Approximately once each Term, the Supreme Court invites the participation of an amicus curiae when one party to a case declines either to participate at all, or to advance a particular position, before the Court.

These amicus invitations have largely escaped both public notice and academic debate. Yet they occur at the intersection of two important recent critiques of the Court: first, the increasing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small, elite cadre of specialized lawyers; and second, the Court’s status as perhaps the least transparent institution in American public life.

This Essay, the first in-depth examination of all recorded Supreme Court amicus invitations, unfolds an important new account, both descriptive and normative, of a largely invisible practice. The findings are at once predictable and surprising: in recent years, amicus invitations have invariably gone to former law clerks of the Justices, but at the same time have increasingly been granted to first-time advocates. These findings, and others, suggest that both peril and promise inhere in the practice of amicus invitation: it threatens troubling distributional consequences and distortions of legal outcomes, but also holds out the prospect of more democratically distributed advocacy. More broadly, examining the practice—both as it is currently constituted, and as it might be refined—sheds considerable light on the Court as an institution, a subset of the advocates who appear before it, and the ways institutional design choices can shape the development of the law.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 29, 2015, a young first-time advocate approached the Supreme Court lectern. This fact was not so remarkable; although first-timers are increasingly rare at the Supreme Court, on this day alone three of the five attorneys who argued before the Court were doing so for the first time. What was unusual was the mechanism by which this young lawyer, William Peterson, came to his argument: a phone call from Justice Scalia, asking Peterson if he would accept an appointment to defend the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in a case the Court had just agreed to hear, and in which the federal government agreed with the petitioner that the Fifth Circuit had erred.

Amicus invitations of this sort—which generally arise when one party to a case declines either to participate at all, or to take a particular position, before the Court—come about once each Term. Although they share a name with the more common, uninvited amicus filings the Court now receives in conjunction with the majority of the cases it considers on the merits, they are quite distinct from those better-known unsolicited filings: they originate with the Court, they direct the recipient of the invitation

*Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. For generous assistance and feedback on this project, I am grateful to Akhil Amar, Jonathan Mark Bearak, Neal Devins, Lee Epstein, Myriam Gilles, Brian Goldman, Michael Herz, Richard Posner, Alex Reinert, Judith Resnik, Alex Stein, and participants in Cardozo’s Junior Faculty Workshop. Sam Markowitz, David Kurlander, Sophia Gurule, Talya Seidman, and especially Madelyn Morris provided terrific research assistance.

2 Both lawyers in the other case argued that day, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1885 (2015)—a significant challenge to Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol—were also arguing before the Court for the first time.
4 The Court uses the terms “invitation” and “appointment” interchangeably in its orders and occasional other references to the practice, so I use both terms throughout this piece.
5 As the Appendix shows, there have been 56 amicus appointments since 1954 (and one much earlier appointment, from 1926), for a rate of approximately one per year. There has, however, been a significant increase in frequency in recent years. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
6 See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1768 (2014) (detailing the “dramatic increase” in amicus filings in the Supreme Court); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 35 (2011) (noting that amicus briefs “are now filed in virtually every case” before the Supreme Court).
to take a particular position, and they are always paired with the right to present oral argument.

The Court keeps no records of such appointments, and its rules do not reference them. Similarly, there is no official guidance on when the Court will appoint such an amicus, whom it will appoint or pursuant to what processes, or the precise nature of the amicus’ mandate. Although these appointments have gone largely unnoticed in the scholarship, they occur at the intersection of two important recent critiques of the Court: first, the increasing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small, elite cadre of specialized lawyers; and second, the Court’s status as perhaps the least transparent institution in American public life.

This Essay investigates five primary questions (and several nested subsidiary questions) related to the practice of amicus invitations. First, as a descriptive matter, who are the advocates the Court invites to argue before it? It is well-known (at least in Washington circles) that they are typically elite lawyers and often former Supreme Court law clerks, but this Essay attempts to answer the question in more granular detail: specifically, what sorts of backgrounds do these advocates share, what types of connections to the Court and to individual Justices is it possible to discern, and what patterns and trends emerge from examining the available data?

Second, how does the Court select these advocates from among the 250,000-plus members of the Supreme Court bar? That is, what do we know or can we discover about the process by which these advocates are chosen?

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7 As we shall see, however, the precise role of the advocate vis-à-vis possible arguments and outcomes—put differently, the identity of the client—is in many ways indeterminate. See infra notes 164-179 and accompanying text.

8 The Court has explained that it issues such invitations in order to permit it “to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.” Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 526 n. 2 (2003) (describing invitation of amicus David DeBruin to present argument favor of the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, which the United States had joined the petitioner in attacking). See also EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 753 (9th ed. 2007) (discussing the Court’s appointment practices).

9 See Email from Supreme Court Public Information Office, October 6, 2015, to author.

10 By contrast, the Court provides at least some guidance to ordinary amicus filers. See SUP. CT. R. 37, BRIEF FOR AN AMICUS CURIAE.

11 The one major exception is Brian P. Goldman’s excellent student Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions? 63 STAN. L. REV. 907 (2011). See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.

12 See infra notes 20-42 and accompanying text.

13 See infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.

14 Richard Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1491 (2008) (noting that the requirements for membership in the Supreme Court bar merely consist of “three years as a practicing lawyer admitted to any bar of any state, a certificate of good standing from that bar, sponsorship by two current members of the bar, and a $200 check payable to the Court.”).
Third, what are the implications of these invitations—for the invited attorneys, the cases in which they participate, and the law more broadly? Put differently, what does the Court get from the attorneys it invites to argue before it, and what does it give in return?

Fourth, what can examining this process tell us about the Court as an institution more generally? Is this a story of elite reproduction and insularity, or a more complex narrative about potential disruption and diffusion? If the act of amicus invitation can only be evaluated in the context of “the standards of appropriate decisionmaking…within the particular institution,” what standards can we discern that might help us evaluate the Court’s track record in this sphere? Finally, if the practice is in certain respects troubling—and I argue here that it is—are there potential modifications the Court should consider?

There is no question that the practice identified here is a discrete one. How the Court decides who gets to brief and argue cases before it—in particular an aspect of a case no party wishes to pursue—isn’t as pressing a concern as what cases the Court takes, or what rules it sets forth. But these invitations do not occur wholly independent of the Court’s case selection and decisional processes. Perhaps more important, institutional design choices of this sort can both reflect and instantiate important values, and the Court’s behavior in this narrow sphere may shed light on the institution much more broadly.

This Essay begins by situating the Court’s amicus invitations in the context of recent discourse on the rise and increasing dominance of the elite Supreme Court bar, as well as concerns about the reflexive lack of transparency that in many ways characterizes the contemporary Supreme Court.

It then turns to a close examination of the process of amicus invitation, drawing on public reporting on the practice, briefs and oral argument transcripts and audio, and archival research. It next introduces the Essay’s key descriptive findings, the results of a comprehensive review of every Supreme Court amicus appointment I could locate, beginning in 1926: it highlights demographic data and trends, then describes the...

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15 In other words, what sort of impact does a Supreme Court appointment or invitation have on the subsequent career trajectory of an attorney?
16 That is, to what extent do these advocates succeed in their presentations before the Court? Does the appointment of an amicus, when controlling for other factors, signal any likely conclusion by the Court regarding the subject of the amicus’ argument?
18 For this review, I ran several different Westlaw searches (including “invit! /s amic!” and “appoint /s amic!”), then excluded invitations to the Solicitor General and other government entities, as well as denials of requests to appoint amici. I then cross-checked those results against a number of secondary sources, including Brian P. Goldman, Note—Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions? 63 Stan. L. Rev. 907 (2011) (compiling and analyzing the Court’s amicus invitations before 2011). The 1926 case
backgrounds of the advocates the Court invites to serve. My findings are at once predictable and surprising: although demographic data suggest that invitee diversity lags behind diversity at the Court more broadly, and trend lines suggest that recent amicus invitations invariably go to former law clerks of the Justices, there appears to be a surprising willingness on the part of the Justices to depart from the norm of prior experience with Supreme Court advocacy; indeed, a majority of recent invitations have gone to attorneys with no previous Supreme Court arguments. This suggests, I argue, that the practice might hold out the promise of disrupting, at least to a degree, the increasing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small group of expert practitioners.

After describing these findings, the Essay takes a step back and identifies a number of themes and dynamics that emerge from examining the data, including the nature of the role, the potential impact of the practice on the path of the law, and the question of diversity. The Essay concludes with a discussion of the normative implications of the preceding discussion, identifying a series of recommendations for improving the process of amicus invitation.

I. Framing the Practice of Amicus Invitation

This section briefly surveys the literature on two important dynamics at the contemporary Supreme Court, both of which provide context for the practice of amicus invitation: first, the increasing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small, elite group of specialized lawyers; second, the persistence of a degree of non-transparency referenced in the text, the removal powers case Myers v. United States, differed from most such invitations in that the position the Court invited outside counsel to argue was also advocated by a private party to the case. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Nevertheless, unlike Goldman, I have included it in my dataset.

It remains possible that cases in which the Court did not issue a formal order, and cases before systematic records were kept—either at all or of such orders, see Richard Lazarus, *The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions*, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 540, 590 (2014) (noting informality of recording-keeping at the early Supreme Court)—were not captured by these searches. In addition, I have not included in the dataset cases in which an amicus was granted leave to participate in a case following a request by the amicus; this is because such participation is initiated by the outside party, rather than the Court itself. (For examples of this sort of amicus participation, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (“Arthur J. Goldberg, Washington, D.C., for United Steelworkers of America, CIO, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court”); Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline, 555 U.S. 1029 (2008) (“Motion of American Antitrust Institute for leave to leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted”)).

19 I should note that the scholarly interest in the Supreme Court bar is a very recent development; as recently as 2008, Richard Lazarus wrote that, despite the significant attention paid to the substance of the Court’s work, “wholly absent, … from … media scrutiny and scholarly commentary is any recognition of the significance for the Supreme Court and the nation’s laws, of the identity of the advocates” who both petition and appear before the Court.” Richard
that would be unthinkable in any other organ of government. The section then describes
the existing academic commentary on the practice of amicus appointment.

A. The Expert Bar

Over the past three decades, Supreme Court practice has become an increasingly
specialized enterprise. A Supreme Court argument is no longer an experience that top
advocates enjoy once or twice in a career, but something a small group engages in on a
routine basis. While in 1980, approximately 80% of Supreme Court advocates were
arguing before the Court for the first time, by 2002, that number was down to 55%, and
by 2007 it was just 43%. As the percentage of first-time advocates dropped by
nearly half, the percentage of very experienced oral advocates—those with ten or more
prior arguments—skyrocketed, increasing from just 2% in 1980 to 28% in 2007. Even
in just the past decade, the change has been striking: as a recent Reuters investigation
revealed, over the last ten years, eight lawyers have presented nearly 20% of oral
arguments before the Court, compared to 30 attorneys holding the same share in the
preceding decade.

