



# HON. GUIDO CALABRESI U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT An Interview

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[START RECORDING] Part I Interviewer: Catherine M. Sharkey, Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law MS. CATHERINE SHARKEY: Guido, thank 00:00:16 you for meeting with me today. As you know, I'm Catherine Sharkey, a law professor at New York University. I'm here with Kenji Yoshino, my colleague. Both of us, as your former law clerks, are delighted to conduct this oral history for the Institute for Judicial Administration. I'd like to start at the beginning of your life. 00:00:37 You were born in Milan in 1932, and in 1939, you immigrated to the United States for political reasons. I know from talking with you that this was a formative experience, and I wonder if you would share with us how this has affected you both personally and

professionally.

HON. GUIDO CALABRESI: Well, I've

- often said that the most important 00:01:00 part of my legal education is the fact that I'm an immigrant - a refugee, and people ask what does that mean? Well, it means that here was somebody who was totally an 00:01:17 insider. We were very well-off in Italy, and we belonged in every way. And all of a sudden, we found ourselves in America, without a penny and not fitting in at all. Having to be ourselves, we didn't fit into any group, because we were different. And that experience of figuring out who you were and knowing what it was like not to belong was something that has
- 00:01:58 made my whole career. Because as a teacher, as a judge, I've always thought what is it like for other people who are in that situation? So, that's the most important thing. My family were academics. But at a time when there were no academics at Yale - virtually - who were Italian,

	Catholic, Jewish, whatever, we didn't
	fit. We came to New Haven
	[,Connecticut], and the real
00:02:30	estate agents - because my dad was
	given a fellowship at Yale, which was
	how we were able to escape, and it
	didn't begin until after we had been
	here for a term, and so we were in
00:02:42	New York without any money for a
	little while, which was not a bad
	experience either - but when we came,
	the real estate agents brought us
	around and showed us where Italians
	lived or Catholics lived or Jews
	lived. And the people from the
	medical school swept in and said no,
	no, you can't live there. You must
	live between Whitney Avenue and
00:03:03	Orange Street, between Edwards Street
	and the park, because you're
	ethnically Yale and that's where the
	assistant professors and fellows
	lived then as they live now. But in
	those days, they were all white
	Anglo-Saxon Protestants, so we didn't

	fit there either. And it was that,
	that has remained with me as part of
	just who I am. The other is,
00:03:33	and I've noticed that in any number
	of people who are refugees and
	immigrants, you try to rebuild. You
	try to reestablish somehow. I never
	thought of myself as doing it,
00:03:47	but looking back on my brother's life
	and on my life and many other people,
	I've tried to rebuild here an
	experience so that people kind of
	know, he's an insider now. I've
	never wanted to be that, but somehow
	now we have rebuilt what was lost
	there.
	MS. SHARKEY: And I know you went to
	Yale College and Yale Law School.
	Before then, you were at
00:04:15	Hopkins. <sup>1</sup> I saw recently in a
	reunion speech, you mentioned that
	your time at Hopkins was the most

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Hopkins School is an independent, coeducational, collegepreparatory day school for grades 7-12 located in New Haven, Connecticut. Founded in 1660, it is the third oldest independent school in the United States.

intellectually rewarding time. And I wonder if you could share a little ... HON. CALABRESI: Yes. MS. SHARKEY: Some specific memories. HON. CALABRESI: The funny thing about that school is- here was a 00:04:32 school that was founded in 1660. Maybe the oldest continuous privately endowed school in the country. Boston Latin is older but has had interruptions and things of that 00:04:46 sort. And yet throughout, that school was open to newcomers to this city. So that the Pintos,<sup>2</sup> early Portuguese Jews, went to Hopkins, and because they went to Hopkins, got into Yale in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century. And this was so throughout. I go to this place, again, an outsider. My brother had competed for a scholarship there and won it, thanks 00:05:16 to some people who had urged him to do it, and I went. What happened

 $^2$  The Pintos are an influential family from Portugal. The earliest mention of the Pintos in Connecticut was in 1736.

then, I couldn't get that scholarship, because only one person in the family could. And so, I had with a lot of other kids work scholarships. We swept the floors and served the table and so on. Today, you could never do something of that sort. But at that time, the 00:05:42 people who had work scholarships tended to be outsiders again or often children of academics who didn't have any money. As against others, tuition wasn't that great, but it was 00:05:56 still high. So you had a small group of people who were working together who were very, very bright and that is always the first part of an intellectually exciting situation of being with peers who are bright. The teachers varied; some were terrific, and some were not. But there was a teacher in math who in some ways was not that great but who led me to 00:06:31 discover, invent radians. What are radians? I don't remember anymore.

It is some way of measuring angles or things, and I figured it out. And he said well you know, it's all very nice, but somebody did it 3 or 400 years ago. And I thought well that's pretty good if I did it. There was a history teacher who spent most of his time teaching in the public schools 00:07:01 but had come toward the end of his days to teach there, who could make history so exciting and so absolutely wonderful that I fell in love with it. And those two, math and history, 00:07:18 were the things that kind of went with me when I went to college. MS. SHARKEY: And was it at Yale College where economics came into play? HON. CALABRESI: Yeah, you see what happened at Yale College was that I found that I wasn't a mathematician; that I loved math, and I could do it 00:07:39 faster than most everybody in my class, and I would get things right, because I've got a very logical mind.

But there were a few people in the class who knew where they were going. When they started, they might make more mistakes, be more slow, but they had a view of the whole picture. I didn't. And I realized that if you didn't see the whole picture, you are not a mathematician. So I said, "too 00:08:07 bad; I like math, but that's not it". So I tried history, and I loved history. History still is my hobby, but my problem with history was that 00:08:24 I didn't like primary sources. I was not a historian. I didn't like to get into the primary sources and get dirty there. A history professor there who taught intellectual history was one of the best teachers I had in Yale College, and I loved it, but it was not going to be what I could do. So I thought well history and math, what does that mean? Maybe 00:08:53 economics, and so I started doing that, and I loved it. And economics became what I did in Yale College. I

	was very, very lucky. The Yale
	economics department had fallen on
	hard times and was being completely
	redone. During my time, they named
	four people, Wallich, Triffin, Tobin,
	and Fellner, $^3$ to remake the whole
	department. And
00:09:27	because there were too few of them to
	teach graduate students and
	undergraduates, they invented a
	major, a bachelor of science in
	analytic economics, which would be
00:09:38	available only to somebody rather
	special, who could take graduate
	courses while an undergraduate. I
	may have been the only person to have
	ever had that major, but I did. And
	so I had Tobin as a tutor and
	Fellner, who was a great old

