The comparative value of the AGRICULTURAL and COMMERCIAL systems, as objects of a Statesman’s attention, begins now to be understood in France and in England, among those who have turned their attention to political economy. Much as this science has been advanced by the disquisitions of a few writers in Great Britain, we certainly owe the fashionable attention this most important subject is likely to receive, to the labours of the French Economistes, a class of Philosophers in the truest acceptation of that word; but whom the conceited and ignorant partizans of the present day, and of this enlightened country, pretend to ridicule. For such empty declaimers this paper is not intended; but it may perchance fall into the hands of some readers of a different description, capable of reflection, and desirous of information.

They will know how to appreciate the importance of the subject of this essay, and excuse the imperfections of an attempt unavoidably so confined, and labouring under the want of public documents, and European collections; a want, which every writer wishing to be accurate, most woefully experiences in this country. Under these circumstances I can undertake no more than hints; but I know

† “Scatter to bring together.”
them to be of moment; I have long wished that the scattered facts of Political Economy and Statistics, young as these sciences are, were collected and compared, that we might get at the important inferences they afford.

It seems determined in America, that we shall be a COMMERCIAL country. Our navy, our army, our loans, our increased taxes, have arisen from our commerce. This is cried up as our most important resource; as the means of riches, of power, of consideration. Upon this ground are our present warlike exertions triumphantly defended. I, on the contrary, am firmly persuaded, until the home territory of a country be accurately cultivated, and fully peopled—until manufactures, founded upon population, are in a state to require other markets to be sought—that foreign commerce is a losing concern; an appropriation of capital in all cases inexpedient, and in most cases detrimental to the country; that it has proved so to the commercial nations of Europe: that to afford it support by prohibitions and bounties, or protection by engaging in wars on account of it, or by manning navies in its defence, is egregious folly and gross injustice. That if it cannot protect itself, or be carried on without the fostering aid of government, it ought, like every other losing scheme, to be left to its own fate, without taxing the rest of the community and their posterity for its support. That foreign commerce is particularly inexpedient in this country, where there is so much land calling aloud for cultivation and for capital, and so deplorably managed for want of these.

1. Of the meaning of Commerce. The barter or exchange of commodities between different persons is Commerce. If it be confined to the citizens of any country among themselves, it is called internal commerce, or the home trade; if between the citizens of one country and those of another, it is external commerce, or foreign trade; if by means of the citizens of one country bartering abroad the produce or manufactures not of their own but of other countries, it is the carrying trade. Foreign trade is susceptible of other distinctions unnecessary to be noticed in this sketch.

2. Comparative importance of the foreign trade, and home trade, in point of amount. The country of all others most engaged in foreign
trade, and generally presumed to owe her prosperity to this source, is Great Britain. Let us see what her foreign trade amounts to, compared with her internal commerce.

It appears from the first report of the select committee of the house of commons, on the waste lands ordered to be printed, December 23, 1795, that in Great Britain there are 73,285,628 Acres: of which 51,178,627 are cultivated, and 22,107,001 uncultivated. The uncultivated lands are thus classed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lands incapable of improvement</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. fit for planting</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. fit for upland pasture</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. fit for tillage</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. fit for meadow</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, between one-third and one-fourth of the island of Great Britain still remains uncultivated. The average produce of the cultivated lands cannot be estimated at less than 3l. sterling per acre. It is generally agreed that the average produce of wheat lands, in Great Britain, is not less than 20 bushels per acre. A. Young states it at 24 for England. (Tour to France 341.) The gross amount of the home trade, in the article of agriculture, is therefore about 150 millions sterling, annually. I forbear to calculate the amount of the trade of home consumption in wood, in minerals and manufactures; I have not documents enough; but it can hardly (in that plentiful and luxurious country) be less than half the value of the agricultural produce.

