Part I: The Nature of Contract/Enforceable Promises	3
A:	The Bargain Theory & The Reliance Principle	3
1.	Siegel v Spear & Co., NY, 1923, p 285:	3
2.	Lusk-Harbison-Jones Inc. v Universal Credit Co., MS, 1933, p 289:	3
3.	Fisher v.  Jackson, CN, 1955, p 291:	3
4.	Underwood Typewriter Co. v Century Realty Co., MO, 1909, p 294:	4
B:	Pre-Existing Legal Duty Rule (PELD)	4
1.	Stilk v. Myrick, Eng, 1809, p 651:	4
2.	Feinberg v. Pfeiffer & Co., MO, 1959, p 308:	4
C:	Intent to be Bound	5
1.	Balfour v. Balfour, Eng, 1919, p 116:	5
D:	Gratuitous Non-Commercial Promises	5
1.	Kirksey v Kirksey, AL, 1845, p 473:	5
2.	Devecmon v Shaw, MD, 1888, p 480:	5
3.	Hamer v Sidway, NY, 1891, p 483:	5
4.	Ricketts v Scothorn, NB, 1898, p 491:	6
5.	DeCicco v Schweizer, NY, 1917, p 494:	6
E:	Moral Consideration	6
1.	Gillingham v Brown, MA, 1901, p 512:	6
2.	Mills v Wyman, MA, 1825, p 523:	7
3.	Webb v McGowin, AL, 1935, p 539:	7
F:	Seals	7
1.	Warren v Lynch, NY, 1810, p 725:	7
2.	Krell v Codman, MA, 1891, p 728:	7
3.	Pillans and Rose v Van Mierop and Hopkins, Eng, 1765, p 744:	8
G: Charitable Subscription/Policy Considerations	8
1.	Allegheny College v National Chautauqua Co. Bank, NY, 1927, p 501:	8
2.	Dworkin	9
A.	Need for a Promise	10
1.	Hurley v Eddingfield, IN, 1901, p 56:	10
2.	Davis v General Foods Corp., NY, 1937, p 121:	10
3.	Mabley & Carew Co. v Borden, OH, 1935, p 124:	10
B:	Implied Contracts	10
1.	Young & Ashburnham’s Case, Eng, 1587, p 146:	10
2.	Hertzog v Hertzog, PA, 1857, p 147:	11
3.	Barnet’s Estate, PA, 1936, p 152:	11
4.	Cropsey v Sweeney, NY, 1958, p 153:	11
5.	Shaw v Shaw, Eng, 1954, p 154:	11
6.	Hewitt v Hewitt, IL, 1978, p 155:	11
C:	Indefinite Contracts/Offer & Acceptance—Offers	12
1.	Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus, MN, 1957, p 183:	12
2.	Jenkins Towel Service Inc. v Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., PA, 1960, p 186:	12
3.	Fairmount Glass Works v Crunden-Martin Woodenware Co., KY, 1899, p 193:	12
4.	Channel Master Corp. v Aluminum Ltd. Sales, NY, 1958, p 196:	13
D:	Indefinite Contracts/Offer & Acceptance—Acceptances	13
1.	Prescott v Jones, NH, 1898, p 238:	13
2.	National Union Fire Insurance Co. v Joseph Ehrlich, NY, 1924, p 241:	13
3.	Austin v Burge, MO, 1911, p 242:	13
4.	Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co. v Holloway, TN, 1919, p 244:	14
5.	Langellier v Schaeffer, MN, 1887, p 247:	14
6.	Butler v Foley, MI, 1920, p 250:	14
7.	U.S. v Braunstein, SDNY, 1947, p 253:	14
E:	Indefinite Contracts/Offer & Acceptance—Firm Offers	15
1.	Dickinson v Dodds, 1876, p 316:	15
2.	James Baird Co. v Gimble Brothers, 2d DC, 1933, p 323:	15
3.	Drennan v Star Paving, CA, 1958, p 326:	15
F:	Unilateral Contracts	16
1.	Carhill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., Eng, 1893, p 370:	16
Part III. Interpretation of Contracts/Meaning of Promises	17
A:	The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith	17
1.	Sun Printing v Remington Paper, NY, 1923, p 216:	17
2.	Hoffman v Red Owl Stores, Inc., WI, 1965, p 223:	17
3.	Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, NY, 1917, p 451:	17
B:	Parole Evidence Rule—Prior Contracts Discharge Game	17
1.	Thompson v Libby, MN, 1885, p 827:	17
2.	Mitchell v Lath, NY, 1928, p 837:	18
3.	Zell v American Seating, NY, 1943, p 852:	18
Part IV: Death of Contract	19
A:	Statute Of Frauds	19
1.	Bader v Hiscox, IA, 1919, p 770:	19
2.	Doyle v Dixon, MA, 1867, p 773:	19
3.	Imperator Realty Co., Inc. Tull, NY, 1920, p 801:	19
B:	Third Party Beneficiaries	19
1.	Lawrence v Fox, NY, 1859, p 85:	19
2.	Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v Continental Casualty Co., 2d DC, 1955, p 1361:	19
C:	Economic Liberty/Consumer Protection/Unconscionability	20
1.	American Home Improvement Inc. v MacIver, NH, 1964, p 589:	20
2.	Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., DC, 1965, p 596:	20
3.	Patterson v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., DC, 1971, p 603:	20
4.	Jones v Star Credit Corp., NY, 1969, p 607:	20
6.	Kugler v Romain, NJ, 1971, p 611:	20

Part I: The Nature of Contract/Enforceable Promises
Which/what kinds of promises are enforceable?
Bargain Theory & Reliance Principle – PELD – Intent to be Bound – Gratuitous Non-Commercial Promises – Moral Consideration – Seals – Charitable Subscription/Policy Considerations

A:	The Bargain Theory & The Reliance Principle

1.	Siegel v Spear & Co., NY, 1923, p 285:

	Siegel gives his furniture to Spear & Co. for storage and insurance and it burns up.  
	Court finds:
(1)	 possessory transfer
(2)	 partial undertaking
(3)	 reliance
and concludes that the promise is enforceable under the Consideration Doctrine.  The induced action or forebearance (actually, in this case possibly both) is the consideration for the promise. But the real question is whether there was any distinction with a difference or whether the court just refrained from overturning Thorne v. Deas, a case from that very court a number of years back by a respected judge.  However, two distinctions:  1) in Siegel, no transfer took place and no bailment was entered upon until after the promise was made, v. Thorne, where parties are already co-owners to the vessel when the promise is made;  2)  Spear’s accepting of Siegel’s furniture is some activity relate to the promise, v. Thorne, where Deas does nothing to indicate that he will actually perform. 