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Henry Wallich was a German-American economist who served as Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and as a Federal Reserve governor. Robert Triffin was a Belgian-American economist best known for the Triffin Dilemma, a critique of the Bretton Woods System. James Tobin won the 1981 Nobel Prize in Economics for his analysis of how financial markets affect business and family decisionmaking. William Fellner was a Hungarian-American economist and a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers under presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Wallich, Triffin, Tobin, and Fellner were all members of Yale University's economics faculty during the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

	Viennese. He was a Hungarian
	refugee, but grand Viennese school as
	a teacher. And I had had in first
	year
00:10:05	economics Warren Nutter, <sup>4</sup> who became
	the founder of the Virginia School $^5$ ,
	which is even more conservative than
	the Chicago School. <sup>6</sup> He was out of
	Chicago and very much Chicago. So I
	got started learning the traditional
	Chicago and arguing with him about it
	right from the start. And he was
	very nice, because he saw that we
	were arguing, but he took to me. And
	so in that
00:10:33	context, I found economics is
	something that would really be fun to
	do and that I would be good.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>G. Warren Nutter was a professor at the University of Virginia specializing in the Soviet Union and the economics of defense, and co-founder of the Virginia School of political economy. Nutter was the Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1974.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The Virgina School of political economy refers to an economic school of thought arising in the 1950s and 1960s which compares the economic role of private vs. public institutions, generally favoring free markets.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Chicago School refers to a neoclassical economic school of thought originating from the University of Chicago in the 1940s, which espoused the benefit of free markets over government intervention in allocating resources.

	MS. SHARKEY: Do you have any
	stories, particularly regarding Jim
	Tobin?
00:10:43	He too was my economics professor at
	Yale several decades later. Did he
	always wear the red sweater?
	HON. CALABRESI: Yeah.
	MS. SHARKEY: Because that was sort
	of his signature.
	HON. CALABRESI: He always went to
	football games. And we often would
	sit near each other at football
	games, and he would look at me and
00:10:59	say no economists cheer. He was a
	wonderful man. There are many
	stories about him actually later when
	we debated Coase <sup>7</sup> . But that's
	another story.
	MS. SHARKEY: After Yale, I know you
	were a Rhodes Scholar, which took you
	over to Oxford University. And did

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Ronald Coase an economist who spent most of his career teaching law and economics at the University of Chicago Law School. He won the Nobel Prize "for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy."

	you study economics there as well?
00:11:19	HON. CALABRESI: Yeah. What happened
	there was kind of funny, because I
	was unsure if I wanted to do law or
	economics, because I was uncertain
	between the two. And actually Ronnie
00:11:33	Dworkin <sup>8</sup> and I, who had won the same
	scholarship in the same place, were
	in the same situation. And we went
	to see the chief tutor in law, who
	was the head tutor at Magdalen. <sup>9</sup> And
	he first said how old are you? And
	we said 20, and he said well then you
	shouldn't read law simply to save a
	year. Because if you read law, then
	two of those years, count
00:12:00	as one of your years in law school.
	But he said but you might want to do
	it anyway. And he turned to me, and
	he said where are you going to go to
	law school, if you go to law school?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ronald Dworkin was a legal philosopher known partly for grounding constitutional interpretation in morality. He taught at Yale Law School and finished his career at New York University School of Law.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Magdalen College is one of thirty eight colleges that comprise Oxford University in the United Kingdom.

Notice he said law school, so it showed he knew something about the United States, rather than where are you going to read law. And I said, bright-eyed and

- 00:12:25 bushy-tailed, "Yale, sir." And he said, "Oh, no. You don't want to read law with me." Fine. He asked Ronnie the same question, and equally bright-eyed and bushy-
- 00:12:42 tailed Ronnie said, "Harvard, sir." And he said, "Oh, you'd get a great deal from reading law with me." He had visited at Harvard and bought into the nonsense of that time, which was wasn't true then, hadn't been true before, but that Yale was just sociology and stuff, and Harvard was really law. So I thought fine, I'll do economics. Ronnie followed his 00:13:09 advice and read law and didn't really like it. He spent all his time with philosophers. I instead decided then I do PPE, and I'd do politics, philosophy, and economics. I wanted

to do philosophy some, because Yale was not very strong in philosophy, and this was a great moment for Oxford philosophy, so that say two of my eight exams were in

- 00:13:40 that. Politics, because I had had Bob Dahl<sup>10</sup> as a very young teacher in Yale, people had told me he's boring - he isn't boring at all - but he's wonderful if you can stay awake and
- 00:13:54 listen to him. He's just starting out. And that had gotten me excited. And so I did two in politics with Ken Tite,<sup>11</sup> who was a wonderful tutor. And then the other four, I was going to do in economics. But I had already done enough so that I could have taken "the schools", exams, the next day. And I convinced my tutors that I was already ahead of the game. And so

00:14:20 they said just spend these two years

Oxford University in the United Kingdom.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Robert Dahl was a political scientist, and professor at Yale University. Dahl is known for his book Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.
<sup>11</sup> Kenneth Tite was a politics professor at Magdalen College at

playing in economics with us, with a quy at the Institute of Statistics<sup>12</sup>, who also won the Nobel Prize later; with John Hicks, 13 who was a friend of my great uncle and so took me as a I mean he was my tutor there. tutor. And so I spent two years just doing what I wanted in economics without really worrying about the exams. In 00:14:48 the last moment I did a few things on that. And that was wonderful, wonderful fun, because I was able to really play at what being what an economist would be. MS. SHARKEY: When you came back and 00:15:02 went to Yale Law School, at what point did you realize you were doing law and economics, which of course

didn't exist at the time?

