IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND NORTHERN DIVISION	
COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC,)
Plaintiff, vs.))
0.12 ACRES OF LAND, More or Less, in Washington County, Maryland, State of Maryland, Department of Natural Resources,	CIVIL NO.:) 1:19-cv-01444-GLR)))
Defendants.))
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GEORGE LEVI	RUSSELL, III
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GEORGE LEVI	RUSSELL, III
For the Plaintiff:	
David M. Fedder, Esquire Arnold M. Weiner, Esquire	
For the Defendant:	
Adam D. Snyder, Esquire John B. Howard, Jr., Esquire	
Proceedings recorded by mechatranscript produced by computer.	nical stenography,
Patricia G. Mitche Federal Official Co 101 W. Lombard Stre	urt Reporter

PROCEEDINGS

(2:51 p.m.)

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THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. You can go ahead and have a seat. Madam Deputy, do you want to call the case for me.

THE CLERK: Yes, Your Honor. The matter now before this Court is Civil Docket Number GLR-19-1444, Columbia Gas Transmission versus .12 Acres of Land. Counsel for the Plaintiff is Arnold Weiner and David Fedder. Counsel for the Defendant is Adam Snyder and John Howard, Jr.

This matter comes before the Court for a continued preliminary injunction hearing.

THE COURT: I want to thank everyone for coming to this hearing. As indicated at the previous hearing, this Court received argument, received additional authority from the parties, considered other additional arguments as well in this matter and indicated to the parties that it intended on issuing an oral opinion for the purposes of the preliminary injunctive relief that is being sought by Columbia Gas through its motion for an order of condemnation in this case.

At the outset, I will state prior to reviewing the basis of the opinion that although the Natural Gas Act certainly does grant Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC the power of eminent domain to condemn land, the Court finds for reasons that will be stated later that the Natural Gas Act does not

abrogate state sovereign immunity or delegate the United States' state sovereign exemption to permit Columbia to sue the State of Maryland for an order of condemnation without Maryland's consent. Thus, Columbia has not established three -- which will be outlined in detail below -- three of the four mandatory requirements for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief, most notably, a likelihood of success on the merits simply because the Eleventh Amendment precludes the State from being sued by Columbia as a private party, given this Court's opinion of the current case law.

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By way of background, this action arises from a condemnation dispute over a tract of land owned by the defendant, the State of Maryland Department of Natural Resources, in the path of a natural gas pipeline project planned by Columbia. Columbia is indeed a natural gas company within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act, and as the owner and operator of one of the largest underground natural gas storage and transmission systems in North America, Columbia transports approximately 3 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day.

On July 19, 2019, the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission granted Columbia a certificate of public

convenience and necessity certificate pursuant to Section 7 of

the Natural Gas Act. The certificate itself approves the

construction and operation of approximately 3.37 miles of

8-inch diameter natural gas pipeline, extending from existing 20-inch and 24-inch pipelines in Fulton County, Pennsylvania to a site in Morgan County, West Virginia. Between Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the pipeline will cross Washington County, Maryland and travel under the Potomac River.

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The project route includes .12 acres of land owned by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources for which Columbia needs a right-of-way easement and other necessary property interests. The easement will allow a portion of approximately 4,200 or 4,300 horizontal -- will allow a portion of an approximately 4,300-foot horizontal directional drill to pass between -- beneath the tract and at approximately 175 feet below the surface and beneath the Potomac River at a depth of approximately 114 feet. The tract is an integral part of the project route approved by the certificate as necessary for construction, maintenance, operation, alteration, testing, replacement and repair of the project.

Columbia agreed to pay the Maryland Department of Natural Resources \$5,000, an amount more than the easement's appraised value, to drill through the tract. However, the State Board of Public Works rejected the Maryland Department of Natural Resources' agreement with Columbia, denying conveyance of the easement, and subsequent negotiations

between Columbia and the State failed.

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As a result, Columbia has not commenced the project. Columbia has a contractually committed service deadline of November 1, 2020, and Columbia's certificate expires on July 19, 2020. Columbia therefore undertook to condemn the easement by authority of the certificate and pursuant to Section 717f(h) of the Natural Gas Act.

Out of the 22 tracts that the project route impacts, Columbia has negotiated voluntary acquisition of easements through 18 privately-owned tracts. In addition to the tract, Columbia has yet to secure easements through three other tracts owned by the National Park Service.

On May 16, 2019, Columbia sued Maryland Department of Natural Resources, filing its Complaint in Condemnation and a Motion for an Order of Condemnation and for Preliminary Injunction and a Memorandum in Support. Columbia seeks an order of condemnation for the easement, the ascertainment and award of just compensation, and damages properly attributable to Columbia's acquisition of the easement, and finally an order granting Columbia immediate access to and use of the easement pursuant to that order of condemnation.