	P probably has a good PE argument, but unfortunately PE is not accepted in this jurisdiction at this time.  Some question as to Siegel’s actual reliance:  is it shown? Even if he wasn’t going to get insurance himself initially?

2.	Lusk-Harbison-Jones Inc. v Universal Credit Co., MS, 1933, p 289:

Court finds for LHJ on a secondary issue – UCC’s promise to insure the repossessed and destroyed cars – through Promissory Estoppel:
(1)	Promise by UCC to continue to insure cars;
(2)	Reasonably relied upon – both parties had an insurable interest in the property, and LHJ couldn’t double-insure
(3)	Actually relied upon – yes, LHJ didn’t purchase insurance, which would have been in its interest (problem: would anyone have insured the cars in that market?)
(4)	Injustice – Seems so, LHJ has to continue to pay for cars destroyed through no fault of its own; the promise can only be enforced by casting the loss on the promisor, UCC.
(5)	Remedy – Purchase price of cars? Balance on cars? Insurable value of cars?

Court dislikes the fact that UCC wants its promise not to be held against them in collecting relief from the party that they harmed by breaking the promise.  Smells like fraud…but PP precludes court from finding fraud.

3.	Fisher v.  Jackson, CN, 1955, p 291:
Promise to give “permanent” employ to a reporter was construed to be not “lifetime,” but an indefinite period terminable at will by either party.  Fisher’s giving up of his previous job was not considered consideration, but merely a condition to acceptance – it may have been a detriment to promisee, but it was not bargained for by promisor. Special consideration is needed in order to make permanent employ mean lifetime unless otherwise agreed upon by both parties.  

Why?
(1)	The court is doing its best here to take this away from the jury and avoid jury nullification (ruling on the basis of sympathy, not facts).
(2)	Public policy considerations – should be difficult to enter into lifetime contracts.

4.	Underwood Typewriter Co. v Century Realty Co., MO, 1909, p 294:

Promise (via provision in lease) by D to permit P to sublease to an acceptable 3rd party (at a profit) is held unenforceable.  Court gets question of consideration/sought after mixed up with the idea of a unilateral contract, and holds this promise unenforceable for lack of mutual detriment.  But what matters to bargain theory is mutual benefit, not mutual liability.  Promise is not enforceable under § 71 because the return act (finding the subtenant) is never sought after by the promisor (is neither requested nor does it benefit), but rather by the promisee.

****§90 is not a way of proving consideration, rather an alternate way of rendering promises enforceable, but the Underwood Typewriter court counts reliance as a way of satisfying the Consideration Doctrine rather than as an alternative to it.  MO law conflicts with Restatement.

B:	Pre-Existing Legal Duty Rule (PELD)

1.	Stilk v. Myrick, Eng, 1809, p 651:
	Contract between captain and sailors for extra compensation after two crewmen desert held to be unenforceable per PELD.  Sailors’ pre-existing contract bound them to perform under emergency conditions.
	
	Other ways to make the new promise enforceable?
(1)	As a formality, supply a new minimal consideration (sailors agree to learn to whistle Dixie in exchange for new pay).  Whether this works depends on the court’s attitude towards nominal (peppercorn theory) consideration.  Some courts say it is too trivial; some courts hold that an exchange is an exchange.
(2)	If possible, pay them in advance.
		
PELD is a quirk in contract law – it facilitates a trick promise.  Usually, contract law provides ways to make promises binding, but here it provides a loophole. 

2.	Feinberg v. Pfeiffer & Co., MO, 1959, p 308:
D’s promise to P to give her either 1) a pension and a pay raise if she continues to work, or 2) a pension if she retires is held to be enforceable under § 90.  D argues lack of consideration – that this was a gift promise – but court uses PE as a form of consideration.  (Instead of a “so what” answer to lack of consideration, a “yes there is” answer.)  

Alternatively, could have satisfied § 71 by finding that P’s forebearance from working elsewhere was consideration.  Pension wasn’t to be given no matter what P did – given it if she retired or continued with D, but not if she went to work elsewhere.  It is reasonable to assume that D would want to prevent this from happening.

Feinberg had no PELD to work; hers was a permanent employ terminable at will by either party.  Continued employment is the consideration for pension and increase in wages.

C:	Intent to be Bound

1.	Balfour v. Balfour, Eng, 1919, p 116:
Court holds that even where a promise (to support) is supported by consideration (forbearance from divorce), if it is made within the context of the marriage, it will not be legally enforceable.  There is a presumption that husbands and wives do not intend that their promises should be attended by legal consequences (v. business settings, where the presumption is that the parties do intend to be bound unless otherwise explicitly stated).

The court is worried about “opening the floodgates” and “excess consumption of judicial resources”…but is this really plausible?

D:	Gratuitous Non-Commercial Promises

Williston on Contracts §112:
The walk to the store to get a free coat is not consideration because it is not sought after; rather, the walk is a condition that the promisee must undergo in order to get the thing promised.  Hence, the promise is not enforceable.

1.	Kirksey v Kirksey, AL, 1845, p 473:
Promise by brother-in-law to widow that if she moves (a long distance) to his land, she can stay for free is held to be an unenforceable gratuitous promise.  Since the only way that you can live on someone’s land is to travel there, the trip was not consideration, but merely a condition. 
But the mere fact that a return act could be a condition to the gift does not necessarily mean that it is, and is not consideration.

