a community leader, the executive director of the New Sanctuary Coalition of New York City, is somebody who has complied with every rule and regulation, is somebody for whom detention is justified.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. That's been very helpful.

Let me turn to the government and hear from Mr. Waterman or Mr. Cordaro, whoever would like to address both the points that I have raised and also those that Ms. Das had

raised.

MR. WATERMAN: Yes, your Honor. And I think we jumped around quite a bit, so -- one second.

THE COURT: I'll give you my overview again that I have subject matter jurisdiction because this is not an attack on a final order of removal; that what this is instead is an argument that there has been a violation of the petitioner's right to due process, and one can characterize those due process violations in different buckets. One would be the revocation of supervised release; the other would be the detention. Those are related.

Based upon that, I think I have subject matter jurisdiction. Then we got to whether or not the Court would issue a mandatory injunction to have the defendant returned to New York. I made some statements relating to various arguments.

Does that sort of put you back where we were, where we started?

MR. WATERMAN: Sure, your Honor.

Let me address your first point, subject matter jurisdiction.

I don't think we are disputing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the habeas petition. If it's a habeas petition that's challenging unlawful confinement or detention, clearly the Court would have jurisdiction to

consider those claims.

I believe our position is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief, the stay of removal, and enjoining transfer to other districts or locations of confinement.

THE COURT: Let's just pause on that.

If the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, then I think as a matter of law the Court can issue relief that allows the Court to effect that relief. And if relief is appropriate, then I think that I can issue an order. I think once I've got jurisdiction, I've got jurisdiction.

MR. WATERMAN: Unless restricted by Congress, your Honor. The Real ID Act here limits the Court's authority to grant stays of removal and also in limiting or effecting the Attorney General's exercise of their discretion.

With respect to enjoining ICE from removing folks to different facilities, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, has the discretion to house aliens in appropriate detention facilities, wherever the Attorney General or Secretary deems appropriate. That is within the Secretary's discretion. The Real ID Act precludes district courts from interfering or reviewing those discretionary decisions. So the Court would not have jurisdiction to interfere with those discretionary decisions.

THE COURT: So the argument of your adversary,

petitioner here, is that to the extent that those regulations or statutory provisions would otherwise infringe on the petitioner's constitutional rights, they would have to be put to one side; that it can't be that those statutory provisions could overcome, for instance, a due process right; but to the extent that they are consistent, so be it. And here their argument is that they are inconsistent. I think that that's the argument, not that the statutes don't have the words in them that you are suggesting that they have, but that those words would have different kinds of meaning in a context where there's a due process challenge.

MR. WATERMAN: I understand, your Honor.

With respect to the challenge to places of confinement, there I believe the petitioner is raising an access to counsel claim. The government has provided a declaration from the ICE deportation officer from Florida to note the availability of a detainee there to communicate with counsel.

The right to access to counsel or communication while in detention is not unfettered; there are restrictions, there are restrictions in any facility.

Here, the petitioner has a clear ability to communicate with his lawyer, communicate meaningfully. There are a number of different avenues. He could appear in person. I understand here there may be some restrictions on the ability

of counsel to do that, but there's also the ability to communicate via telephone. There is the general telephone line, which is monitored and/or recorded, but there's also the right to have access to a private telephone line or a video teleconferencing ability. Those clearly provide counsel — the client, the petitioner, the right and access to counsel.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Waterman, to address specifically what the meaning of the January 20th, 2016 letter is and why you folks chose to act on January 11th versus waiting for the expiration of the stay of removal on January 19th.

There could be multiple explanations. One is because I am misreading the import of this January 20th, 2016 letter, and therefore, whether it was January 11th, 2018, January 25th, 2018, is neither here nor there. It's also possible that wires got crossed and somebody could have waited until January 19th and things would have been a lot easier, but you didn't, or something else.

So tell me what the point of this letter is.

MR. WATERMAN: I believe your Honor is referencing a January 20, 2016 letter for a stay of removal.

THE COURT: Yes. It says: I have reviewed your request for an administrative stay of removal extension. The request has been granted for a period of two years. The stay of removal will expire on January 19th, 2018. And then it goes

on, talks about supervision.

