Fundraising for Stigmatized Groups: A Text Message Donation Experiment

As government welfare programming contracts and NGOs increasingly assume core aid functions, they must address a longstanding challenge in aid provision—the fact that those in greatest need are often members of stigmatized groups. We studied donations to a school lunch program by fielding an experiment in the context of a text-to-give campaign in Greece. Donations did not increase with an appeal to the in-group (Greek child), relative to a control (child), but were halved when we referenced a heavily stigmatized out-group (Roma child). Moreover, an appeal to fundamental rights, the most common appeal strategy used by minority advocates, did not reduce the generosity gap. Donations to all groups were two-thirds lower near Roma settlements. We supplemented our experiment with qualitative research in twelve communities, to better understand Greek-Roma interactions. We conclude that NGO fundraising strategies that narrowly emphasize the needs of particular ethnic groups, whether these are in-groups or out-groups, or the language of fundamental rights, may not be as effective as broader appeals, and discuss implications for public goods provision in an era of growing xenophobia.

DRAFT – COMMENTS WELCOME

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I. Introduction

As government welfare spending contracts across much of the Western world, non-governmental organizations are increasingly funding basic social needs (Korpi and Palme 2003; Rothgang et al. 2005; Ball 2007; Diller 2001). Given their expanding role in public service provision, aid organizations must address the fact that those in greatest need are often members of stigmatized groups (Kogut and Ritov 2011; Belcher and DeForge 2012). Indeed, NGOs face an acute trade-off between effective aid programming and sustainable financing. When they seek donations for narrowly tailored programs, they optimize service delivery to the groups most in need, but the stigma associated with these groups may greatly reduce donations.

Many NGOs are aware of these tradeoffs. Some focus on making in-group appeals by emphasizing shared characteristics between donors and recipients, such as shared religion or language (Koch et al. 2009). However, these in-group appeals can result in the exclusion of the most vulnerable and stigmatized, as in the case of anti-poverty efforts that exclude the ‘ultra poor’ in Bangladesh (Matin and Hulme 2003), or HIV prevention programs that exclude persons who contracted the virus through sexual activity (Amirkhanian et al. 2004). In contrast, other NGOs try to increase out-group generosity by making universalistic appeals to human rights, hoping that these appeals will shift cognitive representations of out-group members from an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ to a more inclusive ‘we’ orientation (Gaertner and Dovidio 2014; Scroggins et al. 2016). For example, advocates for the Roma in Europe have used the language of human rights to increase out-group altruism for more than two decades (Cortes 2015; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017). That said, we don’t have good evidence to know whether in-
group appeals, appeals to universal rights, or some other strategy is most likely to increase donations, and what trade-offs each strategy involves, despite large bodies of related research.

A wide range of observational studies suggest that ethnically diverse communities provide less funding for public goods than homogenous ones (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Stichninh and Van der Straeten 2013). Similarly, extensive behavioral research documents that individuals are more likely to donate to in-group than to out-group members (Balliet, Wu, and de Dreu 2014; Whitaker, Colombo, and Rand 2018). However, observational studies can easily overstate the causal effect of ethnic heterogeneity, because minority communities often suffer from multiple disadvantages researchers cannot fully control for (Sing and von Hau 2016; Lee 2018). In turn, even the best designed lab experiments and lab-in-the-field studies tend to suffer from external validity concerns. For instance, they often involve researcher money and subjects that know they are being observed, which can lead to overestimates of generosity and underreporting of prejudiced behavior (Harrison and List 2004). The strongest field experiments on discrimination unobtrusively vary the ethnicity of job applicants, loan applicants, and service providers, and examine the magnitude of real-life responses by employers, lenders, and customers who are not aware that they are being observed (e.g., Banerjee 2008; Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010; Booth, Leigh, and Vargarova 2012; Ayres et al. 2004).

We build on this tradition of unobtrusive field experiments by studying discrimination for the first time, in an increasingly widely used fundraising technique: the text to-give campaign. Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the Red Cross raised over $43 million dollars through SMS donations, and this campaign’s success became a model for other charities. NGOs value
text-to-give campaigns because they not only use them to raise funds, but also to cheaply communicate their important work to very wide audiences. These appeals are also increasingly used by political campaigns; for example, more than 10% of the adults who donated in the 2012 U.S. election donated via text message (Smith and Duggan 2012). Moreover, since mobile phones are now low cost and ubiquitous across high, middle, and low-income countries, text-to-give campaigns have proliferated worldwide (Smith 2011a; 2011b; Chen and Givens 2013).

In addition, we build on the large body of work that suggests that contexts greatly influences intergroup interactions and generosity (e.g., Condra and Linardi 2019). Intergroup generosity is believed to be highest in contexts where institutions and norms support integration and groups are of equal status, such as schools (Alexander and Christia 2011). In such contexts, increased interaction between groups can increase public goods provision, according to contact theory (e.g., Allport, 1954, Pettigrew 1998; Whitt and Wilson 2007; McLaren 2003; Gao 2016). In contrast, unstructured group interaction many other contexts can lead to conflict and reduce public good provisions, according to the competing racial threat theory (e.g., Enos 2014; Adida Laitin and Valafort 2016). However, little is known about contexts in which ethnic and religious groups interact very little due to de jure or de facto segregation, despite the fact that such settings are perhaps the most challenging for policy-makers.

We focus on the Roma as an out-group because they are Europe’s most isolated and persistently poor community (Berescu 2011; Vincze and Rat 2013; EU Commission 2014; EU-MIDIS II 2016; Powell and Lever 2017), but are surprisingly understudied (Bracic 2016). In the 9 EU states with the largest Roma populations, 80% of the Roma live in poverty and almost half live in
households that lack basic housing amenities (EU-MIDIS II 2016, 3-9). Due to their Indo-Aryan ethnic origins, the Roma are commonly stereotyped as a transient community, although around 80% of Europe’s Roma population is sedentary, often residing in segregated settlements (European Commission 2011). Their social isolation and ghettoization is, in large part, due to their stigmatization as beggars and welfare scroungers lacking in work ethic and social responsibility (Grill 2012; Crețan and Powell 2018). They are often considered at fault for their social seclusion, labeled as “asocial, inadaptable, unwilling to integrate, and involved in illegal activities” (van Baar 2011, 203).

