

Out-of-District Contributors and Representation in the US House*

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Abstract

United States House members have become increasingly reliant on out-of-district individuals for fundraising. Yet we have little evidence on how such donations might affect representatives' policy decisions. Given the high partisanship known to dominate House roll calls, do the preferences of individual donors influence policymaking at all? And are members who rely on out-of-district contributions more responsive to the preferences of the national donor base? This paper examines these and related questions, producing three main findings. First, even accounting for well-established partisanship in House voting, representatives are responsive to the policy preferences of the national donor base. Second, this donor responsiveness is positively associated with electoral safety, including when redistricting exogenously induces the safety. Third, the higher a member's reliance on out-of-district donations, the greater is their responsiveness to the preferences of the national donor base. Together, these findings suggest that current fundraising dynamics skew representation in significant ways.

Introduction

Fundraising is a central part of United States (US) House members' daily routine. As former Representative David Jolly (R-FL13) describes, upon joining the 113th Congress a party leader instructed him, "your first responsibility is to hit \$18,000 a day" (O'Donnell 2016). Likewise, former Representative Tom Perriello (D-VA5) assesses members spend at least half their time calling prospective donors and attending fundraising events (Langhorne 2018). Notably, this activity involves contributions to the party in addition to members' own campaigns. As Perriello notes, "If you're in a safe district, you're busy raising that money to give to the party" (Langhorne 2018).

In fact, the parties regularly distribute a "Members Dues Report" that delineates each representative's expected dues and a fundraising target for the party campaign committee. These amounts vary based on a representative's internal status including committee assignments and any chairmanship or leadership position. For example, in the July 2020 Democratic report, Representative James Clyburn (D-SC6), the Majority Whip, had a fundraising target and dues totaling \$3,800,000. By comparison, Representative Nydia Valázquez (D-NY7), Chairman of the House Small Business Committee, owed \$600,000 combined while rank-and-file members owed \$275,000.¹ The reports,

¹ Supplemental Appendix Table S1 shows the full report, which we obtained from a congressional staffer.

which are distributed to all members, include details on the extent to which each has met the assigned goals.

Individuals are a major source of funds, notwithstanding the importance of political action committees (PACs) that represent organized interests. For instance, Reynolds and Hall (2019) determine that in 2016 the typical incumbent raised approximately the same percentage from individuals (49%) and PACs (50%), while general election challengers raised more than three times the amount from individuals than PACs. These figures represent a shift from several decades ago; FEC data reveal that in 1990 the median House incumbent raised 38% of their receipts from individual donors. More generally, Barber and McCarty (2016, 58) graph the fundraising portfolio of the average congressional candidate to demonstrate that the relative importance of individual donors to PACs has grown steadily since 1980.²

Moreover, for the typical House member, the majority of individual contributions are from outside the district (e.g., Grenzke 1988; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008). Indeed, the rise of out-of-district donors is striking. As a percentage of individual donations, the median House incumbent raised 42% from out-of-district contributors in 1990, 64% in 2000, and 72% in

² These estimates differ from Jacobson and Carson (2016, 82) due to differences in the quantity of interest. They report the percentage of funds for the sum of all general election candidates rather than the average fundraising portfolio.

2010.³ Contributing to this phenomenon, candidates swap contact information on past contributors and rent access to their donor list to candidates for other offices (Pathé 2019). Likewise, the party provides members lists of donors who have given to it and other candidates (O'Donnell 2016). Ultimately, neighborhoods that make up less than 15% of the population account for the vast majority of individual contributions (e.g., Bramlett, Gimpel, and Lee 2011).

Despite this increased importance of individual donors and particularly out-of-district ones, little scholarly attention has been given to analyzing the policy effects. A few existing studies use one-dimensional ideology scores to examine how members', donors', and voters' ideology are associated (e.g., Bafumi and Herron 2010; Barber 2016b), but research suggests the scores measure citizens' consistency across issues rather than ideological distance (Broockman 2016). Moreover, these and other studies focus on a member's existing contributors, thereby creating inference issues in disentangling responsiveness to donors from donors' funding of allies. There is some evidence on the Senate (Canes-Wrone and Gibson 2019a, 2019b), but this work does not analyze out-of-district contributors; furthermore, important chamber-level differences suggest effects may be less likely in the House. While as mentioned earlier, the average House incumbent receives roughly equal funding from individual donors and PACs, the average Senate incumbent receives over two-thirds (68%) from individual donors (Reynolds and Hall 2019, 221). Parties also

³ These figures are from Crespín and Edwards (2016).

exercise significantly more influence over legislative behavior in the House (e.g., Smith, Ostrander, and Pope 2013; Volden and Wiseman 2018).

In sum, we lack evidence on numerous questions regarding the influence of individual donors on House members' legislative behavior. Are members responsive to the preferences of the national donor base? If so, does responsiveness vary according to a member's reliance on out-of-district contributions? And what is the role of electoral safety in determining any such responsiveness?

This paper conducts a series of tests to address these questions. With public opinion data over a set of roll calls from the 109th to 114th Congresses, we analyze whether members are responsive to the preferences of the national donor class, and if so, how responsiveness depends on out-of-district donations and electoral safety. The analysis leverages the change in district safety induced by redistricting to obtain a causal estimate of how it affects responsiveness to donor opinion. Additionally, we account for the potential endogeneity of out-of-district donations in multiple ways, including with two-stage least squares estimation.

Three main findings emerge. First, House members' voting is significantly associated with the preferences of their national donor base, even after accounting for district opinion, the member's party, the primary electorate, and other factors. Second, responsiveness to national donor opinion is higher the safer is the district, including when safety changes exogenously due to redistricting. Third, the higher the proportion of out-of-district donations a

member has received in recent years, the more responsive they are to the preferences of the national donor class. Accordingly, out-of-district contributions reduce geographic representation, shifting members' incentives away from the district towards the national pool of donors. Because donors as a group are skewed towards wealthy, older, male, and white individuals (e.g., Francia et al. 2003; Aldrich, Freeze, and Montgomery 2008; Aldrich et al. 2013), these findings have large implications for representation.

The paper begins by reviewing the existing literature and proceeds with a theoretical motivation. The latter section develops testable hypotheses and in doing so, incorporates information from interviews with congressional and campaign staffers about House fundraising operations. Subsequent sections describe the data, measures, methods, and results. Finally, the conclusion discusses the broader implications of the findings, including with respect to polarization and representation.

Literature review

The topic of money and political influence has various literature strands, ranging from campaign finance law to lobbying to PACs, among others. We focus on the strands closest to this study, specifically empirical analyses of individual donors and/or the relationship between campaign donations and roll call voting.

Most studies of whether campaign donations affect congressional roll call voting examine PACs that represent organized interests. While research suggests PAC donations influence the writing of legislation (e.g., Powell 2013)

and regulatory oversight (e.g., Gordon and Hafer 2005), on legislative voting the evidence is mixed. There exist high quality studies that uncover an effect of corporate PACs on particular votes (e.g., Stratmann 2002; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2010). However, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003, 114) review dozens of political science and economics analyses and conclude, “Overall, PAC contributions show relatively few effects on voting behavior.” Yet even emphasizing evidence in favor of PAC influence, there are reasons to question whether it should extend to individual donors. Prior work suggests interest groups seek lobbying access (e.g., Hall and Wayman 1990; Fournaies and Hall 2014). Correspondingly, corporate PACs tend to be bipartisan in giving, favoring incumbents (e.g., Fournaies and Hall 2014). By contrast, individuals commonly give to candidates of one party, consistent with access not being the main motivation (Barber 2016a; Hill and Huber 2017).

More generally, a growing literature highlights policy and ideology as individual contributors’ primary incentives. This finding emerges from survey responses (e.g., Francia et al. 2003; Magleby, Goodliffe, and Olsen 2018) and revealed donation decisions (e.g., Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower 2017). Especially for out-of-district individual donors, but even within-district ones, a candidate’s positions have a significant effect on donation decisions (e.g., Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower 2017; Baker 2020). Although social and

material goals are not entirely absent,⁴ ideological and policy motivations are dominant (e.g., Barber 2016a; Baker 2020).

Notably, this evidence on motivations does not imply that individual contributors necessarily influence House roll call behavior. An alternative possibility is that contributors give to ideological allies to help secure their reelection. The literature has long identified this inference issue for PACs (e.g., Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987). For individual donors, the same inference challenge arises.

A small but growing literature attempts to go beyond donor motivations and consider whether congressional members' legislative votes are responsive to donors' preferences. Table 1 summarizes scholarship related to this aim.

Table 1. Individual donors' influence on roll call voting?

Study	Policy issues?	Natl donor opinion?	House members?	Out-of-district donations?	Leverages redistricting?
Bafumi and Herron (2010)	No, ideology scores	No	Yes	No	No
Barber (2016b)	No, ideology scores	No	No	No	No
Baker (2016)	No, ideology scores	No	Yes	Yes, but does not account for endogeneity of donations	No
Canes-Wrone and Gibson (2019a, 2019b)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Fellowes and Wolf (2014)	Yes, business policy	No	Yes	No	No

⁴ See, e.g., Francia et al. (2003). Also, Crespin and Edwards (2016) show that redistricting causes members to lose contributors from their former district.

The first two studies estimate one-dimensional ideal points of legislators, donors, and voters, and consider the similarity among them. Bafumi and Herron (2010) examines House members, and finds their donors are more ideologically extreme than their voters are. Likewise, Barber (2016b) shows Senators' contributors are more ideologically extreme than the Senators are. Broockman (2016) critiques such interpretations of ideal points and ideology scores more broadly, arguing that for citizens these scores measure consistency of preferences across policies rather than ideological extremity. In addition to this important critique, Bafumi and Herron (2010) and Barber (2016b) do not purport to disentangle whether donors influence legislators or instead simply support ones whose positions are already similar. Correspondingly, these studies focus on candidate-specific donors.⁵ We examine national donor opinion to reduce the inference issues associated with candidate-specific contributors as well as because legislators should be sensitive to potential new donors' preferences.

As the third row describes, Baker (2016) also uses ideology scores, although importantly, this work analyzes out-of-district donors. In particular, Baker (2016) finds that the greater the percentage of a representative's out-of-district contributions, the lower the alignment between their NOMINATE ideal

⁵ Barber's (2016b) survey is 2/3 itemized donors (i.e., \$200 or more) to 2012 reelection-seeking Senators, and the remaining portion consists of itemized donors from each such Senator's state and party.

point and district ideology as measured by ideology scores based on survey responses. Even temporarily putting aside the ideology score critique, however, Baker leaves open the possibility that contributors respond to a member's ideology rather than influence it; the analysis examines out-of-district donations and roll calls from the same session without accounting for the potential endogeneity of the donations. This paper addresses the potential endogeneity in multiple ways.

Moving further down the table, Canes-Wrone and Gibson's (2019a, 2019b) Senate analyses do examine national donor opinion on individual policy issues, yet several key distinctions remain. First, these studies do not consider the impact of out-of-district donations. Second, they cannot leverage redistricting to obtain a causal effect of electoral safety. Third, differences between the chambers suggest Senators may be more likely to cater to individual donors' preferences. Parties are considerably stronger in the House (e.g., Smith, Ostrander, and Pope 2013; Volden and Wiseman 2018). Moreover, incumbent Senators receive a substantially higher proportion of campaign funds from individual donors than House members do (e.g. Reynolds and Hall 2019).

The final row of Table 1 identifies a study that focuses on the House and does not rely on ideology scores. Fellowes and Wolf (2004) show that in the 105th Congress, contributions from business professionals are associated with representatives' support for business legislation that does not involve expenditures. This research does not examine the policy preferences of the

national donor base, however, or any public opinion data. Nor does it consider the role of out-of-district contributions or electoral safety.

In sum, numerous questions remain regarding the relationship between House members' roll call behavior and individual donors. Whether members are responsive to the preferences of the national donor base, how out-of-district donations affect any such responsiveness, and the impact of electoral safety all remain open questions.

Theoretical motivation

The anecdotal evidence in the introduction highlights the significance of fundraising to the daily routine of House members, not only to secure reelection but also to advance within the legislature. Prior research supports this contention that fundraising has become a major determinant of House organization (e.g., Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson 2006; Currinder 2009). Gone are the days of the “textbook” Congress where seniority dictated chairmanships (e.g., Deering and Smith 1997). Instead, committee and other leadership roles come with fundraising targets that vary according to the influence of the position (e.g., Heberlig and Larson 2012; Bernhard and Sulkin 2018; Powell forthcoming). Additionally, fundraising is associated with a member's ability to bring their bills to the floor (Currinder 2009; Pearson 2015). The literature refers to this new paradigm of legislative organization as the party exchange perspective (e.g., Cann 2008).