On June 17, 2019, Maryland Department of Natural Resources filed its opposition, and on June 8, 2019, Columbia filed its reply.

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy

involving the exercise of far-reaching power which is to be applied only in limited circumstances which clearly demand it. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to protect the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of the lawsuit, ultimately to preserve the Court's ability to render meaningful judgment on the merits. An application of the following factors is used to determine whether a preliminary injunction is warranted: The likelihood of success on the merits, whether the movement will face irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, whether the balance of the equities favors preliminary relief, and whether an injunction is in the public interest.

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In this case Columbia must meet all four of these requirements to prevail on the motion for preliminary injunction. When the balancing the hardships does not tilt decidedly in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff must demonstrate a strong showing of likelihood of success or a substantial likelihood of success by clear and convincing evidence to obtain relief. The Court will analyze, in turn, each of the four Winter factors in this case that Columbia must establish.

Now before the district court can exercise its equitable power in granting a preliminary injunction and a condemnation action by a natural gas company, the Court must first determine whether the company has a substantive right to

condemn the property under the Natural Gas Act. Here there appears to be no dispute that a substantive right exists.

Indeed, first it is a matter of public record that Columbia holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the federal government that actually approves the project. The certificate is valid and does not expire until July 19, 2020.

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Second, the easement Columbia is seeking is necessary to the project. The easement is part of a FERC-approved project route and specifically necessary for the operation of the project that will pass beneath the tract.

Third, Columbia has been unable to acquire the easement by agreement as shown by the offer for \$5,000 for the easement which was denied by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources. A formal denial of that conveyance was made by the board. And finally, the unsuccessful negotiations with the Board or Maryland Department of Natural Resources after the denial of the conveyance. Therefore, Columbia certainly has a substantive right, but that doesn't end the analysis here.

Maryland Department of Natural Resources argues that sovereign immunity, that bars Columbia's suit notwithstanding Columbia's alleged substantive right. This is a jurisdictional issue for this Court which can be raised sua sponte and indeed can be raised, should be raised by the Court

sua sponte when such an issue arises. Neither the United States Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, nor this Court has confronted an issue like this. Upon consideration of the statute and the case law in this case, the natural gas companies do not appear to have the authority under the Natural Gas Act or the Constitution to overcome the state sovereign immunity. As a result, Columbia cannot and is not likely to succeed on the merits of the condemnation action.

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Columbia does not have a likelihood of success on the merits because the Maryland Department of Natural Resources' Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits against states in federal court. A state's immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the state enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution and which they retain today.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or in equity, commenced or prosecuted, against one of the United

States by the citizens of another state. Notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment explicit mention of only citizens of another state, the Supreme Court of the United States has construed the Eleventh Amendment as also protecting states from federal court suits brought by its own citizens. Thus,

the Eleventh Amendment bars actions by any private citizen against the state.

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Additionally, state's immunity extends to agents in state instrumentalities. Although the state retains immunity from suit, this constitutional bar is not absolute and is subject to three exceptions. First, Congress may abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so in acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.

Second, the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law.

Third, the state remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.

In its opposition, the Maryland Department of
Natural Resources argues that the first exception does not
apply because Congress has not abrogated the state's immunity
from such suit; second exception doesn't apply because this
suit is not an action against state officials for alleged
violations of law; and the third exception doesn't apply
because the state has not consented to such suit.

Columbia argues that Congress delegated the power of eminent domain to natural gas companies, including the federal government exemption from state sovereign immunity. The Court finds the Maryland Department of Natural Resources' argument

more persuasive.

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Out of due concern for the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential component of our constitutional structure, the Court indicated the Supreme Court has prescribed a stringent two-part test for determining whether Congress has abrogated the state's sovereign immunity, whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity, and whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power, citing the Seminal Tribe of Florida case. Thus,

Congress must make its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. To determine whether or not Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of its power, the Court must answer this question: Was the act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate?

This Court determines that the only constitutional provision that grants Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity is the Enforcement Clause of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No longer does the Supremacy Clause, nor the enumerated powers of Congress, confer authority to abrogate the state's immunity from suit in federal court.

The Fourth Circuit did have occasion to apply the Seminal Tribe case last year. In Allen v. Cooper, the plaintiffs argue Congress clearly intended to abrogate the

North Carolina's Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting a Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and did so through Article I Patent and Copyright Clause power.

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Focusing on the second prong of the Seminal Tribe test, the Fourth Circuit held the CRCA did not abrogate North Carolina's sovereign immunity because Congress's ability to enact legislation through its Article I powers has been foreclosed by Seminal Tribe and its progeny which makes clear that Congress cannot rely upon its Article I powers to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court has held that Congress must make it clear it is relying upon the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of its authority within the statute at issue and the statute's legislative history. Neither the circa provision at issue nor the legislative history relied on in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the statutory source of authority, rather the legislative history made it readily apparent that it was being enacted pursuant to the Copyright Clause in Article I of the Constitution.