Across the EU, while expressed prejudice toward other vulnerable groups decreased over the last decade, expressed prejudice toward the Roma remains consistently high. The stickiness of Roma prejudice is, in part, a function of their extreme social isolation. As Figure 1 illustrates, only 18% of Europeans report having a Roma friend or acquaintance, which is extremely low compared to European integration with other out-groups (European Commission 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015). ¹

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¹ Greeks view the Roma even more negatively than the average European. While 45% of all Europeans feel comfortable if their children date a Roma person, only 21% of Greeks do, and while 18% of all EU respondents have Roma friends or acquaintances, 11% of Greeks do (European Commission 2015, 24).
To better understand how NGOs can increase generosity toward stigmatized aid recipients in the context of de facto segregation, we embedded a unique, large-scale field experiment in a text-to-give campaign in Greece. We partnered with an NGO in Greece that serves free lunches in public schools. Text-to-give campaigns are common in Greece, in part because the major phone carriers provide registered NGOs with three opportunities a year to fundraise using text donation requests. This allowed us to conduct an unobtrusive intervention with high external validity.\(^2\) In

\(^2\) Our study was pre-registered with EGAP, ID XXX and approved under IRB XXX. When subjects signed up for their phone service plan, they consented to receiving various inquiries, including donation
addition, Greece is an ideal study site because it is a homogeneous society comprised of one dominant in-group. Ethnic Greeks constitute roughly 89% of the population, and the ethnic Roma, which is Greece’s largest minority population, comprise 3% of the population (United Nations 2009, 6).

We requested a small but non-trivial charitable contribution to children in a school lunch program (1.5 euro (<$2)), and made a small variation on the request (same NGO, same program, but different beneficiaries). We also varied whether we included an appeal to fundamental rights in the request to test the efficacy of this commonly employed frame. We found that respondents are half as likely to donate when told that their donation benefits a Roma child as compared to a Greek child or a child with no specified ethnicity. However, respondents exhibit no in-group favoritism, insofar as they were not more likely to donate when told that their donation benefits a Greek child compared to a child with no specified ethnicity. In contrast to a large literature on the efficacy of in-group appeals in boosting generosity, our findings suggest that donation discrepancies are instead driven by individuals’ reaction to the out-group (Roma) appeal. We found that an appeal to universal rights neither influences donation magnitude nor reduces the ethnic discrepancy in generosity. This suggests that NGOs need to consider employing broad-based fundraising appeals. Finally, we use our donation measure to revisit a major debate on how geographic proximity to minorities shapes public goods provision and generosity. We found that Greeks living near Roma settlements reduce their donations to Roma children by one-third requests. Under EU laws governing privacy and telecoms, we received very limited information about our subjects from the partner Greek telephone company.
compared to Greeks living farther away. However, donations to all ethnic groups decline near settlements at similar rates.

This paper proceeds as follows: first, we review existing scholarship on how ethnic diversity influences public goods provision and outline our theory and three main hypotheses. Next, we describe our research design and present our experimental findings. Then, we use qualitative interview evidence from twelve Greek schools matched on community characteristics to discuss how Roma stigmatization shapes interethnic interactions—even in communities that invest heavily in Roma integration. We conclude by discussing the implications of our research for important debates in the NGO community about how to best increase altruism toward stigmatized groups. We also discuss the implications of our findings for debates on how out-group proximity and social isolation shape welfare programs and social capital.

II. Relevant Literature

There is a large literature on public goods provision that suggests that ethnically diverse communities have significantly lower funding for public goods and welfare programs (e.g., Poterba 1997; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Okten and Osili 2004; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Hopkins 2009; Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 2013), and that this is fueled by greater trust within ethnic groups than across group lines (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002), a preference for the welfare of one’s in-group (Tajfel 1974; Vigdor 2004); in-group reciprocity norms (Habyrimana et al. 2007), and the reactive impulse to impose invasive social controls on out-groups (Brewer and Gaertner 2001; Eitle et al. 2002). Although this literature provides important
insight into the range of mechanisms that shape public goods provision, it does not directly address how to remedy ethnic biases in other-regarding preferences. Our objective is to build on this literature, but to directly address the question of how NGOs can best raise funds for their stigmatized beneficiaries. This requires a shift in the methodology used to study public goods provision.

Much of the public goods literature is based on observational data, which means that omitted variable bias remains a major concern. That is, because ethnically heterogeneous communities often suffer from multiple disadvantages (including less wealth, weaker institutions, and weaker social trust), observational studies that cannot fully control for all of these disadvantages could overstate the effects of in-group favoritism and out-group prejudice (Sing and vom Hau 2016; Lee 2018).

Important correctives to these observational studies, including lab and lab-in-the-field experiments, have greatly improved our understanding of generosity towards in-groups and out-groups through dictator experiments, trust and ultimatum games, and social dilemma games (e.g., Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr 2006; Chen and Li 2009; Greenwald et al. 2009; Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; Kubota et al. 2013). However, even state-of-the-art experimental research features a number of methodological limitations, and may systematically understate the true impact of in-group favoritism and out-group bias, or simply fail to produce generalizable findings.
First, these studies often feature limited institutional or geographic variation. For example, we know from lab-in-the-field experiments in ethnically segregated and integrated schools in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina that norms of reciprocity form between ethnic groups in integrated settings, decreasing the group-based biases that appear in segregated schools (Alexander and Christia 2011). We also know from a recent lab-in-the-field experiment in Kabul, Afghanistan that day workers donate more to in-group members when out-group members are physically present than when they are not (Condra and Linardi 2019). However, it is unclear whether other-regarding preferences from these single city studies are generalizable. Moreover, since these studies tend to feature convenience samples, their study populations are largely unrepresentative.

Second, even the few lab-in-the-field experiments that feature multiple study sites, such as Enos and Gidron’s studies of intra-Jewish cleavages (2016) and Jewish-Palestinian discrimination (2018) have subjects allocate funds granted to them by the study administrators. This common experimental feature is highly problematic, insofar that it may unduly inflate generosity in general, and out-group generosity in particular (Harrison and List 2004).