To complement this evidence and delve into details of the fundraising landscape as a background to the hypotheses, we conducted 6 semi-structured

one-on-one interviews with congressional and campaign staff in September-October 2020. The interviewees were high-level staff with decision-making authority; those on the Hill were at least a legislative director and the campaign staff were at least a political director. They were evenly balanced between Republicans and Democrats, and all had positions currently or during the data timespan (2006-2016). Because we covered the sensitive topics of fundraising and internal party dynamics, the participants were given anonymity. Further details are provided in the supplemental appendix (section S2).

Every staffer confirmed that fundraising is a pervasive concern for House members. Of course, this concern derives in part from reelection motives, but interviewees also characterized fundraising as critical to advancement within the party and agenda-setting influence. Indeed, several deemed fundraising prowess to be co-equal with seniority as a criterion for committee assignments, let alone leadership positions. A Republican staffer flatly stated, “you can’t ascend unless you’ve shown loyalty through fundraising.”

Members in marginal seats are not expected to contribute as much to the party and colleagues, but all have assigned fundraising goals. These goals are formalized in the aforementioned system of explicit dues and fundraising targets. For example, the July 2020 Democratic Member Dues Report (Supplemental Appendix Table S1) shows the expected level of contributions for each member based on their congressional positions and committee assignments. Members who fail to meet these goals are less likely to receive or retain desirable positions. A staffer for a Democratic member with over a

decade in the House and a lackluster fundraising record surmised, “he doesn’t get penalized as much as not rewarded. Well, I guess that’s the same thing.” Similarly, when asked if party fundraising could be avoided a Republican staffer responded that it could be if “you’re satisfied with being on the Veteran Affairs committee for the rest of your career.”

Under these pressures, even safe members seek funds and regularly cast wide fundraising nets. Interviewees remarked that going after donations from individuals outside the district and state is a given. In addition to using lists from the party, tactics for expanding donor bases include swapping contacts with House colleagues, Senate co-partisans, and co-partisans running for other offices. As a Democratic staffer summed up, “You always have to broaden it [the list]. Always.”

The staffers believe that out-of-district donors tend to be more ideological and attentive to politics. “They get the bigger picture. They tend to be generally informed, or political junkies,” said one Democratic staffer. In-district donors, by comparison, are more likely to focus on local issues and/or have a personal connection with the member. Even in-district donors, however, often have ideological goals. A Republican staffer noted that the rise of the internet has made in-person events less likely and encouraged small donations that tend to be ideologically motivated. Correspondingly, multiple staffers perceived an over-time shift in the importance of policy issues to contributors. In addition to the advent of internet fundraising, societal polarization and the rise of cable news

were cited as important changes that have contributed to ideologically motivated donations.

Hypotheses

The incentives for members suggested by these interviews and previous studies imply several testable hypotheses. First, given donors' ideological motivations and the need to raise funds from outside the district, we expect representatives to be responsive to the national pool of donors who are disposed to give to candidates in their party. This prediction can be summarized as:

National Donor Responsiveness Prediction. The greater is a position's popularity with the national donor base of a member's party, the more likely the member will be to support that position.

Accordingly, Republican representatives should be responsive to the preferences of the national base of Republican donors, and Democratic representatives to those of national Democratic donors.

Responsiveness should not necessarily be equal across legislators, however. Voting with donor opinion when it diverges from district opinion may have electoral consequences (e.g., Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Nyhan et al. 2012). Research establishes that out-of-step roll call decisions can decrease constituent support and vote share by up to five percentage points (Brady, Fiorina, and Wilkins 2011; Nyhan et al. 2012). Of course, for a member in a safe district, a loss of five percentage points would not sway the election. In marginal districts, however, such a swing could mean electoral defeat.

If representatives raised funds only for themselves, one might question whether those in safer seats would have incentives to focus on fundraising. Indeed, Baron (1994) formalizes this logic in a model where incumbents seek contributions to buy campaign advertising, and district safety decreases members' responsiveness to donor opinion.⁶ However, the party exchange perspective emphasizes members fundraise in part to give to fellow partisans, and our interviews corroborate this view.

Combined with the electoral cost of voting against the district, this incentive to raise for fellow partisans suggests the following prediction:

District Safety Prediction. As the electoral safety of a representative's district increases, the representative will become more responsive to the preferences of their party's national donor base.

In a district that favors an incumbent's party by large margins, the member can vote with national donor opinion even if doing so is unpopular with voters. However, an incumbent from a competitive district may lose reelection with the same behavior. Therefore, she will be less responsive to donor opinion and more responsive to constituents' preferences.

Finally, we consider implications of representatives' reliance on out-of-district contributions. Given that individual donors are ideologically motivated, a member's dependence on out-of-district contributions should increase

⁶ Other formal models of PACs include Denzau and Munger (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (2001).

responsiveness to the national pool of party contributors. If a representative's views were unaligned, the donors could simply direct their contributions to a more aligned set of candidates. The third prediction addresses this member-level variation:

Out-of-District Donations Prediction. A congressional member's responsiveness to the preferences of the national donor base will be higher the greater is the member's reliance on out-of-district individual contributors.

In other words, for members who raise more of their funds from within the district, responsiveness to the preferences of the national donor base should be lower than for those who are highly dependent on out-of-district contributions. Analysis of this prediction will accordingly shed light on the extent to which geographic representation is skewed by members' dependence on campaign funds from outside their voting constituency.

Data

Testing the theoretical predictions requires data on public opinion, fundraising, and House member characteristics. To estimate public opinion, we use the election year surveys of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) from 2006 through 2016 (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2017). The CCES is a national stratified sample survey consisting of between 36,500 respondents in 2006 and 64,600 respondents in 2016. This large size allows for the measurement of opinion among low-incidence populations such as campaign donors and House district constituencies. Each survey asks respondents their preferences on multiple congressional roll calls, and we include all items that

match a House vote. These roll calls cover a range of domestic and foreign policy matters such as abortion, trade, taxes, and NSA surveillance. Appendix Table A1 provides a complete list.

The basic specification tests for a systematic relationship between the roll call decision of House member j on vote i and the national donor opinion of the member's party, controlling for district opinion and other potential influences:

$$[1] \quad \Pr(\textit{Liberal Vote}_{ij} = 1) = f(\textit{National Donor Opinion}_{ij}, \textit{District Opinion}_{ij}, \textit{Additional controls}_{ij})$$

The dependent variable, *Liberal Vote*, is coded 1 when the member votes with the majority Democratic position and 0 otherwise. All roll call data are from *CQ Almanac*.⁷ Because retiring members have different incentives, the analysis excludes members who voluntarily retire from the House. Also, we do not include cases on which a member does not vote. Supplemental Appendix Table S14 provides descriptive statistics for all variables.

The public opinion factors are measured with the CCES data. Most centrally, *National Donor Opinion* is the proportion of respondents supporting the Democratic position among those who donated to political candidates,

⁷ We have also analyzed specifications in which the dependent variable is the likelihood a representative votes yea and the results are substantively similar. See Supplemental Appendix Table S3.

parties, or campaign committees in the past year and identified with the member's party.⁸ For CCES surveys conducted in 2008 and later the data enable measuring the opinions of individuals who contributed to House campaigns. As discussed earlier, our interviews and press accounts suggest candidates obtain contributor lists from not only House candidates but also their parties and other candidates. Therefore, we do not base the primary measure of national donor opinion on House donors only. However, as shown subsequently, the results are robust to measuring it with House contributors. We also considered whether the self-reported nature of donating behavior affects the findings, using the Hill and Huber (2017) validated CCES donor data for 2012. These results support those presented (see Supplemental Appendix Table S4), and correspondingly, self-reported and validated donor opinion are correlated at $\rho > 0.9$.

A key control is public opinion in the member's general electorate. *District Opinion* reflects this factor, equaling the proportion of respondents within each member's district who preferred a liberal roll call vote on the roll call. For all other district-level opinion measures we follow Bafumi and Herron (2010) and restrict the analysis to districts where the underlying sample size is at least 40 respondents.⁹ Conceivably, partisan geographic sorting (e.g., Cho,

⁸ Partisan leaners are included as self-identified partisans.

⁹ Even with this restriction, we have 9921 observations, 780 unique members, and 2349 member-congresses. We have also used a 100 respondent cutoff and,

Gimpel and Hui 2013) could result in district preferences highly correlated with those of the national donor bases of the parties. The correlation between these factors is only $\rho=0.5$, however. This reasonable degree of independence is less surprising when one considers that 5% of zip codes account for over two-thirds of itemized receipts (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011).

Furthermore, the divergence of national donor opinion from district opinion varies across members for a given roll call and across roll calls for a given member. To illustrate, for the 2011 Korea Free Trade Agreement, Representative John Carney (D-DE at large) faced 55% support for the liberal position among Democratic donors and 56% support from district constituents. Meanwhile, Representative Virginia Foxx (R-NC5) encountered just 35% support among Republican donors but 65% support in her district. On the other hand, on the 2016 Highway and Transportation Funding vote Foxx faced almost no divergence between national donor and district opinion (78% and 83%, respectively).

More broadly, for 31% of the observations, House members are cross-pressured such that national donor opinion and district opinion are on opposite sides of the 50% threshold. That is, donor opinion supports the Democratic position and district opinion the Republican one or vice-versa.

separately, estimates from Ahler and Broockman (2018), which are based on multilevel regression with poststratification. Supplemental Appendix Table S4 demonstrates these results are substantively similar.

Furthermore, as Table 2 describes, in these cases, representatives vote with national donor opinion more than 80% of the time. In other words, when the pressures of appealing to the district’s general electorate versus the national donor pool diverge, members resoundingly choose the latter.

Table 2. House member roll call votes when cross-pressured

	N	% Votes agree with donor opinion
Donor opinion versus district opinion	3115	81%
Donor opinion versus district opinion & district partisan opinion	600	66%

Table 2 also demonstrates that representatives are likely to side with donor opinion when it diverges from *both* district opinion and the preferences of partisans in the district. *District Partisan Opinion* equals the percentage of respondents in the member’s district who identify with the member’s party and prefer a liberal vote. When the representative’s national donor class favors voting in the opposite direction than both district opinion and district partisan opinion, the member votes with national donor opinion two-thirds of the time. Thus, at least with raw descriptive statistics, donor opinion has a larger pull than a representative’s general or primary election constituencies.

Moving beyond descriptive statistics, the main analysis contains several additional controls. Perhaps most critically, *Democrat* reflects the member’s party affiliation, equaling 1 for Democratic members and 0 for Republicans.¹⁰ The variable accounts for the high level of party line House voting (Pearson

¹⁰ Members are coded according to the party with which they caucused.

2015). If we instead substitute a member's DW-NOMINATE score (Lewis et al. 2019), which is correlated with party at $\rho > 0.9$, all key results hold (see Supplemental Appendix Table S5).

Recent scholarship suggests that public policy disproportionately reflects preferences of high-income Americans (e.g., Gilens 2012; but also see Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien 2017). To account for this potential influence, we include *Affluent Opinion*, which equals the percentage of respondents preferring the Democratic position among those in the top 10% of the income distribution who did not contribute to a campaign in the past year. Also included as standard controls are year indicators. These year dummies capture shifts in the legislative agenda that could make liberal votes more or less likely for all members.¹¹

To account for in-district donor opinion, two measures are employed. We first use the CCES responses of in-district donors for cases with a sufficient sample size. As an alternative measure, we use the mean Bonica (2016) CFscore of a representative's in-district donors. The CFscores that estimate each donor's ideology are available through 2014.¹²

¹¹ Supplemental Appendix Table S5 shows that national donor responsiveness does not significantly vary by party or majority party control.

¹² Supplemental Appendix Table S6 demonstrates the results also hold controlling for the member's own CFscore, national activists' preferences, and more informed citizens' preferences. Also in the supplemental appendix (Table

Finally, the District Safety and Out-of-District Donation hypotheses require additional variables. *District Safety* is measured with Cook Partisan Voter Index (PVI) scores, which are the deviation of a member's district from the national two-party presidential vote of the candidate associated with the member's party across the last two elections (e.g., Peskowitz 2018).¹³ *%Out-of-District Donations* equals the proportion of total itemized individual contributions the member received from donors outside the district in the prior election. Through 2010 these data are from Crespin and Edwards (2016), and we collected the data for later years from files of the Center for Responsive Politics (2019).