The Supreme Court bar looked like this once before: Following an 1812 rule
change limiting oral argument before the Court to only two lawyers for each side, “a
few extraordinary attorneys dominated oral argument before the Court,” including

Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by
Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L. J. 1487, 1488 (2008).
20 I refer here to the private Supreme Court bar; Supreme Court practice on behalf of the federal
government has long been highly specialized. Drew S. Days, In Search of the Solicitor
General’s Clients: A Drama with Many Characters, 83 KY. L. J. 485 (1995); Rex Lee,
21 John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Reemergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. SUP.
22 Id. Richard Lazarus puts the 1980 figures slightly lower, at 76%. Lazarus, supra note 19, at
1520.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec. 2014), available at
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/. Many of the most significant findings
of this investigative report concern the Court’s certiorari practice, and the increasing success of
expert Supreme Court practitioners in persuading the Justices to grant cert in their case; to take
one example, the report found that just 66 elite lawyers were responsible for 43% of granted cert
petitions during the period of the study. Id.
26 David C. Frederick, Supreme Court Advocacy in the Early Nineteenth Century, 30 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 1, 4 (2005).
27 Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1489.
household names like Daniel Webster. 28 In the 1814 Term, just one of those advocates, Thomas Pinckney, appeared in over half of the cases decided by the Court. 29

That first elite Supreme Court bar was at least in part a function of geography: the challenges of long-distance travel restricted the pool of regular advocates to attorneys who resided in or near Washington, D.C. 30 But “as travel became easier, the Supreme Court Bar naturally and gradually lost its cohesiveness by the latter-half of the nineteenth century.” 31 For the next century, Supreme Court practice was for the most part diffuse and decentralized, with most arguments presented by one-timers who followed a case all the way up. 32 Indeed, in 1986 Justice Rehnquist was reported to have observed that there “there [i]s no Supreme Court Bar” as such. 33

Beginning in the 1980s, things began to change. In a series of articles on the emergence and implications of today’s elite Supreme Court bar, Richard Lazarus traces the current state of affairs to the mid-1980s; in particular, he highlights Reagan Solicitor General Rex Lee’s move from the Solicitor General’s office to Sidley & Austin, and Lee’s development of an elite Supreme Court practice there. 34 As Lazarus recounts, a number of other top law firms quickly followed, hiring other experienced attorneys away from the Solicitor General’s Office in order to create their own Supreme Court practices. 35

These specialized Supreme Court practices quickly had a transformative effect on the Court’s docket. Lazarus focuses on the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, noting that with the shrinking of the Court’s docket, 36 expert practitioners have come to file the majority

28 David C. Frederick, Supreme Court Advocacy in the Early Nineteenth Century, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIS. 1, 4 (2005).
29 Id. at 8.
30 Lazarus, supra note 19 at 1492.
31 Id.
32 Id. (“Most lawyers with Supreme Court cases were newcomers, most likely arguing for the first time. But in no event was there a discrete, coherent group of private lawyers dominating the cases before the Court, capable of boasting a sustained, continuous Supreme Court practice.”)
34 Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1498.
35 Id. Although Lazarus’ primary focus is on the elite Supreme Court bar at law firms, he also notes two additional relevant sites of emerging expertise: new or newly invigorated state solicitor general’s offices, and the creation of Supreme Court clinics at a number of top law schools. Id. at 1501-02. See also Jeffrey Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2013); Symposium—The Rise of Appellate Litigators and State Solicitors General, 29 REV. LITIG. 545, 635-45 (2010).
36 See Ryan Owens & David Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If it Ain’t Broke..., 119 YALE L. J. ONLINE 67 (2009), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/if-it-aint-broke-; David R. Stras,
of successful petitions for certiorari. While in 1980, expert Supreme Court practitioners—a group Lazarus defines as including any attorney who “either him- or herself presented at least five oral arguments before the Court or is affiliated with a law firm or other comparable organization with attorneys who have, in the aggregate, argued at least ten times before the Court,”37—were responsible for less than 6% of successful cert petitions, in 2007 the number was nearly 54%.38 In addition, at the merits stage, “whether counsel in a Supreme Court case is an experienced Supreme Court advocate is a significant determinant in the outcome of the case, even holding everything else equal.”39

Lazarus’s work is imbued with the strong normative conviction that these developments are troubling; and indeed, from the perspective of ensuring broad participation in one of our most important institutions, they are. But to a striking degree, the Justices of the current Court appear entirely unconcerned. To the contrary: the recent Reuters team investigating the Supreme Court bar interviewed eight of the nine sitting Justices, and the views they expressed ranged from sanguine to genuinely enthusiastic. According to the report, “[t]o the[Justices], having experienced lawyers handling cases helps the court and comes without any significant cost. Effective representation, not broad diversity among counsel, best serves the interests of justice.”40

Indeed, when asked, during a recent public appearance, about the recent transformation of the specialized Supreme Court bar, Justice Kagan responded:

“I think the advocates who appear before us do a fantastic job. I mean there’s been - one of the things that has happened over the last twenty years or so at the Supreme Court is the development of a kind of “Supreme Court bar” - people who are repeat players, and who have been there before, and who know what the whole enterprise is about, know the way we think, know the kinds of questions we ask, know the kinds of things that matter to us as we reach a decision. And I think it’s an unqualified good for the Court. …[I]n general the level of advocacy is so excellent that sometimes when you see the opposite -- when you see the people who you know might be good lawyers but in a different venue and sort of don’t get the kinds of questions that we ask, the kinds of issues that interest us and concern us and make us rule one way or the other way -- it can be very frustrating.”41

Others, however, are more troubled by these developments. Former federal appeals court Judge Michael Luttig struck a decidedly different note in an interview with

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37 Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1502.
38 Id. at 1517.
39 Id. at 1544; see also Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. Pol. 187, 192, 193-94 (1995).
40 Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec. 2014).
the same Reuters investigators. In his view, Supreme Court practice has become “a guild, a narrow group of elite justices and elite counsel talking to each other,” with the Court and the bar “detached and isolated from the real world, ultimately at the price of the healthy and proper development of the law.”

B. Transparency

The Supreme Court is one of the least transparent institutions in American public life. Many aspects of Supreme Court opacity are widely known and entirely uncontroversial: the Court’s deliberations about pending cases, for example, necessarily occur free from any sort of public scrutiny. Other strains of Supreme Court non-transparency, like the Court’s prohibition on cameras in the courtroom, are subject to ongoing debate and periodic demands for greater openness. But still other strains of non-transparency at the Court appear uncontroversial not because there is consensus that they are necessary or appropriate, but because the public is for the most part unaware that they even exist. The Court’s amicus invitations fall squarely in the third category.

While the Supreme Court has never been an especially transparent institution, its opacity has come to appear increasingly anachronistic in recent years. As waves of reform have opened the workings of other branches of government to at least a degree of public scrutiny, the Court has remained firmly committed, both in its practice and in

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42 Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec. 2014).
44 In a very loose sense, this phenomenon bears a certain resemblance to David Pozen’s conception of “deep secrets” (popularized by Donald Rumsfeld as “unknown unknowns”)—things “we do not know we do not know.” See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 262 (2010).
45 Peter Fish, Secrecy and the Supreme Court, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 225 (1967).
46 Several waves of reform have resulted in major pieces of federal legislation (with state analogues, some of which reach more broadly than their federal counterparts, see Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 642-43 (2010)) designed generally to promote greater transparency in government. Chief among these federal enactments is the notice-and-comment process set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), which mandates public notice of proposed rules, provides a mechanism for public comment on such rules, and requires agencies to provide explanations for final rules. In addition, the Freedom of Information Act, first enacted in 1966, provides for broad public access, subject to a number of exceptions, to the records of federal agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (as amended by the Open Government Act of 2007). The Government in the Sunshine Act imposes public meeting and other transparency obligations on government. Pub. L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). Other federal laws aimed at increasing transparency include the Federal Advisory Committees Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2, which “aims to keep Congress and the public informed about the number, purpose, membership, and activities of groups established or utilized to offer advice or recommendations to the President or to officers or employees of the federal government;” and, more recently, the
statements by the Justices,\textsuperscript{47} to conducting much of its business in secret\textsuperscript{48}—including aspects of its business around which there is no genuine or compelling need for secrecy.

In recent years, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to aspects of Supreme Court practice that appear driven by habits or reflexes of secrecy, and are unrelated to—perhaps even antithetical to—imperatives of rigor and integrity in the Court’s decisional processes. An important new addition to the discourse on transparency and the Court is Richard Lazarus’s \textit{The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions}\textsuperscript{49}—a ground-breaking examination of the Court’s practice of revising its slip opinions well after their initial release. (Very likely in response to the piece and attendant publicity,\textsuperscript{50} in October 2015 the Court announced that it now plans to make post-release revisions to its opinions clear and accessible via its website.\textsuperscript{51})

As Lazarus’s piece demonstrates, the consequences of the Court’s non-transparent revision process have in some cases been significant. In one example Lazarus provides, a

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, \textit{Mr. Justice Roberts}, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955) (“The secrecy that envelops the Court’s work is not due to love of secrecy or want of responsible regard for the claims of a democratic society to know how it is governed. That the Supreme Court should not be amenable to the forces of publicity to which the Executive and the Congress are subjected is essential to the effective functioning of the Court.”).


\textsuperscript{50} Adam Liptak, \textit{Final Word on U.S. Law Isn’t: Supreme Court Keeps Editing}, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2014).

\end{footnotesize}
revision to the initial language in a concurrence by Justice Rehnquist subsequently became important language in the majority opinion in United States v. Lopez, which effectively upended much of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In another example, doctrinally significant language from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas was subsequently excised from the opinion, but not before it had been cited extensively by scholars and lower courts. In addition to the implications of these specific examples, Lazarus argues that the practice risks confusion about the state of the law, particularly during the period between the Court’s release of its initial slip opinions and the final published opinions (a period that at present averages about five years), and risks undermining confidence in the integrity of the Court’s written opinions.

Other scholars have advanced proposals for injecting a degree of openness into the Court’s workings. Kathryn Watts, for example, proposes applying core administrative-law principles to the Court’s certiorari process. She offers a two-fold proposal for improving accountability and monitoring of the Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction: first, a requirement that the Justices disclose their votes on cert petitions; and second, “through greater invited and uninvited amicus curiae participation” at the cert stage. Carolyn Shapiro suggests that the Court consider “publicly shar[ing] more information about the reasons it does or does not grant cert in particular cases.” One recent proposal, by Michael Abramowicz & Thomas Colby, goes much further, suggesting that the Justices solicit feedback from the public on draft opinions before those opinions become final, so that the Court is able to harness the “wisdom of crowds” and avoid the errors a secret drafting process is bound at times to produce. And a recent piece by William Baude highlights the relative lack of rigor and transparency in what Baude terms the Court’s “shadow docket,” by which he means primarily orders granting or denying requests for stays or injunctions, and summary

53 Id. at 599-601.
54 Kathryn Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57 (2011) (“[V]ote-disclosure requirements offer a promising mechanism to increase transparency and improve public monitoring of the Court.”). See also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2000) (raising questions about the desirability of a Supreme Court with essentially unconstrained power to set its own agenda).
55 Id. at 62. Less relevant to this project, she also suggests that lower courts reinvigorate the practice of “certification” of particular questions to the Supreme Court. Id. at 67. See also Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310 (2010).
reversals. Baude argues that in these cases the Court should adopt some of the procedural regularity and reason-giving that characterize its ordinary consideration of merits cases.  

The Court’s appointment practices, then, are embedded within an institutional context characterized by a reflexive lack of transparency—entirely necessary in certain spheres, but far less so in others.

C. The Existing Commentary

Given the manifest interest in both Supreme Court advocacy and transparency at the Court, the practice of amicus invitation has been the subject of surprisingly little scholarly attention. The few scholars who have addressed the topic have focused its substantive permissibility, on either constitutional or policy grounds. But no one has yet trained a lens on either the process of amicus selection or its results.

In the most comprehensive treatment of the practice to date, Brian Goldman offers a useful taxonomy of the types of amicus appointments the Court makes, concluding that they can be divided into four broad categories: (1) “cases in which the respondent confessed error and reversed its prior position on the merits,” (2) “cases in which the judgment below rested on grounds raised sua sponte by the lower court, which neither party supported,” (3) “cases in which it was not the decision below that was unrepresented, but instead a specific position the Court wanted argued,” and (4) “cases in which the respondent simply failed to enter a proper appearance before the Court.”

Goldman further divides these categories into several sub-categories, offering general objections to some such invitations, and defenses of others. In broad terms, he argues that invitations to address jurisdictional questions are necessary and appropriate; conversely, he labels unjustified or imprudent any instance in which the Court injects into the proceedings non-jurisdictional arguments the parties have chosen not to present, or where by appointing an amicus the Court revives a case that would otherwise have been mooted. He contends that where the Court uses an amicus to “reach[] out to make pronouncements of law and set nationwide precedent on questions not properly before it,” the practice may actually “undermine[] the perceived neutrality and legitimacy on which [the Court’s] authority depends.”

Henry Monaghan similarly suggests in passing that some amicus appointments

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61 Id. at 969-70.
62 Id. at 912.
may raise genuine Article III concerns, though he also appears to conclude that “the practice is now too deeply ingrained to be overthrown.” Still, his discomfort is evident: “Insofar as the Court has expanded its ability to have the final say on any constitutional question capable of judicial resolution, the result seems to be consistent with its current place in our constitutional order…. the Court seeks to establish an unfettered prerogative over what issues to decide[.]”

In another recent piece, Amanda Frost argues that the practice of amicus invitation, though in tension with a broad (if undertheorized) consensus against judicial “issue creation,” is in fact under some circumstances an appropriate mechanism judges use to engage not just in dispute resolution, but also in law pronouncement. And Saikrishna Prakash and Neal Devins, although deeply critical of judicial requests for legal views from either parties to a case or arms of the federal government, in passing exempt amicus invitations, explaining that “[w]hen one or both parties are unwilling to [argue legal issues that the court identifies as relevant], a court may request amici to file briefs. In such circumstances, appointment of amici (a request for legal advice) helps ensure an adversarial presentation of all legal issues the court deems pertinent.”