Third, these experiments develop obtrusive measures of other-regarding preferences, since they involve the direct elicitation of data from the research subjects. The presence of researchers, site administrators, and members of ethnic in-groups and out-groups all contribute to a study environment in which individuals know that they are being observed. This may make them act with more generosity and reciprocity, as well as with less prejudice, than they would otherwise (Scacco and Warren 2018).
The strongest field experiments manage to unobtrusively vary the ethnicity of job applicants, loan applicants, and service providers, and examine the magnitude of real-life responses by employers, lenders, and customers who are not aware that they are being observed (e.g., Banerjee 2008; Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010; Booth, Leigh, and Varganova 2012; Ayres et al. 2004). We build on this tradition of unobtrusive field experiments by studying other-regarding preferences for the first time, using a popular fundraising technique: the text-to-give campaign. Our study allows us to assess how a broad range of ordinary individuals make snap judgments that might be driven both by conscious and subconscious bias.

That said, two mechanisms are likely to be uniquely powerful in the charitable giving context. First, we expect perceptions that minority recipients are at fault for their poverty and thus undeserving to be particularly relevant, and to reduce giving to out-groups (Fong and Luttmer 2011; Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004). Second, however, we expect that a competing mechanism—the perception that minority recipients are especially needy—to work in the opposite direction (Cheung and Chan 2000; Bekkers and Weipking 2011).

III. Theory and Hypotheses

To study the ethnic dynamics of public goods distribution, we experimentally examine other-regarding behavior—that is, “behavior that meets social or civic obligations despite the lack of material incentives to do so” (Persico and Silverman 2006, 1). We connect our text message donation experiment to three major debates in the literature: (1) to what extent individuals exhibit greater altruism toward their ethnic in-group than toward their out-groups; (2) whether
universal rights appeals reduce this discrepancy in other-regarding preferences; and (3) whether geographic proximity to a minority group increases or decreases this discrepancy.

One major ongoing debate in the other-regarding behavior literature concerns the extent to which individuals exhibit differential altruism toward ethnic in-groups and out-groups. While some studies find that individuals distribute more rewards to in-group members than to out-group members in any setting (Brewer 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Brewer and Brown 1998; Ben-Ner et al. 2009), others argue that in-group favoritism only emerges under certain social conditions. For example, Habyrimana et al. (2007) run a series of lab-in-the-field experiments in Uganda and find that in-group bias emerges in repeated games where players can establish in-group reciprocity norms. Numerous studies echo this finding (e.g., Gintis et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis 2004; Goette, Hoffman, and Meier 2006). In real world settings, however, we expect larger in-group and out-group discrepancies in donations than what is suggested by lab and lab-in-the-field experiments. We expect that the generosity gap is especially large when there are few social opportunities to develop norms of intergroup reciprocity with stigmatized groups.

We expect significant discrepancies in donation to in-group and out-group members in the Greek context because ethnic groups in Greece have strong in-group reciprocity norms and strong out-group biases, which are often exacerbated by ethnic segregation. Recognizing the utility of emphasizing shared in-group characteristics in donation appeals, many European NGOs tailor aid programming to benefit potential donors’ in-group members at the expense of Roma communities. For example, NGOs that work to reduce inter-ethnic tensions in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine systematically exclude the Roma from programming that fosters contact
between ethnic minorities because the Roma are more visually and physically distinct, reducing likelihood of program success (Stroschein 2002). Similarly, aid organizations based in Hungary rely on co-ethnic appeals to fundraise for programming that exclusively benefits ethnic Hungarian minorities living in other Eastern European countries, while ignoring the Roma communities that suffer from significantly higher levels of economic and social disenfranchisement (Stroschein 2002, 5).

As such, even in anonymous text donations where no reciprocity norms can be established, we expect that Greeks respond generously to in-group appeals but poorly to out-group appeals. Our study design, which employs a neutral control condition (‘child’) in addition to the in-group condition (‘Greek child’) and out-group condition (‘Roma child’), allows us to test three hypotheses about the impact of other-regarding preferences on donation rates:

\[ H_{1A}: \text{Individuals respond more generously to in-group appeals than to out-group appeals, which will translate to higher donations to Greek children than to Roma children.} \]

\[ H_{1B}: \text{Individuals respond more generously to in-group appeals than to appeals which do not invoke a sense of ‘in-group love’—which will translate to higher donations to Greek children than to ethnically unspecified children.} \]

\[ H_{1C}: \text{Individuals respond less generously to out-group appeals than to appeals which do not invoke a sense of ‘out-group bias’— which will translate to lower donations to Roma children than to ethnically unspecified children.} \]

A second major debate in the legal and human rights literature examines whether emphasizing minorities’ access to fundamental rights boosts support for stigmatized groups. Because the language of rights resonates across cultures and appeals to universal values (Cole 2006; Schmitz 2012), both scholars and activists claim that these frames can bolster support for women (Reily
2007), ethnic minorities (Morrison, Plaut, and Ybarra 2010), different castes (Bob 2007; Lerche 2008), and migrant workers (Sim 2003; Basok and Carasco 2010).

Survey and lab experiments on donations suggest that ethnic discrepancies can be reduced through appeals to broader social values (e.g., human rights), because they shift cognitive representations of out-group members from an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ to a more inclusive ‘we’ orientation (Gaertner and Dovidio 2014; Scroggins et al. 2016). After individuals recategorize former out-group members, they are more likely to evaluate them positively and impart benefits associated with group membership. For example, scholars found that emphasizing that Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees share a common Muslim identity reduces prejudice against refugees (Lazarev and Sharma 2017), and appealing to a common German identity reduced conflict between East and West Germans (Kessler and Mummendey 2001). Moreover, in experiments where out-group members’ global identity was made salient, they were treated with more empathy (Buchan et al. 2011; Reysen and Katzarska-Miller 2013; Lazarev and Sharma 2017) and given more aid (Levitt and Merry 2009; Reese, Proch, and Finn 2015).