Methods and results

We begin by testing the National Donor Responsiveness Prediction. Recall that the dependent variable is the probability the member votes in a liberal direction. To account for the potential correlation of votes by member, we adopt a random effects logit model where the random intercepts for each member j are represented by v_j . Additionally, we present results from a model with member fixed effects where the fixed effects are represented by μ_j . The fixed

S7), we consider that members respond to national party preferences that are themselves affected by donor opinion. These findings further suggest representatives are directly responsive to national donor opinion.

¹³ Supplemental Appendix Table S8 shows the results are robust to measuring district safety with the recent presidential vote.

effects account for personal qualities that may be specific to an individual legislator, for instance legislative style (Bernhard and Sulkin 2018).¹⁴ In addition to these specifications, we also present ones with variables not available for the full dataset, including the aforementioned variables based on House donors, in-district partisans, and in-district donors.

Table 3 presents the findings. Notably, across all specifications, the National Donor Responsiveness Prediction receives strong support. National donor opinion is significantly associated with House members' legislative voting ($p < 0.05$). The more a representative's national donor base supports the liberal position, the more likely is the member to support that position.

In the main specification of Column [1], the marginal effect at the means of the independent variables suggests that as a member's national donor base moves in a liberal (conservative) direction on an issue by 10 percentage points, the likelihood the member casts a liberal (conservative) vote increases by 8 percentage points. The estimated impact is similar in Column [2], when confining the donor opinion measure only to those who donated to House campaigns; in this case, the analogous marginal effect is 10 percentage points. These magnitudes are comparable to those for Senators in prior work (Canes-Wrone and Gibson 2019a), which is in one sense surprising given Senators'

¹⁴ Interestingly, Bernhard and Sulkin (2018) argue that when a district is a poor ideological fit, members have greater incentives to adopt a style of "district advocacy." We return to this point when discussing the tests on district safety.

greater reliance on individual donations. However, because Senators are less dependent on committee assignments for legislative effectiveness

Table 3. National donor responsiveness

	Random effects [1]	House donors [2]	Fixed effects [3]	District partisans [4]	In-district donors, CCES [5]	In-district donors, CFscores [6]
National donor opinion (all donors)	4.055** (0.251)	--	4.578** (0.259)	2.792** (0.925)	12.246* (5.874)	3.845** (0.274)
National donor opinion (House donors only)	--	4.737** (0.286)	--	--	--	--
District opinion	2.219** (0.334)	1.389** (0.385)	1.185** (0.341)	4.904** (1.487)	1.715 (5.422)	2.065** (0.336)
Democrat	2.458** (0.157)	1.922** (0.173)	--	3.912** (0.482)	2.373 (1.900)	-0.044 (0.265)
Affluent opinion	0.275 (0.353)	-0.410 (0.440)	0.686 (0.355)	0.478 (1.141)	-0.918 (3.935)	0.450 (0.356)
District partisan opinion	--	--	--	1.256 (1.299)	--	--
In-district donor opinion	--	--	--	--	-4.285 (4.794)	1.697** (0.143)
Constant	-3.363** (0.218)	-2.623** (0.235)	--	-5.208** (0.785)	-6.985 (2.506)	-2.561** (0.210)
Year effects	included	included	included	included	--	included
σ_v	0.969	0.932	--	0.854	0.001	0.742
N	9,921	7,663	8,000	1,479	129	8,373

Note: Dependent variable equals Pr(Liberal Vote = 1). Standard errors in parentheses below logit coefficients. Columns [1], [2], [4], [5], and [6] include random effects by member, and Column [3] includes member fixed effects. The number of observations varies according to the availability of control variables and because the fixed effects model drops members who always voted for or against the liberal position. The number of unique members is 780 in Column [1], 709 in Column [2], 577 in Column [3], 526 in Column [4], 24 in Column [5], and 718 in Column [6]. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

(Volden and Wiseman 2018), they arguably also have fewer incentives to fundraise for colleagues in exchange for favorable assignments.

Returning to Table 3, the random effects are significant ($p < 0.01$) in likelihood ratio tests in all specifications except Column [5], which has a small

number of observations. The variability/size of the random effects is given by the standard deviation of them across members, σ_v , representing the remaining variance in roll call votes due to unobserved heterogeneity in members. This value suggests that in the main specification (Column [1]) the correlation in a member's likelihood of voting in a liberal (conservative) direction across roll calls is 0.22, even beyond the effects of party, district ideology, and other independent variables.¹⁵

If a fixed effects approach is instead adopted, the results on national donor opinion continue to hold, as Column [3] shows. In conditional fixed effects models, magnitudes cannot be interpreted absent additional assumptions (e.g., Wooldridge 2002). However, the significance of the coefficient on national donor opinion suggests that even after controlling for member-specific voting tendencies, donor preferences remain a factor in representatives' roll call decisions. Moreover, the fixed effects μ_j are jointly significant ($p < 0.01$). These results extend to a linear probability model with member fixed effects, as Supplemental Appendix Table S4 describes. Additionally, this supplemental table establishes that the results extend to a basic logit model and one that excludes controls.¹⁶

¹⁵ The intra-class correlation equals $\sigma_v / (\sigma_v + (\pi^2/3))$.

¹⁶ Some research suggests voters adopt the policy views of their party (Hill and Huber 2019) or leader (e.g., Lenz 2012), and we consider that these effects might extend to donors. Table S9 of the supplemental appendix details this

Generally, the estimates on the main controls perform as expected. District opinion is significantly associated with members' roll call behavior (e.g., Wlezien 1995; Erikson, Stimson, and MacKuen 2002). At the means of the independent variables in the main specification, a 10 percentage point change in district opinion is associated with a 4.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood a representative supports that position. Also as anticipated, a member's partisan affiliation has a significant relationship to legislative voting; the only exceptions are in the specifications that control for in-district donor opinion, which is highly correlated with party affiliation ($\rho > 0.8$).

Somewhat surprisingly, several specifications suggest that affluent opinion does not have a significant association with roll call behavior. A potential reason is that affluent opinion is measured with high-income respondents who were not campaign donors, and Gilens (2012) argues campaign contributions may be the primary mechanism inducing responsiveness to affluence. At the same time, when the parties are estimated separately, a significant effect emerges for Republicans. (Supplemental Appendix Table S5 presents the by-party results, which are otherwise consistent with Table 3.) Finally, the year indicators are jointly significant

analysis and shows the substantive results hold in an instrumental variables model in which national donor opinion is endogenous. Specification testing also fails to reject the null of exogeneity.

($p < 0.01$), indicating that the likelihood of liberal votes shifts across years as the legislative agenda changes.

Table 3 further tests the National Donor Responsiveness Prediction by considering the effects of subconstituencies including partisan voters and in-district donors. Column [4] shows the results for in-district partisans. The collinearity between district partisan opinion and national donor opinion for the full sample is high ($\rho > 0.9$) and so we adopt the Gilens (2012) approach of analyzing observations where the divergence between the variables is greater than 0.15 percentage points, which reduces collinearity to $\rho < 0.7$.¹⁷ Notably, even with the inclusion of district partisan opinion, the National Donor Responsiveness Prediction receives corroboration. Moreover, while the estimate on district partisan opinion is in the expected direction, it is not significant at any conventional level.

The National Donor Responsiveness Prediction receives further support when accounting for in-district donor opinion, whether measuring it with CCES respondents (Column [5]) or donor CFscores (Column [6]). In each case, the coefficient on national donor opinion remains significantly positive. In-district donor opinion also has a significant effect in Column [6], though the correlation

¹⁷ With the full sample, the National Donor Responsiveness Prediction continues to receive support (see Supplemental Appendix Table S6).

with a member's party affiliation is high ($\rho > 0.9$) and the effect of partisan affiliation itself loses significance.¹⁸

In sum, Table 3 provides strong support for the argument that representatives are responsive to their national donor base. Even after controlling for the preferences of a member's party, general electorate, partisan subconstituency, and in-district donors, responsiveness to national donor opinion is substantial. Moreover, the results are robust to various methodological assumptions, including random and fixed effects. These findings indicate that even on what is arguably representatives' most public activity, donor influence is evident.

District safety and redistricting

To analyze the District Safety Prediction, we include an interaction of *District Safety* with *National Donor Opinion* in addition to all main effects. We first analyze all observations with the random effects model, following which the data is limited to cases and years immediately pre- and post-redistricting. For these observations, holding the member's average voting patterns constant with fixed effects enables assessing whether relatively exogenous shifts in the safety of a seat are associated with a change in the member's roll call behavior.

¹⁸ We have also analyzed whether small versus large donors have differential effects, comparing respondents who reported giving \$100 or less to those who reported giving \$1000 or more. Supplemental Appendix Table S6 shows that there is not a significant difference in the effects between the groups.

In each specification, we also interact district safety with district opinion given that electoral safety may not only affect donor responsiveness but also responsiveness to the general electorate.

Table 4 presents the results. Notably, in both analyses the estimates support the District Safety Prediction. The safer is a member's seat, the more responsive the member is to national donor opinion. The positive coefficients on the interaction term involving national donor opinion reflect this effect. Interpreting these estimates requires care, however, and we therefore describe the impact of national donor opinion at different levels of district safety. The Column [1] estimates suggest that in a safe district where Cook favors the incumbent by +20, a 10 percentage point increase in national donor opinion is associated with a 17 percentage point increase in the likelihood the member supports that position. By comparison, in a tossup district with a Cook rating of zero, the same change in national donor opinion is associated with only a 6 percentage point increase in the likelihood the member supports that position. Supplemental Appendix Table S10 provides estimates for a fuller range of values, which further demonstrate that increases in seat safety lead to higher donor responsiveness.

Because conditional fixed effects logit models do not allow for the estimation of magnitudes absent additional assumptions (e.g., Wooldridge 2002), we focus on the above-described magnitudes from the random effects model. Supplemental Appendix Table S8 shows the results also hold with a linear probability model for the fixed as well as random effects specifications. In

each, the coefficients on the interaction term between national donor opinion and district safety are significantly positive. That the District Safety Prediction receives support even for representatives whose safety has shifted through

Table 4. District safety

	Random effects [1]	Redistricting, fixed effects [2]
National donor opinion × district safety	0.255** (0.017)	0.352** (0.077)
District opinion × district safety	-0.241** (0.022)	-0.284** (0.082)
National donor opinion	2.651** (0.251)	3.737** (0.821)
District safety	0.008 (0.012)	-0.076 (0.066)
District opinion	2.778** (0.350)	2.029 (1.166)
Affluent opinion	0.601 (0.355)	-1.610 (1.281)
Democrat	2.194** (0.142)	--
Constant	-3.220** (0.231)	--
Year effects	included	included
σ_v	0.623	--
N	9,921	1,022

Note: Dependent variable equals Pr(Liberal Vote = 1). Standard errors in parentheses below logit coefficients. Column [1] includes random effects by member. Column [2] includes member fixed effects. The fixed effects model drops members who always voted for or against the liberal position. The number of unique members is 780 in Column [1] and 152 in Column [2].
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

redistricting indicates a causal effect. It is not simply the selection of a different type of member but within-member voting behavior that changes when a district becomes safer.

Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction between district opinion and district safety is significantly negative across each specification (including in Table 4 and Supplemental Appendix Table S8). Electoral safety decreases responsiveness to district opinion. This result is consistent with Bernhard and Sulkin's (2018) argument that safety reduces a legislator's likelihood of adopting a district advocacy style. Considering this finding in combination with those on donors, the estimates imply that safety induces counteracting influences, with responsiveness to in-district constituents declining and that to the national donor base increasing.

Overall, Table 4 suggests that donor responsiveness varies by member according to the electoral context. Consistent with the party exchange perspective, the representatives who are most responsive to national donors are the ones in safer seats. This variation indicates that reelection is not the only fundraising motive. While of course important, if it were the only motive, district safety would reduce rather than increase responsiveness to national donor opinion.¹⁹

More generally, Table 4 implies that representation is altered in fundamental ways by the sorting of voters into more ideologically homogenous

¹⁹ Correspondingly, we have analyzed whether wealth is associated with donor responsiveness. If members raise funds purely for reelection, one would expect a negative association. However, there is no significant association (see Supplemental Appendix Table S11).

districts that produce safer seats (e.g., Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013). The causal effect produced by the redistricting analysis underlines that this homogenization of districts alters within-member voting behavior. When districts become more ideologically lopsided, representatives' incentive to cater to their national donor bases strengthens while the incentive to represent constituents' preferences abates. In the conclusion, we return to the implications of these findings for polarization.