HON. CALABRESI: Yeah. What happened

<sup>12</sup> Lawrence R. Klein

https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economics/1980/klein/facts/ <sup>13</sup> Sir John Richard Hicks was the winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics in 1972 for his work on economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory. Sir John Hicks was also a lecturer at the London School of Economics, the University of Manchester and Oxford University.

	with this, the economics people at
	Yale wanted me very much to stay in
	economics. I could have stayed at
00:15:23	Oxford and gotten a fellowship. They
	offered me one in economics
	immediately, and that would have been
	my career. But my problem was one, I
	didn't want to stay in England,
	because England was too much a class
	structure. And if I had wanted a
	class structure, I would have gone
	back to Italy and be there. And the
	other was that economics, the part of
00:15:51	economics that I loved was the most
	theoretical. That's what I did, and
	that was fun. And I knew I was good
	at it. But that left me unsatisfied.
	It didn't have enough to do with
00:16:04	people, and I was looking for
	something, a field where I would be
	as theoretical as I could, because
	that's what I am, and yet inevitably
	it had to be normative and deal with
	humans. And so kind of faute de

mieux<sup>14</sup> I tried law. I came to law school. The economics people wanted me to stay in economics, so they asked me to teach economics. And so I taught two

sections of Econ 10, the whole 00:16:34 course, while I was going to law school. And that must have shaped me, because here I was taking all the first term law courses, and at the same time teaching kids basic welfare economics, microeconomics in the first term. One of my courses was torts. And the torts course was using materials which were Shulman and James,  $^{15}$  and I 00:17:05 was being taught by Fleming James. The materials, I later realized, derived from materials put together by Walton Hamilton, who was an

institutional economist on the Yale

00:17:20 faculty back in the 1920s and 30s.

 $<sup>^{14}</sup>$  French phrase expressing "for want of a better alternative."  $^{15}$  Harry Shulman and Fleming James were professors at Yale Law School.

He had put them together with Shulman, and then he went into antitrust and became an antitrust lawyer. How he became a lawyer is interesting. He had put them together with Shulman. Then Shulman and James kind of revised them, but the structure was still part of what Hamilton had done. So

00:17:44 in torts, with a teacher who was a magnificent teacher, but knew no economics at all, we were constantly being given situations which asked economic questions, which I was thinking of because I was teaching economics. And which Jimmy James said we don't really know why that is. And I said, I know perfectly well why that is. But at the same 00:18:13 time, I saw some things which economics didn't explain. And yet I started asking myself right then is it that what we are doing is crazy, or is it that the economic theory is 00:18:32 not sufficient. And so at the very

beginning I was not an economic analyst of law, but a lawyer economist who was playing the two things against each other. Then I got on the [Yale] law journal, and at the beginning of my second year, we were supposed to write a comment, an article to compete for officership. And I decided I would explain tort 00:19:09 law on the basis of economics. And all the things that were going on, on the basis of economics, and explain where economic theory was not doing enough. And that was my comment, which was a draft of the article that I later published on Some Thoughts on *Risk Distribution*<sup>16</sup> when I came back on the faculty. I should have published it when I became an 00:19:40 officer, but it was clear that the outgoing board didn't like it. They made me an officer because I was a kind of class leader, and they loved

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale Law Journal 499 (1961).

	me and so on. But I could tell that
00:19:56	this great board, Arthur Liman $^{17}$ was
	one of them, didn't like the article.
	That was the greatest piece of luck
	for me, because if it had been
	published as a student piece, nobody
	would have ever noticed it. So I
	said to them do you mind if I don't
	publish it? And they said no, not at
	all. And when I came back two years
	later after clerking, I published it,
00:20:23	and it came out contemporaneously, a
	few weeks before, Coase's article <sup>18</sup> ,
	and it got me tenure, and it started
	the whole thing. But I was already a
	lawyer economist from the time I was
	in school.
	MS. SHARKEY: And interestingly,
	obviously you're also steeped in
	philosophy, which girded you for some
	of the debates

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Arthur Liman was a distinguished trial attorney and known for his work representing the Senate Committee during the Iran-Contra Affair.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> R.H. Coase, *The Problem of Social Cost*, The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. III (Oct., 1960).

00:20:44	HON. CALABRESI: Yes.
	MS. SHARKEY: With the philosophers.
	One thing I have read, I think it was
	in some notes you were writing back
	and forth with Ronnie
00:20:51	Dworkin, was you described
	philosophers as being interested in
	the end point, and economists most
	focused on road posts.
	HON. CALABRESI: Yes.
	MS. SHARKEY: And I wonder if you can
	elaborate.
	HON. CALABRESI: Well there is
	something of that, but I think it
	also was something else. It's odd
00:21:09	how often, and this is kind of
	peculiar, many, many philosophers are
	not religious. And their philosophy
	in some way serves them to do what
	religion might do for others. They
	have to find an answer to something.
	I happen to be religious, and I'm
	going to leave the ultimate answers
	to the Almighty. That's why I'm so
	comfortable in a way with means, and

00:21:52	maybe that's why I think that that's
	what economists do. Looking back on
	it, it may have been more the
	difference between Ronnie and me than
	the fields in general.
00:22:04	MS. SHARKEY: I know you have
	thoughts on the field of law and
	economics. In your most recent $book^{19}$
	about the future of law and
	economics, you've been critical of
	the impulse that economists have to
	make everything very highly
	theorized.
	HON. CALABRESI: Yeah.
	MS. SHARKEY: And divorced from
00:22:22	reality. So I wonder
	HON. CALABRESI: [Interposing] Well
	because again, in a way that's also
	autobiographical. That's why I moved
	away from economics. But there is,
	what I am critical of is not so much
	that impulse, if it really led
	economists to be like mathematicians,

 $<sup>^{19}</sup>$  Guido Calabresi, The Future of Law and Economics, Essays in Reform & Recollection, Yale University Press (2016).

	to play just with theory and not then
	say something about the world.
00:22:50	What I don't like is, when
	economists, because they have made
	something which is theoretically
	interesting, and it doesn't fit the
	world, say the world is wrong or
	irrational, and the
00:23:05	world must be changed. And from that
	you get terrible policies, because
	often it is not that the world is
	irrational. It's that the theory is
	incomplete, and it may be incomplete
	for reasons that can be fixed, in the
	same way that Coase fixed the theory
	and made it much more relevant, in
	many ways, I hope I have done the
	same. There may be ways in which that
00:23:33	particular field's theory cannot be
	fixed and still be true to itself.
	But that means that they cannot speak
	in policy terms and tell people what
	they should do as if what the theory
	said required it. And it's that that
	bothers me. It bothers me when

people, led by their theory, say that what common experience shows people do, must be wrong. Sometimes it is But the wronq. 00:24:04 notion that the theory is necessarily right is plain wrong. And that turns out to be something not just with economics, but with almost every other field. One of the fascinating things to me was to see Frank Michelman's<sup>20</sup> retirement, in 00:24:17 which philosophers were saying to him we don't understand how so able and

we don't understand how so able and so on a person as you are, when philosophical theory would lead to a result which you think is wrong in practice in constitutional law, you don't accept the theory. And I was seeing him do with philosophy exactly the sort of thing I'm saying about 00:24:44 economics. It isn't just economic theory that tends to lead

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Frank Michelman is the Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard University with scholarship in constitutional law and theory, comparative constitutionalism, and South African constitutionalism. He taught at Harvard Law School from 1963 until his retirement in 2012.

theoreticians to want the world to follow them even though the theory may not be complete. I saw this dramatically when I was at Frank Michelman's retirement party, where philosophers were saying to him why don't you just follow philosophy when philosophy doesn't explain the world 00:25:15 and say the world is wrong. What he was doing was exactly what I do in economics. He was law and philosophy, not philosophical analysis of law.