However, it is unclear whether the language of human rights can shift altruism towards out-groups in real-world contexts where the out-group is extremely stigmatized. The few interactions that occur between Greeks and Roma are typically marginal, devoid of social value, and reinforce the social and cognitive distance between groups (Bharathi, Malghan and Rahman 2018). It is possible that extreme stigma makes it impossible for in-groups members to shift cognitive representations to a more inclusive ‘we’ orientation. In turn, we use our field experiment to test the following hypothesis:
Finally, we connect our study to a large literature that examines how geographic proximity to a minority group affects ethnic discrepancies in other-regarding preferences. Scholarly debate on the proximity thesis stems in part from a major unresolved methodological challenge. Minority communities tend to be placed in undesirable geographic locations rather than randomly situated. This means that different levels of public goods provision or lower donation rates could be due to income, education, or other disparities across these communities rather than due to ethnic biases. While observational work aims to control for these influences, concerns linger about unobserved differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous communities. For example, while scholars often control for poverty rates and education, community-level trust and social capital are rarely measured and could be just as critical to explaining donation rates. Because our study was large and fielded across a broad range of communities, we are able to replicate the methodology of prior observational studies that examine whether donation rates are higher or lower near minority communities. In addition, however, we can examine whether donation rates near minority communities change across the board, or decline disproportionately for the Roma out-group.

There is also a lack of theorizing around the types of intergroup contact that typically occur in heterogeneous communities. Contact theory suggests that increased interaction between groups may improve cooperation, promote the formation of norms of reciprocity, and increase public goods provision (e.g., Allport, 1954, Pettigrew 1998; Whitt and Wilson 2007; McLaren 2003; Gao 2016). However, intergroup generosity is highest in contexts where institutions and norms support integration and groups are of equal status, such as schools (Alexander and Christia
2011). Therefore, our study does not contribute to the contact literature because positive interactions are so rare between ethnic Greeks and Roma, and so few institutions facilitate meaningful Roma integration, that the Greek context fails to meet the scope conditions for contact to manifest in positive intergroup dynamics.

Alternatively, variants of the racial threat hypothesis suggest that dominant groups develop exaggerated fears of economic, political, and criminal threats posed by large minority populations, and that ethnic distinctions increase in heterogeneous communities (e.g., Brewer and Gaertner 2001; Eitle et al. 2002). The best evidence of racial threat is found in communities characterized by casual, non-institutionalized, and involuntary interethnic contact. For example, Enos (2014) randomly exposed whites to Spanish-speaking Latinos during their daily commutes and found an increase in whites’ support for exclusionary immigration policies toward Mexicans after consecutive exposure. Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2016) found that increasing the presence of Senegalese Muslims in a dictator game decreased French interethnic donations. Condra and Linardi (2019) found that day workers in Afghanistan donated more to in-group members when out-group members were physically present. According to the logic of racial threat, unstructured intergroup contact highlights intergroup differences in physical and cultural attributes, increases in-group favoritism, and leads to conflict and a reduction in public goods.

There is also some preliminary evidence for a third alternative; in addition to these two well-established theories, segregation may be important for understanding distinct patterns of public goods provision (Enos and Celaya 2018). Alexander and Christia (2011) find that norms of reciprocity fail to operate under institutions of segregation, because threats of social sanctioning
are not perceived as credible when groups are homogenous and tight-knit. What happens when norms of reciprocity break down, and there is little exposure to out-groups? The research on how segregation in heterogeneous communities shapes public goods is very thin, and the results of prior studies have limited applicability to heavily stigmatized out-groups. For example, Troustine (2018) provides observational evidence from U.S. city elections that segregation along racial lines further exacerbates public goods inequalities, through the mechanism of political polarization and the inability of diverse groups to generate policy consensus. Ejdemyr, Kramon, and Robinson (2018) find that ethnic segregation promotes in-group favoritism by local politicians and motivates them to discriminate in resource distribution. These studies provide limited evidence that segregated communities create opportunities for new political cleavages to emerge, and that these political forces exacerbate public goods discrepancies between ethnic groups. However, this form of collective action is aimed at local politicians, and unlikely to influence funds stemming from disaggregated individual donors.

To test the effect of extreme social segregation in diverse communities, we exploit variation in the distribution of Roma settlements in Greece, and compare other-regarding preferences near and far from these segregated communities. We expect that proximity either exacerbates Greeks’ perception of intergroup differences and that living in socially segregated neighborhoods increases in-group trust, or that ethnic segregation implies that there is effectively no ‘treatment effect’ associated with proximity. Therefore, our third hypothesis has two variants:

\( H_{3A} \): *Geographic proximity to an out-group (Roma) reduces donations to all groups.*

\( H_{3B} \) *Geographic proximity to an out-group (Roma) reduces donations to this out-group disproportionately.*
This experiment was carried out in coordination with Prolepsis, a Greek NGO, and a text messaging company that operates with the three major mobile carriers in Greece. The text messages had six experimental variations of a request for a small financial donation to the Diatrofi Program, which provides free lunch to Greece’s poorest public schools. Individuals were randomly assigned to receive a message requesting a 1.5 Euro donation for the nourishment of a Roma child, Greek child, or a ‘child’ with no ethnic specification. Since scholars often compare in-group and out-group treatments without providing a baseline measure in comparison, it is difficult to know when effects are driven by in-group favoritism and when they are due to out-group bias. To address this ambiguity and clarify the mechanism by which generosity operates, we add a baseline comparison treatment. The other experimental variation consisted of informing half of participants that, “Every child has a right to food;” the other half did not receive a rights appeal. In sum, the experiment has a 3 (child background: - / Greek / Roma) x 2 (Human rights appeal: present/absent) factorial between subjects design. The exact wording of the six experimental variations of the text message can be found in Appendix III.

Our nationwide SMS experiment was administered from March 24th to March 28th, 2016. The study’s subjects are adults living in Greece who are customers of one of these three mobile

3 In our Roma text message frame, we used the word “Ρομά” rather than a commonly used pejorative term “Τσιγγάνος” (gypsy).
carriers and have consented to receiving texts requesting donations from licensed NGOs. They have also agreed to have broad, unidentifiable aggregate data disclosed, including their age, gender, and ZIP code. Unfortunately, this provides our analysis with few covariates; however, we can infer certain demographic characteristics from the ZIP code level data.\(^4\)

79,368 individuals spread across Greece received one of these treatments. The SMS company implemented the randomization; our checks below illustrate the randomization was successful. Approximately 60\% of messages—47,887—were reportedly received. The rest were sent to numbers that were no longer valid or were unable to receive messages at the time these were sent. Based on conversations with the SMS company, messages were likely not delivered because many numbers were out of date.\(^5\) Notably, since 40\% of subjects were dropped before they were assigned to a text message treatment, we conduct an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis. Since we can reasonably assume that ‘dead’ phone numbers are independent of treatment assignment, no post-treatment bias enters our study.