Out-of-district donations

The Out-of-District Donations Prediction implies that the more reliant a member is on donations from outside their district, the more responsive they will be to national donor opinion. Accordingly, we include the interaction of *%Out-of-District Donations* with *National Donor Opinion* as well as main effects. The tests include one-equation and two-stage least squares (2SLS) models. The one-equation model is a straightforward extension of the main random effects specification. The 2SLS model allows that the out-of-district donations may be endogenous to a member's voting record. Although the out-of-district variable is measured such that the contributions are from the election prior to the legislative session, statistical endogeneity remains possible (for instance, if out-of-district contributions were highly correlated with prior ones).

In the 2SLS analysis, there are two first-stage equations, one for the main effect of out-of-district donations and a second for the interaction term, as described by Equations [2] and [3]:

$$[2] \quad \%Out\text{-of-District Donations}_{ij} = f(Chair_{ij}, Chair_{ij} \times National\ donor\ opinion_{ij}, National\ donor\ opinion_{ij}, Controls_{ij})$$

$$[3] \quad \%Out\text{-of-District Donations}_{ij} \times National\ donor\ opinion_{ij} = f(Chair_{ij}, Chair_{ij} \times National\ donor\ opinion_{ij}, National\ donor\ opinion_{ij}, Controls_{ij})$$

Each equation includes the instruments *Chair*, which measures whether the member was a committee chair in the session leading up to the prior election, as well as *Chair x National Donor Opinion*. This strategy of interacting an instrument with the exogenous variable that is interacted in the second stage is standard (e.g., Wooldridge 2002). In terms of the specific instruments, prior scholarship suggests committee chairs receive more contributions from individuals (e.g., Thomsen and Swers 2017), yet there is no expectation that a chair is more or less likely to vote in a liberal direction than other members of their party. In Supplemental Appendix Table S12, we further justify this assumption by showing that there is not a significant relationship between being a chair and voting in a liberal direction, including for members of a particular party.

Table 5 presents the results.²⁰ Consistent with expectations, the coefficients on the interaction term between national donor opinion and out-of-

²⁰ Note that 2SLS models are linear probability models. Additionally, the number of observations is slightly lower than in the baseline model. Members seated off-cycle are excluded due to a lack of comparability, and the pre-2012

district donations support the Out-of-district Donations Prediction. A greater proportion of contributions from outside the district is associated with stronger

Table 5. Out-of-district donations

	Random effects [1]	2SLS, 2 nd -stage [2]	District safety [3]
National donor opinion × %Out-of-district donations	2.226** (0.717)	1.139* (0.577)	1.484* (0.702)
National donor opinion × District safety	--	--	0.251** (0.017)
National donor opinion	2.615** (0.519)	-0.088 (0.364)	1.737** (0.505)
%Out-of-district donations	-0.589 (0.448)	-0.001 (0.381)	-0.428 (0.417)
District opinion × District safety	--	--	-0.244** (0.022)
District opinion	2.417** (0.341)	0.212** (0.034)	2.985** (0.359)
Affluent opinion	0.202 (0.360)	-0.093* (0.036)	0.512 (0.362)
Democrat	2.382** (0.160)	0.231** (0.031)	2.151** (0.146)
District safety	--	--	0.010 (0.012)
Constant	-3.031** (0.349)	0.132 (0.233)	-3.001** (0.344)
Year effects	included	included	included
σ_v	0.927	0.087	0.604
Hausman endogeneity test	---	$\chi^2=13.80$ ($p=0.18$)	---
N	9,608	9,608	9,608

Note: Dependent variable equals Pr(Liberal Vote = 1) in Columns [1] and [3] and Liberal Vote in Column [2]. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All columns include random effects by member. The number of unique members is 765 in each specification. Appendix Table A2 describes 1st-stage estimates for the instrumental variables analysis of Column [2]. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

data on out-of-district contributions do not include cases involving mid-cycle redistricting.

responsiveness to national donor opinion. For instance, in the random effects model of Column [1], for a member who receives 10% of their individual donations from outside the district, a 10 percentage point increase in national donor opinion increases the likelihood the member supports that position by 6 percentage points. By comparison, if the member receives 90% of their individual donations from outside the district, the same increase in national donor opinion increases the likelihood of supporting the position by 9 percentage points. Supplemental Appendix Table S13 provides the estimated magnitudes for a range of values, and these estimates further support the Out-of-district Donations Prediction.²¹

In Column [2] of Table 5, which presents results from the 2nd-stage of the 2SLS model, the prediction again receives corroboration. The effect of the interaction term is significantly positive, as expected. However, the Hausman specification test does not reject the null of exogeneity ($p=0.18$, two-tailed), which is perhaps unsurprising given that contributions are from the election preceding the congressional session. The first-stage results, described in Appendix Table A2, are also consistent with expectations.

²¹ Baker (2016) finds that members in the 90th percentile of out-of-district donations in a given congress have a more ideologically extreme NOMINATE score by 0.4-0.8 points in that congress than do members at the out-of-district donations minimum.

Column [3] presents the estimates from a random effects model that includes the interactions involving district safety. Notably, out-of-district contributions continue to increase donor responsiveness. Additionally as before, district safety does so while reducing responsiveness to district opinion. Although the findings on out-of-district donations could be due purely to reelection motives, the fact that electoral safety continues to have an effect suggests that donor responsiveness is driven in part by party advancement. Supplemental Appendix Table S13 describes marginal effects of national donor opinion at different values of seat safety and out-of-district donations to illuminate the relationship among the factors. At low values of out-of-district donations, moving from a toss-up to safe seat (Cook=0 to +20) more than triples the marginal effect of national donor opinion and even at high values of out-of-district donations, such a change in seat safety more than doubles the marginal effect. The impact of out-of-district donations is also evident but not as large. In a toss-up district, a shift from out-of-district donations of 10% to 90% increases the marginal effect of national donor opinion by 55%. In a safe seat, this shift in donations increases the marginal effect by only 16%.

Broadly, Table 5 suggests out-of-district donations reshape representation, encouraging members to cater to a national donorate at the expense of their electorates. The analysis has pushed in multiple ways to provide causal estimates that distinguish members' responsiveness to out-of-district donors from these donors merely contributing to like-minded members. Moreover, the variation in donor responsiveness associated with out-of-district

donations and seat safety suggests that the responsiveness is not simply a function of representatives and contributors having similar preferences. To complement the methodological and data advantages of the tests, we present several case narratives.

Examples

Paired examples illuminate the findings on out-of-district donations and seat safety. Consider Republican Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL18) and Fred Upton (MI6) in the 109th Congress. Ros-Lehtinen represented a district the Cook Report considered a tossup with a rating of R+3. Likewise, Upton's district was a tossup with a rating of D+1. Within the set of CCES roll calls for the 109th Congress, each had five votes on which they were cross-pressured between district opinion and national donor opinion. Ros-Lehtinen sided with national donor opinion on four and received 63% of her individual donations from outside the district. By comparison, Upton received only 26% of his individual donations from outside the district and sided with national donor opinion on just two of the five cross-pressured votes.

Comparing Ross-Lehinten and Upton to two co-partisans from safe seats highlights the role of seat safety in addition to out-of-district donations. In the 109th Congress, Representative Michael Burgess (TX26) represented a district with a Cook rating of R+13, received 66% of his individual contributions from out-of-district donors, and faced four cross-pressured roll calls in the data. On each, he voted with national donor opinion. Representative Barbara Cubin (WY at-large) encountered the same four cross-pressured votes, had an even higher

Cook rating of R+18, and yet received only 38% of her individual contributions from outside the district. Consistent with a higher level of safety than Upton and lower percentage of out-of-district donations than Burgess, Cubin sided with national donor opinion more than the former but less than the latter, bucking national donor opinion once to vote with her district.

A similar story emerges in electorally unfavorable seats, as suggested by two Democrats in the 110th Congress, Representatives Vic Snyder (AR2) and Ben Chandler (KY6). Snyder represented a district rated R+9 by Cook and received just 25% of his individual donations from outside the district.

Encountering district opinion in conflict with national donor opinion on the Peru trade agreement and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, he voted with district preferences on each. Like Snyder, Chandler faced a tough district, in this case with a Cook rating of R+10, and the same cross-pressured roll calls. Yet Chandler received 50% of his individual donations from outside the district and split these votes, siding with the district on FISA and national donors on the trade agreement. Snyder, Chandler, and the other examples, although not presented as tests, help illuminate the roles of out-of-district funding and seat safety in members' responsiveness to national donor opinion.

Conclusion

This paper provides new evidence about the impact of individual donors on policymaking. Unlike earlier studies, we analyze a range of policy issues in a context where party influence is known to be dominant, the US House. The analysis pushes on inference through various means, including the

examination of national donor opinion rather than only members' own donors, redistricting as an exogenous shift in seat safety, and 2SLS estimation of the role of out-of-district donations. Moreover, it examines a diverse set of individual policy issues rather than ideology scores, which research suggests represent consistency in citizens' preferences rather than ideological distance. To complement these methodological advantages, we conducted field interviews to help motivate the predictions and illustrate findings with narrative examples. Three main findings emerge.

First, we show House members' roll call decisions are responsive to the national donor base. This result holds controlling for a variety of factors, including the preferences of the district, the partisan subconstituency, and the national party. Interestingly, it also appears in the raw descriptive statistics, which suggest that when the national donor base prefers a different outcome than a representative's general and primary electorates, overwhelmingly the member chooses the donor-favored position.

The second main finding is that district safety increases members' responsiveness to individual contributors. This result extends to analysis of the full dataset as well as members who served immediately pre- and post-redistricting. In the latter, by holding the legislator's average voting record constant, we obtain a causal estimate of how an exogenous shift in safety influences roll call behavior. The results also suggest that as seat safety increases, representatives' responsiveness to district opinion declines.

Third and finally, the analysis establishes that out-of-district contributions are associated with members' responsiveness to the national donor base. The greater is a representative's reliance on out-of-district funding, the more they cater to the preferences of the national pool of their party's contributors. These results are robust to a range of specifications, including ones that account for the potentially endogenous nature of out-of-district funding. Furthermore, in specifications that jointly consider the impact of out-of-district contributions and district safety, each has an independent effect.

Notwithstanding the strength of the findings, there are some boundaries of applicability worth noting. The roll calls under examination are on salient issues. Correspondingly, they are not procedural. On the one hand, perhaps it is surprising that donor opinion is influential on items that are relatively accessible to the public. On the other hand, a different set of factors could dominate members' voting on procedural and less salient roll calls. Separately, the findings are from a period with a specific fundraising system that incentivizes member-to-member and member-to-party contributions. We would not claim that responsiveness to donors would necessarily be similar under alternative campaign finance systems or party institutional arrangements.

Within these boundaries, the results have several implications for representation, including on the topic of polarization. La Raja and Schaffner (2015) argue that polarization would decline if parties could directly raise and distribute more funding. This paper provides evidence for the argument, at least on issues over which donors have more disparate views than voters do.

Moreover, this circumstance applies to most policies in the data. For instance, it occurs for partial birth abortion, capital gains taxes, and the Affordable Care Act. While exceptions occur, such as on agricultural policy, on balance donors are more polarized than is the general electorate, arguably contributing to the current high levels of elite-level polarization.

Correspondingly, the findings on district safety imply that partisan sorting and redistricting can augment the impact of donors. Indeed, our estimates suggest the effect of district safety is even larger than that of out-of-district donations. While earlier work finds that redistricting members into safer seats does not directly increase partisan polarization (e.g., McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2009), the results here highlight that there are potential indirect effects, particularly for issues over which donors are more polarized than voters are. In these cases seat safety can further exacerbate polarization. More generally, the paper implies that redistricting is consequential with respect to legislative outcomes.

Most broadly, the findings highlight that individual donors skew House roll call decisions towards a national donor class that relative to the voting population is wealthier, older, has a higher proportion of males, and a higher proportion of non-minorities. Furthermore, out-of-district donations increase this lack of representativeness. Yes, district opinion still matters. However, the estimated magnitude of the effect is no higher than that of national donor opinion and in some analyses lower. Moreover, as seat safety increases, the impact of national donor opinion grows while that of district opinion declines.

In sum, the results show how incentives to cater to the national donorate shape representation and policymaking.