Columbia argues that the Maryland Department of
Natural Resources asserting sovereign immunity to prevent the
project is a de facto violation of the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. However, neither the Supremacy
Clause nor the enumerated powers may authorize abrogation of
the state's sovereign immunity. Congress enacted the Natural

Gas Act pursuant to the Commerce Clause which is an Article I enumerated power.

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The provisions of the Natural Gas Act that grant natural gas companies the power of eminent domain does not state that the companies are being granted its authority pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Congress did not make its intent unmistakably clear in the statute. Nevertheless, even if 717 stated that the states were not immune from suit, the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have concluded that that language is not enough because the act in question was not passed pursuant to the sole constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate, namely Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress did not, therefore, unequivocally express its intent to abrogate.

As to delegation, this Court finds and determines for this preliminary injunctive relief that Congress did not delegate the federal government's exemption to state sovereign immunity. Since the ratification of the Constitution, the states' sovereign immunity has been preserved, and the states only consented to suits brought by other states or by the federal government, and to some suits pursuant to subsequent constitutional amendments. The states, however, remained immune to suits brought by private parties and did not consent to suit by anyone whom the United States might select. This

is language directly from Blatchford v. Native Village.

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Thus, as stated in the most recent case of Sabine Pipe Line, LLC, a private party does not become a sovereign such that it enjoys all rights held by the United States by virtue of Congress's delegation of eminent domain power.

In Blatchford, Alaska native villages brought suit against a state official for money allegedly owed to them under a state revenue-sharing statute. To avoid the difficulty of arguing abrogation, the native villages argued instead that the provision at issue delegated the federal government's sovereign immunity exemption to the natives themselves. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, expressing doubt that the sovereign exemption can be delegated, even if one limits the delegation to persons on whose behalf the United States itself might sue. The Court went on further to say that even assuming the delegation of an exemption from state sovereign immunity was theoretically possible, there was no reason to believe that Congress ever contemplated such a strange notion.

More recently, as indicated, the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas considered these questions in an almost identical case. Sabine, a natural gas company, sought to renew a right-of-way agreement that it had with a previous landowner over three tracts of land. The landowner over one tract of land was the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department

which did not agree to give Sabine the right-of-way. Sabine had a valid certificate of public convenience and necessity that had been issued by the commission, issued in 1964 -- I'm sorry, issued in 1964 and sought to exercise eminent domain under the Natural Gas Act to condemn state land, arguing that it was, in fact, a delegee of the federal government.

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The district court held that Sabine was conflating two separate rights held by the federal government: the right to exercise eminent domain and the right to sue states in federal court. The Court explained that the federal government may exercise eminent domain over state land, not due to the supreme sovereign's right to condemn state land but because the federal government enjoys a special exemption from the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the suit was barred by the Texas sovereign immunity.

Conversely, as pointed out by Columbia, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held last year that a suit for condemnation of state land was not barred by New Jersey's sovereign immunity because the natural gas company stood in the shoes of the sovereign as a result of being vested with the federal government's eminent domain powers. This particular case does not address Seminal Tribe, Alden, Blatchford or Sabine, instead simply noting that the Natural Gas Act expressly granted natural gas companies the right of eminent domain. The Court concludes that there are

two separate and distinct rights, only one of which eminent domain the federal government can delegate.

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In Chao the Fourth Circuit discussed a constitutional alternative to a private party, seeking to sue the state and show there were private parties collectively sued the Virginia Department of Transportation under the Fair Labor Standards Act for alleged nonpayment of certain work. The suit was dismissed twice. Because of the dismissal, the Secretary of Labor intervened. The Virginia Department of Transportation raised its sovereign immunity defense, arguing that the suit was essentially a private suit.

The Fourth Circuit held that Virginia's sovereign immunity was not a bar to the federal government suit because the federal government exercised its political responsibility for the suit, which is within the federal government's exemption from sovereign immunity. The Court compared the importance of a case where the federal government decides to take action against a state on behalf of employees, which the state consented to when ratifying the Constitution, with one in which the individuals take action against the state to which the state did not consent.

Fourth Circuit also noted the Supreme Court's doubts in *Blatchford* as to whether or not the federal court exemption from state sovereign immunity can be delegated to private individuals.