This Essay takes an entirely different tack. Rather than focus on either the substance or the desirability of the Court’s amicus invitation practice, I have canvassed every existing amicus invitation, and together the data provide rich new material for assessing some important trends on the Supreme Court. As the parts that follow show, these data shed important light on “where the Court is today, what cues it responds to, and what kind of dialogue the Justices are currently engaged in with the legal, political, and social culture that surrounds them.”

II. Findings

The preceding sections provide context for the Supreme Court’s amicus invitation process. I turn now to a description of the results of that process. I begin with an

63 On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 707 (2012) (“Injecting issues does … present additional Article III problems, since the Court is now fashioning rules concerning matters beyond those provided by the litigants. Appointing additional litigants—amici to ‘support or defend the judgment below’—certainly takes yet another step beyond, at least in the cases when no actual litigant wants to support the judgment, as opposed to instances in which the litigant cannot proceed.”)

64 Id.

65 Id. at 730.


overview, then present some of the key results of my examination of every recorded amicus appointment of which I could locate any record.

A. Overview

Approximately once each Term—with an increase in frequency in recent years—\(^69\) the Court appoints an amicus curiae when one party to a case declines either to participate or to make a particular argument.\(^70\) As the Court has explained, it typically makes such an appointment in order to permit it “to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.”\(^71\) Beyond such general statements in its opinions, however, the Court provides no information to the public or the Supreme Court bar about the circumstances under which it will appoint an amicus, or how it decides whom to appoint. Nor do its rules reference such appointments. Stern and Gressman provide only a general description of the practice, writing, “When for any reason counsel is not available to present argument on one side, the Court may appoint a private lawyer….to present an argument on that side of the case as an amicus curiae.”\(^72\)

The first amicus appointment of which there is any record arose in connection with the Court’s consideration of the 1926 presidential power case Myers v. United States. Myers involved a statute that required the President to obtain Senate consent before removing a postmaster.\(^73\) The President, after concluding that the statute was

\(^69\) See infra Appendix.

\(^70\) In addition to these amicus appointments, the Court makes use of outside attorneys in several other capacities. First, it appoints “Special Masters” to function as judicial adjuncts in original actions filed in the Court. See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625 (2002). Second, on a number of occasions, it has appointed outside counsel when an unrepresented in forma pauperis (IFP) party who successfully petitions the Court for certiorari requests such an appointment (or when the Court chooses to make such an appointment even absent a request). Perhaps the most famous such appointment was the Court’s selection of Abe Fortas to represent Clarence Gideon in the case that became Gideon v. Wainwright. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 49, 54 (1989). See also United States Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 726 (1993) (“Carter G. Phillips, Washington D.C., appointed by this Court, argued for respondent”); Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004) (“Seth P. Waxman, appointed by this Court, Washington D.C., for petitioner”). It appears, however, that with the rise of the specialized Supreme Court bar, and the attendant close monitoring of the Court’s docket, any IFP party who manages to persuade the Court to grant cert will immediately receive offers of pro bono representation, so that such appointments very rarely arise today.

\(^71\) Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 526 n. 2 (2003) (explaining its appointment of amicus David DeBruin to argue in favor of the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, which the United States had joined the petitioner in attacking).

\(^72\) EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 753 (9th ed. 2007). The authors continue: “Since the Court accepts a case for oral argument because it presents issues of importance to the public, and not merely to the parties, it wants the benefit of argument by skilled counsel on both sides, and not merely one side, before it reaches a decision.” Id.

\(^73\) 272 U.S. 52, 106-07 (1926).
unconstitutional, removed a postmaster without first seeking Senate consent; the postmaster challenged his removal, and the executive branch argued against the statute’s constitutionality. Myers’ counsel defended the statute’s constitutionality, but after he twice failed to appear at the Court for oral argument, the Court appointed Pennsylvania Senator George Pepper to defend the statute as amicus curiae.

The Court sided with the President, concluding that the power to remove executive officers was his alone. But it ended its opinion with an expression of appreciation to Pepper for his advocacy of the opposing position:

Before closing this opinion we wish to express the obligation of the court to Mr. Pepper for his able brief and argument as a friend of the court. Undertaken at our request, our obligation is none the less, if we find ourselves obliged to take a view adverse to his. The strong presentation of arguments against the conclusion of the court is of the utmost value in enabling the court to satisfy itself that it has fully considered all that can be said.

After its amicus appointment in Myers, the Court went several decades without another appointment—along the way ruling on cases in which the decision not to appoint an amicus was striking. In the 1939 case United States v. Miller, the most important decision on the Second Amendment until 2008, the Court did not appoint an amicus, despite the fact that the attorney for defendants Miller and Layton (whose firearms indictments had been quashed below based on the Second Amendment), did not file a brief or appear for oral arguments, and had informed the Court in advance that he would not. Still, the Court did not appoint an amicus to develop the Second Amendment claim—and accordingly heard argument from only the government.

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74 Id. at 107-08.
75 Myers v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 199, 203 (Ct. Cl. 1923).
76 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176; see also Saikrishna Prakash, The Story of Myers and Its Wayward Successors: Going Postal on the Removal Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 165, 169-77 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (describing the litigation). Pepper also filed a brief, Brief for the Appellant Filed by George Wharton Pepper, Amicus Curiae, Myers, 272 U.S. 53 (No. 77), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 69-174, at 109, 113 (1926), and appeared to present argument before the Court. Prakash, supra, at 172--73, 176. See also President’s Rights Before High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1925, page 2.
77 Myers, 272 U.S. 52.
78 Id. at 176-77.
81 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller placed some reliance on the one-sidedness of the Miller argument. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 623 (“The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court’s consideration of the Second Amendment).”). For more detail on the procedural history of Miller, see Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3. N.Y.U. J. L & LIBERTY 48, 68 (2008) (noting that in the Supreme Court, “no one represented Miller or
The Court’s next amicus appointment came in 1954, when the Court invited Harvard Law School Dean Erwin Griswold to argue in support of a Third Circuit judgment dismissing a divorce action and upholding the domicile requirement of a Virgin Islands divorce statute. The spouses in the case, though nominally adversaries, agreed that the domicile requirement was unlawful, and so the Court appointed Griswold to defend it. The papers in the case, *Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith*, are sparse, but it appears that there was some hesitation about appointing an amicus; a memo from Justice Frankfurter to Chief Justice Warren, dated November 18, 1954, provides, in what appears to be a response to a question, “a good illustration of the duty of a court to have the benefit of informed argument, particularly in matters that touch clearly the institution of the family.”

It then offers a lengthy excerpt from an English case involving an invited amicus, *Galloway v. Galloway*. Evidently this memo was persuasive; four days later the Court took the case and invited Dean Griswold “to appear and present oral argument as *amicus curiae* in support of the judgment below.”

After *Granville-Smith*, the Court settled into the practice of fairly regular amicus appointments, though it has gone some long stretches without appointing any amici (for example, there were no appointments between 1957 and 1968). In addition, the Roberts Court has made an unusually high number of appointments—17 between 2008 and 2015, for a rate of more than two appointments per year. It is probably too soon to say whether a new norm of more frequent amicus invitation has been established, but the post-2008 data are certainly suggestive of such a turn. In addition to the increasing frequency, the Court’s first healthcare case, the 2012 case *NFIB v. Sebelius*, featured two separate appointed amici, something that had never previously occurred.

Amicus appointments have figured in some significant cases, in addition to *Myers*. *Bob Jones University v. United States* featured the amicus appointment of prominent attorney William Coleman, who defended the revocation of Bob Jones’ tax-exempt status when the federal government declined to do so. In *United States v. Dickerson*, amicus Paul Cassel argued that *Miranda* was not a constitutional rule, such

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83 *Galloway v. Galloway* (1954), 2 W.L.R. 980. The actual opinion continues, in a portion not excerpted by Frankfurter, “In the result we have had the advantage of a full and careful argument of both sides of the question….and I would express my indebtedness to counsel for the help they have given us.”
84 348 U.S. 885 (Mem.) (1954). The order also denied the parties’ request to submit the case without oral argument.
85 See Appendix.
86 See Appendix.
that Congress had the authority to overrule it by statute.\textsuperscript{89} And when the Court considered the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor, appointed amicus Vicki Jackson provided one side of the argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case.\textsuperscript{90}

In addition to the involvement of amici in significant cases, a number of prominent attorneys first argued before the Court as appointed amici. The most striking such example is now-Chief Justice John Roberts, who was appointed to defend the judgment below in United States v. Halper\textsuperscript{91} while he was still an associate at Hogan & Hartson.\textsuperscript{92} And a number of other appointed amici have gone on to the federal bench, including Fifth Circuit Judge Rhesa Barksdale,\textsuperscript{93} Second Circuit Judge Barrington Parker, Jr.,\textsuperscript{94} Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey Sutton,\textsuperscript{95} Federal Circuit Judge Richard Taranto,\textsuperscript{96} and former Utah District Court Judge Paul Cassell.\textsuperscript{97}

\textbf{B. Process}

How exactly do these amicus appointments come about? There is no official guidance from the Court, but public reporting about such appointments and the papers of the Supreme Court justices provide some clues. What emerges from these sources is a strong sense that the process is ad hoc and relationship-driven; that a degree of familiarity with the Court—not necessarily experience arguing before the Court, but familiarity with its operations, most frequently as a result of a recent clerkship—has become a near-absolute prerequisite; and that little systematic care or attention is typically given to these appointments, despite their significance to the cases in question, the careers of the selected attorneys, and sometimes to the path of the law.

A series of 1982 memos from Chief Justice Burger succinctly captures these dynamics. The case at issue was Verlinden v. National Bank of Nigeria, which presented a question regarding the scope of the jurisdictional grant in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.\textsuperscript{98} The Court granted certiorari in January 1982, but months later, in early October 1982, the Clerk of the Court notified the Chief Justice that he had received word

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{530 U.S. 428 (2000).}
\footnote{133 S.Ct. 814 (2012).}
\footnote{490 U.S. 435 (1989).}
\footnote{See Mauro, Justices Turn to Ex-Clerks (“When Roberts, following up on Alito’s invitation, called to tell Jorgensen the Court had approved his appointment, Roberts noted that he himself had snagged his first argument in a similar fashion.”). See also John G. Roberts, Senate Judiciary Questionnaire, p. 34 (listing Halper first among Supreme Court arguments).}
\footnote{Thigpen v. Roberts, 464 U.S. 1006 (1983) (appointment memo).}
\footnote{New York v. Harris, 492 U.S. 934 (1989) (appointment memo).}
\footnote{Hohn v. United States, 522 U.S. 944 (1997) (appointment memo).}
\footnote{Great-West Life Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 532 U.S. 917 (2001) (appointment memo).}
\footnote{Dickerson v. United States, 528 U.S. 1045 (1999) (appointment memo).}
\footnote{461 U.S. 480 (1983).}
\end{footnotesize}
that counsel for the respondent “ha[d] been instructed by his client not to proceed further in this case, and hence no brief w[ould] be forthcoming.” On October 28, 1982, the Chief Justice sent a note to the conference referencing the clerk’s memo, and elaborating: “I assume we want to appoint an amicus to argue for the respondent here. I’ll try to muster up some names from among the Washington Bar. I have a former Clerk who was Assistant Legal Adviser at State and now with Covington & Burling. I question whether any of the “Big Guns,” e.g., Griswold, et al., are anxious to work for nothing on a case like this.” In a separate memo circulated later that day, following another update from the Clerk, the Chief Justice proposed what he seemed to view as a clean resolution: “It now develops that we may have a “natural” for appointment as amicus. A former Harlan Clerk, Stephen N. Shulman, ….has already filed an amicus brief….perhaps we can ‘anoint’ him.” On November 1, the Court issued an order inviting Shulman to argue the case as amicus curiae, which he did in January 1983.

The case file on Bob Jones University v. United States, which involved the permissibility of the IRS’s decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of several universities with racially discriminatory policies, is also intriguing, though less revealing than Verlinden. The original IRS rule change occurred in 1971, and in 1975 Bob Jones University had its tax-exempt status formally revoked. Throughout the lower-court litigation, the federal government defended the IRS’ interpretation of the tax code. By the time the case was before the Supreme Court, however, there had been a change in administrations, and the Solicitor General’s merits brief sided with the university, concluding that the statute did not permit the IRS interpretation that had led to the revocation of the schools’ tax-exempt status. Accordingly, the Court decided to appoint an amicus to defend the IRS and the judgment of the Fourth Circuit.