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Appendix

Table A1. Roll Call Votes

<u>Congress</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Bill/Resolution</u>	<u>Vote #</u>
109 th	Minimum wage increase	HR 2	18
109 th	Stem cell research	HR 810	204
109 th	Partial birth abortion ban	HR 760	242
109 th	Iraq troop withdrawal	H Res 861	288
109 th	Central American Free Trade	HR 3045	443
109 th	Capital gains tax cut	HR 4297	621
110 th	Housing bailout	HR 3221	301
110 th	Stem cell research 2	S 5	443
110 th	Bank bailout	HR 1424	681
110 th	FISA amendments	S 1927	836
110 th	CHIP	HR 982	982
110 th	Peru trade agreement	HR 3688	1060
111 th	CHIP 2	HR 2	16
111 th	Stimulus	HR 1	46
111 th	Obamacare	HR 3590	165
111 th	Don't ask don't tell repeal	HR 2965	638
111 th	Dodd Frank	HR 4173	968
112 th	Ryan budget	H Con Res 34	277
112 th	Obamacare repeal	HR 6079	460
112 th	Korean Free Trade Agreement	HR 3080	783
113 th	Debt limit	S 540	61
113 th	Farm bill	HR 2642	31
114 th	Obamacare repeal 2	HR 596	58
114 th	Medicare access	HR 2	144
114 th	No Child repeal	S 1177	665
114 th	Highway funding	HR 22	673

Table A2. 1st-stage estimates, Out-of-district donations 2SLS

	National donor opinion × %Out-of-district [1]	%Out-of-district [2]
National donor opinion × Chair	0.094** (0.015)	0.002 (0.023)
Chair	0.004 (0.010)	0.096** (0.015)
National donor opinion	0.623** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.011)
District opinion	-0.004 (0.010)	0.014 (0.014)
Affluent opinion	0.012 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.015)
Democrat	0.088** (0.005)	0.142** (0.007)
Constant	-0.027** (0.006)	0.570** (0.009)
Year effects	included	included
N	9,608	9,608

Note: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. Table 5 presents 2nd-stage estimates. Dependent variable in Column [1] is the interaction National Donor Opinion × %Out-of-district Donations, and dependent variable in Column [2] is %Out-of-district Donations. * $p > 0.05$, ** $p > 0.01$, two-tailed.

**Supplemental Appendix for
“Out-of-District Contributors and Representation in the
US House”**

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S1. Member dues

One interview respondent provided a copy of a recent House Democratic Member Dues Report. The report lists the fundraising expectations placed on members beyond the amounts they raise for their own reelection campaigns. These amounts include the dues each member is expected to contribute to the party, described in the third column, as well as an additional fundraising goal listed in the fifth column. The report shows that members are placed in tiers based on their status including as party leaders, chairs of exclusive committees and subcommittees, chairs of other committee and subcommittees, members on exclusive committees, and as rank-and-file members.

Member Dues : Members | Member Dues Report

DCCC 2019-2020 ELECTION CYCLE DUES & MONEY RAISED (JULY 2020 DRAFT)

Member Dues Report

Formal Name	6/30/2020 COH	Dues Goal	Dues Received	Raise Goal	Current Raised	Frontline & R2B Raised / Given	Member Points
Leadership (17 Members)							
Hon. Nancy Pelosi*	\$6,475,383.62	\$1,000,000.00	\$1,605,000.00	\$30,000,000.00	\$154,697,700.00	\$13,000,500.00	1095
Hon. Steny Hoyer*	\$643,229.07	\$900,000.00	\$925,000.00	\$3,000,000.00	\$2,202,766.67	\$3,092,900.00	405
Hon. James Clyburn	\$1,418,797.99	\$800,000.00	\$800,000.00	\$3,000,000.00	\$2,459,269.00	\$1,525,700.00	595
Hon. Ben Ray Lujan	\$2,451,688.55	\$700,000.00	\$0.00	\$2,000,000.00	\$453,234.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Hakeem Jeffries*	\$2,509,183.76	\$575,000.00	\$850,000.00	\$1,500,000.00	\$2,405,931.00	\$1,980,400.00	482
Hon. Katherine Clark*	\$1,230,034.01	\$575,000.00	\$575,000.00	\$1,500,000.00	\$1,415,351.00	\$1,709,702.00	180
Hon. Cheri Bustos*	\$3,331,468.08	\$575,000.00	\$700,000.00	\$12,500,000.00	\$41,852,274.00	\$3,105,750.00	1015
Hon. David Cicilline	\$1,026,888.06	\$575,000.00	\$400,000.00	\$1,500,000.00	\$811,650.00	\$984,300.00	114
Hon. Matt Cartwright	\$2,337,209.32	\$450,000.00	\$0.00	\$600,000.00	\$331,000.00	\$17,275.00	2
Hon. Debbie Dingell	\$656,654.16	\$450,000.00	\$270,000.00	\$2,000,000.00	\$919,250.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Ted Lieu*	\$1,885,366.33	\$450,000.00	\$450,000.00	\$600,000.00	\$177,500.00	\$600,197.00	22
Hon. Rosa DeLauro	\$287,525.36	\$500,000.00	\$220,000.00	\$600,000.00	\$701,901.00	\$890,203.00	25
Hon. Barbara Lee	\$294,531.83	\$500,000.00	\$280,000.00	\$600,000.00	\$87,050.00	\$296,084.00	69
Hon. Eric Swalwell	\$336,688.94	\$500,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$600,000.00	\$148,000.00	\$2,000.00	0
Hon. Jamie Raskin	\$1,065,831.40	\$400,000.00	\$400,000.00	\$550,000.00	\$177,770.00	\$73,000.00	8
Hon. Joe Neguse	\$865,249.76	\$400,000.00	\$10,000.00	\$550,000.00	\$594,840.64	\$34,000.00	3
Hon. Veronica Escobar	\$396,432.91	\$225,000.00	\$110,000.00	\$320,000.00	\$30,500.00	\$60,570.00	21
DCCC Regional Vice Chairs (5 Members)							
Hon. Gwen Moore	\$130,590.09	\$350,000.00	\$42,500.00	\$750,000.00	\$552,000.00	\$148,187.00	40
Hon. Scott Peters*	\$1,998,438.12	\$350,000.00	\$350,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$147,500.00	\$346,950.00	43
Hon. Marc Veasey	\$422,918.84	\$350,000.00	\$310,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$470,800.00	\$97,001.00	52
Hon. Charlie Crist	\$3,132,673.57	\$350,000.00	\$0.00	\$750,000.00	\$16,500.00	\$106,500.00	10
Hon. Madeleine Dean	\$455,173.45	\$350,000.00	\$140,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$155,500.00	\$18,000.00	9
DCCC Finance Chairs (1 Member)							
Hon. Donald Beyer*	\$635,866.65	\$350,000.00	\$375,000.00	\$2,000,000.00	\$2,247,142.72	\$570,240.00	400
DCCC National Chairs (23 Members)							
Hon. Pete Aguilar*	\$1,660,944.11	\$350,000.00	\$353,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$1,395,001.00	\$1,099,097.00	1001
Hon. Ami Bera*	\$1,893,852.34	\$350,000.00	\$350,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$745,000.00	\$372,800.00	93
Hon. Henry Cuellar*	\$1,918,834.15	\$350,000.00	\$350,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$364,847.50	\$7,000.00	0
Hon. Suzan DelBene*	\$1,510,876.67	\$350,000.00	\$350,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$1,146,200.00	\$96,800.00	2
Hon. Lois Frankel	\$1,205,349.52	\$350,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$3,765,838.71	\$380,500.00	98
Hon. Robin Kelly	\$843,510.55	\$350,000.00	\$180,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$3,586,638.71	\$13,000.00	26
Hon. Daniel Kildee	\$1,151,309.89	\$350,000.00	\$350,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$768,500.00	\$216,276.00	170
Hon. Sean Maloney	\$1,065,006.54	\$350,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$470,452.50	\$22,000.00	0
Hon. Raul Ruiz	\$2,272,122.27	\$350,000.00	\$230,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$872,050.00	\$131,701.00	5
Hon. Bobby Rush	\$13,575.49	\$350,000.00	\$5,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	2
Hon. Adam Schiff*	\$10,846,998.35	\$350,000.00	\$850,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$2,658,181.95	\$3,743,409.00	94
Hon. Robert Scott	\$179,588.14	\$350,000.00	\$200,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$1,535,000.00	\$51,000.00	6

Formal Name	6/30/2020 COH	Dues Goal	Dues Received	Raise Goal	Current Raised	Frontline & R2B Raised / Given	Member Points
Hon. Mark Takano	\$205,878.37	\$350,000.00	\$298,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$285,150.00	\$809,600.00	14
Hon. Lisa Blunt Rochester	\$450,344.13	\$275,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$180,000.00	\$113,700.00	133
Hon. Val Demings	\$595,216.59	\$350,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$15,500.00	\$24,600.00	23
Hon. Donald McEachin	\$387,345.51	\$350,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$220,499.99	\$47,000.00	25
Hon. Jimmy Panetta*	\$757,919.67	\$350,000.00	\$400,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$51,500.00	\$96,000.00	4
Hon. Bradley Schneider*	\$2,407,237.36	\$350,000.00	\$400,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$558,500.00	\$403,300.00	23
Hon. Sharice Davids	\$2,480,022.31	\$350,000.00	\$0.00	\$750,000.00	\$512,500.00	\$0.00	10
Hon. Lori Trahan	\$885,921.39	\$350,000.00	\$55,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$1,510,000.00	\$43,000.00	25
Hon. Deb Haaland	\$352,053.06	\$350,000.00	\$286,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$3,885,438.71	\$124,885.00	74
Hon. Joe Morelle	\$317,317.51	\$350,000.00	\$17,500.00	\$750,000.00	\$32,500.00	\$7,000.00	18
Hon. Linda Sánchez	\$954,900.85	\$350,000.00	\$120,000.00	\$750,000.00	\$1,460,000.00	\$46,000.00	0
Chief Deputy Whips (6 Members)							
Hon. G.K. Butterfield	\$580,741.74	\$350,000.00	\$175,000.00	\$550,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	2
Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee	\$69,549.44	\$350,000.00	\$0.00	\$550,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Cedric Richmond	\$720,429.44	\$350,000.00	\$75,000.00	\$550,000.00	\$0.00	\$39,500.00	0
Hon. Janice Schakowsky	\$673,802.97	\$350,000.00	\$306,753.00	\$550,000.00	\$492,500.00	\$151,022.00	5
Hon. Debbie Wasserman Schultz	\$675,774.32	\$350,000.00	\$232,978.60	\$550,000.00	\$740,500.00	\$1,190,950.00	25
Hon. Peter Welch	\$2,133,938.04	\$350,000.00	\$200,000.00	\$550,000.00	\$15,500.00	\$0.00	0
Exclusive Committee Chair (4 Members)							
Hon. Nita Lowey	\$492,278.95	\$600,000.00	\$553,878.00	\$1,200,000.00	\$160,400.00	\$54,000.00	7
Hon. Richard Neal	\$4,225,810.46	\$600,000.00	\$510,000.00	\$1,200,000.00	\$5,448,300.00	\$1,141,700.00	22
Hon. Frank Pallone	\$2,943,332.18	\$600,000.00	\$491,000.00	\$1,200,000.00	\$2,246,046.00	\$894,750.00	75
Hon. Maxine Waters	\$716,197.23	\$600,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$1,200,000.00	\$125,500.00	\$219,500.00	28
Committee Chair (16 Members)							
Hon. Kathy Castor	\$856,294.91	\$300,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$8,000.00	\$123,000.00	5
Hon. Peter DeFazio	\$1,703,960.58	\$300,000.00	\$210,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$270,500.00	\$186,550.00	30
Hon. Theodore Deutch	\$463,508.43	\$300,000.00	\$110,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$348,400.00	\$92,600.00	0
Hon. Eliot Engel	\$467,559.92	\$300,000.00	\$25,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$95,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Raúl Grijalva	\$240,176.09	\$300,000.00	\$12,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$48,750.00	\$2,000.00	0
Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson	\$361,652.38	\$300,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Derek Kilmer*	\$3,502,843.98	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$1,538,000.00	\$160,750.00	22
Hon. Zoe Lofgren*	\$1,184,412.59	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$262,000.00	\$3,744,994.00	420
Hon. Carolyn Maloney	\$16,142.73	\$300,000.00	\$206,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$30,500.00	\$183,101.00	21
Hon. James McGovern	\$342,549.14	\$300,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$60,000.00	\$76,080.00	8
Hon. Jerrold Nadler	\$730,476.73	\$300,000.00	\$80,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$156,000.00	0
Hon. Collin Peterson	\$1,336,292.75	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$18,000.00	\$139,000.00	0
Hon. Adam Smith	\$487,693.05	\$300,000.00	\$230,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$788,000.00	\$125,500.00	0
Hon. Bennie Thompson	\$1,512,338.66	\$300,000.00	\$248,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$235,500.00	\$185,000.00	7
Hon. Nydia Velázquez	\$291,633.08	\$300,000.00	\$25,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$50,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. John Yarmuth	\$231,937.49	\$300,000.00	\$75,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$25,500.00	\$52,000.00	0
Exclusive Committee Vice Chair (2 Members)							
Hon. Yvette Clarke	\$267,431.73	\$400,000.00	\$0.00	\$600,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Terri Sewell*	\$1,920,422.45	\$400,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$600,000.00	\$185,000.00	\$20,000.00	0