2.	Devecmon v Shaw, MD, 1888, p 480:
D’s promise to pay for a trip he suggests P (his nephew) take to Europe is held enforceable (not clear under what theory, sounds PE-ish).  P wins on theory of detriment to promisee (reliance-like), but colorable argument could be made for § 71, if D’s statement “If you go to Europe, I will reimburse you” is a request (meaning “sought after”) or merely a  condition to a gift.  

3.	Hamer v Sidway, NY, 1891, p 483:
D’s promise to P, his nephew, to pay him $5000 if he forbears from a multitude of sins until he is 21 is held to be enforceable.  P’s forebearance is ample consideration; it is not necessary that P suffer a detriment, rather enough that P forebore from legal activities.  Neither (material) benefit to promisor nor (material) detriment to promisee is a necessary feature of a bargain…as long as something is sought after, it is necessarily a benefit.  Seems to work under both § 71 and § 90.

Case is tricky: not maintainable under contract law because statute of limitations has run out, but it is maintainable as a trust (but since the enforceability of the trust rests on the enforceability of the promise the court still has to so find).  No explicit creation of trust, but court reasons this way:  If the promise is enforceable/founded on valuable consideration, the uncle became indebted to the nephew once promise “vested,” and a trustee relationship can be implied from the uncle’s obligation to pay off this debt. 

4.	Ricketts v Scothorn, NB, 1898, p 491:
D’s promise to P (his granddaughter) to give her $2000 so that she wouldn’t have to work is narrowly held enforceable under the doctrine of equitable estoppel:  where your statement induces someone to rely on it to her detriment, you are estopped from denying that statement.

Note about women suing men for breach of contract:  trend has been for women to win only if the man dies without having revoked the promise.

5.	DeCicco v Schweizer, NY, 1917, p 494:
D’s promise to pay an annuity to his prospective son-in-law the Count (already engaged to his daughter, Blanche) is held enforceable under the Holmesian Bargain Theory.  D claims want of consideration, that the Count was already obligated (PELD) to marry Blanche, so that couldn’t be his consideration. 
Cardozo fashions a crafty decision:  D promised not only to the Count, but also to Blanche.  The Count and Blanche have a legal right to mutually decide not to get married (no PELD to refrain from rescinding), and it is this new duty that constitutes consideration for D’s promise.  Cardozo infers their reliance on D’s promise thusly:  1) Promise supplied an incentive (not to dissolve engagement); 2) C & B did not do the thing the incentive was designed to prevent; 3) can therefore infer the reliance element of Holmesian Bargain Theory.  
(Dissenting opinion by Crane thinks this is all just a waste of time:  this is a marriage settlement, binding explicitly under § 90 (2), but where’s the fun in that?.)
Cardozo was imaginative but not irresponsible.  Sometimes judges cannot just apply a rigid rule to a particular case.
What the law is has to be argued, not assumed; if we are going to allow legitimacy of precedent, we must argue the present case.

E:	Moral Consideration

Restatement Second 86, PROMISE FOR BENEFIT RECEIVED (Moral Consideration):
(1)	A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.  
(2)	A promise is not binding under Subsection (1)
(a)	if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the promisor has not been unjustly enriched; or 
(b)	to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit.

****The section dispenses with the term “moral obligation,” which has been criticized for diverting judicial attention from the enrichment factor in many moral obligation cases and instead links the promise to compensate for a benefit received to the idea of unjust enrichment.  

1.	Gillingham v Brown, MA, 1901, p 512:
Court finds that a promise to repay a debt is enforceable despite the statute of limitations having expired; partial payment is recognized as an acknowledgement of the legal obligation in the background, which renews the obligation (although the terms may now differ depending on how the debt was acknowledged).  A promise for a debt had expired due to the statute of limitations, and a new promise was made that the old debt would be paid in installments.  The promise is enforceable, but only under the new terms.

2.	Mills v Wyman, MA, 1825, p 523:
D’s promise to P for payment for having taken care of D’s son while ill is not enforceable.  The consideration is past; the promise occurs after the act, and D is free to revoke because the material benefit was to son, not father.  Material benefit to a 3rd party will not render a gratuitous promise enforceable.

3.	Webb v McGowin, AL, 1935, p 539:
D’s promise to pay an annuity to P, who saved his life, continues to be enforceable against D’s estate.  P’s having risked his life for that of D is sufficient consideration…it is assumed that having one’s life saved is “sought after,” it is certainly a material benefit. P suffered from this act; court finds that not to enforce the promise would be manifestly unfair.

F:	Seals

“We will enforce promises only when they possess certain formal characteristics (are in writing, with a seal of a certain type, a certain number of witnesses).”

Cohen: Consideration is a formalism like a ceremony or the practice of wax seals.  Formalisms help you know when a promise is enforceable—since the two parties went through this ritual, then it was their intention to make the promise enforceable by invoking the coercive powers of the state.

Fuller:  It is possible to view consideration as a type of evidence of the seriousness of the promise and of the thoughtfulness of it.  Consideration can have both formal and substantive aspects – a gratuitous promise may be rendered enforceable by following certain formal guidelines.  You don’t go around stamping wax unless you are prepared to assume legal responsibility.

Peppercorn Theory of Minimal Consideration
	Consideration can be employed in a purely formal manner – equivalent to producing a “sealed document” without the seal by substituting one formal element for another.  So, if you choose to sell your house for a peppercorn, it implies some thoughtfulness…you might rashly give your house away, but not likely to rashly enter into such a contrived transaction.

1.	Warren v Lynch, NY, 1810, p 725:
Court holds that a document is not enforceable because its seal is not in wax.  Variations destroy the neatness of the formalism solution…but this is why formalisms work best in homogeneous societies, because there must be a certain social understanding.

2.	Krell v Codman, MA, 1891, p 728:
A covenant enforceable in England will also be in MA because it is formally written and sealed.  The formal style of the covenant suggests its validity.  
“…consideration is as much a form as a seal.”  Holmes holds sealed promises enforceable by analogy to the consideration doctrine; wants to preserve the formal traditions of consideration in order to make sure that there is a way of invoking the coercive powers of the state when needed rather than rely on good faith. PE, on the other hand, would tear bargain theory up by the roots by eliminating its formalistic uniqueness.