At some point Chief Justice Burger evidently asked the Conference for possible names, and on April 8, 1982, Justice Marshall sent a memo in response. It read, “I have been doing some more thinking about the appointment of counsel in the above cases. I have ended up by suggesting that we appoint William T. Coleman. It would appear to me that he has all of the qualifications.” Coleman, a prominent DC attorney who had been the first African American law clerk on the Supreme Court, had, among other things,

102 459 U.S. 964 (1982) (appointment memo)
103 See IRS Rev. Rule 71-447.
105 Memorandum from Justice Marshall to the Chief Justice, cc to the Conference, April 8, 1982.
106 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Man in the News; No Stranger to the High Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1982).
spent time early in his career working with Marshall at the NAACP LDF, appearing with Marshall on the NAACP’s brief in Brown v. Board of Education.107

The day after Marshall’s memo, Chief Justice Burger circulated a memo to the Conference listing six suggestions he had apparently received: in addition to Coleman, it contained the names of Erwin Griswold and Lloyd Cutler, with “No” written next to each, and, in addition to Coleman, the names of Bernard G. Segal, Philip Tone, and Robert Landis.108 It then noted “We can discuss at the next Conference.” Ten days later, the Court issued an order inviting Coleman to brief and argue the case.109

These two case files provide intriguing glimpses (limited as they are) into the Court’s amicus appointment process. And recent reporting suggests that the process remains largely unchanged today. A 2008 piece by Tony Mauro sheds some light on a more recent amicus appointment, from the perspective of the appointed amicus, former Alito clerk Jay Jorgensen. As Mauro reports, Jorgensen received a phone call from Justice Alito asking him whether he’d accept an appoint to defend the judgment below in Greenlaw v. United States, a case in which the Eighth Circuit had sua sponte extended a defendant’s sentence by fifteen years.110 Jorgensen, who had never argued before the Court, “eagerly agreed.” As it turned out, his argument occurred on the same day as another appointed amicus, former Thomas clerk Peter Rutledge, who was also arguing before the Court for the first time.111 Kansas Solicitor General and University of Kansas Law Professor Stephen McAllister, who clerked for Justices White and Thomas, tells a similar story of receiving a phone call from Justice Alito asking him if he would accept an appointment in United States v. Bond.112 For these amici—as with Coleman—a relationship with an individual Justice appears to have driven the invitation.

C. Invited Amici: What the Data Show

108 Memorandum to the Conference from Chief Justice Burger, April 9, 1982.
109 456 U.S. 922 (appointment memo). The choice of Coleman was widely praised. See, e.g., A True Friend of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1982 (calling the selection of Coleman “a brilliant response” to the Reagan Justice Department’s “shameful” change in policy, and opining that the appointment “assures first-class representation for Americans, black and white, who protest this tax subsidy.”).
111 Tony Mauro, Justices Turn to Ex-Clerks for Unusual Role: Justices Tap Former Clerks to Make the Arguments Others Have Abandoned, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, April 14, 2008.
112 McAllister Tapped for Rare Opportunity to Defend Orphaned Argument at U.S. Supreme Court, KU LAW MAGAZINE 17 (Spring 2011), available at http://issuu.com/kulaw/docs/ku_law_magazine_sp11.
With that background, this section discusses my key findings regarding the identities of the individuals the Court invites to serve as amici, as well as the outcomes of the cases in which they are selected to participate.

1. **Relationships to the Justices**

   Thirty-seven of the 57 invited amici—65%—once served as law clerks to one or more of the Justices. This overall figure, however, is somewhat misleading; the general practice of inviting former clerks to serve as amici, though not a new development, has increased dramatically over time. While three of the Court’s first ten amicus invitations were issued to former law clerks, all of the ten most recent invitations have gone to former clerks (although one of the ten clerked for Justice Alito when he was still on the Third Circuit, rather than on the Supreme Court). Of the first 25 appointments in the dataset, nine were former law clerks to Supreme Court justices; of the 25 most recent appointments, 24 went to the Justices’ former clerks. The chart below depicts these general trend lines, by decade.

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113 For purposes of this figure, I count as a former Supreme Court law clerk one individual who clerked for Justice Alito when he was on the Third Circuit. This was a judgment call, to be sure. But it reflects the significant of the relationship to a justice.


115 See Appendix.


117 Though the development is a striking one, it bears noting that for the early period covered by the dataset, Supreme Court law clerks in most chambers functioned primarily as legal secretaries; it was not until the mid-1930s that the position began evolving into “the full-time professional research assistantship that is now associated with the title law clerk,” and it took substantially longer in many chambers for the change to take hold. See THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR’S WASHINGTON (David J. Garrow & Dennis J. Hutchinson, eds. 2002). Still, by the 1960s, the position had largely assumed its current form, and the norm of appointing prior clerks does not appear to have fully taken hold until the 1980s. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) So the shift is not fully attributable to the change in the institution of the Supreme Court clerkship. See also infra notes 228-236 and accompanying text.
Even some of the early amici who did not serve as law clerks possessed close relationships to one or more of the Justices. For example, the second amicus invitation in the dataset, in 1954, went to Dean Griswold, a former student and close friend of Justice Frankfurter. In 1969, Arkansas attorney James Gallman was invited to argue in defense of a discriminatory recreational facility in the case Daniel v. Paul; although he did not clerk on the Court, Gallman had worked with Justice Marshall in the district court litigation in Cooper v. Aaron, when Gallman was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Arkansas, and Marshall was at the NAACP. Former California Senator Thomas Kuchel also did not clerk at the Court, but he had been appointed to the U.S. Senate by then-Governor Earl Warren in 1953; though his 1971 amicus invitation came two years after Warren’s retirement, it seems highly likely that the relationship played a role.

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119 Goldman, supra note 19, at 916.
120 393 U.S. 1601 (1969) (appointment memo).
122 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 404 U.S. 813 (1971).
The more current paradigm, however, seems to have shifted decisively from former colleagues or acquaintances of the justices to former law clerks—including, as detailed below, law clerks without any prior experience arguing before the Court.123

2. Geography

Geography appears to play a role in a sizable number of amicus invitations, though by no means all. In a significant number of cases in the dataset—more than pure chance would produce—former law clerks to the Justices in whose circuit of responsibility the case arose have received invitations.

An overview of the ten most recent amicus invitations is illustrative. Three of the ten invitations went to individuals who were former law clerks to the Circuit Justice. The most recent amicus invitee, Richard Bernstein, who argued in October 2015 in Montgomery v. Louisiana, is a former law clerk to Justice Scalia; Justice Scalia is the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, in which Montgomery arose.124 Jeffrey Bucholtz, who was invited to argue in support of the judgment below in the 2012 case Millbrook v. United States,125 is a former law clerk to Justice Alito; Justice Alito is the Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, where Millbrook arose. And Evan Young, who also clerked for Justice Scalia, was appointed in 2011 to argue Setser v. United States, another case out of the Fifth Circuit.126

Other appointments appear traceable to geography, but not necessarily in the sense of a clerkship for the Circuit Justice. William Peterson, who argued last spring in defense of a Fifth Circuit judgment, clerked for Justice Thomas, who is not the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit; but Peterson had done an appellate clerkship on the Fifth Circuit and was practicing in Texas when Justice Scalia called to invite him to defend the judgment below, so it is entirely possible that geography played some role.127

Others do not strictly satisfy this geographic criterion (perhaps in part because they served as law clerks to Justices no longer on the Court). Again, confining the discussion to the ten most recent invitations, Vicki Jackson, who argued one aspect of United States v. Windsor in 2013, is a former law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall.128

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123 See Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 Geo. L.J. 1515 (2010) (describing former law clerks as key players in the media and academic circles whose views impact the Justices).
125 133 S.Ct. 1441 (2013).
127 Miriam Rozen, Lawyer Picked to Defend Fifth Circuit Ruling at SCOTUS, Texas Lawyer (Jan. 26, 2015).

There are two outliers in this group of ten—that is, individuals who clerked for Justices currently on the Court, but not those in whose circuits the cases arose: Miguel Estrada, who served as a law clerk to Justice Kennedy, but was invited to argue in support of the judgment below in a case out of the Seventh Circuit; and John Manning, who clerked for Justice Scalia but whose invitation case arose in the DC Circuit.

It is entirely possible that the invitations in these latter two groups were driven by other relationships to the Circuit Justice—the Chief Justice in *Auburn Regional Medical Center*, perhaps, or Justice Ginsburg in *Windsor*—but the public record is silent on that question. In general, then, geography appears to be a significant factor in amicus invitations, but one which in no way explains all such invitations.

3. Subject matter expertise

Subject matter expertise appears to play a role in some appointments, although that appears true primarily—perhaps exclusively—in the selection of academics. When Dean Griswold was invited to argue in *Granville-Smith*, for example, he had recently published an article in the Harvard Law Review on “the problems raised by nonuniform state divorce laws,” closely related to the jurisdictional issue in the case. Paul Cassell’s profile in criminal law made him a natural selection to argue in *Dickerson v. United States* that *Miranda* was not constitutionally required. Stephanos Bibas, a prominent criminal law scholar, was invited to argue a question of district court sentencing authority in *Tapia v. United States*. And Professor Vicki Jackson is a well-known expert in both constitutional law and the federal courts; and *Windsor*, the case in which she was invited to argue, presented a complex question of federal jurisdiction.

No similar subject matter expertise, however, appears to link the non-academics to the cases for which they are selected, at least in ways that are obvious from the public

130 132 S.Ct 2321 (2012).
131 *Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center*, 133 S.Ct. 81 (2012).
132 Goldman, supra note 11, at 916.
133 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Professor Cassell had also authored an amicus brief below in *Dickerson*, see Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation and Safe Streets Coalition as Amici Curiae, *United States v. Dickerson*, 166 F. 3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
134 131 S.Ct. 975 (2011) (appointment memo).
135 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
record. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the amicus data is how little subject matter expertise appears to drive most appointments. Compared to the preceding two factors—relationships and geography—the explanatory power of subject matter expertise is thus quite limited.

4. Experience with Supreme Court Advocacy

One of the most interesting and surprising findings in the amicus dataset is the presence of first-time advocates among the amicus ranks. Indeed, it appears that 32 of the 57 invited amici, or 56%, had never previously argued before the Court at the time of their invitations. Just in the past five years, eight invited amici (all of whom are former law clerks to the Justices) who had never argued before the Court were invited to do so.136

As detailed above, recent work on the modern Supreme Court bar argues convincingly that both the Court and the development of the law have been profoundly impacted by the increasing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small, elite group of “expert” practitioners.137 And at first glance, the Court’s invitation practices appear consistent with this general trend: that is, they involve a relatively small group of elite attorneys, generally with connections to the Court or at least to one of the justices, and their backgrounds frequently resemble those of the elite practitioners who make up the Supreme Court bar. But the fact that the majority of amici in recent years have been first-time advocates may represent an important distinction between the appointment phenomenon and other trends at the Court.

5. Diversity

In reviewing the 57 amicus invitations the Court has issued, a number of demographic trends emerge. First, the lack of diversity is immediately striking. This is to be expected in the case of early invitations, but the continuing exclusion of women and minorities from the amicus ranks is surprising. Only four of 57 amici, or 7%, have been women, with three of the four invitations issuing since 2010.138


137 See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text.

Overall data on demographic diversity within the Supreme Court bar is limited, but based on the few existing compilations, these numbers appear even lower than the already-low overall percentages. One recent article tracked the demographic makeup of “top” Supreme Court advocates, which the author defined as any advocate who had argued before the Court five or more times from 2000-2012. Of the 83 top advocates the article identified, the author found that 15 were women (18%).\(^{139}\) And a journalist recently found that in 2013, 17% of Supreme Court advocates were women.\(^{140}\) The amicus invitation figure is far lower than either of these.

In addition, it appears that only three of the 57 amicus invitees—5%—have been African American or Latino, and the other 54 white.\(^{141}\) Like the gender figure, this figure appears to lag behind the overall percentage at the Court. The same study described above found that of the 83 top practitioners between 2000 and 2012, 9—or 11%—of the advocates were not white (although the study does not further divide the group, so it may be that the figures for African American and Latino lawyers in the overall set are similar to the amicus set).\(^{142}\)

6. Outcomes

Of the 57 cases involving invited amici, 36 can be classified as losses and 18 wins, for an approximate win rate of 32%. (In two cases, cert was denied as improvidently granted, and in one case the Court did not reach the question the amicus had been invited to argue.) At least an initial analysis, then, suggests that amicus win rates are not especially high—though in light of the nearly-hopeless task of many amici,

\(^{139}\) Kedar S. Bhatia, Note—Top Supreme Court Advocates of the 21st Century, 2 J. LEGAL METRICS 561, 575 (2013).