Formal Name	6/30/2020 COH	Dues Goal	Dues Received	Raise Goal	Current Raised	Frontline & R2B Raised / Given	Member Points
Exclusive Subcommittee Chair (23 Members)							
Hon. Joyce Beatty	\$969,862.32	\$300,000.00	\$245,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$65,000.00	\$3,000.00	0
Hon. Sanford Bishop	\$420,058.77	\$300,000.00	\$55,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Earl Blumenauer*	\$630,751.38	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$126,000.00	\$301,900.00	5
Hon. William Lacy Clay	\$433,373.19	\$300,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$47,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Emanuel Cleaver	\$800,315.22	\$300,000.00	\$25,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$141,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Danny Davis	\$267,151.90	\$300,000.00	\$110,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$255,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Diana DeGette	\$253,674.85	\$300,000.00	\$115,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$55,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Lloyd Doggett	\$4,934,745.40	\$300,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$56,000.00	\$64,900.00	5
Hon. Michael Doyle	\$250,884.89	\$300,000.00	\$50,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$8,000.00	0
Hon. Anna Eshoo	\$862,053.31	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$2,181,395.00	\$15,000.00	0
Hon. Al Green	\$220,518.14	\$300,000.00	\$75,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Marcy Kaptur*	\$689,675.96	\$300,000.00	\$400,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$10,500.00	\$49,000.00	55
Hon. John Larson	\$472,511.57	\$300,000.00	\$155,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$386,000.00	\$44,500.00	0
Hon. Betty McCollum	\$189,254.97	\$300,000.00	\$155,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$165,500.00	\$65,500.00	0
Hon. Gregory Meeks	\$563,939.46	\$300,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$110,500.00	\$169,650.00	6
Hon. David Price	\$238,523.51	\$300,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$86,000.00	\$3,000.00	0
Hon. Mike Quigley	\$998,086.37	\$300,000.00	\$205,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$573,000.00	\$13,000.00	0
Hon. Lucille Roybal-Allard	\$104,357.95	\$300,000.00	\$75,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$30,000.00	\$49,000.00	0
Hon. Tim Ryan	\$192,640.54	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. José Serrano	\$38,653.04	\$300,000.00	\$10,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Mike Thompson*	\$1,588,501.06	\$300,000.00	\$325,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$549,500.00	\$344,771.00	10
Hon. Paul Tonko	\$848,126.99	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$61,500.00	0
Hon. Peter Visclosky	\$147,197.25	\$300,000.00	\$140,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$380,000.00	\$0.00	0
Ways & Means (10 Members)							
Hon. Brendan Boyle*	\$1,197,934.74	\$250,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$4,000.00	0
Hon. Judy Chu*	\$2,573,616.12	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$306,366.67	\$120,600.00	2
Hon. Brian Higgins	\$1,116,666.09	\$250,000.00	\$235,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$16,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Ron Kind	\$3,118,287.76	\$250,000.00	\$40,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$140,000.00	\$133,000.00	22
Hon. Bill Pascrell	\$1,613,594.54	\$250,000.00	\$175,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$30,000.00	\$26,000.00	0
Hon. Dwight Evans	\$133,209.70	\$250,000.00	\$7,500.00	\$300,000.00	\$430,500.00	\$105,650.00	5
Hon. Stephanie Murphy	\$1,379,758.83	\$250,000.00	\$110,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$330,500.00	\$261,175.00	15
Hon. Thomas Suozzi*	\$1,925,072.87	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$140,000.00	\$88,000.00	1
Hon. Jimmy Gomez	\$910,451.45	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$85,000.00	\$11,000.00	0
Hon. Steven Horsford	\$1,569,494.12	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$154,250.00	\$25,000.00	5
Appropriations (9 Members)							
Hon. Brenda Lawrence	\$860,962.67	\$250,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Grace Meng	\$724,315.14	\$250,000.00	\$160,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$86,800.00	17
Hon. Chellie Pingree*	\$349,265.36	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$269,500.00	\$500.00	0
Hon. Mark Pocan*	\$652,011.30	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$30,500.00	\$65,800.00	5
Hon. C. Ruppberger*	\$1,068,506.54	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$369,535.72	\$76,000.00	0
Hon. Norma Torres	\$333,112.14	\$250,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$8,000.00	0
Hon. Bonnie Watson Coleman	\$210,259.40	\$250,000.00	\$10,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$500.00	\$1,000.00	0
Hon. Ann Kirkpatrick	\$689,575.47	\$250,000.00	\$2,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0

Formal Name	6/30/2020 COH	Dues Goal	Dues Received	Raise Goal	Current Raised	Frontline & R2B Raised / Given	Member Points
Hon. Ed Case	\$338,655.91	\$250,000.00	\$50,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$0.00	0
Energy & Commerce (11 Members)							
Hon. Tony Cárdenas	\$517,160.15	\$250,000.00	\$105,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$35,500.00	\$112,300.00	2
Hon. Joseph Kennedy*	\$6,241,075.24	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$615,750.00	\$1,042,110.00	170
Hon. Ann Kuster*	\$2,427,718.83	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$438,250.00	\$56,000.00	0
Hon. David Loebsack	\$415,679.71	\$250,000.00	\$77,500.00	\$300,000.00	\$16,000.00	\$85,600.00	30
Hon. Doris Matsui	\$336,667.45	\$250,000.00	\$190,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$1,776,488.09	\$239,000.00	10
Hon. Jerry McNerney	\$488,805.11	\$250,000.00	\$35,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. John Sarbanes*	\$1,097,062.74	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$51,500.00	\$201,829.00	0
Hon. Kurt Schrader	\$2,588,013.11	\$250,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$23,000.00	\$320,325.00	17
Hon. Nanette Barragán*	\$867,019.42	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$28,000.00	0
Hon. Tom O'Halleran	\$1,372,452.11	\$250,000.00	\$5,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$30,000.00	\$5,000.00	0
Hon. Darren Soto	\$328,086.77	\$250,000.00	\$170,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$30,000.00	\$0.00	0
Financial Services (25 Members)							
Hon. Alma Adams	\$250,187.78	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$12,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Bill Foster*	\$3,387,726.58	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$35,000.00	\$390,686.00	63
Hon. Tulsi Gabbard	\$3,416.91	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Denny Heck	\$1,133,206.01	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$137,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. James Himes*	\$2,526,862.74	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$772,000.00	\$452,600.00	2
Hon. Stephen Lynch	\$1,539,755.46	\$250,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$280,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Ed Perlmutter*	\$896,256.15	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$30,000.00	\$134,600.00	5
Hon. David Scott	\$291,905.91	\$250,000.00	\$25,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$35,500.00	\$46,000.00	0
Hon. Brad Sherman*	\$2,354,795.23	\$250,000.00	\$310,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$1,500.00	\$270,700.00	5
Hon. Juan Vargas	\$88,527.08	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$5,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Vicente Gonzalez	\$1,318,432.94	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$37,000.00	0
Hon. Josh Gottheimer	\$8,842,989.82	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$1,554,038.00	18
Hon. Al Lawson	\$204,850.37	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Katie Porter	\$6,753,136.90	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$36,000.00	\$356,174.00	18
Hon. Cindy Axne	\$3,112,981.25	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$31,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Sean Casten	\$3,013,594.92	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Sylvia Garcia	\$241,678.46	\$250,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$50,000.00	\$1,000.00	0
Hon. Michael San Nicolas	\$11,936.68	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Rashida Tlaib	\$1,278,879.45	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Jesus "Chuy" Garcia	\$147,194.10	\$250,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$300,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$1,250.00	0
Hon. Ayanna Pressley	\$388,385.02	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Dean Phillips	\$430,764.70	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$5,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez	\$2,962,555.44	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Ben McAdams	\$2,200,483.09	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	2
Hon. Jennifer Wexton	\$2,100,856.54	\$250,000.00	\$0.00	\$300,000.00	\$22,000.00	\$0.00	0
Non-Exclusive Committee Vice Chair (6 Members)							
Hon. Joaquin Castro	\$156,373.59	\$175,000.00	\$10,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Andy Levin	\$363,004.04	\$175,000.00	\$127,500.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Anthony Brown*	\$1,092,486.72	\$175,000.00	\$157,500.00	\$125,000.00	\$329,500.00	\$43,000.00	0
Hon. Conor Lamb	\$1,333,773.85	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0

Formal Name	6/30/2020 COH	Dues Goal	Dues Received	Raise Goal	Current Raised	Frontline & R2B Raised / Given	Member Points
Hon. Lauren Underwood	\$3,179,022.80	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$1,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Mary Gay Scanlon	\$509,478.13	\$175,000.00	\$5,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$12,500.00	\$26,150.00	0
Non-Exclusive Subcommittee Chair (51 Members)							
Hon. Karen Bass*	\$1,016,209.07	\$175,000.00	\$175,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$205,000.00	\$355,896.00	10
Hon. Suzanne Bonamici	\$587,208.86	\$175,000.00	\$147,250.00	\$125,000.00	\$100,535.00	\$13,400.00	4
Hon. Julia Brownley*	\$2,916,529.35	\$175,000.00	\$185,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$625,500.00	\$232,700.00	53
Hon. André Carson	\$942,173.80	\$175,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$105,500.00	\$1,000.00	0
Hon. Steve Cohen	\$1,250,432.52	\$175,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$26,500.00	\$15,000.00	0
Hon. Gerald Connolly	\$3,157,380.23	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$40,500.00	\$12,000.00	0
Hon. Jim Cooper	\$833,285.30	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$163,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Jim Costa	\$427,372.90	\$175,000.00	\$50,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$10,000.00	\$9,000.00	0
Hon. Joe Courtney	\$1,028,896.06	\$175,000.00	\$50,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$128,000.00	\$21,500.00	0
Hon. Susan Davis	\$116,788.74	\$175,000.00	\$40,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$5,000.00	0
Hon. Marcia Fudge	\$1,096,680.81	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Ruben Gallego	\$970,452.48	\$175,000.00	\$40,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$25,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. John Garamendi*	\$950,641.33	\$175,000.00	\$175,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$86,880.00	25
Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton	\$68,000.51	\$175,000.00	\$20,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$2,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Jared Huffman	\$887,185.92	\$175,000.00	\$175,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$231,000.00	\$23,000.00	4
Hon. Henry Johnson	\$119,985.72	\$175,000.00	\$22,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$34,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. William Keating	\$1,506,061.81	\$175,000.00	\$65,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$2,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. James Langevin	\$1,250,505.80	\$175,000.00	\$70,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$190,000.00	\$6,000.00	0
Hon. Rick Larsen	\$346,154.17	\$175,000.00	\$121,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$325,500.00	\$23,000.00	0
Hon. Daniel Lipinski	\$1,626.84	\$175,000.00	\$10,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$49,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Alan Lowenthal*	\$474,062.64	\$175,000.00	\$175,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$500.00	\$51,000.00	0
Hon. Grace Napolitano	\$474,332.83	\$175,000.00	\$5,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Donald Norcross	\$1,616,964.50	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$524,500.00	\$25,000.00	5
Hon. Donald Payne	\$83,987.04	\$175,000.00	\$10,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Stacey Plaskett	\$61,774.99	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$100,500.00	\$0.00	2
Hon. Kathleen Rice	\$287,255.68	\$175,000.00	\$70,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$97,500.00	\$45,800.00	8
Hon. Gregorio Sablan	\$110,325.54	\$175,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Albio Sires	\$132,313.49	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Jackie Speier*	\$1,758,712.55	\$175,000.00	\$185,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$32,500.00	0
Hon. Dina Titus	\$326,435.02	\$175,000.00	\$80,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Filemon Vela	\$537,118.72	\$175,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Frederica Wilson	\$316,607.02	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. J. Correa	\$1,072,196.72	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$10,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Raja Krishnamoorthi*	\$7,873,336.94	\$175,000.00	\$175,008.00	\$125,000.00	\$76,500.00	\$59,555.00	0
Hon. TJ Cox	\$1,968,975.24	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Andy Kim	\$3,508,792.05	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	2
Hon. Kendra Horn	\$2,619,780.01	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$228,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Harley Rouda	\$2,858,953.33	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$30,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Mike Levin	\$1,615,452.61	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Jason Crow	\$2,119,853.26	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$40,000.00	\$307,800.00	1
Hon. Abby Finkenauer	\$2,685,055.60	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$15,500.00	\$0.00	2