In total, we received 510 Euros in donation via SMS from 291 respondents. Respondents could reply to the text message multiple times; each respondent donated between 1.5 and 15 Euros, averaging 1.75 Euros in donation per donor. This total is low relative to the overall Diatrofi

\(^4\) On average, Greece has about 7,100 inhabitants per ZIP code. However, there is wide variance around that estimate due to the country’s geographic characteristics, including its many small islands and mountain ranges.

\(^5\) Residents of Greece change phone numbers frequently because new SIM cards often come with special offers; indicatively, Greece has 175 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, the highest rate in the EU (Eurostat 2016).
program budget, which is in the millions of Euros, and is used to serve free lunches at low-income schools across Greece. However, our 0.6% response rate for a single text message is in line with response rates reported by other researchers making a one-time, unsolicited donation request (Damgaard and Gravert 2017). Response rates across one-time, unsolicited mobilization strategies are generally low, ranging from face-to-face canvassing with an 8% average response rate, to volunteer phone calls with a 3% average, to commercial phone calls with a 0.6% average, to direct mail campaigns with a 0.6% average (Dale and Strauss 2009; Nickerson and List 2007; Ha and Karlan 2009). Repeated donation appeals typically increase the likelihood that an individual donates (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011).

Table 1 offers summary statistics on demographic characteristics by treatment group. The table illustrates that differences in summary statistics between treatments are very small in magnitude, as we would expect when randomization is carried out correctly. The average SMS recipient was 40 years old, and the subject pool was skewed towards men (65% men; 35% women). From respondents’ ZIP codes we can infer some characteristics of their communities. 42% of SMS recipients reside in Attica, which encompasses Athens and its vicinities, and in which almost half of the Greek population lives; another 19% of recipients reside in Central Macedonia, a region that contains Greece’s second largest city, Thessaloniki (Hellenic Statistical Authority 2014). 10% of SMS recipients live in a ZIP code with a Roma settlement. The ZIP code level median individual income was 7,342 Euro, while the average child poverty rate was 29%. Additionally, we indicate when an SMS respondent falls into one of three categories—residing in a small 

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6 Note that the 0.6% response rate is calculated using the 47,887 SMS received as the denominator; it falls to 0.4% if we include all messages sent (received and not received).
(20,000-40,000 in population), mid-sized (40,000-80,000 population), or large municipality (>80,000 in population). To discern any differences between the means of treatment groups on each demographic characteristic, we started with a series of one-way ANOVA tests, which did not show any statistically significant differences (Appendix II, Table II.1). We then run a randomization check to ensure balance across treatment conditions; using logit models, we assess whether we can predict assignment to particular treatment groups based on individual and ZIP code level characteristics (Appendix II, Table II.2). We also run an additional multivariate regression in Appendix II, Table II.3, with our individual and ZIP code level control variables as our outcome, and five of six treatment dummies as our explanatory variable. The coefficients do not suggest a problem with the randomization.
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<th>Child</th>
<th>Child Rights</th>
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<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.6 (0, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium city (40,000-80,000) (%)</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>31.6 (0, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large city (80,000+) (%)</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>47.3 (0, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma settlement in ZIP (%)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.0 (0, 100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1: Demographic Characteristic Means by Treatment Group

This table displays demographic characteristic means by treatment group. As determined by a series of one-way ANOVA tests, there is no statistically significant difference between the means of groups on any demographic characteristic. This provides additional assurance that our experiment was properly randomized. For the full results of the one-way ANOVA tests, please see Appendix II, Table II.1.
One important caveat of our research design is that we lack data on SMS recipients’ ethnicity. In a multiethnic society with many large minority groups, this would severely limit inference. However, this is less problematic in societies with a single preeminent ethnic group. While many Roma possess cell phones, to receive SMS donation requests, individuals have to subscribe with a company for an extended time period. It is therefore improbable that Roma are overrepresented in our sample or within our donor pool, and we are able to maintain our base assumption that ‘Greek’ is the reference in-group, and ‘Roma’ is the predominant reference out-group in our experiment.

As an additional check, Figure 2 maps where donations originated. We see that donations are geographically dispersed across regions with various economic levels. As expected, many donors reside in major metropolitan areas such as Athens and Thessaloniki, which are the most densely populated areas of Greece (Hellenic Statistical Authority 2014). The map also shows that Thrace, a poor and mountainous region bordering Bulgaria and Turkey, where a different important minority resides—the Muslim minority that is predominantly of Turkish origin — is not heavily represented among donors, as we would expect.

In subsequent sections, we investigate how donations correlate with income and Roma settlement locations; the relative scarcity of donations from low-income communities and near Roma settlements gives us additional assurance that ethnic Roma are not overrepresented in our donor sample. Figure I.1 in Appendix I maps Roma settlements throughout Greece to further illustrate this point.
V. Findings

i. Large Donation Discrepancies & Ineffective Rights Frames

Figure 3 presents the results of a logistic regression model to predict the probability of donation as a function of treatment assignment, controlling for age, gender, location, median individual
income, children in poverty, and city size. The full logit model can be found in Appendix II,

Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Donation by Treatment Condition (with 95% CIs)

Logistic regression predicting donation based on treatment condition, with controls for age, gender, Attica, Central Macedonia, median individual income, percentage of children in poverty, and city size. For full specification and robustness checks, please see Appendix II, Table II.5.

Table II.5, Model 2.
Our data indicate that, relative to the out-group appeals, the other appeals more than doubled the probability of donation, from a 0.22% average donation rate to a 0.45% average donation rate.\(^7\) This finding is statistically significant, and consistent with our expectation in hypothesis 1c that out-group bias and social stigma depresses generosity toward the Roma in Greece. This finding does not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of controls or on the functional form of our regression, as the robustness checks in Appendix II Table II.4 show. Our data also indicate that, relative to the out-group appeals, the in-group appeals increased the probability of donation from 0.26% average donation rate under the out-group appeals to .41% under the in-group appeals.\(^8\) This finding is statistically significant, and consistent with our expectation in hypothesis 1a that individuals respond more generously to in-group (Greek) appeals than to out-group (Roma) appeals.