Such is the amount of her internal commerce, while at the time of Great Britain’s utmost prosperity, immediately preceding the present war, the gross amount of her exports never reached 23 millions sterling₁, carrying trade included. I know the objections

₁ I suspect the increase of late years, has been rather an increase of nominal value, than of quantity or real value. Perhaps if the exports were checked by the tonnage, it
to the accuracy of custom-house entries, but they are the best evidence we have—and an error of a million or two, will make no difference in the present reasoning.

The landed produce above mentioned, is consumed by the necessary food of about 11 millions of people, including sailors: by the waste of the luxurious, the armies, the navies, the cattle, the horses of that nation. Prodigious as this amount seems to be, it is many years since Great Britain has been able to supply her own consumption of grain. If a very small portion of the capital, expended in commerce and colonizing, had been applied to the third part of the kingdom now in waste, it would have yielded a produce equal to the whole amount of her export trade, and maintained a million of people more.

Next to Great Britain, France, of all the European powers, has the greatest proportion of foreign trade. That kingdom, before the present war, was calculated to contain 131,722,711\textsuperscript{3} acres. I suspect this to be too much, but let it be taken at 130 millions, exclusive of roads, &c. The wheat lands of France produce 18 bushels on the average, but of inferior grain to England, so that the proportion is about 25 to 18\textsuperscript{4} in favour of the latter country. The value per acre of the gross produce of the lands of France is 35s. which brings the agricultural produce of that country to 227 ½ million sterling. I have no means of estimating the amount of manufactures raised and consumed within the kingdom.

M. Arnould in his Balance du Commerce\textsuperscript{5} states the average exports of France, from 1784 to 1788, at 354,423,000 liv. or about 15

---

\textsuperscript{2} See the report of the lords of the committee of council for trade and plantations, March, 1790, who state the annual import for 18 years to 1788, to be £. 291,000. The report of the committee of the board of agriculture in 1795, state the average quantity imported (beyond the export) for 18 years ending Jan. 5, 1789, at 42,657 quarters (8 bushels to a quarter) of wheat, and 284,175 quarters of oats. France is or was in nearly the same situation.

\textsuperscript{3} Young's tour to France, i. 282.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid, 341.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid, 498.
½ millions sterling: in the year 1788 the exports of Great Britain were about 17½ million. Can the prosperity and power of these kingdoms be owing to the merchants’ gain, the 15 per cent. on these insignificant sums? Ought we not rather to look for it in the excess of industry over expenditure in the 200 millions of home trade? Especially when it is considered, that just before the present war, the taxes of Great Britain (exclusive of roads and poor rate) amounted to near 20, and of France to 25 millions?

We are surprized too at the exertions of Great Britain, at the expenses she supports, at the nearly balanced power of that country and France, though the one contained 26 millions of people, while the other, including the population of Ireland, contained but about 13 or 14. But we shall cease to wonder when we consider, that if we add to the agricultural produce of Great Britain 40s. an acre for 26,000,000 of acres in Ireland, the gross amount of the internal and external commerce of the two nations will be about the same. But how is it that 100 millions of acres in Great Britain and Ireland should be as profitable as 130 in France? Because the farmer of England employs at least double the capital in his business, and the landlord in permanent improvements as much as the farmer. Young does not exaggerate when he calculates (not the farming which would be much more) but the farmer’s capital in Great Britain and Ireland at 275 millions, and in France at 262. Here lies the secret of 10 bushels of wheat in America, 18 in France, and 24 in England. Yet are we extolling, encouraging and protecting foreign commerce.

But let us turn our eyes to the produce of our own country. Our present population will not be deemed exaggerated at 4 ½ million. Suppose 5 acres per head cleared; a proportion not too large; for I know, by repeated calculations, that in the average farming of this country, it takes at least 3 acres to supply the food of a labouring man here. There will then be 22 ½ million of acres in cultivation. Suppose the produce equal to the value of ten bushels of wheat, or 50s. currency, or 30s. sterling? the gross produce will be 33 ¾ million sterling.

---

6 Ibid, 430.
Add for the produce of wood lands, in the pasturage of cows and horses, in timber and in cord wood, a dollar per head per annum: this will make about a million sterling more. Add for home manufactures, brewers, distillers, carpenters, joiners, smiths, weavers, taylors, shoemakers, iron-works, &c. &c. 2 dollars per head more, and the aggregate will be about 37 millions and an half sterling, as the gross amount of the internal commerce of this country.