\(^{140}\) See Mark Sherman, Diversity Lacking Among Lawyers who Argue Cases to Supreme Court, THE DENVER POST, May 13, 2013 (observing that in 2013, 17% of Supreme Court advocates were women).

\(^{141}\) They are: Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct 2321 (2012) (Miguel Estrada); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (Barrington Parker, now on the Second Circuit); and Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (William T. Coleman, Jr.). This figure is more tentative than the gender figure, as I have not been able to determine amicus race with absolute confidence in several instances, but it appears that all of the remaining 54 advocates have been white.

\(^{142}\) Bhatia, 2 J. LEGAL METRICS at 576. See also Mark Sherman, Black Lawyers Rare at Supreme Court, USA TODAY (Oct. 28, 2007), available at usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-10-28-3842117658_x.htm (noting “Several factors account for the dearth of minorities at the court: continuing problems in recruiting and retaining black and other minorities at the top law firms; the rise of a small group of lawyers who focus on Supreme Court cases; the decline in civil rights cases that make it to the high court; and the court’s dwindling caseload.”).
who are often invited to take a position even the winning party will not defend, perhaps the rate is rather high after all. Former clerk win rates are higher than the win rates of amici who did not clerk, although not dramatically so.

Amicus win rates for clerks & non-clerks

I have coded these cases as wins or losses, but I am mindful of Richard Lazarus’ caution that “The content of the Court’s opinion is almost always far more important than the formal judgment.” As the piece continues: “Binary analysis that treats Supreme Court rulings as either “wins” or “losses” misapprehends the nature of judicial rulings and the essential role served by legal reasoning. Not all losses are created equal.” Accordingly, the next part engages with outcomes in a more nuanced and less binary fashion.

Another vector on which to assess the “outcome” of amicus appointments is their effect on the advocates themselves. Here, anecdotal evidence suggests that an appointment by the Court confers significant professional, reputational, and in some instances even concrete monetary advantages. Just as Supreme Court clerkships or

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143 Cf. Stephen R. McAllister, Federalism and Retroactivity in State Post-Conviction Proceedings, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 271, 284 (2015) (predicting, regarding the currently pending amicus invitation in Montgomery v. Louisiana, that “(1) the amicus appointed in Montgomery will thoroughly enjoy the opportunity, (2) the Court will be grateful to him for providing such service, and (3) the Court will rule against his jurisdiction position unanimously.”).


145 Id.
positions in the Solicitor General’s office can place a young attorney in the “pipeline to power,”\textsuperscript{146} so too may the opportunity to argue before the Court provide similar advantages, particularly for an attorney relatively early in his or her career.

In 2010, Adam Liptak interviewed Adam Ciongoli, a former Alito clerk who argued Pepper v. United States\textsuperscript{147} approximately four years after finishing his clerkship. Liptak reported that Ciongoli, a first-time advocate, prepared for months for the argument, mostly at night and on the weekends, and “was paid solely in prestige.”\textsuperscript{148}

Tony Mauro suggests in a different piece that invitations to argue actually “launched the Supreme Court appellate careers of several former high court clerks, among them Chief Justice Roberts and Maureen Mahoney, who until recently headed the appellate and constitutional practice at Latham & Watkins.”\textsuperscript{149} While it is difficult to draw a causal link between one event like a Supreme Court invitation and subsequent career developments, it is at least possible that these early experiences conferred significant benefits on the invited attorneys. In private practice, the difference between no Supreme Court arguments and a single Supreme Court argument may be quite significant, for everything from billing rates to likelihood of being entrusted with future Supreme Court arguments.

III. Analysis

Having first framed and then described the practice of amicus invitation, this section identifies several of the broader themes and dynamics that emerge from examining the practice. It begins with a discussion of the categories of cases in which the Court invites amicus participation. It then asks what the sort of review conducted here can tell us (since the Court gives no explicit guidance on this score) about the role of the invited amicus: the identity of the client, the nature of the mandate, and the precise relationship between the amicus and the Court. Finally, it explores more deeply the question of relationships—in particular, what the Justices’ increasing tendency to turn to former law clerks to serve this function might tell us about the Court today.

\textsuperscript{146} Linda Greenhouse, Keynote Speech at the 2012 Pipeline to Power Symposium, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1433, 1436. See also Christopher Avery et al., The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 74 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 447, 450 (2007) (“Federal court clerkships are also often stepping stones to various elite legal posts.”).

\textsuperscript{147} 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011).

\textsuperscript{148} Adam Liptak, Court Chooses Guardians for Orphaned Arguments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2010.

\textsuperscript{149} Tony Mauro, Justices Turn to Ex-Clerks for Unusual Role: Justices Tap Former Clerks to Make the Arguments Others Have Abandoned, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, April 14, 2008. Mauro also argues that where ex-clerks are invited to return to the Court to argue as amici, “the intangible rewards for the lawyer are great, representing yet another way in which a Supreme Court clerkship can be a ticket to top-tier career opportunities.”
A. Reason for the appointment

Though they share a name, not all amicus invitations are alike. They do, however, cluster into several discrete categories, raising some distinct conceptual issues that merit brief discussion here.

Many amicus invitations involve what can be broadly described as confessions of error—either an error by the government itself, as where the Solicitor General’s office decides to disavow a position taken by litigators below, or an error by the lower court or courts. Much of the time, cases in this category involve a decision by the federal government not to defend or press for a victory, for various institutional and legal reasons. As I have argued elsewhere, there are considerable advantages to permitting government entities to change positions in litigation, including by declining to defend statutes they have concluded are unconstitutional; from this perspective, the practice of amicus invitation enables the government to make such decisions without undermining courts’ ability to answer important questions. Dickerson supplies the best example of this phenomenon; in that case, one of the most important instances of constitutional nondefense by the federal executive, the federal government argued in the Supreme Court against the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §3501 (and in support of the view that Miranda was a constitutional rule). Accordingly, the Court invited scholar Paul Cassell, who had filed a significant amicus brief in the lower court litigation, to defend the statute. In a more representative example, the federal government in Ornelas v. United States, after arguing below that appellate review of a lower court’s finding of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be for clear error, joined with the petitioner in arguing for a de novo standard before the Supreme Court. The Court invited attorney Peter Isakoff to defend the lower court judgment.

In a number of other cases, the Court itself raises an issue or question it wishes to consider, but which the parties do not present. A recent example in this category is United States v. Windsor, in which amicus Vicki Jackson was asked to brief and argue the position that the executive branch lacked authority to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in light of its agreement with the plaintiff on the constitutionality of DOMA, and, additionally that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group lacked Article III standing. Alabama v. Shelton is a slightly older example; in that case, amicus Charles Fried was invited to argue the position that the Sixth Amendment did not bar imposition of a

150 Goldman, whose focus is on Article III concerns, slices the cases slightly differently, dividing out SG error confessions and changes in position from cases in which neither party accepts a sua sponte decision of the lower court. Goldman, supra note 11, at 917.
151 See Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 11 COLUM. L. Rev. 213 (2014).
152 Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and Safe Streets Coalition as Amici Curiae, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750).
suspended criminal sentence even where the original conviction had been obtained without counsel, although neither the lower court nor any party had taken that position.

In a third category of cases, the Court invites amicus participation where one party to a case simply fails to appear or to respond to communications with the Court. New York v. Harris is one such example: in that case amicus (now Judge) Barrington Parker was invited to argue for suppression of a confession as insufficiently attenuated from an unlawful search, after the criminal defendant in the case failed to respond to numerous communications from the Clerk’s office. And in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Court invited the participation of amicus Charles Lipsey after being notified that the respondent had not authorized its counsel to participate in Supreme Court litigation in the case.

Finally, in a small subset of these cases, the Court appears simply to conclude that the quality of the advocacy on one side of a question is not sufficient to enable it to decide a case. The presidential power case Myers v. United States, which featured the first invited amicus, was such a case. Myers did have his own attorney; though that attorney had twice failed to appear for oral argument, he did file several briefs, and ultimately did participate in the argument in which amicus George Pepper appeared. An even clearer example of such a case is Lambert v. California, in which attorney quality almost certainly drove the Court’s appointment. The Court first considered Lambert, which raised the question of the constitutionality of a California felon registration statute, in the 1956 Term. But rather than deciding the case, the Court set the case for rear argument the next Term, appointing former Douglas clerk Warren Christopher to represent Lambert, in lieu of the attorney who had represented her below and in the 1956 Supreme Court argument. And yet a third example is Keeton v. Hustler, in which the Court learned on the eve of oral argument that Hustler publisher Larry Flynt had discharged his attorney and wished to argue on his own behalf; the Court instead appointed Mayer Brown attorney (formerly of the Solicitor General’s office and former

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158 487 U.S. 1231 (1988). See Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Anthony Kennedy, June 28, 1988 (“The Conference requested me to recommend at attorney for appointment as amicus in this case….After checking, I recommend Charles Lipsey…Each of you has far more extensive knowledge of the D.C. bar than I do, and I will be pleased to defer to you if you have an alternate suggestion.”)
Burger clerk) Stephen Shapiro, who was already counsel of record in an amicus brief in support of Hustler.\textsuperscript{163}

B. Nature of the role

At the conclusion of oral arguments in a case involving an appointed amicus, Chief Justice Roberts typically includes a brief acknowledgment of the amicus’ contributions, along the following lines: “You briefed and argued the case … at the invitation of the Court, and you have ably discharged that responsibility, for which we are grateful.”\textsuperscript{164} Opinions frequently contain similar language.\textsuperscript{165} But what exactly is the “responsibility” the Chief Justice is invoking in his expression of gratitude?

The Court never specifies, at least in its public communications; nor does it explain who the amicus’ client is—if there is one—or elaborate on the nature of the role. In some respects, of course, the role is clear—to take a particular position before the Court, whether that position entails defending a judgment or making a specific argument. But is the role of the amicus akin to the role of a private attorney, whose obligation is one of zealous advocacy, within ethical bounds, to a particular client? Or is it more similar to the role of the Solicitor General, whose role requires the incorporation of other considerations?\textsuperscript{166} Does the amicus appropriately consider, say, the proper development of the law? And do the answers to these questions turn on the particular type of amicus invitation at issue?

One answer might be that all of these amici are in some ways akin to the original amici who morphed into the unsolicited filers so prevalent in Supreme Court litigation today. In a widely cited piece on the emergence of the amicus curiae, Samuel Krislov

\textsuperscript{163} See 464 U.S. 958 (1983). The idea of appointing Shapiro seems to have come from Clerk Alexander Stevas, who notified the Chief Justice of Flynt’s attorney’s withdrawal in a memo in which he suggested the Court issue an order authorizing Shapiro to present argument. See Memorandum from Clerk Alexander Stevas to the Conference, Nov. 3, 1983, Papers of Justice Harry Blackmun, Box 393 Folder 7. See also Jeffrey Cole, Discovery, An Interview with Steve Shapiro, 23 LITIG. 19, 22 (1997).

\textsuperscript{164} Transcript of oral argument at 45, Kucana v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827 (2010).

\textsuperscript{165} See, e.g., 558 U.S. 233, 242 (2010) (“We appointed Amanda C. Leiter to brief and argue the case, as \textit{amicus curiae}, in support of the Seventh Circuit’s judgment. Ms. Leiter has ably discharged her assigned responsibilities.”); Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2012) (“Since petitioners and the Government both take the position that the Fair Sentencing Act’s new minimums do apply in these circumstances, we appointed as \textit{amicus curiae} Miguel Estrada to argue the contrary position. He has ably discharged his responsibilities.”)

traces the historical evolution of the amicus curiae in England and the United States; initially an attorney with no interest in the proceedings, who simply brought matters of law or fact to the attention of the judge, the amicus under English common law soon morphed into a representative of a third party whose interests might be impacted by a case. The problem of unrepresented third party interests was only magnified in the United States, with its more complex federal system and a variety of doctrines limiting access to the federal courts, and so the practice expanded in the United States.

Although Krislov’s piece predates most of the amicus invitations discussed here, the early amici Krislov describes do seem to supply the closest analogue to today’s invited amici, who, alone among Supreme Court players, stand in a closer relationship to the Court than to any identifiable client. And the generally underspecified nature of the role is quite similar; as Krislov explains of the amicus at early common law, “Inasmuch as permission to participate as a friend of the court has always been a matter of grace rather than right, the courts have from the beginning avoided precise definition of the perimeters and attendant circumstances involving possible utilization of the device.”