On its own, evidence of hypothesis 1a could be interpreted as in-group preference, or ‘in-group love’ towards ethnic Greeks. However, our experimental design allows us to eliminate this common explanation for ethnic discrepancies in other-regarding behavior. We find no evidence of in-group favoritism; no statistically significant differences emerge when we reference ‘child’ (παιδί) as opposed to ‘Greek child’ (Ελληνόπουλο) in the text message, disconfirming hypothesis

\(^7\) Note that these donation probabilities average 0.4% rather than 0.6% because we analyze all people who were sent a message (intent-to-treat) (n=79,368) as our baseline rather examining the texts that were actually received (n=47,887).

\(^8\) Note that these donation probabilities average 0.4% rather than 0.6% because we analyze all people who were sent a message (intent-to-treat) (n=79,368) as our baseline rather examining the texts that were actually received (n=47,887).
1b. In other words, in-group cues do not elicit greater degrees of altruism in our experiment. Moreover, the control conditions (‘child’ and ‘child rights’) elicit the highest donations of the six treatment variants. We can therefore attribute the donation discrepancy to respondents’ reluctance to donate to a strongly disfavored out-group. Figure 3 also demonstrates that the fundamental right appeal does not reduce donation discrepancies, contrary to Hypothesis 2. Additional checks (in Appendix II Table II.5) demonstrate that the substantively small differences between the framings Greek child/Greek rights, Child/Child rights, and Roma child/Roma rights are never statistically significant.

This disappointing result for Roma rights advocates is inconsistent many of the prior studies discussed earlier. However, this null effect is consistent with two recent experimental studies on rights language fielded in California and Norway that also report null results (Bloemraad, Silva, and Voss 2016; Ivarsflaten and Sniderman 2017). One possibility worth investigating is that rights language can shift attitudes and behaviors only among persons who have not already incorporated this language into their thinking. That is, it is possible that people considering donating to a free lunch program already believe in a right to food (and similarly, that residents of Norway and California are more convinced about fundamental rights than the average U.S. resident). We explore these possibilities further in our conclusion section.

**ii. The Impact of Out-Group Proximity in Segregated Communities**

Our analysis in Figure 4 below, and Appendix II Table II.6, shows that SMS recipients were two-thirds as likely to donate when they lived near Roma communities than when they lived
further away. Following much of the literature, in these models we include controls for community size, income and poverty levels, and measure geographic proximity by whether the SMS recipient lives in the same ZIP code as a Roma settlement.

Prior observational studies sometimes interpret similar results as consistent with the racial threat hypothesis (i.e. the hypothesis that proximity to a minority population increases hostility towards that population). However, our study improves on prior work by testing, in addition, whether donation rates to the Roma in particular, or donation rates to other groups as well, depend on proximity to Roma settlements (see Appendix II Table II.6 for full specifications and robustness checks). We find that donation rates decline across the board near Roma settlements; people living near Roma communities donate about one-third less often than people living far from Roma communities in both Roma and non-Roma treatment conditions (see Appendix II Table II.6, Model 2). Moreover, as Figure 4 demonstrates, Greeks are about half as likely to give to the Roma as to others, whether or not they live near or far from Roma settlements. This does not support Hypothesis 3b, that geographic proximity to an out-group (the Roma) reduces donations to this out-group in particular. It is, however, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, that out-group proximity will reduce donations evenly across treatments.

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9 Notably, however, this result is only statistically significant at p<0.1 level, in Appendix II Table II.6, Model 1. Once we include our controls (Model 2), this finding is no longer statistically significant.

10 Although the Roma are commonly mischaracterized as a transient population, Roma settlements in Greece and in much of Europe are actually long-standing and well documented. The Greek Ombudsman for Roma Rights keeps up-to-date records of Roma settlements, which we leverage in our analysis, and present in Appendix I, Figure I.1.
Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Donation to Greek Child, Child, and Roma Child Based on Proximity (with 95% CIs)

Logistic regression predicting donation based on the three pooled treatments and proximity to Roma settlement (and their interaction term), with controls for age, gender, Attica, Central Macedonia, median individual income, percentage of children in poverty, and city size. For full specification and robustness checks, please see Appendix II, Table II.6.

It is likely that our observational analysis, as well as other scholarship on generosity and diversity, does not adequately control for the non-random geographic assignment of minority
populations. Roma settlements and other concentrated minorities are not only situated in poorer-
than-average communities (a measure we and other scholars include in regressions) but also in communities with lower social capital (a measure that we and other scholars do not observe).

Even when we control for the most plausible confounders, such as income, poverty rates, community size, and regional variations, there may be other unobserved (and perhaps unobservable) differences. Figure 5 overlays median net individual income data with Roma settlements and SMS donations to illustrate that Roma settlements are generally situated in medium and low-income parts of Greece, and that the vast majority of donations come from ZIP codes without Roma settlements. This is consistent with a selection story that we believe explains our results.
One reason we may not find a disproportionate decrease in out-group generosity near Roma settlements is due to a noisy measure of Roma proximity. However, we measure proximity to Roma settlements by determining whether respondents have a Roma settlement in their ZIP code. Since the average Greek ZIP code has just 7,100 residents, this measure of proximity is relatively nuanced.

**Figure 5:** Map of Donations, Roma Settlements, and Income Distribution across Greece

This figure depicts donations, Roma settlements, and median net individual income data at the ZIP code level from the Greek Economics Ministry (2013). We can see that donors are less likely to reside near Roma settlements.
We run a simple added test to help rule out an alternative account, based on the social trust literature, which suggests that public goods decline for everyone in heterogeneous communities due to weaker social ties (rather than due to general poverty). Hypothesizing that people living in urban metropoles might be more unaware of a proximate Roma settlement than people living in less populated, semi-urban or rural communities with a settlement, we would expect that those living in smaller proximate communities exhibit weaker social trust and lower overall donations. However, as Figure 6 illustrates, donations in rural and semi-rural regions are not depressed by the proximity of Roma settlements; in fact, in-group donations are more generous in rural areas near settlements than far from settlements. This finding makes us more confident that proximity is mainly shaping donations through a selection story, rather than through other mechanisms. Moreover, this finding is in line with our expectation that in the context of ethnic segregation, proximity to a stigmatized out-group should not have much of an effect on out-group altruism in particular, because there is not enough contact to reinforce negative stereotypes (beyond Greeks’ baseline level of strong anti-Roma prejudice).
In other words, since the Roma remain socially segregated, Greeks become neither more positive nor more negative in their perception of this out-group. Ultimately, geographic proximity is only analytically meaningful when ethnic groups share experiences, maintain contact, and experience
frequent physical interaction. This finding adds an important scope condition to the racial threat literature. In the following section, we draw from semi-structured, in-depth interviews to gain a more nuanced picture of Greek-Roma interactions (or lack thereof).