The last report of the gross amount of foreign trade (our exports) was 61 millions of dollars; of which 33 millions was the produce of other nations; our own foreign trade therefore consisted of 28 millions of dollars, or about 6 ½ million sterling only!

Hence it appears that in England, France and America, the gross amount of the home trade is prodigiously greater than the foreign trade. The latter is therefore an object of trifling importance, when compared with the former.

3. The capital employed in the home trade is much more beneficial to the country than the capital employed in the foreign trade.

If a merchant employ 1000L.† in purchasing and exporting the produce of this country, and importing in return the produce of another, all the gain to himself and to this country will be the profit he makes upon the capital thus employed: the produce purchased and exchanged is the fruit of a home capital in each country previously expended. But if the 1000L.∗ were laid out in agriculture for instance, or in raising any article of home manufacture, the gross produce, the whole result, is gain to the country: it is an accession of valuable produce within the country to the amount of its value. Whatever may be done with 1500 pounds worth of wheat raised in the country, it is still so much valuable produce belonging to it. The whole capital thus productively expended is gain to the community. The whole of the spur to industry is at home: whereas the capital of the merchant, is beneficial directly to himself alone, and indirectly is as much a spur, a stimulus to industry in the foreign as in the native country.

† Although the “l” is lowercase in the original, we have capitalized it for clarity.
Hence, if the profit of the merchant and farmer be the same, 20 per cent. for instance, 1000L. employed by a merchant is gain to the country to the amount of the merchant’s gains, or 200L: but 1000L. employed by a farmer is gain to him of 200L. and to the nation of 1200L. for there exists 1200L.’s. worth of real wealth, of valuable produce, more than before. I beg my readers to reflect upon this very important view of the relative values of the two systems.

4. That the lands of this country stand particularly in need of capital.

This cannot be doubted. The smallness of the produce, compared with Europe, is most disgraceful to America. It certainly is not half the produce of England, if it be above half that of France. I have not room to enter into details, but I refer to Arthur Young (Tour 343, 431) for the reasonings that shew the greater produce of land in England over France, to be owing almost, if not entirely, to the greater capital employed in English agriculture. But while a produce rent—the system of Metayers† exists here, it is impossible the land can yield one-half of what it ought. I cannot dilate upon this article important as it is. I beg my reader to think on the subject, and peruse with attention the passages I have referred to.

5. The capital of the foreign trade is more precarious than that employed in the home trade. Precarious from the hazard of storms, the hazard of war, the hazard of failure of a debtor at a great distance and under foreign jurisdiction. The very idea of insurance companies is commercial. Hence, if the same capital could be employed to equal profit, national and individual, at home, it were better so employed than abroad.

6. The capital employed in the home trade circulates twice or thrice, while a capital in the foreign trade circulates at home but once. Reflect upon the travels, if I may so call them, of a capital employed at home. 1st. It goes from the home merchant to the home producer (whether agriculturist or manufacturer.) 2dly. From the consumer or purchaser to the home merchant, and so on. In the foreign trade the capital goes, 1st. into the hands of the home producer, and thus

† A form of sharecropping.
far is a stimulus to industry at home. 2dly. It is entrusted in the
form of produce to the captain or supercargo, who, 3dly. delivers it
to the foreign merchant. He of course demands a credit equivalent
to the time necessary for the return of his own capital at home into
his hands. 4thly. From the foreign merchant it passes to the for-
eign purchaser or consumer who pays for it. 5thly. The foreign
merchant again invests it with the foreign producer. 6thly. The
produce thus purchased is entrusted on board ship, whence, 7thly,
it gets into the hand of the home merchant, who, 8thly, sells it and
gets his capital again from the home consumer, to be again sub-
jected to the same routine.

Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations, Book II. Ch. 5.) has stated this
case generally, and M. Herenschwand (Disc. sur le Commerce ex-
terieur, p. 6) more particularly: My statement is somewhat different:
I refer to these authors; no man ought to pretend to be a legislator in
the present day, who is not well read in both of them.—Hence it is
evident, that the same capital puts in force two or three times the
industry at home, when employed in the home trade, that it does
when employed in the foreign trade. In the latter case its effect is
equally divided between the two countries.

7. That the capital embarked in the carrying trade is of no use in a na-
tional point of view. For it is employed to promote the industry of
foreign countries. If Mr. America purchases the coffee of Monsr. St.
Domingo, and then invests it in the Sherry of Signor Spain, it is
clear he gives encouragement to St. Domingo and Spain: and if the
wine of Spain be brought here, he gains at the expense of the
Americans alone; out of their pockets the whole of his profits come.
In the foreign trade of consumption, half the merchant’s gains are
from the foreign, and half from the home consumer. As to the em-
ployment of seamen, it is a detriment and no benefit to the country;
at least to a country like ours of scanty population.

8. The merchant, and all the people directly employed by him, rank
among the unproductive classes of society. The farmer, the wood-cutter,
the miner, (and perhaps\textsuperscript{7}) the manufacturer, employs his capital and labour in producing real riches, some commodity of value: the merchant, the agent, the factor, the retailer, the clerk, the captain, the seaman, are employed in arranging, assorting, transporting, dividing, what has been already produced by the capital and labour of others. If produce be (as it clearly is) the real, the only riches of a country, we ought to aim at increasing it; and encourage (if the system of encouragement be adopted at all) the employments that are productive, rather than those that are not so. I am aware of the objection, where shall we find a market? It cannot apply to a young country like ours, to a country of scanty population, to a country whose produce consists of the necessaries of life. But I shall notice it again.

9. Sailors, the favourites of the populace, and the boast of the partizans of expensive governments, are doubly unproductive. I except the fisheries: there they are productively employed. But I speak of our foreign trade; that is my subject. What does a sailor add to the produce of his country? His sole employ is to transport it from one country to another: in doing this he consumes indeed the produce of his own and of other countries, but he produces none. He is still farther unproductive; he contributes little or nothing to population; he cannot marry with prudence or convenience. Nor are his earnings spent in his own country; much of what an American sailor receives at home is spent abroad: he is at least half a foreigner. Indeed a sailor can hardly be said to belong to any nation, nor will a country whose government has not a tendency to commercial wars, increase them if it can be avoided.

10. Nor is it a slight objection, that while by the peaceful products of agriculture, gains can be made but slowly, gradually, and by the regular exertions of habitual, wholesome industry, the

\textsuperscript{7} The Economistes say, manufacturers are not, A. Smith contends that they are, a productive class: See his Wealth of Nations, Book iv. Chap. 9. The respectable author of the “Essential principles of the Wealth of Nations,” (published for Becket, London) coincides with the French writers. See L’ordre essentiel des Societé politiques, ii. p. 402.
commercial speculator often gets rich by accident, by unfair venturing, by sudden exertions. Wealth thus suddenly obtained is in many respects detrimental to the community. It operates as a lottery: it tempts capital into trade beyond prudent bounds: it entices to unjustifiable boldness: it introduces ostentation, luxury and pride, and manners out of harmony with republican principles.

11. The merchant is of no country. His connections extend to all: his property is moveable, transportable. The home trader is fixed: he has his all at stake in the country he lives in: he has no interest out of it. Therefore the one can, and the other cannot, be depended on as a good citizen. The merchant cares not, if for his private gain he involve the country in dispute; his increased expences are laid upon the price of the commodities he imports; the consumer at home repays him. The farmer, the manufacturer, &c. have neither the temptation, the means, nor the opportunity, of doing national mischief. Let the reader reflect on the cover our professed neutrality has afforded for illicit trade, for jealousy, for complaint, for attack.