Certainly Columbia reminds the Court that Sabine is 1 2 not binding, but Sabine is persuasive especially in light of the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Chao which is binding. Ιf 3 the federal government deems it important to condemn the Maryland Department of Natural Resources' land, it is within 5 the federal government's right to bring such an action. 6 Indeed, based upon the arguments, it appears no dispute with the federal government's power to do such. However, a private 8 party like Columbia Gas does not hold the same political 9 responsibilities or any political responsibilities of the 10 federal government. As the federal government would do the 11 same. Because the Maryland Department of Natural Resources 12 did not consent to the condemnation by private parties under 13 the Natural Gas Act and because Columbia is not constrained by 14 any political responsibility like the federal government would 15 16 be, the present suit is barred by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources for the purposes of this preliminary 17 injunctive relief. In essence, the Columbia Gas is not likely 18 to succeed on the merits of the case. 19 As far as the irreparable harm is concerned, there's 20

As far as the irreparable harm is concerned, there's no question, and I don't believe there's any dispute, that there has been significant losses or will be significant losses if the injunctive relief is not granted in this matter. Indeed there are significant contractually committed services that are issued, there are easements and other forecasted harm

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which Columbia ends up making, and indeed much of that is not disputed. Some of this is tempered by the fact that Columbia has still not obtained the rights to the National Park Service tracts, but nevertheless, especially if you put that aside, there is a likelihood of irreparable harm had an injunction not been granted.

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The balancing of the equities here really tips the scales here. Columbia argues that the balance of the equity is in its favor because, of course, in condemnation cases, the -- typically balancing the equity favors the natural gas company. However, in this particular instance, the Maryland Department of Natural Resources counters that the harm to the state's sovereign immunity outweighs any business disruption or cost to Columbia in this case.

Considering these arguments, losing the Eleventh

Amendment immunity from suit to which it did not consent would

diminish Maryland's sovereignty. This is a significant equity

concern, and as a result, the Court concludes that the balance

of hardships does not weigh decidedly in Columbia's favor, and

as a result, Columbia must make a strong showing of a

substantial likelihood of success which I have already

indicated that they have not done.

Certainly as far as the public interest is concerned, there is a public interest in having this project. However, there's also a public interest in protection of the

state's sovereignty, especially before a final determination on the merits in this action. And as a result, for these aforementioned reasons and for the reasons I previously stated, I'm going to deny the motion for preliminary injunctive relief.

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Now Mr. Fedder, Mr. Weiner, at the outset here, I've already made a determination that I do not believe -- I think Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. So in concluding that, the issue I have before you is that Columbia Gas, I am prepared at this point in time to dismiss this case on jurisdictional grounds to afford Columbia the ability to be able to take an expedited appeal up to the Fourth Circuit, given the time constraints that we're under here. That way the Fourth Circuit can tell me -- tell Judge Russell whether or not he's got it right or whether or not he got it wrong because this is not particularly clear in this circumstance.

So I take it, Mr. Fedder, given the Court's ruling and strong ruling regarding the likelihood of success on the merits in this case, I'm prepared right now for the reasons that I previously stated to dismiss your case based upon jurisdictional grounds on Eleventh Amendment action and based upon the briefing and argument in this case and allow you the opportunity to file, note an immediate appeal to the Fourth Circuit on an expedited basis, given what I've already said about the potential irreparable harm that would be suffered.

MR. FEDDER: Thank you, Your Honor. Given where you are as a legal conclusion on the Eleventh Amendment, its applicability to the facts as stated on the record, I don't think there's any alternative but for the Court to dismiss on that basis. And then as you said, we'll note an appeal.

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THE COURT: Absolutely. Of course, the Secretary of the Interior could just file a lawsuit, and we wouldn't be here. But I understand that would be an interesting precedent. So we'll have the Fourth Circuit take a look at what I've determined and written.

So based upon this, I'm going to go ahead and deny the preliminary injunction relief for the reasons that I stated on the record in finding that Columbia Gas cannot succeed on the merits of this case for the reasons that I stated and the reasons in the brief. I'm going to go ahead and dismiss this case sua sponte on a jurisdictional ground.

I'm going to deny the State's motion as moot at this point in time because I exercised my individual authority.

Counsel, is there anything else that needs to be placed on the record before we conclude?

MR. FEDDER: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I hope you have a safe journey back.

Thank you very much for your argument. Welcome to Baltimore.

I want to thank the State as well for the arguments. It was an extraordinarily well-argued case, and I really enjoyed the

1	briefings and the challenge. Thank you.
2	MR. FEDDER: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	MR. SNYDER: Thank you.
4	THE CLERK: All rise. This Honorable Court now
5	stands adjourned.
6	(Proceedings concluded at 3:22 p.m.)
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8	I, Patricia G. Mitchell, RMR, CRR, do hereby certify
9	that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the stenographic record of proceedings in the above-entitled
10	matter.
11	Dated this 23rd day of August 2019.
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13	Patricia D Mitchell
14	Patricia G. Mitchell
15	Official Court Reporter
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