VI. Elucidating Interethnic Dynamics through In-Depth Interviews

To further examine why donors living near Roma settlements did not depress their donations to the Roma in particular, we conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with school principals in twelve different schools across six regions of Greece. We expected that the most extensive interpersonal contact between ethnic Greek and Roma families occurs in schools, making schools the ‘best case’ environment for assessing the impact of increased interethnic contact (Alexander and Christia 2011).

i. Levels of Social Isolation

We selected interview sites based on two factors emphasized in the literature. One of these factors is the out-group’s prominence—namely, whether the community is situated in a rural, semi-urban, or urban area. Because of the relatively higher population density in urban communities, the presence of Roma families may be less prominent, and the contact between Roma and ethnic Greeks less frequent than in rural communities, decreasing the generosity gap. We selected schools that varied on urban, semi-urban, or rural location to examine how proximity influences other-regarding preferences.
Second, we expected that Roma living in settlements are physically and socially isolated from Greeks, making Roma-Greek relations substantively different than interethnic contact that occurs in integrated neighborhoods. As such, we selected six schools that were near a Roma settlement and six schools near an integrated Roma-Greek neighborhood to capture varied levels of integration.

Table 2 presents the twelve schools selected, ordered by proximity to a Roma settlement and whether they are in a rural, semi-urban, or urban area. Several trends emerge. First, in four of the six schools near a settlement, the majority of students live in makeshift structures. In comparison, in all six schools in integrated neighborhoods, the majority of Roma live in basic housing. Residence type directly correlates with the percentage of Roma students that have a very low socioeconomic status; when Roma students live in makeshift structures, a majority has very low socioeconomic status.

Table 2 also illustrates high levels of segregation both in communities near Roma settlements and in communities with Roma dispersed in neighborhoods. Although illegal under Greek and European legislation, widespread prejudice against the Roma has led many schools to de facto segregate.\footnote{https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/04/the-stunted-education-of-romani-children-in-europe/} We observe extreme segregation in two regions—Zefiri and Thiva—where one school’s student body is 100% Roma, while the neighboring school is majority ethnically Greek. Our interviews indicate that ethnic segregation is self-enforced. Both Roma and ethnically Greek
parents perceive school integration efforts negatively; in five schools, principals stated that Roma parents believed integration would imply a loss of cultural heritage.

Lastly, principals in schools near Roma settlements estimate that interactions between Greek and Roma families outside of school are rare or non-existent. Interactions outside schools in integrated neighborhoods were slightly more frequent, however, principals reported that these interactions were not meaningful and highly varied. For example, the principal in the 7th Primary School in Aspropirgos reported that Roma and Greek students interact during extracurricular activities like soccer. While the principal provided one example of positive interactions between Greek and Roma parents—several Greeks testified for their Roma neighbors in court— in many other instances, there are no interactions whatsoever, and prejudice is still pervasive. For example, in Aspropirgos, Greek parents refuse to send their children to the 7th Primary School because they believe that their grades will suffer; Greek parents also refuse to rent houses in the surrounding neighborhood due to the high number of Roma families. In the middle-class area where Greek-Roma integration is widely seen as most successful, the Agia Varvara neighborhoods, principals reported that children invite one another to birthday parties, but parents rarely interact outside of schools.
Table 2: Measures of Disadvantage and Levels of Segregation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Residence</th>
<th>% Roma with Very Low SE</th>
<th>% Student Roma</th>
<th>Interactions Outside of School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Thiva</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Basic housing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Thiva</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Makeshift</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Megara</td>
<td>Semi-Urban</td>
<td>Basic housing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Megara</td>
<td>Semi-Urban</td>
<td>Makeshift; Basic housing</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Chalandri</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Makeshift</td>
<td>&gt;50%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Chalandri</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Makeshift</td>
<td>&gt;50%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Roma Settlement**

**Roma in Neighborhoods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Residence</th>
<th>% Roma with Very Low SE</th>
<th>% Student Roma</th>
<th>Interactions Outside of School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Aspropirgos</td>
<td>Semi-Urban</td>
<td>Makeshift; Basic housing</td>
<td>&gt;50%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Aspropirgos</td>
<td>Semi-Urban</td>
<td>Makeshift; Basic housing</td>
<td>&gt;50%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Zefiri</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Basic housing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Zefiri</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Basic housing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Residence</th>
<th>% Roma with Very Low SE</th>
<th>% Student Roma</th>
<th>Interactions Outside of School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Agia Varvara</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Basic housing; Modern apartments</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Agia Varvara</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Basic housing; Modern apartments</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: We denote missing values using ‘-’

Even in communities with partial integration, school principals reported that negative stereotypes against the Roma were rampant. In eight of the twelve schools (including both schools in Agia Varvara), principals stated that Greek families blamed Roma for the violence and crime in their
communities. Greek parents regularly accuse Roma of committing robberies, firing guns in the street, drug dealing and vandalism. Illustratively, the school principal in the B Primary School in Agia Varvara stated that he was pleasantly surprised when a Roma former student returned an expensive mobile phone that he had found after a parade. Similarly, many Greek parents and school principals believe that Roma are abusive and quickly resort to violence. For example, the principal in the B Primary School in Aspropirgos stated that, when the referee was offensive during a Roma-majority soccer game, Roma parents immediately threatened to break the students’ ‘good sportsmanship’ medals. Lastly, many Greek families and educators believe that Roma do not care about education. Principals’ bar of success for Roma students is so low that the principal in the B Primary School in Aspropirgos bragged about one former student who became a taxi driver rather than living on welfare benefits.

ii. Community Altruism

To assess community-level altruism, we asked principals to report sources of school funding, illustrated in Table 3. Almost all schools receive institutional funding earmarked for Roma educational support from the EU and the Greek government. Donations made by non-profit actors are more varied. Individual giving is limited in Greece due to recent austerity measures. Based on the theoretical implications of the racial threat hypothesis, we would expect zero community donations to schools with Roma-majority student bodies. Similarly, existing scholarship on in-group favoritism would predict that donations from local non-profit organizations or members of the local community would flow exclusively to schools with Greek majority student bodies.
Contrary to expectations, donations made by the Greek Orthodox Church, NGOs, and non-Roma community members overwhelmingly go to schools with student bodies that are either entirely or majority Roma. While NGO donations largely take the form of providing extracurricular activities, English-language classes, first aid seminars, and specialized learning programs, donations from non-Roma individuals in the community are small, in-kind goods. For example, in the B Primary School in Zefiri, the b Primary School in Thiva, and the B Primary School in Aspropirgos, educators contact non-Roma community members to request donations of clothing, food, pencils, and other school supplies. This demonstrates that assessment of neediness and other more objective evaluations can facilitate out-group altruism, even in segregated contexts.