12. The merchant has an interest opposed to the interest of the consumer. The merchants form a small class: the consumers form the nation. It has been observed before, that the merchant’s gains come out of the consumer’s pocket. It is his interest to make them as large as he can; it is the interest of the nation to make them as small as is consistent with justice. The merchant living by trade, cares not at what expence to the consumer (i. e. to the nation) that trade is supported. It is his interest, his business, to magnify its importance; to obtain protection for it though at ten times its value to the nation; to support every scheme of revenue, to engage government on his side. Is not all this evident? Have we experienced nothing of this?

13. The most flourishing, populous and best cultivated parts of Europe are not maritime or commercial. I except Holland, which can hardly be called a country; it is a city of merchants; driven into the system of foreign commerce, and the carrying trade, by their maritime situation and the small extent of landed territory they possess. I select

---

the following, from Dr. Jameson’s Political Geography, which I think, upon the whole, is more accurate than Zimmerman’s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime and colonizing nations.</th>
<th>Inhabitants upon one square mile.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>119(^9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain and Ireland</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>150(^10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>157(^11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia in Europe</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States of little or no foreign commerce.</th>
<th>Inhabitants per square mile.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The whole of Germany</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palatinate of the Rhine with Bavaria</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electorate of Saxony</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The French acquisitions on the left bank of the Rhine since the war</td>
<td>200(^12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piedmont</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) Zimmerman.

\(^{10}\) This is far too great, being calculated on a surface of 79,712 square miles, whereas the report of the committee of waste lands, before quoted, make a surface of 114,500 square miles.

\(^{11}\) This also is too high an estimate, being calculated on a surface of 157,924 square miles, whereas Neckar’s account, adopted by Young, on much consideration, gives 205,816 square miles.

\(^{12}\) This is lower than the estimate in the Aurora of June 3, 1798, which I suspect to be taken from the Statistical Tables published at Berlin, and added to Dornford’s translation of Putter. But I have not now that work by me.
To which it will not be unfair to add the empire of China, with
no foreign trade, but permitting every nation, on payment of duties,
to fetch away her commodities, 333 per square mile. To say nothing
of the inland country of India, equally populous by the cultivation
of the earth and internal manufacture.

I may assert farther, as a known fact to European travellers or
readers of travels, that the public monuments of art and apparent
wealth of uncommercial table, is far beyond the other.

14. *That commerce has never paid the interest of the expensive wars it
has induced: and that to commerce is now owing the funding system.* It is
useless to examine this question by the example of many of the
maritime countries of Europe: the inferences which the facts of
Great Britain will furnish, are enough: *ex uno discem omnes.*† I have
before observed, that I am fully aware that all tables of export and
import are inaccurate, varying according to the motives of the mer-
chant in giving in his valuation. But the utmost supposeable inaccu-
racly will not affect my general conclusions. It will not be necessary
to go farther back than the two last reigns.

Sir John Sinclair, in his history of the public revenue (ii. 99)
states the expence of the commercial wars during these two reigns
as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War of 1739</td>
<td>£. 46,418,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of 1756</td>
<td>£. 111,271,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American war</td>
<td>£. 139,171,876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† I refer to Young’s account of Italy generally, and recommend a careful perusal of it.
† “From one we can learn the rest.”
If this 300 millions had been invested in agriculture, it would have constituted a fixed, a permanent stock of real wealth, that would have gradually improved, and have doubled the produce of Great Britain. Then indeed a fostered system of foreign commerce might have been justifiable. At present this immense sum is totally lost, wasted, annihilated. Suppose however that the loss were merely the common interest of money; this, at 5 per cent. (and the average of loans is not less) would be 15 millions sterling per annum.

The average expence of the navy, in time of peace, has been of late years about 2 millions: is it unfair to say that 1 million at least is made necessary by foreign commerce, and the other for home defence?