If the murkiness of the mission connects early English amici to today’s invited amici, several of the cases discussed here give some clues about the nature of the role (and the Court’s apparent grappling with it). First, the 1967 case Commissioner v. Stidger featured a question about the tax treatment of certain expenses by a Marine Corps officer. The Court granted cert, but the respondent, a taxpayer who had prevailed in the Ninth Circuit, informed the Court that he “did not intend to brief or argue the case...because the amount involved is so small ($180). He asks that counsel be appointed but does not claim that he qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis.” Instead of appointing counsel to actually represent the petitioner, the clerk suggested “that counsel be appointed as amicus curiae to argue from the point of view of the taxpayer. This would give the Court the benefit of the argument without setting a precedent of appointing lawyers for litigants who are not paupers.” This framing made clear that the amicus

167 Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L. J. 694, 695 (1962); see also Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1765 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (“Interestingly, the original amicus was the lawyer, not the client...It was not until the early 1900s that courts began to attribute amicus briefs to the organization that sponsored it rather than the lawyer who submitted it.”)
168 As one nineteenth century state-court case put it, “he acts for no one, but simply seeks to give information to the court.” Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 70, 72 (1859).
170 Krislov, 72 YALE L.J. at 697-98.
171 Id. at 695.
172 386 U.S. 287 (1967).
174 Id.
was not to report to, or stand in any formal relationship with, the petitioner, but rather to
give the Court the benefit of the sorts of arguments the petitioner might make. The order
then described Stidger’s status vis-à-vis not the petitioner or a taxpayer, but the judgment
below (“John A. Reed….is invited to brief and argue this case…in support of the
judgment below.”). 175

Where the task of the amicus is defined as defending the judgment below, amicus
frequently offer alternate grounds on which to affirm the judgment, including grounds
rejected by the lower court. In Verlinden v. United States, for example, amicus Stephen
Shulman offered a number of arguments for the position that the lower courts had lacked
jurisdiction over the dispute in question. At one point at oral argument, Justice Rehnquist
pushed back on an argument—that jurisdiction was lacking as a statutory as well as a
constitutional matter—as having been rejected below. 176 Shulman reminded Rehnquist,
with an audible chuckle, that his task was to “defend[] the judgment below,” and
explained that he was merely offering an alternate basis to affirm. 177 It’s a brief
exchange, but a revealing one, in that it features a rare moment of an amicus stepping
outside of the role—through a fourth wall of sorts.

A more recent example highlights the subtle ways the ambiguity surrounding the
role might be made manifest. In the 2013 case Millbrook v. United States, the lower court
had held that the immunity waiver in the FTCA was limited to tortious conduct “that
occurs in the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.” 178
Though ostensibly appointed to defend the judgment below, amicus Jeffrey Bucholtz
took a slightly different position than the court below had adopted: while the court below
held that the immunity waiver was limited just to law enforcement officers engaged in
one of three enumerated activities (searching, seizing, arresting), Bucholtz conceded
(very effectively, though unsuccessfully) that immunity might be waived for certain sorts
of law enforcement officials all of the time, whether or not they were engaged in the

176 Specifically, he urged the Court to find that the FSIA conferred jurisdiction only when the
plaintiff was a citizen. Oral Argument at 33:00, Verlinden v. National Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
177 Here is an excerpt from the exchange:
Shulman: This Court should construe the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to provide
jurisdiction only when the plaintiff is a citizen….
Justice Rehnquist: The court of appeals didn't agree with you on that point, did it? I mean, it... I
take it it would have liked to construe the statute that way, but it felt it just couldn't.
Mr. Shulman: That is correct, Justice Rehnquist. I am arguing in support of the judgment below
[chuckle], and this is an additional ground which I believe is available to support the judgment.

enumerated activities. That concession did not adversely impact the named defendants in the case—prison guards, rather than more traditional law enforcement officers like FBI agents—but was still a very different rule from the one the lower court adopted.

These exchanges, though suggestive, in no way supply any definite answers to the question of the role of the amicus. The best answer may be that the nature of the mandate varies with the particular circumstances of the amicus invitation—and the diversity of those circumstances suggests that the Court perhaps should not use the same label to describe what are in fact quite disparate invitations.

C. Familiarity

As the findings in Part II make clear, the Court relies heavily on familiarity when making these appointments: the Justices’ familiarity with any potential invitees, and the invited attorneys’ familiarity with the Court.

There is no question that the Justices’ preference for parties who have had some exposure to the Court makes a certain sense. The Supreme Court is an institution with its own folkways, and it is surely at least in part for this reason that the Court is most comfortable using insiders to serve this role. In general, former law clerks are familiar with the Justices—at a bare minimum they know their identities, and they likely know a good deal more about their views. And, by virtue of their experience observing oral arguments, they are familiar with the rhythm of the exchange with the Justices. As Justice Jackson explained in an essay on Supreme Court advocacy many years ago: “One who is at ease in its presence, familiar with its practice, and aware of its more recent decisions and divisions, holds some advantage over a stranger to such matters.”

One example of this largely intangible quality came in last Term’s appointed amicus case, Mata v. Lynch. Late in the argument of appointed amicus William Peterson, Justice Breyer engaged in the following colloquy with Peterson:

179 Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) (No. 11-10362) (“Where somebody doesn’t have two hats, they only have one hat, like an FBI agent, and they are on the job and they are engaged in what normal people would think of as law enforcement activity, maybe that’s covered.”).

180 See Tony Mauro, Appealing Practice: The Supply of High Court Case is Shrinking, THE AMERICAN LAWYER Oct. 2000 (“Those experiences [clerking and working at the SG’s office...] give lawyers insight into the folkways of the Court and the kinds of arguments that appeal to the justices. There’s no way to overstate the value of that experience, says [Carter] Phillips, a clerk for the late Warren Burger. It’s a very warm environment if you’ve been there before. Everyone says hello.”).

181 Where the non-expert advocate confuses the Justices, the response can be unforgiving. See, e.g., the oral argument in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (Tr. at p. 32 (“I’m Justice Souter – you’d better cut that out.”)).

JUSTICE BREYER: And, and so we’re getting into what’s actually I think a tough question. And maybe it’s cowardly. But I’m thinking why go into those two tough questions, when in fact we asked for the answer to a simple question. There are –you have written a very good brief and I understand what you’re doing and but I still am sort of stuck on this, which I’ll put to you.

MR PETERSON: Well, thank you, Justice Breyer. I know it’s the end of the term and I’m asking you to complicate the case.

JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.

There’s not much of substance in this exchange; and the fact that the Court is unlikely to want to complicate a seemingly simple case at the end of April during a Term with a number of significant cases (marriage; healthcare) pending isn’t especially privileged information. But the exchange is nevertheless one in which only someone steeped in the schedule and rhythms of the Supreme Court would likely participate.

In short, it is easy to see why the Court prefers to anoint insiders. But the question, which I take up in the next Part, is in service of what values, and at what cost.

IV. Normative Implications

A. Outcomes and the path of the law

In some instances, the presence or arguments of an amicus may have profound consequences—either for the case at hand, or for the path of the law more broadly. In United States v. Halper,\(^\text{183}\) for example, then attorney (now Chief Justice) John Roberts, in his first Supreme Court argument, managed to convince the Court that where a civil judgment arose out of conduct that had already resulted in a criminal sentence, that civil judgment constituted unconstitutional double jeopardy. Eight years later the Court reversed itself, calling its decision in \textit{Halper} “ill considered” and “unworkable.”\(^\text{184}\) It seems at least possible that the quality of Roberts’ advocacy is what led the Court to reach what it later determined was the incorrect result.

Another case in which the quality of the advocacy almost certainly drove the result, along the way shaping the law more broadly, is Lambert v. California.\(^\text{185}\) \textit{Lambert} was argued initially, and disastrously, by Samuel McMorris, who had represented petitioner Virginia Lambert below.\(^\text{186}\) McMorris’s brief was poorly structured and

\(^{185}\) 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
\(^{186}\) \textit{See supra} note 161 and accompanying text.
difficult to follow,\textsuperscript{187} and the oral arguments in the Spring of 1957 were something of a disaster, with McMorris repeatedly resisting the Justices’ explicit requests for the facts of the case or the specifics of the state statute in question.\textsuperscript{188} Three months after the initial oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument, inviting Warren Christopher—former clerk to Justice Douglas, future Secretary of State—to argue that the California felon registration statute under which Lambert had been convicted was unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{189} Christopher’s brief, which has been described as “a masterpiece,”\textsuperscript{190} proved persuasive to the Court, with Justice Douglas’s opinion for a five-Justice majority holding that due process prevented the conviction of a person who “did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge.”\textsuperscript{191} Justice Frankfurter’s dissent struck a cautionary note, charging that the state and federal law books were “thick with provisions” that would “fall or be impaired” if the majority’s opinion were read expansively.\textsuperscript{192} Ultimately, though, he predicted that “the present decision will turn out to be an isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents—a derelict on the waters of the law.”\textsuperscript{193}

Although the Court has not subsequently repudiated \textit{Lambert}, as it did with \textit{Halper}, the consensus seems to be that Justice Frankfurter’s prediction has proven accurate. As one scholar has written, “\textit{Lambert}’s notice principle has never taken off. Few decisions rest on it, and the principle itself remains an unenforced norm, not a genuine constitutional rule.”\textsuperscript{194} Another commentator argues that the rule of \textit{Lambert} has proven most relevant in “criminal law casebooks,…while local governments have proceeded to enact a myriad of criminal laws, rendering residents and non-residents alike susceptible to prosecution” without regard for their knowledge of the law.\textsuperscript{195}

But the fact that the decision has not led to a reformation of our concepts of notice in criminal law does not mean that its impact has not been profound. A recent piece lays blame for many of the pathologies of criminal law enforcement on decisions like \textit{Lambert}, which purport to provide protections but instead concentrate power in

\textsuperscript{187} Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), Appellant’s Brief, Feb. 23, 1957, \textit{U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832-1978}. Peter W. Low & Benjamin Charles Wood, \textit{Lambert Revisited}, 100 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1608 (2014) (describing the brief as containing “a scattergun array of assertions, some of which met their mark, but most of which were clearly wide of the target and plainly of no interest or persuasive power at that level.”).


\textsuperscript{189} 354 U.S. 936 (1957) (appointment memo).

\textsuperscript{190} Low & Wood, \textit{supra} note 187, at 1609. (“The Christopher brief was a masterpiece”).

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Lambert}, 355 U.S. at 230.

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Id.} at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{194} William J. Stuntz, \textit{The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law}, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 589 (2001) (“The system by which we make criminal law has produced not the rule of law but its opposite. And the doctrines that aim to reinforce the rule of law only add to the lawlessness.”).

prosecutors.196 Other work describes Lambert as part of “a story of unfulfilled potential,” regarding “a more humane, moral, and altogether more sound substantive penal law.”197 To be sure, there is no way to draw a clear causal link between the Court’s invitation to Christopher and the effects commentators believe have flowed from the decision in Lambert. But the amicus invitation is an important part of the story of Lambert, and thus of the criminal law, and it is one that has not been told.

Invited amici do not necessarily need to prevail in order to impact the path of the law. Although Vicki Jackson’s argument that the Court was without jurisdiction to decide DOMA’s constitutionality did not carry the day in Windsor, it received substantial support from the dissenting justices. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice, insisted that “[w]e have no power to decide this case.”198 The Chief Justice’s separate writing underscored his agreement with Justice Scalia,199 and Justice Alito agreed in part, accepting Jackson’s argument that the executive branch had suffered no injury that allowed it to seek Supreme Court review, but ultimately concluding that the House of Representatives, acting through the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, was able to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction.200 Four votes, therefore, now appear to exist for the proposition that the executive branch cannot invoke the Court’s jurisdiction where it has prevailed below. Although this view does not at present command a majority, it is not far-fetched to suggest that it could come to do so at some future date.

One of the key cases whose meaning divided the Windsor majority and dissents—at least on jurisdiction—was I.N.S. v. Chadha, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of the legislative veto.201 The Chadha/Windsor dyad highlights something quite significant about amicus invitations: the power they give the Court to place substantive issues on the table, and thus to incorporate those issues into the development of the law, or to leave particular issues either underdeveloped or unexamined altogether.