Your client has been issued an order of supervision, and his continued compliance with the conditions is required.

So what is the impact of the expiration of this letter, if any, on the status of the petitioner?

MR. WATERMAN: Sure, your Honor.

That order or that letter obviously grants petitioner the understanding that he is permitted to stay in the United States pending the expiration of that stay. ICE has exercised its discretionary authority there to allow the petitioner to remain in the United States, I believe, because he was pursuing post-conviction relief or other matters to try to set aside the removal order.

THE COURT: Maybe I've confused you. It is not so much that I care why this was issued, is what is the legal effect of the expiration on January 19th, 2018? Is there any?

MR. WATERMAN: Well, your Honor, my understanding is ICE could revoke that earlier, if it chooses to do so; and, in fact, ICE did revoke that stay, I believe, on January 11th. So the day that he was detained, my understanding is ICE issued a revocation of that stay effective January 11th, 2018. I believe that, again, is your Honor —

THE COURT: All right. So let me just see if I can put some words around what I think you're saying, but I'm not sure, which is that had ICE waited until January 19th, 2018,

the stay would have expired by its own terms.

MR. WATERMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: However, for reasons that were within the discretion of ICE, on January 11th, 2018, ICE decided to revoke the stay, petitioner's stay of removal, early, eight days early.

MR. WATERMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: That January 11th revocation effected the same legal status -- which is TBD -- that would have occurred on January 19th, 2018, without earlier revocation.

MR. WATERMAN: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: In other words, had there been no January 11th letter, the petitioner's status would be the same on January 20th as if there had been a January 11th letter. His stay of removal was no longer extended.

MR. WATERMAN: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Now, so let's go to this next point, which is supervised release. Because once the petitioner was given any stay of removal -- and this now goes back to 2012, which is at least the first of the letters that I have -- he was placed on supervised release.

In the government's view, does petitioner's right to supervised release expire on the day the stay of removal expires or does it expire only when various procedures are

undertaken to terminate supervised release?

Do you see what I'm saying?

MR. WATERMAN: I do, your Honor.

My understanding -- I'd have to look into this further, but my understanding is that ICE can revoke supervised release sooner. And I believe under the same regulation that petitioner's counsel has cited, 8 CFR 241.13(i), my understanding is that regulation provides that ICE may detain an arrest, an alien, on account of changed circumstances where ICE has determined that it has a significant likelihood of removing the alien in the reasonably foreseeable future. That's my understanding of the way that regulation works.

Here, ICE clearly had a significant likelihood of removing the individual; they had a travel document in hand and were prepared to remove the alien.

THE COURT: Those are the changed circumstances?

MR. WATERMAN: I'd have to consult with ICE, your

Honor, but that's my understanding, that's what would amount to changed circumstances.

THE COURT: All right.

So let's move then to another issue.

What is the government's position in terms of what rights, if any, the petitioner has to orderly deportation? As you've heard Ms. Das argue, even assuming the stay of removal was gone, even assuming that supervised release wasn't going to

be extended because of that, if he hadn't been shown to be some sort of risk, did he have a right or did he not have a right to an orderly deportation which would involve things like — as Ms. Das described, it could be any number of things. But it could be, You need to leave by X date; you need to show us a plane ticket, whatever the process is, but allow him to get his affairs in order.

MR. WATERMAN: Your Honor, I don't believe we've had an opportunity to explore the merits of the petition in detail, so I don't think I can give your Honor a straight answer on that. But my understanding, your Honor, is that ICE, they can exercise their discretion as to how they detain an alien who is subject to a final removal order. And how they effect that removal, whether they provide a notice in advance, a baggage letter, for instance, that asks the alien to get their bags together and report at a certain date, or whether ICE can detain the individual, arrest and detain the individual, for a period reasonably necessary to effect the removal, my understanding is ICE has the discretion how they choose to do that.

THE COURT: Is there a regulation or statutory provision that says something along those lines?

MR. WATERMAN: I would need time, your Honor, to provide that.

THE COURT: All right.

I interrupted you, Mr. Waterman.