### Table 3: School Funding Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% Student Roma</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Greek Govt</th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Thiva</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Chalandri</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Zefiri</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Chalandri</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Megara</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Agia Varvara</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Megara</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Agia Varvara</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A</td>
<td>Aspropirgos</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Aspropirgos</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Thiva</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B</td>
<td>Zefiri</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: We denote missing values using ‘-‘.

However, Roma discrimination remains high in these communities. For example, in the 7th Primary School in Aspropirgos, local government officials refuse to hire Roma to work in the municipality through the European Structural Fund because they do not want Roma to live in the
area. The mayor also refers to the Roma as ‘gypsies’ in public, which negatively affects the school’s integration efforts.

The fact that we observe local Greeks donating to Roma-majority schools despite high levels of discrimination suggests that, in highly segregated contexts, other mechanisms like pity or objective assessment of need influence other-regarding preferences. For example, in the 9th Primary School in Thiva, the principal described Roma students living conditions as ‘miserable,’ since Roma parents frequently go to prison for drug use and other crimes; in the 3rd Primary School in Zefiri, the principal explicitly only solicits donations for needy Roma children.

VII. Conclusions and Implications

NGOs have gradually assumed the role of managing welfare programs traditionally implemented by governments. In so doing, they face a critical trade-off: the vulnerable groups that rely on their programming are often the most stigmatized and isolated. Since NGOs and private organizations depend on voluntary giving for their funding, this can hinder their ability to mobilize resources for the neediest beneficiaries whilst maintaining their own financial health. Indeed, as a wide literature suggests, other-regarding preferences can become a major obstacle to the social integration of ethnic minorities when ethnic diversity depresses individuals’ willingness to fund welfare programs (Alesina et al. 1999). In an era of rising nationalism, it is critical to understand how NGOs can continue to mobilize resources for vulnerable communities and ensure adequate public goods provision.
This article is the first to use a common fundraising tool—a text-to-give campaign—to experimentally examine other-regarding preferences my measuring text message recipients’ differential willingness to donate across six treatments.

Our findings complement the wealth of research on intergroup contact and public goods provision. We find that, when minorities are segregated, individuals’ distributional preferences are quite sticky. In fact, when we made an out-group (Roma) appeal to donors, text recipients were half as likely to donate relative to the in-group (Greek) and control (Child) appeals. Given our innovative research design, we are able to determine that this discrepancy is driven by out-group bias, rather than in-group favoritism. We anticipate that other types of appeals, particularly those that enable greater recipient choice through cash transfers rather than in-kind aid, generate even larger generosity gaps.

NGOs are aware that their neediest aid recipients are stigmatized, and invest heavily in programs that raise awareness of and advocate for their beneficiaries’ needs and rights (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998; Mahathir 2002; Cortes 2015). However, we find that a commonly used advocacy strategy—an appeal to rights—has no effect on other-regarding preferences, because preferences are hard to change in segregated contexts. An alternative explanation for our null finding is that human rights frames can more easily shift attitudinal measures (e.g. survey responses) than behavioral measures that have higher costs (e.g., donations). If this alternative explanation is true, it suggests that the human rights literature must move beyond survey experimental measures to increase the external validity of their findings.
In addition, our observational analysis shows that generosity in diverse communities decreases proportionally toward the in-group and out-group. This highlights a critical scope condition of the racial threat hypothesis: that out-groups must be visible and regularly share space with the in-group in order for either in-group identification or out-group bias to increase. Absent these everyday interactions, out-group proximity is not a meaningful indicator of racial threat. In ethnically heterogeneous and segregated regions, this leads us to expect that local public goods are relatively unaffected by the presence of the segregated out-group.

Moreover, our qualitative interviews demonstrate that assessment of neediness and other more objective evaluations also shape other-regarding preferences. In contrast to a large literature that assumes that ethnic biases only depress donations, we find that these biases and stereotypes can also motivate generosity. Needs assessments help explain why donations to the Roma are non-zero—even in contexts where they are intensely stigmatized and socially isolated. In sum, we find that appeals to in-groups and appeals to fundamental rights are less strategically useful for NGO fundraising than universal appeals (e.g., the ‘Child’ appeal).

More broadly, we argue that text-to-give experiments can help aid organizations better understand which appeals resonate with their target audience in varied contexts. Our experimental text-to-give approach can also help scholars measure important in-group and out-group dynamics as they relate to prejudice, altruism, and a variety of other important behaviors.

Our replicable research design has multiple strengths that resolve common methodological challenges to internal and external validity. First, our text-to-give experiment examines split-
second decision-making in an important real-world context, capturing donors’ implicit biases (Lodge et al. 2011). Second, by designing an unobtrusive intervention, we minimize demand effects—namely, respondents’ desire to appear more altruistic toward their out-group (Zizzo 2010). In so doing, we bolster the findings of laboratory studies such as dictator games, which typically have weak external validity (Harrison and List 2004). Third, text-to-give campaigns are widely used by aid organizations, politicians, and others to solicit small contributions. As such, our measure captures a real-world behavior that individuals frequently engage in across a variety of contexts. Our intervention is large-scale (79,639 SMS were sent) and country wide (across 1,040 ZIP codes in Greece), ensuring that our sample is diverse enough to capture contextual differences across varied regions. Lastly, we impose a realistic threshold to capture other-regarding behavior—a 1.5 Euro (<$2) donation. Since the task is costly, respondents are more likely to act on biases than in a cost-free scenario. Given these methodological strengths and array of applications, our study offers a promising new toolkit to assess group dynamics in the context of social and economic development.
Works Cited