3.	Pillans and Rose v Van Mierop and Hopkins, Eng, 1765, p 744:
A contract among merchants and banks is enforceable as long as it is written. Because of the seriousness of the merchant business, a written promise is not to be treated as a gift from one merchant to another, but an enforceable one.  (This cuts off sales law from regular contract law.)

G: Charitable Subscription/Policy Considerations

1.	Allegheny College v National Chautauqua Co. Bank, NY, 1927, p 501:
Deceased beneficiary Mary Yates Johnson’s promise to donate $5000 after her death is held to be enforceable under the Holmesian Bargain Theory.  J had pledged via letter, and stipulated on the back that the gift was conditional on its use and on being known as the “MYJ fund.”  J gives P $1000 and then shortly thereafter repudiates the promise.  P sues 30 days after her death for enforcement.
 P loses under §71 and under §90, but Cardozo applies Holmes’ even  more restrictive version of the bargain theory and finds for P. How?  Cardozo implies a return promise by P, from its acceptance of a first $1000, to name fund after J, and implies that such promise was sought after by J and was therefore sufficient consideration for the promise.  This satisfies the Holmesian requisite element of mutuality:  the promise to donate and the promise to commemorate were mutually induced by one another.  Cardozo doesn’t use a theory of reliance, but brings § 90 into the picture anyway so as to point to policy reasons as to when it is reasonable to imply or infer certain facts:  1) § 90 creates an exception for charitable contributions, so he doesn’t want to leave it out of the analysis; 2) sometimes the substance of law, legal integrity, is more important than the symmetry of legal relationships.

Issues:
(1)	Those who remain rigid to the law will not see when we need to bring in the rough edges to a legal discussion that implicate an inclusion of policy considerations in legal decision.
(2)	§90 was in the background of Siegel v. Spear and DeCicco v. Schweizer and can be used to see what is going on in those two cases.  They are signposts in the road to the creation of §90 as a legal theory.
(3)	Should we have only the Bargain Theory in place or should we be less rigid and allow §90 or another way around §71?

Summary:  Allegheny College Combines Form and Substance:
Retains forms and elements of bargain theory and converts this restrictive Holmesian theory into newer and more generous to promisee approach: analysis follows legal formulations of bargain theory (esp. Holmes), but uses substantive relationships/ uncontested fact to imply certain pertinent facts, e.g., “sought after” or “reliance.”  
A favorable disposition to the enforcement of promises.  But it is not enough simply to find all the elements of PE:  must frame them within Holmesian Bargain Theory, e.g., Thorne v. Deas:  under some circumstances, it is justifiable to imply that something is sought after.
Result: If you have a Good case under PE you should be able to find some aspect that would allow court to satisfy elements of consideration.  ex. Kirksey v. Kirksey: Infer move was sought after and made only because of the promise.
Difference from PE: Cardozo demands that Judges be faithful to past without abandoning their pursuit of the ethical norms that justify the doctrine of PE. 
Allegheny College Decision establishes legitimacy of PE.
•	PE is an appropriate supplement to bargain theory. We cannot insist on actual compliance to enforce a bargain; detracts from formalistic elements.
•	However, in NY, PE never unambiguously adopted.
•	Even so, no reported decision in NY has ever rejected PE.

2.	Dworkin
Positivism: The command of the sovereign.  Judges do two things:
1. Mechanical: Apply a rule where there is one.
2. Political: 	Where there is no rule, pick one that is consistent with earlier rules-fill in the gaps.
During hard cases, the court spends more time looking at the past in scrutiny in order to help pick a good rule than they do when it is an easy case.  Past seems to matter more in a hard case.

Interpretation:
1.	 Fit the facts/details: make sure all relevant facts fit together to support the conclusion and to support each other.  Ex: all the cases on consideration before Allegheny.
2. 	Justification: Decide what interpretation that is consistent with the facts would be the best interpretation that would make the decision the best ‘work of art’ possible.  Ex: Put details together in a way that is best orchestrated to fit the purpose of law, like facilitating the making of credible promises and gaining relief from broken promises.

In hard cases, judges will look carefully at the past like theater critics look carefully at the details of a hard movie.
1. Be faithful to the past.
2. Be faithful to justice — what the law upholds.

Need theories of mistakes in order to clean up messes made by bad interpretation.  Cardozo does what Dworkin later advocates by showing that you can be faithful to the past and to justice as well.

Law is like a picture with blurred parts.  Lawyer should be able to interpret blurred parts and contest past decisions that badly interpret the blurred parts.
Part II. The Formation of Contracts
When/at what point was there a promise of an enforceable kind?
Need for a Promise – Implied Contracts – Indefinite Contracts - Offer & Acceptance – Firm Officers – Unilateral Contracts

A.	Need for a Promise

1.	Hurley v Eddingfield, IN, 1901, p 56:
Court holds that D doctor had no duty to enter into a contract to care for a patient, even where he was the family doctor.  Larger issue is the principle that no one can be forced to agree to a contract (a manifestation of American individualist philosophy).  
Why not?
(1)	Doctors have no moral obligation to treat anyone they don’t wish to, for any reason (less so today with antidiscrimination laws).
(2)	Malpractice issues
(3)	Could deter people from becoming doctors, which is bad for society
(4)	It would be a substantial infringement of personal liberty
			Problems?
(1)	Did D have a moral obligation or even a contractual obligation stemming from his relationship to P (as “family doctor”)?  In exchange for paying for an initial consultation, is there an implied promise whereby the patient has the option to purchase services in the future?

2.	Davis v General Foods Corp., NY, 1937, p 121:
D’s letter to P stipulating the terms of use of and compensation for P’s recipe is held to be too vague and indefinite to constitute a promise (at D’s “total discretion”).  Putting trust in D was P’s mistake. Letter could be interpreted as “we will pay if we decide we will pay,” or “we will pay  (at the market rate?) if we decide to use.”