The expence of forces in the plantations and Gibraltar—African forts—the civil establishments of Canada and other colonies in the West Indies and British America—charge for loyalist settlers in Upper Canada, and other articles appertaining to foreign commerce, amount to about £. 400,000 per annum. I calculate nothing for the expence of building ships, for the store-houses, the fortifications of Gibraltar, &c. &c. Call that 400,000 half a million, then does Great Britain pay for her foreign trade 16½ millions annually, besides the annihilation of 300 millions of capital!—while the profit upon that foreign trade, at 15 per cent. (which I know the mercantile profit of that country does not exceed) brings in but about 3½ millions!

I have said nothing respecting the East Indies; let the expences of peace and the expences of defence be considered as

---

1 "1,00,000" in original.
14 I have taken the preceding calculations from the “Supplies” in the Annual Registers, for half a dozen years preceding the present war.
compensated by the 3 millions of territorial revenue said to be derived from thence.

Is this a system of infatuation or not? And are we, or are we not running on in the same career of absurd, incalculable extravagance?

Much indeed of this expense has been owing to the system of colonization; but colonization is the immediate offspring of foreign commerce. I am decidedly† convinced that colonies are mill-stones round the neck of every European nation who has fostered them; the very worst part of the system of commerce.15 And I am sorry to say that much of the calculations which demonstrate this, are applicable to the conduct of the United States, in their mode of peopling the wilderness of America. After the preceding facts, who can hesitate to allow, that if the funding system had not its origin, it has had its permanence in the system of foreign commerce. I shall not attempt to prove that this funding system, though slowly, is certainly destructive of the prosperity of a nation; that it excites to war; that it renders a government careless and extravagant; that it encourages speculation; that it locks up productive capital; that it is manifest injustice to posterity, &c.—I refer the reader to the works of A. Smith and A. Young on the one side, and De Cafaux on the other; nor will he find his leisure ill employed by perusing Dr. Logan’s publication in this country, containing a concise but just view of the more prominent evils of this system.

15. The modern system of foreign commerce, is not only expensive beyond all calculation of its profits, but it has proved one of the most productive sources of human misery. Are the wars it has occasioned sufficient to demonstrate this? If not, turn your eyes to the conduct of the Spanish in South America—the Portuguese in Africa—the British and the Dutch in the East Indies—to the slave trade, that disgrace of humanity; and then say if this proposition needs farther proof.

† “Decidely” in original.
15 Let any man peruse Anderson’s Interest of Great Britain with regard to her colonies, considered—the observations of De Cafaux and Tucker upon the same subject, and the remarks interspersed through the very valuable writings of that bigoted Anti-democrat, A. Young, and his mind will be made up on this question.
What then are we to do? to prohibit commerce? to refuse protection to our citizens engaged in lawful occupations? are not our merchants as much entitled to defence as any other class? No. Prohibit nothing, but protect no speculation, no investment of capital at an expence beyond its national value. If wars are necessarily attendant upon commerce, it is far wiser to dispense with it; to imitate the Chinese and other nations who have flourished without foreign trade: your commodities, the nations who want them will fetch away:—If they will go to China for tea-cups, they will come to America for bread. But if your merchants chuse this mode of investing their capital, do not forbid them: let them do it like other adventurers, at their own risk: while it is profitable, let them carry it on, but should the quarrels of other nations render it unprofitable, do not bolster it up by the bounty of protection, at the expence of every other class of the community. If a cotton spinner, or any other manufacturer, should apply for a bounty to enable him to carry on his trade, would it not be fair to say, if it is profitable you need none: if not, employ your money and your time in something that is. Why not say the same to the merchants. If any profession is to be fostered, let it be the tiller of the earth, the fountain head of all wealth, and all power, and all prosperity. Improve your roads, clear your rivers, cut your canals, erect your bridges, facilitate intercourses, establish schools and colleges, diffuse knowledge of all kinds; agricultural, veterinary, statistical. No fear but if you raise produce and people, they will find their market. It will soon be discovered what articles are wanted, what are the most profitable, and such will be supplied. On this simple plan of home defense, how is war possible? Who would, or who could invade you? But on the system of foreign commerce, a smuggling merchant may involve you in dispute, and render peace and happiness insecure: on that system, sooner or later, war, taxes, debts, and despotism are inevitable.

T.C.