00:25:29 MS. SHARKEY: So let's explore your time as a law clerk. We know you clerked for Justice Hugo Black,<sup>21</sup> and I'd love to hear some reminiscence from that time. But also today as a judge with myriad law clerks and all the experience of working with them, how does that make you reflect back on that experience?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Hugo L. Black was an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1937 to 1971.

	HON. CALABRESI: Justice Black was
00:25:52	one of the most sophisticated and
	brilliant people I have ever known.
	Now many people tend to think of him
	as using simplistic language and so
	on - none of that. If you got to
	know him, you'd know what an
	extraordinary mind and how subtle he
	really was. He had, for instance,
	the best understanding of what
	fascism was and what it was not, of
	anyone I ever met
00:26:27	in America. Only my parents could

111 America. Only my parents could have talked about it in the same way. And he also was a person who almost naturally looked at things in a different way from other people. A
00:26:49 truly original mind is somebody who sees a situation that everybody else sees and looks at it differently. And so again and again, when I clerked, opinions would get written ultimately whether they'd come out his way or not, but from his viewpoint, because he saw a way of

	looking at it which was new and
	original and different from other
00:27:17	people. And that is one of the
	things that influenced me most, of
	trying to figure out how I can make
	myself look at things from a
	different point of view. Move the
	furniture so that you don't look at
	it in the canonical way, a terribly
	mixed metaphor. But try to do things
	in a way that is different. He also
	was a person for whom his clerks were
00:27:51	his family. I've often said that it
	was not surprising that when he died,
	and his funeral was in the National
	Cathedral, there was his family, his
	law clerks, and then the President of
00:28:07	the United States. And that, in
	terms of relationship with clerks,
	was what told me what you do as a
	judge with your clerks. My clerks as
	you well know are my family after my
	family. And it is that, that
	teaching, learning, as you can do
	only from your kids, and with your

	kids, was influenced by Black. There
	are any number of stories about Black
00:28:39	and how he reacted to any number of
	things, to Korematsu, $^{22}$ to the
	business of his having been in the
	Klan. There isn't time today to talk
	about them, but if I live long
	enough, one of the books I want to
	write is Hugo Black tales and just
	talk about some of the things that he
	said that influenced me and about
	what courts are like, why they're
	independent, what the
00:29:19	dangers to judicial independence are,
	the problems with liberals. I'll just
	tell that one. He once wrote an
	opinion which is extremely strong in
	a very difficult case. And I said to
00:29:36	him, "Judge, how can you be so sure?"
	And he said, "I'm not sure. I could
	change my mind tomorrow." And I
	said, "But look at how you've written

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> In <u>Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944)</u>. 65 S. Ct. 193, the Supreme Court upheld Fred Korematsu's criminal conviction for failing to report to an internment camp for American citizens and residents of Japanese descent.

this. It's so strong." And he repeated, "I could change my mind tomorrow." And I said, "But then why did you write so strongly?" And he said, "Well, I don't think the people that would never change their minds should be 00:29:59 the only ones to write strongly." And often liberals, because they see various sides of something, are unwilling to speak forcefully. And Black was saying no, speak forcefully and then be willing to change your mind. MS. SHARKEY: So you mentioned your law clerks as a kind of extended 00:30:18 family. Certainly I know I personally, and many of us feel that way. Your annual clerk reunions are a testament to that, to our affection towards you. But I want to 00:30:29 talk a little bit about your family. I know your family is very important to you. And, in particular, your spouse Anne you've known a long time,

and I wonder if you could talk a bit about the beginnings of your relationship and how it's flourished over the years. HON. CALABRESI: Well Anne and I have been married 56 years. We met 00:30:51 in my elementary school days. I was given a scholarship to the Foote School, which is a little private school, a magnificent school, made magnificent because of the bigotry of the time. Yale had no women teachers. And so the wives of the great professors who were brilliant, learned, and wanted to do something, tended to teach in places like this 00:31:22 little school. So there were teachers who today would be the most distinguished professors, and back then they were teaching little kids. Well I was offered a scholarship there, for affirmative 00:31:35 action reasons. But not the affirmative action reasons you might think of, all of which might well

have applied to me, but because I was a boy. In seventh grade, enough little boys went off to boarding school, to prep schools, so that they found themselves short, and they went to the public school nearby, which was the Yale area public school, and found me and offered me a 00:32:00 scholarship. So I went to this school, and I saw two years behind me a little girl who had the biggest, fattest red brown braids that I had ever seen. You don't usually notice kids who are in younger classes, but I noticed those and thought gee, that is wonderful. And that was Anne. That's how we met. She talks about 00:32:34 this little Italian kid, because I was still totally Italian, still dressed as an Italian, not as an American elementary school kid. And we got to know each other. Not much, 00:32:52 but in school. Over the years, in high school and in college, we were part of the same group of people who

would be together at parties. The world was such in those days that parents of young women would give dances at vacation time in their houses, and they would invite boys whom they thought were proper. About half the parents of these daughters who had

00:33:32 gone to the same school would invite me and about half would not. Some would think me proper; some would not. Anne's parents were among those who did. So we were all part of the same group. She was then considerably taller than I. She has shrunk with age. And she would always try to arrange for me to meet, fix me up with friends who were short 00:33:58 and bouncy. They were perfectly nice but that never got anywhere. So we remained friends but never really got to know each other until I came back to teach at the law school after my clerkship. And then by an odd 00:34:13 coincidence, a friend who had been my

note editor had come back to New Haven to practice law. He had asked for the names, he was not from New Haven, of young guys and gals here, because he didn't know anybody, and I had given him a series of names, among them Anne, who by then had finished Radcliffe and was working in 00:34:38 New York but coming back often to New Haven because her grandfather was ill, and so she wanted to be there. I came back to New Haven and decided to room with this quy, and he had taken Anne out once. She had found him incredibly boring. He was a nice man, but utterly monosyllabic. And he invited her out again, and she was too nice to say no. She said I'll 00:35:07 give him another chance. And in the meantime, I had moved in with him, and he said I'm going out with her. We're going out to dinner; can you get a date and join us? So I did. 00:35:19 And, at the last minute, I invited somebody who was almost as

monosyllabic as he was. And so there we were at dinner. We knew each other well, but these guys were grunting, and so we started talking. And we talked, talked, and talked, and that was it. And from then on, we started going out together, and not much more than a year later, we 00:35:45 were engaged and married almost a year after that. We were very old at the time. That is, when I was married, I was 28, almost 29, and she was 26, almost 27. Today, that would be thought of as being much too young. Then we were old enough so that the president of Smith<sup>23</sup> who had been master one of the colleges here, and a very good friend of Anne's 00:36:17 family and the guy who had been the secretary of the Rhodes committee that had picked me, so he knew me, asked her to come and speak to the senior class at Smith and tell them

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Founded in 1971, Smith College is an all-women's college located in Northampton, Massachusetts.