The Chadha Court, before it considered the substantive constitutional question of the legislative veto, examined its own authority to resolve the dispute. The case pit the I.N.S. and Chadha, an alien whose suspension of deportation had been overridden by a one-house veto, against Congress. Both houses of Congress argued that the I.N.S., which had prevailed in the Ninth Circuit, was not an aggrieved party and accordingly could not appeal.202 The Court held, however, that “When an agency of the United States is a party

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196 Stuntz, supra note 194, at 599.
198 United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2697 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
199 Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of the courts below.”).
200 Id. at 2711-14 (Alito, J., dissenting)
202 Id. at 929 (“Both Houses if Congress contend that we are without jurisdiction…to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832.”).
to a case in which the Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitutional, it is an aggrieved party for purposes of taking an appeal.” The Court also concluded that Chadha had standing to challenge the deportation order the agency had issued as a result of the House’s veto. Accordingly, the Court proceeded to decide the merits of the case. The Court did not, however, delve separately into the status of the two houses of Congress as proper parties to the dispute, probably because the parties did not devote much attention to the question. The Department of Justice’s brief merely noted in a footnote that “An adversary presentation of the issues will be assured in this Court by the participation of the Senate and House of Representatives, which have the principal interest in sustaining the constitutionality of [the statute].” No other discussion of congressional authority to participate appears in the briefing. The Court explained in its short discussion of the issue that “We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.” But this statement, whether correct or incorrect, was not subjected to any sort of adversarial testing, and the issue might have benefited from the sort of careful briefing and argument Professor Jackson provided in Windsor.

The Court’s divergent approaches to jurisdictional questions in its two recent considerations of the Affordable Care Act, NFIB v. Sebelius and King v. Burwell, supply another illuminating example of just this dynamic. The Court in NFIB invited two separate amici to brief and argue separate positions in the case—in particular, as relevant here, that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the Court’s consideration of the case. As the Court noted in an usual explanatory parenthetical, it chose to appoint an amicus “because there is a reasonable argument that the Anti-Injunction Act deprives us of jurisdiction to hear challenges to the individual mandate, but no party supports that proposition.” In the end, the Court unanimously agreed with the parties that the Anti-Injunction Act posed no jurisdictional obstacle.

By contrast, the Court in King v. Burwell did not invite an amicus to argue against the standing of the plaintiffs, who challenged federal health-care subsidies in states without their own health-care exchanges, despite the presence of what some
perceived as a “reasonable” argument against standing.\footnote{See, e.g., Louise Radnofsky & Brent Kendall, \textit{New Questions Swirl on an Affordable Care Act Challenger}, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2015); Liz Goodwin, \textit{Twist in Obamacare Supreme Court Case: Weak Plaintiffs}, YAHOO NEWS (March 2, 2015).} Although the federal government had argued against the plaintiffs’ standing in the court of appeals,\footnote{See Brief for Appellees, King v. Burwell, 759 F. 3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), available at 2014 WL 1028988, at *48-*52. It was noteworthy, however, that the federal government presented its standing argument after its merits argument, a highly unusual sequencing.} the Solicitor General’s Supreme Court brief failed to raise standing at all, and at oral argument the Solicitor General indicated, after a lengthy exchange with a number of Justices, that he was “willing to accept the absence of representation [of changed circumstances that would defeat standing] as an indication that there is a case or controversy here.”\footnote{Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).} That concession, however, did not mean that the issue was beyond dispute; Justice Ginsburg began the arguments by posing a standing question,\footnote{Id. at 3.} and the standing exchanges with both the Solicitor General and the petitioners’ counsel occupied a full 11 pages of the oral argument transcript.\footnote{Id. at 3-7, 39-44.} So it was in many ways conspicuous that the Court received neither briefing nor oral argument that took the position that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and that standing was not even mentioned in the Court’s opinion in the case.\footnote{See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). One difference between the two cases is that the Fourth Circuit in \textit{NFIB} had held that the Anti-Injunction Act stripped the court of jurisdiction, Liberty University v. Geithner, 671 F. 3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011), while the lower Court in \textit{King} had found standing, 759 F. 3d 358 (4th Cir. 2011). An additional difference may have been the factbound nature of the standing argument in \textit{King}, which would have made the amicus argument challenging. But it is not clear why either difference should have been dispositive.}

The point here is not that the Court was incorrect in any of its decisions to invite, or not to invite, amici in any of these cases. Indeed, there may well have been principled reasons to make each decision as it did. But without any public guidelines or explanation, it is impossible to make such a determination. As this discussion shows, these decisions can have real consequences. And the magnitude of those consequences argue in favor of the imposition of clear standards and guidelines, regarding both when and whom to invite—a sort of rigor that at present is clearly missing.

\textbf{B. Diversity, Revisited}

One set of critiques of both the opaque processes described above, and the results of those processes, sounds in concerns about diversity—both demographic and experiential. Why should we be concerned that advocates before the Court be diverse—that is, that they be drawn from a relatively broad cross-section of the population? One reason is the considerable evidence that diverse groups produce better outcomes—specifically, that they are better at problem-solving and decision-making—than homogenous groups, even when those homogeneous groups are composed of highly...
competent individuals. As economist Scott Page argues in his book *The Difference*, experimental studies suggest that under certain circumstances, “collections of diverse individuals outperform collections of more individually capable individuals.” Page offers an explanation for this phenomenon: “The best problem solvers tend to be similar; therefore, a collection of the best problem solvers performs little better than any one of them individually. A collection of random, but intelligent, problem solvers tends to be diverse. This diversity allows them to be collectively better.” Page goes still further, arguing that diverse groups not only perform better than their constituent members would perform individually, or that they perform better than otherwise similar non-diverse groups, but that, given a baseline of ability and a sufficiently large pool from which to draw, diverse groups will perform *better* than non-diverse groups, even where the non-diverse groups are composed exclusively of individuals of higher “ability” than the diverse groups.

Page’s work is largely concerned with group problem-solving and decision-making. So while the applicability of his theory to certain dimensions of Supreme Court practice—the Justices’ own deliberative processes, for example—may be self-evident, its relevance to the invited outside attorneys who are the focus of this Essay is less obvious. Are these attorneys participants in a decisional process that would bring them within the reach of Page’s theory? Put differently, is making legal arguments analogous to solving problems in the way Page envisions?

Perhaps not perfectly. But drafting briefs and preparing for oral arguments is often a deeply collaborative undertaking, and the briefs filed by amici today typically contain a number of names of their covers, beyond the direct recipient of the invitation. Those individuals closely resemble, at least experientially, the actual invitees. In some sense, then, it may be that the individuals the Court currently relies upon are all “smart” in the same way—they share roughly similar backgrounds and thus approach the task of making arguments before the Court in similar ways. As social scientists have noted in the context of interest-groups and unsolicited amicus filings, “groups of the same organizational typology are likely to rely on similar presentation styles and authorities in

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215 *SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES* 133 (2007). These conditions include that the problem be difficult (otherwise any problem solver would be able to find the best solution), *id.* at 159; that “all problem solvers are smart” (an oversimplification of what Page terms “the calculus condition”—in essence, that the members of the group must have some knowledge that is relevant to the problem at hand), *id.* at 160; there must be genuine diversity (that is, not all problem-solvers in a group should identify the same solution), *id.* at 160-61; and the pool must be large enough, *id.* at 162.

216 *Id.* at 137.

217 *Id.* at 164. *See also* Lu Hong and Scott E. Page, *Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers*, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, vol. 101, pp. 16385-89 (2004) (explaining that the reason groups of diverse problem solvers outperform groups of problem solvers composed of higher-ability individuals is that in large groups of problem solvers, “the very best problem solvers must become similar,” *id* at 16389. This similarity is an impediment to optimal problem-solving. *Id.*
their advocacy efforts.”\textsuperscript{218} A similar dynamic likely applies in the context of the Court’s current practices.

Moreover, invited amici themselves are clearly in some sense participants in the Court’s decisionmaking processes. This may be particularly true in the context of oral argument, which Chief Justice Roberts has described as “the organizing point for the entire judicial process.”\textsuperscript{219}

Of course, if there is force to this argument, it is not limited to the amicus context, but applies generally to the task of Supreme Court advocacy. So it may be more broadly true that a more diverse pool of advocates would bring to the Justices creative ways of approaching cases—ways they might not otherwise encounter, and that might ultimately enrich and even improve our body of law. But it is uniquely in the context of amicus invitations that the Justices, without any upheaval, could make small but meaningful changes that would bring a degree of additional diversity to their decisional processes.

C. Distributional consequences

As the preceding Part makes clear, the Justices’ opaque and relationship-driven invitation practices dramatically limit the universe of parties who might well provide excellent service to the Court (and might reap the obvious benefits that flow from such service). Indeed, the current approach permits the justices to dole out the valuable asset of a Supreme Court argument to friends and former employees, in a way that is reminiscent of the cronyism and patronage that characterized government employment writ large before the adoption of the federal Pendleton Act and various state analogues.\textsuperscript{220}

The rise of the elite Supreme Court bar may bear on this dynamic in two distinct ways. First, as the Justices increasingly hear only from experts, they may in turn be even more inclined to reach only for individuals who are already steeped in the institution’s culture. And second, as practice before the Court becomes increasingly limited to expert practitioners, who tend to present arguments in very similar styles and to adhere to very similar norms, outsiders may find it more and more difficult to perform consistent with the Court’s desires and expectations around advocacy, both written and oral.


\textsuperscript{219} John G. Roberts, Jr., \textit{Oral Advocacy and the Reemergence of a Supreme Court Bar}, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 70 (2005) (“Oral argument matters, but not just because of what the lawyers have to say. It is the organizing point for the entire judicial process. The judges read the briefs, do the research, and talk to their law clerks to prepare for the argument. The voting conference is held right after the oral argument...it is natural, with the voting coming so closely on the heels of oral argument, that the discussion at conference is going to focus on what took place at argument.”).

\textsuperscript{220} See generally Carl Russell Fish, \textit{The Civil Service and the Patronage} (1904); see also, e.g., David E. Lewis, \textit{Testing Pendleton’s Promise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?} 69 J. POL. 4, 1073 (2007).
But is the Court’s preference for comfort and familiarity enough to outweigh the costs of this practice in distributional effects—and to justify the persistence of something that feels like genuine patronage in 2015? The costs to the Court of hearing argument from a lawyer not fully socialized into the norms of the Supreme Court would hardly be catastrophic; the Court is not the sort of fragile ecosystem whose existence will be threatened by the introduction of unknown outsiders. So the answer seems to be clearly no.

Notwithstanding the foregoing critique, there is a sense, perhaps a counterintuitive one, in which the sort of quasi-patronage involved in these invitations may actually hold out the promise of disrupting the domination of Supreme Court advocacy by the elite bar. That is, although recent invitations inevitably issue to lawyers with some relationship to the Justices, the Court’s invitation practices do seem to indicate a willingness to depart from the increasing norm of extensive prior experience arguing before the Court. They therefore may suggest a route to opening or democratizing Supreme Court advocacy. Consider that 56% of the invitations in the amicus dataset were issued to individuals who had never argued before the Supreme Court; by contrast, the overall number of first-time advocates was 43% during the 2007 Term, and is likely even lower today.

It is possible, then, that the Court’s willingness to invite these attorneys even given their lack of experience may suggest a degree of openness on the part of the Justices to new participants in the dialogue that precedes their law-making. The challenge, then, is merely to further grow the pool of eligible advocates.

V. Solutions

There is no question that the relationship-based and opaque process by which these appointments currently issue is troubling; the Court is a public-sector entity, and the opportunity to brief and argue a case before it is of great (and undeniable) value. And, in addition to these distributional consequences, the Court’s practices have the possibility of shaping the path of the law. So it seems uncontroversial to suggest that in handing out such invitations, the Court should be subject to a degree of transparency and fair process, whatever precise shape any reforms might take. At the very least, an element of both regularity and transparency would be a start, since in many ways “[p]rocedural regularity begets substantive legitimacy.”