MR. WATERMAN: Sure.

I think we were just going through points here.

THE COURT: Is there any reason why ICE decided to do this on January 11th, versus waiting till January 20th -- 19th?

MR. WATERMAN: Your Honor, I don't know for certain the reasons why they did what they did. My understanding is they had a travel document; that travel document may have expired by now, I don't know for certain. But they certainly had -- my understanding is that ICE had a valid travel document for that period of time. I'm not certain exactly when it expires, but my understanding is it is going to expire this week. Whether it was before the 19th or after, I haven't seen the travel document to confirm, but my understanding is it would have expired this week. So they moved forward with what they had at the time.

THE COURT: All right.

In any event, you're now precluded by the court in New Jersey from -- let me look at the order. I think you attached it to your most recent filing this afternoon.

MR. WATERMAN: Yes, your Honor. I believe it's until, at the earliest, January 25th, pending the court's consideration of the motion for a stay.

THE COURT: Okay.

What other points did you want to make?

MR. WATERMAN: If I may have one moment, your Honor.

I'm just looking at my notes.

(Pause)

MR. WATERMAN: Your Honor, I think at this point we're happy to rest on our papers, unless you have any further questions.

THE COURT: Let me just flip through some things that I have.

Let's just make sure that we are clear on what the current motion is that's before me versus the petition, the order to show cause that was brought last week.

The current motion before me is specifically to return petitioner to this jurisdiction. Is that right, Ms. Das?

MS. DAS: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DAS: Oh, and, your Honor, we would like to just quickly address a couple of things, if we may.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you address those matters that you'd like to respond to.

MS. DAS: Thank you, your Honor.

We just want to clarify again that the order of supervision exists separate and apart from the stays of removal. Mr. Ragbir received his first order of supervision in January of 2008, when he was released from 22 months of detention, when he was first placed in removal proceedings and

after he had a final order of removal. So that order of supervision, the order of supervised release, was in place many years before he got his first stay of removal.

The stay of removal is referenced to an order of supervision; it's just referencing the fact that they know he has one and he has to continue to comply with it. And it continues to exist, as far as we know, to this day. We have, again, received no paperwork. And, again, I haven't been able to see my client, but as far as he can recall, there's no paperwork he was given to actually revoke that order of supervised release. So that's why the bulk of our claims about the unlawfulness of his detention versus an orderly departure are still in play.

I would note also that the revocation letter of the stay that we received several hours after he was detained did not mention a revocation of the order of supervision that Mr. Ragbir had and continues to have. So I just wanted to clarify that. They are two separate pieces, and that the order of supervision existed prior to the stay; it isn't connected — you don't need a stay of removal to get an order of supervision. Most people don't have stays of removal, but they are entitled to the regulations and the due process requirements that come with having a decision that they should be released under certain conditions and the rules that are provided for when that order of supervision itself can be

revoked.

Secondly, I do think it is telling that counsel for the government itself does not know the reasons why Mr. Ragbir was detained that day, given the deprivation of liberty that detaining someone in a prison entails. In particular, in this case, transferring him 1,000 miles away from his family, his counsel, his clergy, and his work for immigrant rights in this city, in this country, is incredibly problematic and, again, underscores the due process concerns here, given the many Supreme Court cases and others that have recognized how fundamental liberty is; that even ICE's own counsel cannot state the reasons for the detention or produce a travel document or otherwise establish that basis.

And then I think just briefly Ms. Rofé and I would like to just clarify the jurisdictional issues with respect to the actual orders.

The emergency orders on the 11th have to do with temporarily enjoining the government from taking him out of this jurisdiction, as well as temporarily issuing a stay of removal. The statutory provisions that the government cites are not about temporary orders, they are about permanent relief. We are not arguing that this Court can issue a decision that says we may never remove Mr. Ragbir from this country, nor are we arguing that they can say that we can never move him from one place to another under the circumstances.

What we are saying is while this Court is considering the lawfulness of the revocation of his ordered supervision and his subsequent detention, that he then has, under this Court's inherent authority to protect its jurisdiction, as well as to ensure that he has access to the Court and access to counsel, that that inherent authority is not touched by these jurisdiction—driven provisions, which are really about jurisdiction over permanent relief. As this Court said, it has jurisdiction over the case. At the end of the day, once it has jurisdiction over the case, it could issue those types of orders.