3.	Mabley & Carew Co. v Borden, OH, 1935, p 124:
D’s letter to Anna Work, indicating that in return for AW’s good work and continued employ, D would supply her with a pension to be paid on her death to any chosen beneficiary (P), was held to be enforceable, despite the letter’s stipulation that the terms might be withdrawn and discontinued at any time.  The issue of consideration is not complicated – continued employment.  Court finds a binding contract not between D and AW, but between D and P – the promise was revocable only during AW’s life; upon her death the benefits vest.  “Withdrawn and discontinued” are things you can do to policies, not to benefits, court concludes.
	Differs from Davis in that it contained the specific terms of the promise.

B:	Implied Contracts

1.	Young & Ashburnham’s Case, Eng, 1587, p 146:
Court holds that the P innkeeper cannot collect room rate from the D Gentleman of Quality without an agreement to pay including set rates.  The court can’t determine the amount of remedy, so the court can’t hold for P. 
Quantum meruit – later doctrine which said that there should be recovery for services performed for another on the basis of a contract implied in law –  an implied promise to pay performer for what the services were reasonably worth, which arises not from the consent of the parties but from the law of natural justice and equity and is based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
Today, the UCC allows for a remedy even if no price is set…price is estimated from current market rates.

2.	Hertzog v Hertzog, PA, 1857, p 147:
A contract to hire cannot be implied from a son’s working for 24 years past majority age for his father without agreement as to wages.  We imply contracts from circumstances evidencing an intent to be bound; and there is no room for intent to be bound in the entirely natural circumstance of a son working for the benefit of his father, without compensation, absent an express contract to that purpose.
This is not a decision based on the court’s empirical evidence, but rather on its policy position of how sons should act towards their fathers.  Also probably a means to take question from jury.

3.	Barnet’s Estate, PA, 1936, p 152:
Widow’s claim for salary payments from deceased husband is denied on similar grounds as in Hertzog.  Reasoning is that spouses usually do work for each other without compensation except for increase in mutual property and well-being.  Contract must be explicit for spouses in order to enforce.  Wife managed husband’s concession stand but her economic motive could have been not to receive compensation but rather to further the general well-being of whole family, i.e. husband’s property.  
However, the business relationship between husband and wife here could alternatively have been a distinguishing factor.  

4.	Cropsey v Sweeney, NY, 1958, p 153:
Similar to above two cases except that the marriage was not legal.  ‘Wife’ sues for compensation from estate for value of services rendered to ‘husband’, but court decides that she can’t recover because the motivation for her to do work should not have been wealth, but something “higher and holier.”

5.	Shaw v Shaw, Eng, 1954, p 154:
Widow is able to recover for death benefits after discovering that her marriage was illegal (husband was still married).  Court reasons on a theory of breach of implied warranty of marriageability, which D reinforced daily by remaining in cohabitation with P.  Having relied on false promise to her detriment, P is granted a remedy (what she would have received were she in fact his legal wife).

6.	Hewitt v Hewitt, IL, 1978, p 155:
Wife who cohabits for 14 years in what she believes to be a legal common-law marriage is granted compensation on the theory of express contract.  Reversed by IL Supreme Court on the grounds that parties could have gone through a formal ceremony if they wanted to, that providing compensation for services is tantamount to prostitution, and that it is undesirable on public policy grounds to recognize this marriage contract. 
However, Supreme Court overlooks fact that the  woman was deceived in this case, that implementing that particular public policy rewards the wrongdoer and creates an incentive effect contrary to the State’s best interests.

C:	Indefinite Contracts/Offer & Acceptance—Offers

1.	Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus, MN, 1957, p 183:
In response to two advertisements, one offering for sale fur coats “worth to $100” for $1, one offering a fur stole “wroth $139.50” for $1, both first come first serve, P’s showing up constituted an acceptance which ripened the advertisement/offer to sell in the second, but not the first case, into a binding promise.  Court concludes that the first advertisement was so indefinite (as to the value of what was being offered) as to constitute merely an invitation to make an offer, but the second was definite enough to be an offer, and that P can recover.  Court rejects D’s argument that a house rule stipulates that the customer be a woman; it’s not in the ad. While an advertiser has the right to revoke or modify offer at any time before acceptance, s/he does not have the right after acceptance either to revoke or to impose new or arbitrary conditions not contained in the original offer.

Where an advertisement is clear, definite and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it constitutes an offer, and with acceptance a contract is created

Policy considerations can also be taken into account in determining whether the advertisement was a reasonable offer, with intent to be bound – store had every reason to want people to come in and hopefully buy other things.

2.	Jenkins Towel Service Inc. v Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., PA, 1960, p 186:
P’s submittal of a sealed bid for D’s property constituted an acceptance to an offer, and therefore produced a contract for sale.  D stipulated that it would sell to the highest acceptable bidder, but reserved the right to approve or disapprove of any or all offers, or to withdraw property from market.  D chooses over P’s bid one by Esso which actually varied the terms of the offer. D argues that a) its letter was an invitation to offer, not an offer itself; b) even if its letter was an offer, it had the right to choose.  Court holds that a) D’s letter was ambiguous, must therefore be interpreted against the draftor and in favor of the acceptor, so it was too an offer, and b) D’s offer was accepted only by P because Esso’s bid was a counteroffer and therefore a rejection (Mirror Image Rule), so P was the only party with which D could have formed a contract (and of which it is now in breach).   D’s diclaimer is not invalid per se; it just only applies to the bids that don’t meet its terms (which the dissent thinks is a silly point; you don’t need a disclaimer against counteroffers/rejections).

3.	Fairmount Glass Works v Crunden-Martin Woodenware Co., KY, 1899, p 193:
	Where D invited an offer from P for 10 carloads of jars, P replied with a quote “for immediate acceptance and shipment,” and D agreed to the terms, a contract was formed from P’s quote/offer and D’s agreement/acceptance.  Normally, a quote is not an offer, but the text of the message contained terms in sufficient definiteness (a “carload” being an industry standard), plus the language “for immediate acceptance,” which the court concludes is sufficiently strong evidence of an intent to be bound.  D’s letter was an offer subject to the terms and conditions set forth; the offer was duly and unconditionally accepted by P, who is entitled to specific performance. 
	Alternatively, the court could have found that “for immediate acceptance” was a merely descriptive phrase: “these are our prices right now.”
	D’s argument that its inclusion in its last message of “strictly first-quality goods” transforms it into a counteroffer doesn’t pass muster with the court, which holds that this is not an addition of a new term, but rather the spelling out of a term implicit in the communications.