00:36:29	that it was all right if they were
	not engaged by their senior year,
	that they might still find somebody
	good. And she said oh, you're crazy.
	She was then as she has been ever
	since a person who has always thought
	for herself and is an amazing,
	amazing human being.
	MS. SHARKEY: Well, wonderful. Thank
	you very much. This has been
00:36:52	delightful to have this opportunity
	to sit down and talk with you about
	your early years and formative
	schooling years, thank you Guido.
	HON. CALABRESI: Thank you, Cathy.
	Part II
	Interviewer: Kenji Yoshino, Professor
	of Law, New York University School of
	Law
	MR. KENJI YOSHINO: So Guido, I'm so
	delighted to be here on behalf of the
	IJA Oral History Project to discuss
	your life's influence and time on the
	bench. I want to begin by talking
00:37:20	about your family and its long and
storied record in the humanities. At a time when we hear in journal after journal and in institution after institution, that the humanities are in crisis, what role do you think the 00:37:34 humanities have to play in the law? HON. CALABRESI: Humanities are crucial to law because one way of seeing whether law makes sense is to see how the same situation has been treated all over time in the great canons of the humanities. When Dante says that, in Paolo and Francesca, 24 that they were reading a French novel 00:38:09 and fell in love, the question of how does reading literature, television affect behavior is being treated in a particular way? Dante may be right; he may be wrong. But it is an insight on questions which we talk about today by somebody who is looking at it from another point of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Referring to the story of Francesca de Rimini and Paolo Malatesta's adulterous affair as depicted in Dante's *Divine Comedy*.

	view. And of course Shakespeare, but
	every one of the great writers tells
	you
00:38:45	something about a legal relationship
	in a somewhat different way. And
	that insight is as important as any
	insight from economic theory or
	philosophy. And people have to
00:39:00	understand that we can see what makes
	sense and doesn't make sense in the
	law from that point of view. And
	that's apart from the whole question
	of interpretation. When you know
	that Stravinsky, <sup>25</sup> <i>Rite of Spring</i> was
	totally different when he conducted
	it once and when he did it 20 years
	later, when you find that a
00:39:34	play about South Africa with the same
	players, the same actors, and the
	same writer is different 20 years
	later, because South Africa is
	different, you are saying something

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Russian composer Igor Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring* debuted at the Théâtre des Champs Élysées in Paris in 1913 to mixed reviews and provoked an upheaval in the audience.

about interpretation, which you cannot avoid, you cannot ignore when you're talking about legal interpretation. It just strikes me as bizarre that anyone would think that something

- 00:40:05 that is as much a part of us as all of humanities are, shouldn't tell us as much or more than anything else about what we're doing in law.
  - MR. YOSHINO: You, just as much as
- 00:40:20 anybody I know in the judiciary, have thought deeply about questions of interpretation. Are there modalities of interpretation that you would say that you would favor? We're often told that people are originalists or prudentialists or consequentialists or textualists. And in particular, could I get your view on originalism, which I think is much in vogue, not 00:40:44 only among conservatives, but even more recently among liberals. HON. CALABRESI: A couple of different things. First, I think it

is important to make a distinction between interpretation and construction. Interpretation as I view it is always a way, always retrospective, always a way of trying to find out what the people who made 00:41:11 that law, whether it's the constitution or a statute, intended. Construction is a role that courts have of saying what something means today really not regardless of, but 00:41:30 sometimes even despite what the people originally meant. And you see this dramatically in *Hively*,<sup>26</sup> the decision of the Seventh Circuit, in which the majority acts as if it is interpreting, as if the people, when they wrote Title VII, meant it to apply to same sex discrimination. They didn't back then. Posner quite rightly says that isn't what matters. 00:42:03 What matters is what this statute must mean today, given all the things

 $<sup>^{26}</sup>$  Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (2017).

that have changed. That's construction. And that's part of a role, a more limited role in some ways, but a role that courts have. It's when we construe to avoid a constitutional issue. It's when we construe to make a statute be updated, and there's nothing new about

00:42:29 that. Landis<sup>27</sup> pointed out that that is exactly what happened with children born out of wedlock and the wrongful death statutes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, that they were construed to 00:42:43 cover these people after they had years before been interpreted to mean something else. Because the underlying conditions had changed courts construed the statutes differently. So that's something that is important and is what I talk about in Common Law for the Age of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> James M. Landis, Dean of Harvard Law School (1937-46), also served as Chair of the Security and Exchange Commission as well as Special Counsel to President John F. Kennedy.

Statutes,<sup>28</sup> and it remains a fundamental difference that one should know because one then can ask when is it appropriate to construe. And it is certainly appropriate 00:43:05 to construe in *Hively*, given what changed and what not. The question of originalism is a different one. Originalism, whether originalism is originalism in terms of original language, or originalism in terms of what we think the framers were thinking of, that doesn't interest me so much. But are we bound, stuck with what it was that they said and 00:43:38 then require that any changes not be made by courts to update, but by constitutional amendment. That's a profoundly conservative attitude. Profoundly conservative not in a right-left sense, but just because it 00:43:57 says that what was done in the past binds us. When you say about

<sup>28</sup> Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard University Press 1985).

liberals today looking to originalism, the reason is quite obvious. It is the same reason why in Italy in the 1920s, unlike Germany, all the great scholars were formalists. Because formalism was a form of conservatism that said you cannot change the law,