Mr. Rofé will talk more specifically about the stay, but I did want to point your Honor to another case that we feel that is very instructive, which is a case out of this district, Ying Fong v. Ashcroft, 317 F. Supp. 2d, 398 (2004), which is a decision by Judge Hellerstein where an individual was actually removed while the Court was issuing a temporary stay of removal, as he explains in his decision as part of his inherent authority to have issued that original stay and his authority to bring her back.

That is what we are seeking today, is that Mr. Ragbir be brought back. I'm not sure why the government believes it has the position to keep him in Krome while this Court is deciding whether or not to vacate the stay. It's been several days since -- my apologies, to vacate the transfer order. It's

been several days since that happened. They have multiple flights going from Miami to New York each day. Upon information and belief, they put Mr. Ragbir in a van, we don't know to where, but they were prepared to take him to the airport. They could have easily brought him back to New York to follow this Court's order. And then if this Court decided to vacate it, transfer him according to this Court's order.

I think it's that kind of aggressiveness, in my 16 years of representing immigrants who are facing deportation and detention, including people who have criminal convictions, and final orders of removal, I have never seen the government act with such aggressiveness, in violation of even their own regulations, let alone our views about what the Constitution requires in removing this community leader from his community.

I know Ms. Rofé has some remarks with respect to the stay that we believe will be helpful to the Court.

THE COURT: Yes. Ms. Rofé.

MS. ROFÉ: Thank you, your Honor.

Just to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over the stay of removal, we'd just like to point the Court's attention to *Incan v. Holder*, which notes the distinction between stays of removal and injunctive relief, and notes that a stay of removal is a temporary form of relief that just permits the court to really make an informed decision about the underlying petition, which is what we'd be requesting

here.

Moreover, the two statutes that the government cites in its briefing, 1252(g) and 1252(a)(5), the two jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not address stays of removal. Indeed, 1252(g) -- I'm sorry, let me just find it.

1252(g) specifies three discrete actions whereby jurisdiction is barred. Those are the commencement of proceedings, the adjudication of cases, and the execution of removal orders. None of those are at issue here in this case. Once again, the habeas is about the unlawful detention, and the stay of removal would just be so that the Court could take its time to adjudicate that petition.

With respect to 1252(a)(5), that is with respect, once again, to a review of an order of removal, which we are not requesting that this Court do. So we just argue that this Court does have subject matter jurisdiction, and that the stay of removal is not injunctive relief in any way, shape, or form.

Moreover, we'd like to discuss the fact that there is irreparable harm with respect to access to counsel at Krome. We have noted Ms. Das's declaration at ECF 19-1, as well as Ms. Chung's declaration at 19-3, which discussed the fact that there have been no -- there is minimal access to confidential calls. Ms. Das has noted that she's only had one ten-minute call with Mr. Ragbir that has been unrecorded, upon information and belief, and there is no videoconferencing available. All

of that is evidenced in the declarations and the exhibits. So we'd just like to note that as rebuttal evidence to the government's submission which does not address any of those concerns.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let me ask Mr. Waterman — let me put it differently. Will the government just agree on its own to fly Mr. Ragbir out here, since you are already under a court order from New Jersey that he be here for the next 14 days? Is there anything to prevent the government from just returning him to the New York area without an order from the Court that they be required to do so?

MR. WATERMAN: Your Honor, I believe the answer is no. ICE has stated that they will keep him in Florida at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. You know how one of the ways that courts frequently try to resolve emergency motions is to see whether or not the parties can put themselves in a position where voluntarily they maintain the status quo until the merits of something substantively can be worked out. And that's something which then prevents the Court from having to issue orders which are, of course, immediately appealable; not in all respects, but I think in this instance I think it would be an immediately appealable order one way or the other.

Do you both agree? Ms. Das?

MS. DAS: Your Honor, it's something that we are

looking into in both respects, since this Court already did issue the order.