In an illuminating discussion of the context-specific nature of corruption, Deborah Hellman writes:

221 Richard Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1520 (2008).
222 Baude, The Shadow Docket, supra note 58, at 12.
Suppose I am a public official hiring someone for a public job. Giving the job to John, despite the fact that he is less qualified than other applicants, because he is my brother-in-law, constitutes a classic case of corruption. Here, I act corruptly because the benefit I allocate is supposed to be awarded on the basis of criteria that exclude family connectedness. Contrast this example with the following one. Suppose I decide to invite John to a holiday dinner at my house. I invite him, even though he is a less-gifted conversationalist than other possible dinner invitees, because he is my brother-in-law. Here I do not act corruptly. The criteria that apply to this decision (whom to invite to a holiday dinner) are either completely within my discretion or, properly understood, include family connectedness as a valid criterion.223

The question raised by this thought experiment is whether a Supreme Court argument is the sort of public good that ought to be distributed in a method that is subject to public process, or whether it is sufficiently personal, and perhaps inconsequential, that there is no such need. As the foregoing discussion has established, these invitations are too consequential to be considered purely personal. As such, they should be “awarded based on criteria that exclude…connectedness.”224

This Part identifies two sites of possible reform. First, the Court might revise the selection process to allow for the participation of a broader pool of qualified advocates. Second, the Court could clarify the mandate. On the latter score, it could do two things: first, announce and describe with specificity the circumstances under which it will invite amicus participation, to avoid the possibility that ad hoc decisions to appoint or not to appoint will adversely impact the development of the law. And second, it could provide general guidance about the contours of the role, so that lawyers who are not fully socialized into the norms of Supreme Court argument might nevertheless participate.

A. The messengers

The Court’s willingness to depart from the increasing norm of extensive prior experience arguing before the Court actually may suggest that surprising potential inheres in the practice of amicus argument. That is, the Court has already conceded that first-time advocates are up to the task of amicus advocacy. The real challenge, then, may merely be expanding the pool of attorneys from which the Court currently draws, beyond individuals with whom one or more of the Justices already has some personal relationship.

An open application process for amici—alogous to the systems some federal appeals courts have implemented for creating pools of willing pro bono attorneys—is one obvious procedural fix. The Second Circuit, for example, maintains such a panel, with

224 Id. at 1393.
inclusion criteria that are publicly available and straightforward—primarily, “at least 3 years of experience in appellate work at either the state or federal level.” Such a change would no doubt expand the universe of attorneys willing to serve to include those with no personal relationships to the Court or the Justices. And the Justices could certainly craft criteria that involve significant legal experience, including with appellate advocacy.

Another possibility is for the Court to simply pose the question it wishes to have addressed—e.g., “does the Court lack jurisdiction in this case?”—and allow interested parties to file. It is almost certain that many filers would emerge, and likely very fine ones. Given the resources involved in assembling and filing an amicus brief, it’s not clear that this change would have much of a democratizing effect. Moreover, the Court might find itself with multiple briefs making the same argument in different ways; but, given the current norms in favor of allowing virtually unrestricted amicus filing, this would not likely represent a significant change. The Court could then, if it wished to hear oral argument, select from among these invited filers, although the fact that each amicus brief would represent the views of a particular outside entity could complicate matters. Still, this process would be far more transparent than the current approach.

B. The law clerk analogy

Both because a large percentage of amicus invitations go to former Supreme Court law clerks, and because law clerk selection processes once closely resembled current amicus invitation processes, both the history and the contemporary practice of law clerk hiring are instructive here.

Supreme Court law clerk hiring was once driven almost entirely by individual justices’ relationships with professors or deans at elite law schools. Judge Richard Posner has described the selection process in the 1960s, when he served as a law clerk, this way:

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225 See, e.g., Second Circuit’s notification of application for pro bono panel, available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/News/Press%20Release%20Re%20Pro%20Bono%20Panel_030112.pdf. Other federal circuits maintain similar lists of attorneys willing to accept a pro bono appointment, but those lists do not appear to be public, and inclusion criteria are not public. See also Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (2008) (describing Federal Circuit list and local Rule 29(b)).

226 SUPREME COURT RULE 37, BRIEF FOR AN AMICUS CURIAE; PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 45 (2008) (“[T]he Court’s modern rules and norms clearly allow for essentially unlimited amicus participation.”).

227 Indeed, the Court essentially followed this path in both Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), and Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1983); in both cases, after learning that counsel for one party in an already-granted case would not appear for oral argument, the Court appointed as amicus an attorney who had already filed an amicus brief in the case.

“There weren’t many applications; there were no particular standards. Often the justice would delegate the selection of his law clerks to a personal friend, a professional acquaintance, or a law professor he was friendly with, without bothering to screen or interview applicants himself.” Justice Stevens tells a similar story about law clerk selection in the late 1940s, when he secured a clerkship with Justice Wiley Rutledge:

Willard Wirtz, then a professor of law at Northwestern, was a close friend of Justice Wiley Rutledge, and Willard Pedrick, also a law professor at Northwestern, had a close relationship with Chief Justice Fred Vinson.

Unbeknownst to Art [Justice Steven’s Law Review Co-Editor-in-Chief] and me, the two Willards had had discussions with the two Justices and believed that two clerkships would be available to us: one with Rutledge during the 1947 Term and the other with the Chief Justice during the 1948 Term. Considering us equally qualified for both positions, they came to the Law Review office to find out which position each of us would prefer. While more prestige would attach to a clerkship for the Chief Justice, given our advanced age [both men had served in the war prior to law school], we both wanted the earlier opportunity. To resolve the conflict, we resorted to a tie-breaking method, one that I have often been tempted to use during my years on the bench: We flipped a coin.

Others describe geography as a key factor in the justices’ early hiring decisions. According to one anecdote, Justice Hugo Black was generally inclined to hire law clerks from Alabama, if “suitable” candidates from Alabama could be located.

By contrast, every Justice now employs a law clerk hiring process that is, at least in theory, open and competitive. The basic criteria for eligibility are relatively transparent—graduation at or near the top of the class at an elite law school, generally followed by a clerkship for a federal appellate judge—although many Justices continue to rely heavily on personal relationships with members of law school faculties. Some also

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229 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court and Celebrity Culture, 88 CHI-KENT L. REV. 299, 301 (2013). Ward & Weiden paint a similar picture, although they suggest that the justices did receive unsolicited applications, even before the dawn of the current era in law clerk hiring. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 17 (2006).


231 Christopher R. Benson, A Renewed Call for Diversity Among Supreme Court Clerks: How A Diverse Body Of Clerks Can Aid The High Court As An Institution, 23 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 23, 49 (2007) (“Selection during earlier years was comparatively informal, and Justices often based their decisions on idiosyncrasies such as geography.”).

232 In Courtiers of the Marble Palace, authors Ward & Weiden recount an exchange between Justice Black and Yale Law School Dean Wesley Sturges. Dean Sturges wrote Justice Black a letter highlighting three potential law clerks for the 1948 Term, noting that “we all appreciate that you may prefer a boy from your home state of Alabama, and I am placing an Alabama boy before you for first consideration.” Black responded that if the candidate from Alabama “desires to be my clerk, I should be glad to have him.” Ward & Weiden, supra note 229, at 56.
use screening committees to select finalists, or rely on lower court clerkships with “feeder” judges as proxies for quality and/or fit.  

The existing scholarship does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the transformation of the law clerk hiring process, from one based entirely on personal networks and relationships, to one in which every top law student with a post-graduate clerkship with a well-regarded federal judge is at least in theory eligible. The authors of the recent books *Sorcerers’ Apprentices* and *Courtiers of the Marble Palace*, two exhaustive examinations of the institution of the Supreme Court law clerk, note the increase in application numbers and thus competition for Supreme Court clerkships beginning in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, and appear to attribute the increasing formality of the selection process to this increase in applications. But neither book engages in any sustained exploration of the substantive transformation.

The degree to which the law clerk hiring process is now a merit-based one should not be overstated; there is considerable evidence that law clerk hiring, at both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, is largely driven by applicants’ academic or social connections to faculty members or even current law clerks. The point is simply that a process that is to some degree competitive—and which does at times produce law clerks with no existing connections to the Court or to the justices—does exist.

C. The mandate

Finally, clear standards and instructions might facilitate the participation of non-insiders. First, the Court could promulgate formal standards, as part of its internal rules, for the appointment of amici, explaining in at least general terms the types of situations in which it will appoint an amicus. In addition to eliminating the sort of subtle shaping of the development of law that may occur through the use—and non-use—of invitations in particular cases, clear criteria might aid outsiders by articulating the nature of the mission beyond simply, say, defending a judgment below. Were it to consider formalizing the process, the Court might eliminate the category of invitations that seems most troubling, in part because they are so subjective—those in which the quality of the advocacy drove the invitation.

234 Ward & Weiden, *supra* note 229, at 58 (“The number of applications exploded during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, and now more than one thousand applicants apply each year for less than a handful of spots per chamber.”).
237 Note that the Court has other tools it can use when it is concerned about the quality of advocacy. For example, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, a case challenging the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute authorizing the death penalty for the rape of a child, the Court granted a request
D. To what end?

Many of these recommendations go broadly to concerns about transparency. Transparency in the political branches is generally viewed as a mechanism of governmental accountability, although many critics question its efficacy on that score. This democratic-accountability concern makes good sense in the context of the political branches. But these precise concerns are arguably inapplicable in the context of the Supreme Court—an institution that is by constitutional design insulated from the democratic process. So there is a genuine question as to whether an accountability interest has any salience in the context of the Supreme Court—and, if not, whether transparency itself as a substantive value fits poorly with the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional order.

While the notion of accountability may be an imperfect fit with the design and role of the federal courts, courts may serve an indirect accountability-forcing function vis-à-vis the other branches of government—that is, open and independent courts are arguably critical to ensuring the accountability of the political branches, particularly where mechanisms allow courts to review and pass on the conduct of those branches. And scholars have argued that the values of openness or transparency, on the one hand, and independence, on the other, need not exist in tension in the context of the judiciary itself. Judith Resnik, for example, contends that openness promotes judicial independence: “Open processes serve as a mechanism to make plain that a government

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238 Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1346 (“Foremost among [the aims of transparency], at least in much of contemporary discourse, is what is commonly described as ‘accountability.”’); Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(Out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y Rev. 79, 83 (2012) (“Public accountability has been inextricably linked to transparency; and transparency is routinely regarded as a necessary precondition of accountability.”); Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 619-20 (2010) (“Government institutions operate at a distance from those they serve. To be held accountable and to perform well, the institutions must be visible to the public. But in the normal course of their bureaucratic operation, public organizations—sometimes inadvertently, sometimes willfully; sometimes with good intent, sometimes with unethical or illegal intent—create institutional impediments that obstruct external observation. These obstructions must be removed in order for the institutions to be visible and, ultimately, transparent.”).

239 Shkabatur, supra note 238, at 84 (“[I]t is not clear to what extent current transparency policies actually enhance public accountability.”)

240 Kathryn Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2011) (“[T]he members of the Court— unlike the heads of agencies— are insulated from direct political oversight.”).
must acknowledge the independent power of the judge, or open processes can reveal state efforts to try to impose its will on judges.”

In addition, as perceived governmental legitimacy comes increasingly to rest, to at least a degree, on openness in the political branches of government—and, as a corollary, as secrecy comes increasingly to be associated with illegitimacy—there is ever greater urgency to questions of transparency at the Court.

VI. Conclusion

What emerges from an examination of the practice of amicus invitation is a picture of a Court that has become increasingly insular and cloistered over time, less and less inclined to invite in outsiders who might approach the law in different, perhaps radically different, ways. The results of the process examined here, in particular its distributional consequences and its potential for impacting the path of the law, should give all serious Court-watchers pause.

At the same time, there is another side to the story, both more optimistic and more pragmatic: the Court’s willingness to depart from the norm of prior experience holds out the tantalizing possibility of expansion of the ranks of the Supreme Court bar. The Justices have shown themselves to be comfortable with first-time advocates, and this is a significant fact in an era of a shrinking Supreme Court bar; the task, then, is designing an invitation system that will grant first-time advocates from outside the ranks of former law clerks to the Justices the opportunity to participate in the Court’s production of law.

Of course, the unfettered discretion the Court enjoys in its invitation practice is not the exception, but rather the rule—the Court’s recusal practices and its promulgation of its own internal rules are but two notable examples. But there is real value in focusing on aspects of Supreme Court practice that are shrouded in secrecy for reasons unrelated (or antithetical) to the integrity of the Court’s decisionmaking processes. The Court’s invitation practices have gone uniquely unnoticed, and I hope through this Essay to draw attention to both the troubling dimensions of the practice, and the promise it holds out.

241 Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 Villanova L. Rev. 771, 787 (2008) (graphically “mapping” the “declining public dimensions of conflict resolution” in the United States). See also Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 579, 665 (2010) (“One can find numerous affirmations in constitutions and in case law at the state, national, and international levels about obligations to provide “open and public courts” and independent judges[.]”).
### Appendix – Amicus Invitations

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