4.	Channel Master Corp. v Aluminum Ltd. Sales, NY, 1958, p 196:
D’s representation to P that it was capable of entering into a long-term supply K with P, when in fact D had already committed its supplies to other customers, constitutes a colorable action in fraud.  
Despite the fact that P relies on D’s misrepresentations to its detriment, this is not an action in contract because the agreement falls under the Statute of Frauds (the Year provision) but is not in writing, oops.  
Llewellyn hates this decision because he wants people to protect themselves by closing contracts and not just remaining in a quasi-negotiations stage, counting on reliance as a possible remedy should things go awry.  If you want a legal claim, bind yourself by accepting the offer.

D:	Indefinite Contracts/Offer & Acceptance—Acceptances

1.	Prescott v Jones, NH, 1898, p 238:
	Where D insurance company stipulated that silence by P policyholder would constitute a request to renew, which P relied upon to his detriment (D did not in fact renew and P’s property was destroyed by fire), no recovery, because such silence could not constitute acceptance of the offer and produce consideration for a binding contract.  A party cannot, by the wording of his offer, transform the absence of communication into an acceptance; you cannot insist that an offeree must take positive action to avoid being bound.  P’s silence was neither acceptance nor rejection; it was a nullity in the exchange.
	Had P paid a premium, or expressed his intention to pay in some way, even without expressly accepting the offer to renew, the payment/expression would probably have constituted sufficient consideration.
	D may have a moral duty to fulfill P’s expectations, but not a legal one.  You can’t apply an estoppel doctrine in the absence of any agreement.

Exceptions to the “universal doctrine” that silence  acceptance follow.

2.	National Union Fire Insurance Co. v Joseph Ehrlich, NY, 1924, p 241:

	D policyholder who received and retained renewal policy and bill for 2 months before rejecting renewal is liable for premium accrued prior to rejection.  The prior relationship between P and D made it reasonable to assume that D’s silence constituted acceptance of the renewal policy, since the insurance company had stipulated that it would provide coverage in the period before the first premium was paid.  Court reasons that this decision is in D’s best interests’ had a fire occurred in the interim, P would not have been allowed to argue that D had not accepted the policy. 

3.	Austin v Burge, MO, 1911, p 242:
D’s father-in-law’s receipt and use of the unrequested renewal of a newspaper subscription from P constituted an implied contract to pay for the renewal, for which D is liable.  The contract is implied from the conduct; D had no right to assume that the paper was a gratuity, since that is not how things work.  
	D did try twice to cancel subscription, but he continued to take it home from the post office, impliedly agreeing to pay for its value.

4.	Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co. v Holloway, TN, 1919, p 244:
	D’s unreasonable delay(two months) in declining an order/offer to buy from P constituted an acceptance of the offer and produced a binding contract.  It is the duty of a wholesale merchant like P to inform its customers within a reasonable time that orders are not accepted, especially here, where an agent of D visited P several times in the interim, during which the price of the goods increased substantially, without mentioning the order. Otherwise, a merchant could place goods upon the market, solicit orders, and hold the offeror to the contract while waiting to see if acceptance would be profitable.  Acceptance may be either express or implied from the circumstances.

5.	Langellier v Schaeffer, MN, 1887, p 247:
	P’s purported acceptance of an offer to sell a deed by D contained too many suggested new terms/qualifications and actually constituted a counteroffer/rejection.  P sent D an invitation for an offer; D replied with an offer to sell; P accepted the price but introduced 1) an offer to pay in installments (if okay with D, otherwise forget it), and 2) a request that the deed be sent to a specific bank (again, if possible, etc.).  Court invokes the general contractual rule that absent specification of place of delivery, acceptor of offer is bound to tender money directly to offeror at his residence; P doesn’t state an intention to do so, so it is not an acceptance.
	This is a very harsh rule…P never states that he will not travel to D’s residence, if desired, nor does it seem reasonable that D necessarily will insist on receiving the money at his house.
	The point is not that P had to repeat the exact terms of the offer, nor that all suggestions result in counteroffers.  Had P just replied, “I accept,” there would have been a contract.  But the court holds that P went beyond mere suggestion – “send it” is a new term, and the addition of “please” doesn’t change that.

6.	Butler v Foley, MI, 1920, p 250:
	That a word (“subject”) was left out of a telegram from D offeror to P offeree, accepted by P, does not mean that D can void the contract.  The offeror takes the risk as to the effectiveness of communication in an acceptance made in the manner expressly or impliedly requested.  
	P originally sends by telegram an offer to buy 50 shares of stock at $152; D replies by telegram with a counteroffer for 44 shares at that price, wiping the original offer off the table.  D is now the offeror, master of the offer, and telegram is now the means stipulated by him. 
	Note that court holds that “please ship today” in P’s reply does not constitute a counteroffer for the exact same reason that the suggestions in Langellier did: because nothing had yet been stated about delivery details.  Court just goes a different way on that one.  Could also have been possible to construe as two separate deals:  one to buy the shares, one to determine method of payment.

7.	U.S. v Braunstein, SDNY, 1947, p 253:
	Where P’s response to D’s offer to purchase raisins unfit for human consumption contained a clerical error that made it obviously dubious and much too good to be true (P purports to accept an offer to buy at $.10 per box, instead of the $.10 per pound D actually offered), it could not constitute an acceptance that produced a legally binding contract to sell at that price.  Even though P eventually sent a new telegram correcting its error, its original “acceptance” so confused matters that the deal was off the table, and the new telegram constituted an offer which D could choose to accept or deny (or not respond to at all).  There being no K on which to sue, the complaint was dismissed. 
	 To create a contact, an acceptance must be unequivocal, positive and unambiguous and must comply exactly with the requirements of the offer.  § 71 precludes accepting “an offer which is on its face too good” as to be unreasonable. A court may be willing to overlook clerical errors in already established Ks, but it will not interpret the parties into a contractual status.