00:44:35 the law must remain, the great 19<sup>th</sup> century codes. What that did was preserve in the law the values of the  $19^{th}$  century, which may have been economically libertarian, but they were also libertarian as to civil rights in the face of fascism. So that formalism was a defense against the updating by the fascists. What happened was that the great scholars 00:45:11 in Italy were all formalists. When the war ended, two of them said now we can be functionalists. Now we can do what is better, have the law respond to the immediate wishes of 00:45:28 people. And another great antifascist scholar said what about the

next dictatorship? He was more pessimistic and said we should preserve the past, be bound by it, because the future, following what people want, can be so awful. I'm not an originalist. I never can be. I'm too optimistic. I think in the end, we must do what people think is 00:46:01 right. On the other hand, to create inertia so that momentary lapses into totalitarianism, into fascism, into bigotry, can be stopped, is one of the reasons for our constitutional structure. And I would love it if people like Justice Thomas<sup>29</sup> today would say there are some things that cannot be done, which are right wing wrongs, because of originalism. 00:46:37 MR. YOSHINO: So what do you do when you're in the position of these competing goods of faithfulness to the rule of law and your own moral

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Clarence Thomas is an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States, appointed in 1991 by President George H.W. Bush.

	conscience? Because you, as much as
00:46:48	any jurist I know, again really care
	about these values so deeply. So
	what happens? For example, let's
	take the death penalty, when
	something that I know you are morally
	opposed to, is nonetheless law of the
	land.
	HON. CALABRESI: Well that's the
	biggest question for any judge. Now
	first I want to make a distinction
00:47:10	between a judge in a place like Nazi
	Germany or fascist Italy, where you
	reject the system, and then it is
	your job to do everything to undercut
	it. You're a revolutionary in a
	black robe, but you are a
	revolutionary. And that's what you
	must do, as against a judge who on
	the whole accepts the system, like
	me. There are many things that are
00:47:41	wrong in the American legal system,
	but by and large I accept it. I
	think it is as good as one is likely
	to have, so I cannot simply undercut

	it. In that situation, there's a big
00:47:57	problem. For you to nullify as a
	judge is both being untrue to your
	oath, but also saying that other
	judges can nullify when they don't
	like it. And frankly, much as I
	respect my colleagues, I'd rather
	that they were bound by the law than
	by what their values are because
	sometimes I think their values are
	mighty peculiar. And if I don't do
00:48:22	it, then they won't. So I don't
00:48:22	it, then they won't. So I don't believe in nullification. I also
00:48:22	_
00:48:22	believe in nullification. I also
00:48:22	believe in nullification. I also don't believe in what happens to some
00:48:22	believe in nullification. I also don't believe in what happens to some judges who because they don't like
00:48:22	believe in nullification. I also don't believe in what happens to some judges who because they don't like something morally decide it isn't
00:48:22	believe in nullification. I also don't believe in what happens to some judges who because they don't like something morally decide it isn't them at all, it's the law. Remember
00:48:22	believe in nullification. I also don't believe in what happens to some judges who because they don't like something morally decide it isn't them at all, it's the law. Remember Bob Cover <sup>30</sup> writing about the judges
00:48:22	believe in nullification. I also don't believe in what happens to some judges who because they don't like something morally decide it isn't them at all, it's the law. Remember Bob Cover <sup>30</sup> writing about the judges who were abolitionists but were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> In *Justice Accused*, Robert Cover explores the reasoning of judges who enforce laws they believe are unjust. Robert M. Cover, *Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process* (Yale University Press 1984).

- 00:48:56 that they might have been able to do something but had failed to find the way, in such a situation. That won't do. That won't do. That's the worst of all. Nor am I willing to recuse myself to pull myself out,
- 00:49:10 because that leaves only the judges who aren't troubled by that to be making judgements. That's like death qualified judges. It would be wrong. So what do you do? You wake up in the middle of the night, and that can mean much before just the night before. So if it is really a difficult case, months ahead because you see it coming, as you see it coming. And see if really you 00:49:40 have to follow what people think is the law or whether they are wrong. Whether in fact if you use all the brains the good Lord gave you, you can find a way that is consistent with the law to come out the right way. And more often than you would think, because the law is pretty

	good, what people think is the law in
	a particular case is not, when you
00:50:12	look at it with that fierce attempt
	to see why it seems wrong. Buzz
	Arnold, $^{31}$ a conservative, and I were
	judging a moot court once, and
	somebody said does it do any good to
00:50:29	plead the equities? And we both
	blurted out of course, it makes us
	work harder. If a case seems wrong,
	you really look to see if it is
	wrong. And if you come up with
	something the next day, and your
	court is not an ideological court,
	you'll say we can do this, and the
	other judges are apt to say oh good,
	Guido. Good, that case was really
	bothering
00:50:56	me. Didn't bother them as much as

J0:50:56 me. Didn't bother them as much as you, or they would have been up in the middle of the night. And there will be cases that bother them but didn't bother me, and they will come

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 31}$  Morris "Buzz" Arnold is a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

up with something and say oh, good. And that moves the law forward. And when that happens, you sleep very well the next night. Sometimes you can't find a way. And then you may write a concurring opinion saying why 00:51:24 the law is wrong and write for history. But you know when you've done that, that you failed, that you have not found a way. And so though 00:51:37 it's very tempting to write that opinion, which speaks to history in saying how wonderful things are, or would be if people followed me, you know that then you have failed. And there's a temptation to do that, because it is tempting to say, I'm a martyr, and I have to do it. It's a little bit like T.S. Eliot's<sup>32</sup> temptation to martyrdom, only worse 00:52:03 because you think you're a martyr, but it's the other person, the person you have not been able to help, who

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$  T.S. Eliot is considered one of the major poets of the Twentieth Century.

	really gets it in the neck. So it's
	a very easy martyrdom. So you should
	avoid that if you possibly can. But
	sometimes it is the thing to do if
	there's nothing else.
	MR. YOSHINO: That's so fascinating,
	because Benjamin Cardozo <sup>33</sup> once said
00:52:24	that dissenting opinions are much
	more literary than majority opinions,
	because there's an inverse
	relationship between force and fancy,
	or coercion and imagination. But
00:52:35	what you're suggesting is that we
	should eschew the false martyrdom of
	imagination in an instance where you
	could actually exert power for the
	good. Is that correct?
	HON. CALABRESI: That is right. That
	doesn't mean that there aren't, that
	there isn't a place for them. But
	that is kind of, you must be sure
	that that is the last straw. You

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Benjamin Cardozo, an influential jurist who served as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, as well an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

- 00:52:56 know, you must be sure that you have done as much as you can. Some of my favorite opinions are ones in which I wrote concurring or dissenting, because having done all I could, that was all I could do. And then I could be more literary. And that's why I love them, because I could be freer. But precisely for that reason, they're a temptation. 00:53:27 MR. YOSHINO: One of the things I
- noted when I was clerking for you was what a literary person you are. I really think that you have the soul of the poet in many ways. And so can 00:53:36 you help me with that? Because oftentimes a field that you're known for founding, law and economics, is counter-posed against law and literature. So what is the relationship between the two in your mind?