Formal Name	6/30/2020 COH	Dues Goal	Dues Received	Raise Goal	Current Raised	Frontline & R2B Raised / Given	Member Points
Hon. Jared Golden	\$2,189,227.02	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Chris Pappas	\$1,530,386.52	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Mikie Sherrill	\$3,439,955.15	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Xochitl Torres Small	\$3,920,817.83	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$50,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Susie Lee	\$2,420,184.62	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Max Rose	\$4,334,372.09	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Lizzie Fletcher	\$3,453,656.25	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$32,000.00	\$2,500.00	0
Hon. Elaine Luria	\$2,882,957.18	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Abigail Spanberger	\$4,085,176.15	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Haley Stevens	\$3,003,136.65	\$175,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Members (26 Members)							
Hon. Mark DeSaulnier	\$445,936.38	\$150,000.00	\$56,666.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Alcee Hastings	\$176,080.52	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Seth Moulton	\$452,644.69	\$150,000.00	\$75,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$10,000.00	2
Hon. Salud Carbajal	\$1,698,487.53	\$150,000.00	\$110,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$150,500.00	\$63,200.00	16
Hon. Adriano Espaillat	\$478,679.02	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$2,095.00	3
Hon. Pramila Jayapal*	\$1,381,416.43	\$150,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$149,000.00	0
Hon. Ro Khanna	\$2,216,426.57	\$150,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$9,000.00	0
Hon. Angie Craig	\$2,508,896.09	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$113,500.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Gil Cisneros	\$1,667,943.24	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Anthony Brindisi	\$2,754,865.67	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$42,000.00	\$0.00	0
<i>Hon. Joe Cunningham</i>	\$3,089,471.48	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Colin Allred	\$2,980,715.39	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$201,900.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Greg Stanton	\$801,014.97	\$150,000.00	\$38,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$32,500.00	\$7,500.00	0
Hon. Josh Harder	\$4,386,842.80	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Jahana Hayes	\$1,190,702.73	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$15,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Debbie Mucarsel-Powell	\$2,758,411.02	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Donna Shalala*	\$1,803,732.44	\$150,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$123,000.00	\$344,124.00	31
Hon. Lucy McBath	\$3,787,981.93	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$47,000.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. David Trone*	\$677,608.47	\$150,000.00	\$398,500.00	\$125,000.00	\$100,000.00	\$497,000.00	179
Hon. Elissa Slotkin	\$4,867,522.76	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Ilhan Omar	\$1,111,861.46	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Tom Malinowski	\$3,313,794.03	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Antonio Delgado	\$3,067,035.36	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Chrissy Houlahan	\$2,692,981.80	\$150,000.00	\$150,000.00	\$125,000.00	\$140,000.00	\$178,760.00	4
Hon. Susan Wild	\$2,093,040.04	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Hon. Kim Schrier	\$2,341,653.71	\$150,000.00	\$0.00	\$125,000.00	\$272,000.00	\$0.00	0

Italicized Members are DCCC Frontline Members.

Dues subject to increase based on committee assignments.

DCCC Raise Goals are subject to change over the course of the cycle.

Bolded Members are DCCC 2018 True Blue Candidates

Members who have an asterisk by their names are DCCC Gavel Society Members or DCCC Leadership Circle Members.

S2. Description of interviews

The text presents the interviews as background material, not as tests of the hypotheses. We conducted 6 semi-structured interviews with high-level staffers in a House office on Capitol Hill or in the member's campaign. By high-level, we mean that each interviewee had decision-making authority and was at least at the level of a legislative director if on the Hill or a political director if on a campaign. The interviews were split evenly between staffers working for Democratic and Republican members. All interviewees were either currently working for a House member or had done so during the time of our data. Each interview lasted between 30-60 minutes and focused on topics including fundraising dynamics and their perceived effects. Because of the sensitivity of these topics, interviewees were granted anonymity other than their party affiliation.

As a set, the members for whom these staffers worked was diverse. (Some staffers worked for multiple members over the time period.) Geographically, the districts encompass ones in the West, Midwest, South, and East. There was also a range of positions within the party hierarchy, including rank-and-file members who did not hold a committee chair, party leadership position, or serve on an A-list committee (i.e., Appropriations, Ways and Means, Financial Services or Energy and Commerce); members on one of these A-list committees; and party leaders. Ideologically, the representatives were diverse as well, including moderates from each party, conservatives, and liberals.

The semi-structured interviews involved open-ended questions that were sufficiently structured to address the same topics but open enough to facilitate information and ideas that were not foreseen. With these goals in mind, we asked each

interviewee similar questions regarding fundraising pressures and incentives, any over-time change in these dynamics, how members obtain donor contacts, perceptions of different types of donors, and general perceptions of the current fundraising system. Several interviews also delved into details regarding the interaction of their member with the fundraising system within their party. Because the interviews occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, they were conducted over zoom or phone other than one case of written responses; for each, we used the preferred medium of the staffer.

S3. Yea votes

Table S3 describes the results of a random effects logit where the dependent variable is the probability of a “yea” vote on roll call i by representative j rather than the probability of the liberal position. All public opinion variables analogously reflect support for the yea position. Likewise, party position reflects whether the representative’s party supported the yea vote, measured by whether a majority of members in the party voted yea.

Table S3. Yea votes

	Yea vote
National donor opinion	5.076** (0.280)
Party position	1.887** (0.140)
District opinion	1.495** (0.284)
Affluent opinion	-2.661** (0.394)
Constant	-2.841** (0.271)
Year effects	included
σ_v	0.592
N	9,921

Note: Dependent variable equals Pr(Yea Vote = 1). Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S4. Alternative baseline models

Table S4 provides alternative specifications of the main model. Column [1] excludes control variables. Column [2] estimates the main specification using a basic logit model. In Column [3] the sample is restricted to those districts where 100 respondents were available in the CCES to estimate district opinion. In Column [4] we measure district opinion with the Ahler and Brookman (2018) estimates, which are based on multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP).¹ Column [5] reports estimates from a fixed effects linear probability model (LPM). Finally, Column [6] provides results for the subset of cases where donors could be validated. In each specification national donor opinion maintains a strong association with member roll call votes.

¹ Using Ahler and Brookman's MRP estimates did not increase the overall sample size because while they did furnish opinion estimates for 278 of 304 cases where our in-district sample size was too small, they did not include one of the issues in our study and did not include estimates for a number of districts in individual survey years. Simply substituting the MRP estimates for the 274 cases was not a viable option since the MRP values, while strongly correlated with direct opinion measures ($\rho=0.92$), have very different cardinal values.

Table S4. Alternative baseline models

	No controls [1]	Basic logit [2]	100 respondent threshold [3]	MRP estimated opinion [4]	Fixed effects, LPM [5]	Validated donors [6]
National donor opinion	6.674** (0.153)	2.968** (0.262)	5.406** (0.373)	3.738** (0.250)	0.666** (0.024)	--
Validated national donor opinion	--	--	--	--	--	14.485** (2.484)
District opinion	--	3.122** (0.393)	1.824** (0.580)	--	0.087** (0.033)	6.466** (2.315)
MRP estimated district opinion	--	--	--	5.010** (0.444)	--	--
Democrat	--	2.433** (0.130)	2.344** (0.202)	2.428** (0.155)	--	2.147** (0.779)
Affluent opinion	--	-0.161 (0.401)	-0.719 (0.609)	-1.586** (0.406)	-0.015 (0.033)	-19.072** (4.124)
Constant	-3.377** (0.099)	-3.186** (0.179)	-3.331** (0.322)	-3.796** (0.231)	0.272** (0.019)	-2.757* (1.079)
Year effects	--	included	included	included	included	--
σ_v	1.165	--	0.866	0.917	--	1.670
<i>N</i>	9,921	9,921	5,450	9,441	9,921	1,169

Note: Dependent variables equals Pr(Liberal Vote =1) in Columns [1], [2], [3], [4] and [6] and Liberal Vote in Column [5]. Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. Columns [1], [3], [4], and [6] include random effects by member, and Column [5] includes member-specific fixed effects. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S5. Alternative party specifications

Table S5 presents alternative models for member partisanship. Column [1] includes a variable for DW-NOMINATE, scaled where higher positive values indicate a more liberal member. Column [2] adds an interaction of majority control with national donor opinion as well as the main effect of majority control. In Columns [3] and [4] we estimate the main specification separately for Democratic and Republican members. The strong associations between national donor opinion and member roll call voting remain with all of these models.

Table S5. Alternative party specifications

	DW- Nominate [1]	Majority control [2]	Democrats [3]	Republicans [4]
National donor opinion	3.064** (0.221)	4.604** (0.381)	3.895** (0.459)	4.910** (0.394)
National donor opinion × majority control	--	-0.655 (0.418)	--	--
District opinion	2.486** (0.321)	2.249** (0.341)	3.474** (0.472)	1.065* (0.488)
DW-NOMINATE	3.749** (0.155)	--	--	--
Affluent opinion	0.856* (0.354)	0.151 (0.357)	-0.520 (0.609)	1.026* (0.439)
Majority control	--	0.161 (0.227)	--	--
Democrat	--	2.316** (0.165)	--	--
Constant	-1.706** (0.209)	-3.415** (0.271)	0.201 (0.604)	-3.739** (0.285)
Year effects	included	included	included	included
σ_v	0.525	0.965	1.109	0.797
<i>N</i>	9,921	9,921	4,907	5,014

Note: Logit models with by-member random effects where the dependent variable equals $\text{Pr}(\text{Liberal Vote} = 1)$. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S6. Subconstituencies

Table S6, presented on the following page, provides alternative specifications that account for subconstituencies including member-specific donors, within-district partisans, national activists, more informed constituents, and large versus small donors. *District Informed Opinion* is based on in-district respondents who could identify the majority party of both the House and the Senate and did not donate to a political candidate that year. Like other public opinion measures, the variable equals the percentage of such respondents who favor the liberal position on the roll call. Similarly, *National Activist Opinion* is based on the percentage of national partisans who engaged in any campaign activity except contributing, and equals the percentage of this group who favor the liberal position. All other variables are defined in the text. The data on national activists and donation size are only available in the CCES from 2008 forward. The coefficients for national donor opinion remain significant at conventional levels through each of these alternative specifications. Furthermore, the difference in estimated effect between small and large donors is not significant ($\chi^2_{(1)}=0.35$; $p=0.55$), indicating that members' responsiveness to donors does not vary significantly between these groups.

Table S6. Subconstituencies, alternative specifications

	District partisan opinion, full sample [1]	National activists [2]	District informed opinion [3]	Size of donations [4]	Member CF score [5]
National donor opinion	4.226** (0.502)	8.079** (0.846)	5.231** (0.458)	--	4.340** (0.260)
National small donor opinion	--	--	--	3.036** (0.983)	--
National large donor opinion	--	--	--	1.916* (0.943)	--
Member CF score	--	--	--	--	1.891** (0.153)
District opinion	0.905 (0.711)	1.544** (0.425)	4.522** (1.071)	0.862* (0.403)	1.893** (0.344)
Democrat	2.589** (0.192)	1.846** (0.171)	1.946** (0.271)	2.178** (0.165)	-0.729* (0.288)
Affluent opinion	0.411 (0.560)	-0.841 (0.447)	-0.063 (0.663)	-0.533 (0.440)	-0.054 (0.375)
District partisan opinion	1.365* (0.638)	--	--	--	--
National activist opinion	--	-3.522** (0.928)	--	--	--
District informed opinion	--	--	-0.618 (0.839)	--	--
Constant	-3.614** (0.302)	-2.397** (0.241)	-5.053** (0.426)	-2.398** (0.240)	-1.321** (0.260)
Year effects	included	included	included	included	included
σ_v	0.915	0.945	0.934	0.934	0.676
<i>N</i>	6,735	7,663	3,996	7,663	9,111

Note: Logit models with by-member random effects where the dependent variable equals Pr(Liberal Vote = 1). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S7. Party position and national donor opinion

Table S7 analyzes whether national donor opinion has a direct association with a member's roll call voting after accounting for any impact it has on the position of the member's party. The supplemental model from Table S3, in which the dependent variable is based on whether a member votes yea, includes party position as an independent variable that is distinct from party affiliation. (By comparison, in the models in which the dependent variable is based on whether the member votes in a liberal/Democratic direction, the differences between the parties are captured by the Democrat indicator.) Building on the yea vote specification with an instrumental variables approach, party position is instrumented by President Bill Clinton's position on the same or a comparable issue when he was president. President Clinton's position should be positively associated with the more recent Democratic Party positions and negatively associated with the Republican Party ones, but otherwise not associated with a member's likelihood of voting yea in the years of the data (2006-2016). Because the endogenous variable in this case is binary, the appropriate method is two-stage least squares (Angrist and Pischke 2009).² Table S7 presents these results.

² Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Table S7. Party position

	1 st -stage [1]	2 nd -stage [2]
National donor opinion	1.512** (0.007)	0.346** (0.086)
Party position	--	0.558** (0.058)
Clinton yea position x Democrat	0.059** (0.010)	--
Clinton yea position Democrat	-0.144** (0.007)	--
District opinion	-0.430** (0.017)	0.168** (0.038)
Affluent opinion	-0.638** (0.022)	-0.193** (0.047)
Constant	0.608** (0.015)	0.062** (0.038)
Year effects	included	included
σ_v	--	0.060
Hausman endogeneity test	$\chi^2(1) = 1.31$ (p=0.998)	
<i>N</i>	9,921	

Note: Two-stage least squares model where the dependent variable in the 1st-stage (Column[1]) is whether the member's party supported the yea position and the dependent variable in the 2nd- stage (Column [2]) is whether the member voted yea. Member-specific random effects included. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S8. Alternative district safety specifications

Table S8 (next page) provides alternative specifications of testing the District Safety Prediction. Columns [1] and [2] report results from linear probability model (LPM) specifications of the analyses in Table 4. In particular, Column [1] provides results from an LPM on the full dataset with random intercepts by member and Column [2] from an LPM for members who served immediately pre-and post-redistricting with member fixed effects. Columns [3], [4], [5] and [6] measure district safety as the percentage of the district's two-party vote for the presidential candidate of the member's party in the most recent election. Columns [3] and [4] are based on the analyses from Table 4 in the main text: a random effects logit model on the full sample in Column [3] followed by a conditional fixed effects logit model among members serving immediately pre- and post-redistricting in Column [4]. Columns [5] and [6] report the results from LPMs of these analyses. All of the alternative specifications suggest that greater electoral safety is associated with increased donor responsiveness.

Table S8. District safety, alternative specifications

	LPM random effects [1]	LPM redistrict. fixed effects [2]	Pres. vote random effects [3]	Pres. vote redistrict. fixed effects [4]	Pres. vote LPM random effects [5]	Pres. Vote LPM redistrict. fixed effects [6]
National donor opinion × Cook PVI	0.020** (0.001)	0.011** (0.003)	--	--	--	--
National donor opinion × Presidential vote	--	--	0.263** (0.016)	0.316** (0.078)	0.019** (0.001)	0.012** (0.003)
District opinion × Cook PVI	-0.030** (0.002)	-0.016** (0.004)	--	--	--	--
District opinion × Presidential vote	--	--	-0.215** (0.022)	-0.267** (0.089)	-0.028** (0.002)	-0.013** (0.004)
National donor opinion Presidential vote	0.483** (0.025)	0.216** (0.047)	-10.651** (0.914)	-11.894** (4.208)	-0.465** (0.081)	-0.378* (0.175)
Cook PVI	0.007** (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	--	--	--	--
District opinion Affluent opinion	0.416** (0.036)	0.194** (0.063)	13.308** (1.256)	15.840** (4.598)	1.843** (0.121)	0.821** (0.221)
Democrat	-0.046 (0.033)	0.005 (0.052)	0.657* (0.355)	-1.859 (1.295)	-0.054 (0.032)	0.003 (0.052)
Constant	0.329 (0.014)	--	2.199** (0.144)	--	0.322** (0.014)	--
Year effects	0.037 (0.022)	0.248 (0.038)	-2.903** (0.715)	--	-0.316** (0.068)	0.314* (0.160)
σ_v	included 0.067	included --	included 0.604	included --	included 0.066	included --
N	9,921	3,148	9,921	1,022	9,921	3,148

Note: Dependent variable equals Liberal Vote in Columns [1], [2], [5], and [6], and Pr(Liberal Vote = 1) in Columns [3] and [4]. Column [1], [3], and [5] includes random effects by member. Columns [2], [4], and [6] include member-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S9. Instrumenting for national donor opinion

Out of concern that national donor opinion might simply follow partisan elite cues and/or that it is endogenous to member roll call votes, we estimate an instrumental variables model. The instruments include lagged national donor opinion and the position of President Bill Clinton on the same or a comparable issue when he was president. Lagged national donor opinion, which is available for the subset of the observations in which the same or a similar roll call emerged within the previous congresses of the CCES data, should be associated with current national donor opinion but not otherwise affect members' roll call votes. Likewise, whether Clinton supported the liberal position should be associated with national donor opinion but otherwise independent of roll call voting. Because Clinton's position should be positively associated with support from Democratic donors and negatively associated with support from Republican ones, we interact the Clinton position variable with the indicator for the member's party. As Table S9 depicts on the following page, the instruments are significantly associated with national donor opinion. Column [2] shows that even after accounting for this effect, national donor opinion still has a significant direct association with member roll call votes. Moreover, the Wald test of exogeneity cannot reject the null of exogeneity.

Table S9. Instrumenting for national donor opinion

	1 st -stage [1]	2 nd -stage [2]
National donor opinion	--	2.481** (0.404)
Lagged national donor opinion	0.242** (0.008)	---
Clinton liberal position x Democrat	0.347** (0.004)	--
Clinton liberal position	-0.160** (0.006)	---
District opinion	0.106** (0.016)	2.927** (0.338)
Democrat	0.243** (0.004)	1.303** (0.234)
Affluent opinion	0.219** (0.009)	0.859 (0.480)
Constant	0.064** (0.009)	-3.464** (0.235)
Year effects	included	included
		$X^2(1) = 0.44$
Wald test of exogeneity		($p=0.51$)
<i>N</i>		3,083

Note: Instrumental variables probit model where the dependent variable in the first stage (Column[1]) is National Donor Opinion and the dependent variable in the second stage (Column [2]) equals $\text{Pr}(\text{Liberal Vote} = 1)$. Standard errors clustered by member in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S10. District safety marginal effects

Table S10 below provides marginal effects associated with the estimates in Table 4, Column [1] in the text. The marginal effects reflect the estimated increase in a member's probability of casting a liberal (conservative) roll call vote associated with a 10 percentage point increase in support for the liberal (conservative) position by national donor opinion at several levels of district electoral safety, ranging from a Cook PVI rating of -5 for the incumbent to a rating of +20.

Supplemental Table S10. Marginal effects at different levels of district safety

District Safety	Marginal effect of 10 percentage point increase in National Donor Opinion
-5	3.1 percentage points
0	5.9 percentage points
5	8.7 percentage points
10	11.4 percentage points
15	14.0 percentage points
20	16.6 percentage points

Note: Marginal effects on probability of liberal roll call vote. Magnitudes based on estimates from Column [1] of Table [4] in the text. Estimates assume variables other than District Safety are at their means.

S11. Member wealth

Table S11 provides estimates that account for member wealth. Column [1] uses a continuous variable of wealth (in millions of dollars), both as a main regressor and interacted with national donor opinion. In Column [2] member wealth is instead measured with a dummy variable indicating if the member was in the top 10% of net worth among members in the chamber for that Congress. No significant effects are observed for member wealth with either measure, and their inclusion in the models does not substantially affect the association between national donor opinion and member roll call voting behavior.

Table S11. Member wealth

	Member wealth [1]	Member wealth, top 10% [2]
National donor opinion × Member wealth	-0.004 (0.005)	--
National donor opinion × Top 10% wealth	--	-0.241 (0.473)
National donor opinion	4.090** (0.253)	4.092** (0.257)
Member wealth	0.003 (0.003)	
Member top 10% wealth	--	0.289 (0.283)
District opinion	2.234** (0.335)	2.275** (0.335)
Affluent opinion	0.238 (0.353)	0.197 (0.354)
Democrat	2.453** (0.157)	2.458** (0.157)
Constant	-3.371** (0.219)	-3.386** (0.221)
Year effects	included	included
σ_v	0.971	0.972
N	9,906	9,884

Note: Logit models with by-member random effects where the dependent variable equals $\text{Pr}(\text{Liberal Vote} = 1)$. Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S12. Committee chairs and legislative voting

Table S12 examines whether committee chairs are more likely to vote in a liberal direction as well as whether chairs are more responsive to national donor opinion. Column [1] examines the baseline model for all members jointly. Columns [2] and [3] allow that the impact may vary by party. All of these analyses suggest that liberal voting is not significantly associated with being a chair, and that chairs are not significantly more responsive to national donor opinion.

Table S12. Committee chairs and legislative voting

	Baseline model [1]	Democrats only [2]	Republicans only [3]
National donor opinion	4.015** (0.252)	3.889** (0.459)	4.843** (0.398)
District opinion	2.238** (0.334)	3.469** (0.472)	1.069* (0.488)
Democrat	2.474** (0.157)	--	--
Affluent opinion	0.274 (0.353)	-0.518 (0.609)	1.025* (0.439)
Chair	0.307 (0.347)	-0.344 (1.300)	-0.162 (0.408)
Chair × National donor opinion	0.492 (0.638)	0.362 (1.580)	0.994 (0.951)
Constant	-3.397** (0.219)	0.208 (0.605)	-3.735** (0.286)
Year effects	included	included	included
σ_v	0.964	1.110	0.794
<i>N</i>	9,921	4,907	5,014

Note: Dependent variables equals Pr(Liberal Vote =1). Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All analyses include member random effects. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

S13. Out-of-district donations marginal effects

Table S13 reports marginal effects from estimates in Table 5, Column [1] and Column [3] in the text.

Supplemental Table S13. Marginal effects at different out-of-district donations levels

Panel A. Analysis of out-of-district donations

% Out-of-district donations	Marginal effect of 10 percentage increase in National Donor Opinion
10%	6.0 percentage points
30%	6.9 percentage points
50%	7.8 percentage points
70%	8.6 percentage points
90%	9.3 percentage points

Note: Marginal effects on probability of liberal roll call vote. Magnitudes based on estimates from Column [1] of Table [5] in text. Estimates assume variables other than %Out-of-District Donations are at their means.

Panel B. Analysis of out-of-district donations and district safety

% Out-of-district donations	Marginal effect of 10 percentage increase in National Donor Opinion	
	District Safety = 0	District Safety = 20
10%	4.3 percentage points	15.5 percentage points
30%	4.9 percentage points	16.0 percentage points
50%	5.6 percentage points	16.4 percentage points
70%	6.1 percentage points	16.7 percentage points
90%	6.7 percentage points	17.0 percentage points

Note: Marginal effects on probability of liberal roll call vote. Magnitudes based on estimates from Column [3] of Table [5] in text. Estimates assume variables other than %Out-of-District Donations and District Safety are at their means.

Table S14. Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Liberal vote	9,921	0.543	0.498	0	1
Yea vote	9,921	0.596	0.491	0	1
National donor opinion	9,921	0.562	0.329	0.044	0.984
National donor opinion (House donors only)	7,663	0.563	0.337	0.028	0.970
District opinion	9,921	0.591	0.175	0.035	0.987
MRP estimated district opinion	9,441	0.572	0.153	0.158	0.919
District partisan opinion	6,735	0.585	0.280	0	1
Democrat	9,921	0.495	0.500	0	1
DW-NOMINATE	9,921	-0.046	0.437	-0.913	0.685
Affluent opinion	9,921	0.546	0.163	0.237	0.869
Activist opinion	7,663	0.558	0.272	0.086	0.943
Validated donor opinion	1,169	0.462	0.349	0.073	0.993
In-district donor opinion (CCES)	129	0.551	0.371	0	1
In-district donor opinion (CF scores of in-district individual donors)	8,373	-0.080	0.804	-1.575	1.442
Informed district opinion	3,996	0.591	0.184	0.071	1
Small donor opinion	7,663	0.576	0.313	0.060	0.965
Large donor opinion	7,663	0.554	0.326	0.026	0.978
Lagged national donor opinion	3,083	0.572	0.307	0.104	0.977
District safety (Cook PVI)	9,921	10.510	10.666	-22	44
District safety (Presidential vote)	9,921	60.639	10.901	23.706	97.061
Member CF Score	9,111	-0.089	0.871	-1.482	1.504
% Out-of-district donations	9,608	64.399	20.035	0	100
Member wealth (1,000,000's)	9,906	6.084	29.400	-24.4	501.0
Member wealth (top 10%)	9,884	0.100	0.301	0	1
Majority party status	9,921	0.559	0.497	0	1
Committee chair	9,921	0.041	0.198	0	1
Clinton position	9,921	0.617	0.486	0	1
Party position	9,921	0.582	0.493	0	1

Note: Summary statistics for each variable include observations where member cast a roll call vote and for opinion variables calculated from CCES survey data where 40 or more respondents from the corresponding district were available.