E:	Indefinite Contracts/Offer & Acceptance—Firm Offers

1.	Dickinson v Dodds, 1876, p 316:
	Where D extended a firm offer to sell to P, which P accepted only after learning that D had sold to someone else, P’s acceptance did not ripen D’s offer into a K, since D had exercised his right to revoke prior to acceptance.  D did promise not to revoke the offer before a certain date (hence firm), but since that promise was without consideration, it is not legally enforceable.
	Ruling has been eroded by PE/reliance-based recovery, and by UCC, which states that a firm offer in writing is enforceable even without consideration (except in real estate), so as to facilitate transactions where a party wishes to be bound to a firm offer. 
	Another problem arises because P communicated his acceptance in a way for which there is no evidence that it was acceptable to D.  An acceptance legally constitutes dispatch only if made in a way acceptable to the offeror.  Theoretically, had P communicated his acceptance effectively simultaneously with D’s communicating his revocation, P would prevail per the Mailbox Rule (acceptance effective upon dispatch; revocation by receipt). But here P learned about the revocation prior to his acceptance, so no dice.
			 
2.	James Baird Co. v Gimble Brothers, 2d DC, 1933, p 323:
	Where contractor P used an erroneous bid by subcontractor D to compile its own successful bid, where D revoked the offer to P before P submitted its own bid, P does not have a remedy in PE  – it is not reasonable to rely on an offer never actually accepted.  Court holds that D accepted neither the original erroneous offer (and perhaps could not have per § 71) nor the second offer. This rule applies despite the fact that D stipulated that if P was successful, its bid was “absolutely guaranteed, and we are offering these prices for reasonable, prompt acceptance after the general contract has been awarded,” especially since D realized and revoked the offer that same day, before P’s bid was accepted.
	PE does not apply except where there is a completed promise (offer + acceptance).

3.	Drennan v Star Paving, CA, 1958, p 326:
	Where contractor P relies on an erroneous bid by subcontractor D to compile its own successful bid, where D did not revoke the offer until after P submitted its own bid, P has a remedy in PE; court implies a promise by D to keep bid open, absent a revocability clause.  P’s reliance rendered D’s offer irrevocable (and also bound P to the deal).  D had every reason to expect that if its bid proved the lowest (without being so low as to negate its reasonableness as an offer), that it would be used by P – D induced action on P’s part.  There was no unreasonable delay between D’s offer and P’s acceptance that might void the contract.
	On the other hand, P had all the bids in hand, and probably realized that something was strange about D’s much lower bid. So really fault does not fall entirely on D.
	Reconciling this decision with that in James Baird Co. involves: 1) assuming a difference of opinion between L. Hand (Baird judge) and this judge; and 2) this court’s policy decree that “the loss resulting from the mistake should fall on the party who caused it” (i.e., where one party’s mistake results in the other party’s detriment, the offer will not be revocable.
	What are the possible effects of this ruling (that subcontractors are liable for their mistakes):
(1)	Prices will increase to compensate for extra costs;
(2)	Subcontractors will expressly word offers so as not to be bound to mistakes;
	Coase theorem:  If transaction costs are low, parties will negotiate so that responsibility goes to the party who can most easily carry the risk, and rights to the party who values them most – whoever can do so at the least expense will take out insurance and incorporate the premium into the overhead.  In other words, as long as the rule is known, the parties will bargain around it to the same result.

F:	Unilateral Contracts

1.	Carhill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., Eng, 1893, p 370:
	D’s reward advertisement offer (sit in a room filled with the noxious fumes of D’s product for 2 weeks and collect £100 if you get the flu) became a legally biding contract upon P’s acceptance of the offer through performance.  The seriousness of D’s promise is evidenced by 1) its deposit of £1000 in the bank; 2) the wording of the advertisement; 3) D’s interest in having people buy its product in order to fulfill performance (this also counts as consideration).  Generally, when an offer is made, no binding contract results unless 1) the offer is accepted, and 2) that acceptance is communicated to the offeror, but the offeror (“master of the offer”) can always waive that requirement.  P also has a remedy in reliance, but there is some question as to how far one must go before entitled to recover (buy the product? breathe in the fumes for 1 week? 2 weeks? actually get the  flu?)

Part III. Interpretation of Contracts/Meaning of Promises
How to discipline examination of words and facts in deriving intent?
Duty to Bargain in Good Faith – Parole Evidence Rule/Prior Contract Discharge Game

A:	The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith

1.	Sun Printing v Remington Paper, NY, 1923, p 216:
	Where P and D agreed to a contract for sale of paper for 16 months, but the term of price was specified for only the first 4 months (thereafter price was to be recalculated but was not to exceed a certain maximum), the contract is too vague to be enforced – it is merely an agreement to agree.  The parties left out both price and the length of time during which a given price was to apply, rendering the agreement unenforceable.
	Actually, the court could probably have devised a reasonable solution (set price at market rate), but the issue is really that it would have been simple for the parties, as experienced businesspeople, to create a binding contract, they didn’t, so court infers an intent not to be bound.  The Court declines to make the contract over for the parties.  

2.	Hoffman v Red Owl Stores, Inc., WI, 1965, p 223:
	Where P relied on the representations of D in incurring expenses and relinquishing a profitable business in the course of negotiations to purchase a franchise  from D as being in good faith, P is entitled to recover via PE for amounts actually lost (not for potential losses).  It was reasonable for P to rely because he assumed good faith on D’s part.  “Good faith” is neither merely not defrauding nor an obligation to accept any fair offer…but it implies that P was not just being used in a grocery store experiment.

3.	Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, NY, 1917, p 451:
	Where P agreed to use his best efforts in promoting D’s fashions in exchange for exclusive rights to her endorsements, an implied contract exists based on an implied promise, and is enforceable.  D’s argument that agreement does not constitute an enforceable contract because P did not offer anything up as consideration is rejected; P impliedly promised to use his best promoting efforts to bring revenues and profits into existence, which is valuable consideration.  Cardozo holds that the law is no longer so formal that every slip from precision is fatal – “a promise may be lacking and yet the whole writing may be intact with obligation imperfectly expressed.”