HON. CALABRESI: Well, it is amazing how bad writers economists mostly are. When you find one who knows how

00:53:55	to put a sentence together, (it's
	usually, someone who is English) and
	you start to cheer. So that's the
	first relationship. Wouldn't it be
	nice if you could get people to do
	economic analysis and do it in a way
	that used words in an elegant
	fashion? But a deeper relationship
	is these are all ways of looking at
	the world and trying to explain it.
	There is no

00:54:27 single way of understanding the complexity of our relationships, understanding whether we are doing it right or not. If we simply accept the relationship as it is, we become 00:54:44 originalists in that sense. And nothing can change unless there is a revolution, and you kick everything out and start from scratch, but that's not good. We have to have a place to stand on, to look at the world and criticize it. Economics is one leverage point. And it will tell you some things because of its

structure and its theoretical power that other

things will not tell you. Literature 00:55:13 is another place to stand on. What a fantastic place to stand on to understand what the world is and when it is right and wrong. When they both agree about something being wrong or right, you have a tremendous power. When they disagree, ask yourself what it is about each discipline that might cause it to 00:55:44 miss something important? MR. YOSHINO: That's wonderful, thank you. So you've had an unwavering record of supporting LGBT rights. And in fact, just after I was 00:55:56 clerking, I had a conversation with you, in which you expressed regret about having to recuse yourself from one of the gays in the military cases, the don't ask, don't tell policy that banned individuals who ... HON. CALABRESI: I remember very well.

	MR. YOSHINO: Right, who self-
	identified as gay from serving in the
00:56:15	military, so long as they didn't
	rebut the presumption that they
	engaged in homosexual conduct. And
	we've talked about how you do not
	believe in recusal as a general
	matter, but in this case a recusal
	motion that came from the government
	was quite specific. You had made
	pro-gay comments, again to your
	credit as an academic, and felt like
00:56:37	you should recuse yourself. Could
	you speak a little bit about that
	experience, because I believe you had
	a very ingenious way of thinking
	about this case, had you been able to
00:56:49	write in it.
	HON. CALABRESI: I thought at the
	time that it really wouldn't matter.
	The panel was a very strong panel.
	It was John Walker $^{34}$ and Will

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 34}$  John M. Walker Jr. is a senior judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

	Feinberg. <sup>35</sup> In my place, we took
	Pierre Leval, $^{36}$ and it was a strong
	panel. And I thought probably my
	being there would not have made any
	difference. If I had dissented in
00:57:20	that case, precisely because the
	government had made a motion to
	recuse myself, my dissent wouldn't be
	paid much attention to. What I later
	realized was that probably I did make
	a mistake, because I didn't need
	technically, necessarily to recuse
	myself. And it's interesting that
	most of the people who tended to
	agree with me on gay rights said I
00:57:48	was right to recuse myself. Most of
	the ones who tended to disagree with
	me said no, you should've stayed in
	and written your point of view. So
	it's interesting about our court.
00:57:59	But what I might have done had I been
	on that court would have been to say

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Wilfred Feinberg was a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
<sup>36</sup> Pierre N. Leval is a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

for the first time that sexual orientation was a category of people discriminated against. It was a suspect classification. I might then have gotten the panel to go along with that, even if they were going to decide against the individual soldiers, because the military 00:58:38 situation made it okay to discriminate even against suspect classification. Now that would have been a fascinating thing, because the soldiers would not have appealed because they would have been so happy to have a court for the first time say sexual orientation is a suspect classification. The government, which would have been very unhappy, 00:59:05 couldn't appeal, because they had won. The result would have been that this would stand long before anybody else said that, as a statement about the law, which would have been correct.

00:59:19 So I think probably if I had known

enough and thought enough, I wouldn't have recused myself, and I think it would have been a very interesting result. MR. YOSHINO: Well fast forward about a decade, and it's 2009. And I'm going to use a point of personal privilege here, because you marry your clerks, and my husband and I 00:59:42 were fortunate enough to be married by you. Before we got married, you sat us down and said the year is 2009, marriage is fully legal under state law in Connecticut. But the Defense of Marriage Act [DOMA], which defined marriage as between one man and one woman for federal purposes, had not been struck down yet. It was struck down in 2013<sup>37</sup>, I believe. But 01:00:05 you said to me and my husband, I have thought about this, I have prayed about this, I've talked to Anne about

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> In United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 186 L. Ed. 2d 808, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4921, the Supreme Court held the purpose and effect of DOMA was a violation of the Fifth Amendment's grant of equal protection.

	this, and I can't treat you any
	differently from the rest of my
01:00:13	clerks. And when I marry
	heterosexual couples, I always say by
	the power vested in me by the state
	of Connecticut and the United States
	of America, I now pronounce you
	married. And I'll never forget this
	moment, because you said technically
	under DOMA, I should leave out the
	last bit, about by the power vested
	in me by the United States. But you
01:00:34	said I'm not going to leave it out
	because that would be differential
	treatment. So could you speak a
	little bit about that?
	HON. CALABRESI: Well frankly, I
	thought then that DOMA was
	unconstitutional, and I was right.
	And I was saying that as a Court of
	Appeals judge, when I said that my
	power, and by the way, my power under
01:01:00	the state would have been enough to
	marry you, because I do have power
	under the state. So technically that

	was all I needed to say you would
	have been just as married if I didn't
01:01:10	say the last part. But I wanted to
	assert that I as a judge had thought
	about it, and I had thought that that
	law was unconstitutional, and I
	should take every possible occasion
	to say so. And that's what I was
	doing. Because I was marrying you by
	the power vested in me, also by the
	United States of America.
	MR. YOSHINO: So the human being in
01:01:41	me was so moved by that. And I have
	actually written about this
	experience. But the lawyer in me and
	the former clerk in me was very
	anxious on your behalf on this one.
	So I was very heartened when you also
	said and by the way, whenever I brush
	my teeth, it's by the power vested in
	me by the United States of America
	because I am after all a federal
01:02:01	judge. So I want to make sure that
	you have the plausible deniability
	and running room there that you need.