THE COURT: I think it's in the nature -- I do think it's in the nature of a mandatory injunction. I think that therefore it's immediately appealable as injunctive relief.

Mandatory injunctions are immediately appealable. I think it is on either side, so I think the Second Circuit is likely to hear this from either side, but that could be obviated obviously in terms of the immediate issue if he was returned to New York pending the determination of the underlying petition.

But you think, Mr. Waterman, it's a no-go?

MR. WATERMAN: Your Honor, we can have that conversation with the client again, but as of right now it's a no.

THE COURT: I understand the position that it's been done; that he's down at Krome right now; and that there may be a principled position as to why ICE doesn't want to bring him back. But given the amount of resources that ICE is spending on the back-and-forth, I think it would be at least a useful conversation to have.

If ICE is very quickly able to say no, so be it; if they are able to see their way to bringing him up here so that at least we don't have to go through that procedural wrangle, that would be, I think, quite helpful; and it would be something that would then result in a savings of judicial

resources because one of you, I think, is going to appeal. So this is just going to go on. It may be that ICE is then not using the resources in that manner.

MR. WATERMAN: I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

So let's do this: You'll need to let me know lickety-split, because I'll decide this lickety-split. I was hoping to decide this from the bench today. I won't. Because I do want to re-review and read some of the cases that have been cited. While I had been threading my way through what is a complicated statutory scheme, I think that based upon my remarks and based upon the colloquy from you folks today, your argument, I think that I still need to go back now with what you've said in mind, re-review things. I can do that very quickly. I'm going to expect to get you a decision in the next day or so. So let me do that.

But what I would ask, Mr. Waterman, is if you could let me know as soon as possible — tonight, if possible, tomorrow by midday, if possible — whether ICE would be willing to reconsider its position, that would be most helpful. Not its position on the merits; I'm not asking that. I'm just asking whether or not they would put him on an airplane.

MR. WATERMAN: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: If it's a money issue, I think that that would be useful to know. What I would not want to have is for

the price of a plane ticket from Miami to New York, to have the expenditure of judicial resources in the manner in which we're expending them. But if it's something else, then so be it.

MR. WATERMAN: Understood.

Your Honor, if I may make two more quick points.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WATERMAN: One, petitioner's counsel has stated that the government doesn't know why the petitioner was detained. We know why he was he detained. He was detained to effect removal; detained pursuant to his valid removal order and to remove him. What we don't know is why they chose to do it now. So I think those are two very different things.

ICE certainly acted well within its authority to pick up the petitioner and execute a valid, enforceable removal order. That's why he is currently detained in Krome. While a stay is in place, he is removable and ICE was seeking to execute that removal order.

THE COURT: All right.

I'm not going to repeat myself, but I think that the petitioner has the better argument of a reasonable liberty interest in the period of time at least between January 11th and January 19th, 2018, which is when he had that — his stay of removal was in place. I think that as between the argument that he could be put into detention in order to execute on an order of removal, I think that ICE would have had a different

argument as of January 19th than it had as of January 11th. It really, for reasons best known to itself — it sounds like nobody in this room, at least nobody here at counsel table or the Court, knows why January 11th was picked. But it was, to say the least, sort of a strange choice, given the expiration of that stay letter. Makes your life harder, Mr. Waterman.

MR. WATERMAN: It does, your Honor.

If I may make one more quick point.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WATERMAN: I would just point your Honor to a case decided by Judge Karas in this district with respect to the access to counsel claim that petitioner is raising. The case name is McIntosh, that's M-C-I-N-T-O-S-H, versus The United States. The citation is -- it's a Westlaw citation. 2016 Westlaw 1274585, decided March 31st, 2016. I believe the access to counsel claim discussion starts around page 22 of that decision. I would just point your Honor to that case.

THE COURT: All right. So I think that, as I've said, I'll take this under advisement. I'll get you a decision very quickly. Mr. Waterman, I'd appreciate it if you folks could get back to me on whether there is any room to reduce the expenditure resources that will inevitably follow as well. And then I just would ask the court reporter if she could prepare a transcript for me.

We're all set. Thanks. (Adjourned)