B:	Parole Evidence Rule—Prior Contracts Discharge Game

1.	Thompson v Libby, MN, 1885, p 827:
	Parole evidence cannot be used to prove the existence of an implied warranty of quality in a contract for the sale of logs by P to D.  
	Breakdown of exception arguments, all rejected by court:
(1)	Completeness:  If the writing doesn’t mention the previous discussions as to the quality of the logs, it must be incomplete.
(2)	Interpretation:  The word “log” is ambiguous – is it “a piece of tree,” or “wood suitable for use as lumber”?  Also, perhaps the price term implies a certain level of quality that the previous communications can help define.
(3)	Collateral Matter:  The agreement as to the quality of the logs is entirely separate from the written agreement of sale. (Thompson court disagrees by invoking rule that in a K for sale of personal property, warranty, if made, is always one of the terms of the K…if they wanted a warranty, they should have spelled it out).

2.	Mitchell v Lath, NY, 1928, p 837:
	An oral agreement on the part of D to remove an ice house adjacent to land he proposed to sell to P is not  enforceable; the contract for sale appears full and complete, and sets forth the obligations of each party, which do not include removal of the ice house. 
(1)	Completeness:  No – writing purports to be full and complete.
(2)	Interpretation:  No – the terms are spelled out in full, as are the obligations of each party. 
(3)	Collateral Matter:  No – written agreement is not collateral in form, oral agreement would contradict provisions of the written agreement, subject of oral agreement is too clearly connected with the principal transaction to be collateral.
***Can also argue reliance: the written agreement was approved in reliance on the earlier oral agreement.

3.	Zell v American Seating, NY, 1943, p 852:
	When parties have previously agreed that their written promises are not to bind them, that agreement controls and no legal obligations flow from the writing.  A purported written agreement, which the parties designed as a mere sham, lacks legal efficacy; extrinsic evidence will be received to prove this.  A very realpolitik opinion; authoring judge thinks that PER is just a silly game, riddled with exceptions. (Reversed on appeal.)

Part IV: Death of Contract
How to further lighten the burden of interpretation?
Statute of Frauds – Third Party Beneficiaries – Economic Liberty/Consumer Protection

A:	Statute Of Frauds

1.	Bader v Hiscox, IA, 1919, p 770:
	A promise whereby P who agreed to marry son of D while with son’s child and drop charges of seduction in exchange for 40 acres of land from D is enforceable; the cause of action does not fall under the SoF.  Court holds that the consideration for the agreement was the dropping of charges; marriage was merely a condition whereby the dropping of charges could be effected.
	The fact that P has fulfilled her part of the bargain means that D must be held to his part (part performance).

2.	Doyle v Dixon, MA, 1867, p 773:

	An oral agreement by D not to go into the grocery business for 5 years is unenforceable; such agreement cannot be completely performed within one year, so it must be in writing.  Here death would prevent full performance of the agreement, not fulfill it (as it would had agreement been “for life.”)

3.	Imperator Realty Co., Inc. Tull, NY, 1920, p 801:

	An oral agreement between seller P and buyer D subsequent to a K for sale of land stipulating that seller could either 1) remedy zoning violations or 2) post a bond in order to complete the sale is enforceable – sale must go through.  Oral modifications to written agreements are okay.  Even though a colorable argument can be made that the oral agreement still fell under the SoF, reliance on a modification to a K excuses the party seeking compliance from the SoF.
	Cardozo’s concurrence adds the idea that K law forbids one party from maneuvering the other into breach by insisting on the literal interpretation of a technicality.

B:	Third Party Beneficiaries

1.	Lawrence v Fox, NY, 1859, p 85:
Intended 3PB has right to sue a party to a K in breach of the K.  Foundation case for 3PB rights.

2.	Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v Continental Casualty Co., 2d DC, 1955, p 1361:
Materialman P, as an intended 3PB to a K between D surety co. and subcontractor, can sue to enforce agreement.  Structure of agreements are complex, and purport to benefit other 3Ps, but since the system is set up so that P gets paid, P is really the intended 3PB.
System is set up so that, given a contractor (C) and a subcontractor (SC), each who have paid bonds to surety companies, if SC defaults on its debts to its materialmen, its surety company can:
(1)	pay an enormous amount of money to the C; or alternatively
(2)	pay the debt to the materialmen for SC.
Since clearly the surety company is always going to choose the latter, P must be the intended 3PB of the K.  P has accepted the K by suing and by acting in material reliance.

C:	Economic Liberty/Consumer Protection/Unconscionability

1.	American Home Improvement Inc. v MacIver, NH, 1964, p 589:
	A sales K that did not disclose the amount of finance charges and the rate of interest on the money borrowed nullifies the contract.  Decision hints at excessive price as a basis for unconscionability, but doesn’t quite go there.

2.	Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., DC, 1965, p 596:
D’s add-on clause to Ks of sale to P whereby debt repayments are applied pro rata (payment is applied in proportion to amount owing on each item, so that all items are paid off simultaneously, and upon default, everything can be repossessed) is unconscionable.  Judge Skelly Wright fashions a two-part test for unconscionability:  a) absence of meaningful choice, and b) terms unreasonably favorable to the other party.  In other words, the problem is inequality of bargaining power for various reasons, some highly paternalistic.  Unconscionability is a way to reform or rescind oppressive Ks.

3.	Patterson v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., DC, 1971, p 603:
		An accusation by P of excessive price on the part of D does not constitute a prima facie cause for unconscionability; and absent establishment of a prima facie case, P is not permitted to conduct discovery into D’s profit margin.  Sort of a Catch-22 opinion.  

4.	Jones v Star Credit Corp., NY, 1969, p 607:
Sale by D to P of a refrigerator worth $300 for $900 ($1,439.69 including charges/tax/insurance) is unconscionable purely on basis of excessive price.  If buyer’s limited financial resources were known to seller at the time of sale, that information is also relevant to unconscionability.

6.	Kugler v Romain, NJ, 1971, p 611:
		Court permits P Attorney General to read unconscionability into a statute that doesn’t specifically use that word in order to permit P to sue on behalf of a number of  parties without going through the laborious and expensive process of proving fraud for each.