	Could I ask which choice of yours do
	you think has been most impactful on
01:02:13	your life?
	HON. CALABRESI: What choice has
	mattered most? Well of course my
	marriage, because I believe there are
	two things that make for a happy
	life. One is to find something to
	do, which is fun and useful.
	Something that you can do, that
	you're good at and that you enjoy,
	and that helps other people. And the
01:02:43	other, to find somebody to spend your
	life with. And that choice, I don't
	know if it was my choice or her
	choice, I've spoken about choices at
	other times, in commencement
	addresses, and often the choices are
	not made by us. But that choice was
	the most important. The other was
	the choice to go into law. I could
	choose to do many different things,
01:03:10	but here was something that it turned
	out that I was good at, that I
	enjoyed, but I could see the whole

	picture right from the start. And
	which can do so much good for so many
01:03:21	people.
	MR. YOSHINO: You've talked about
	going into law as being a powerful
	force for the good. And of course we
	have all been the beneficiaries of
	that along so many dimensions. And I
	myself have talked to you about the
	LGBT civil rights movement and your
	role in that. What do you think the
	next great civil rights movement will
01:03:40	be that will grab the nation and
	require the law's intervention?
	HON. CALABRESI: Well we have it
	right now. It's the treatment of
	refugees, immigrants, people who are
	of religions and backgrounds that are
	truly different. Now we started that
	way with $Brown^{38}$ and with the
	rejection of Korematsu <sup>39</sup> and the
	treatment of people from an ethnic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Brown v. Board of Education, 344 U.S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 1, 97 L. Ed. 3, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 1953.
<sup>39</sup> Supra, Note 21.

point of view.

01:04:13	But today, we have gone back to the
	kind of attitudes about religion that
	dogged this country before it was a
	country, that was what the first
	amendment went against, to say that
01:04:31	the evils of the $16^{\text{th}}$ and $17^{\text{th}}$ century
	were to be avoided by allowing
	everyone in. And today instead, we
	see a resurgence of a kind of
	partisanship in religion. And you
	see it within religions, Sunni and
	Shiite, <sup>40</sup> who are as fierce as
	Protestants and Catholics were in the
	17 <sup>th</sup> century. It's strange, but it's
	not that surprising that the great
01:05:07	issues of the past become again the
	great issues of the present and the
	future.
	MR. YOSHINO: There are many people
	who say, I'm thinking about for
	example Justice Ginsburg <sup>41</sup> saying that

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 40}$  The two most prominent sects of Islam.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Ruth Bader Ginsburg is an Associate Justice on the Supreme

	our U.S. Constitution would not be a
	model for say Egypt in thinking about
	its own constitution building,
	because it was too old. But added to
01:05:28	that of course has to be a tinge of
	it's not just old, it's very
	difficult to amend. Should our
	constitution be easier to amend,
	because that would make it more of a
01:05:38	living constitutionalism that even
	originalists could live with? Or
	alternatively, have we found the
	right balance of difficulty of
	amendment precisely because we have
	these longstanding commitments that
	could be jeopardized by a fluctuating
	majority that wanted to take away
	fundamental rights?
	HON. CALABRESI: I like the idea of a
01:06:02	constitution that is difficult to
	amend. I find California
	fascinating, because there the
	constitution is amended by referendum
	in the easiest of possible ways. And
	there are advantages to it. But I

much prefer a way that says the formal way of amending is there, but the inertia is very great. And then that courts can construe so that in that common law way, I'm

- 01:06:43 a common law lawyer, I teach torts, so that in that common law way, the constitution can also be brought up to date, not in one dramatic amendment change, but through the
- 01:06:58 development of what is a living constitution, as terms change and are updated, so that I like the notion of having a common law constitutional court be able to update slowly and bigger changes take place, but in a way that is difficult.

MR. YOSHINO: You're going to have to explain the term the simplicity of making mistakes, which I have found 01:07:27 in some of your writings. What is that, and how has it influenced your judicial philosophy? HON. CALABRESI: So it came up first

in a commencement speech that I gave

many, many years ago at Connecticut College, about making choices. I think that commencement speech is in a book of the ten best commencement speeches. That's not a compliment. 01:07:54 But there it is, and I was talking about choices, about choices for good and choices for the bad. And I was saying there that the banality of good is often ignored, but in fact many of

01:08:10 the best choices we make are made by, or are strongly influenced by, other people. They're not clearly our own choices. And then I went to the other side, how easy it is to make mistakes, to do things wrong, when you are in positions of authority and power. And of course, I was thinking of the people who put into place Korematsu.<sup>42</sup> They were Earl Warren,<sup>43</sup> as you well

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Supra, Note 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Earl Warren was the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1953-1969.

- 01:08:43 know, since you are the Chief Justice Earl Warren Professor, not the Earl Warren Professor. And Hugo Black and Franklin Roosevelt, they were not bad people. They were good people, and yet they made a terrible mistake, I was thinking of people and of any number of situations, you know, where good people simply do things wrong. Now, I know they did their best to avoid it,
- 01:09:22 but the important thing is if you realize how easy it is to make mistakes, and how important it is to be open to change, to be open to recognizing mistakes, and to make things right.

01:09:40 That's what I had in mind with not the most elegant of phrases. But that's what I had in mind. MR. YOSHINO: Is there anything in particular that we haven't covered in this interview that you would like to share about shaping influences in your life, or your thoughts on the

judicial role?

HON. CALABRESI: Well, we began with Cathy about my coming to America and 01:10:01 being an immigrant and what that The greatest influences on my meant. life as a judge were the fact that my parents were willing to give up all that they had on a matter of principle and start new in a new place and thinking about what led them to do that and worrying about whether I would have the courage to 01:10:41 do the same thing, if it came to it. Now remember it's very easy to make that look like an easy choice. Oh, if that happens, I will do it. It's equally easy to find that it must 01:11:01 never occur, that you always stay within. The important thing is to realize that no matter how good things seem to be, that possibility is always there, and you must always realize that when you're judging, you're at the fringe of making a mistake that you must not make,

because you want to stay when you should leave. If you know that, you may be okay.

01:11:39 MR. YOSHINO: Thank you so much, Judge. It's been a great pleasure and an honor. I feel like, I mean I've known you more than half of my life, but the renovating estrangement of this interview has brought out even greater richnesses than I have experienced before. So I think of you as the Albus Dumbledore<sup>44</sup> of the federal judiciary. And I only hope that you find that pesky 13<sup>th</sup> use of 01:12:02 dragon's blood. Thank you. HON. CALABRESI: Thank you. [END RECORDING]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Albus Dumbledore, a fictional wizard in J.K. Rowling's *Harry Potter* book series. Dumbledore was the school headmaster, a powerful wizard, and a wise mentor and protector to the title character.