The Electoral Effect of Stop-and-Frisk*

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Abstract

Scholars have recently demonstrated that negative experiences with law enforcement can have a depressing effect on political participation. Here, we explore the impact of living in a neighborhood targeted by police for stop-and-frisk. To do so, we combine individual electoral participation in the 2009 and 2013 mayoral, 2010 and 2014 midterm, and the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections with records of stop-and-frisk activity in New York City. The results show that overall, stop-and-frisk reduced turnout among registered voters in midterm and mayoral elections. However, the effect of stop-and-frisk depends on individual-level characteristics of citizens living in areas of elevated police activity. Black, male, and older citizens were the most strongly demobilized by stop-and-frisk. Our results suggest that crime prevention strategies may have negative consequences for civic engagement and may exacerbate inequality in representation.

Introduction

As part of a "broken windows" approach to policing that focuses on lower level crimes in the hopes of preventing more serious crimes (Wilson & Kelling 1982), several large US cities in recent decades have employed the proactive policing program known as "Stop, Question, and Frisk" (SQF). While the case we focus on here, New York City, has been the most prominent example, SQF has also been heavily relied upon by police in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles (Lerman & Weaver 2014*a*). According to New York Police Department (NYPD) policy, "when a police officer reasonably suspects that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a felony or a Penal Law misdemeanor, the officer is authorized ... to stop, question and possibly frisk that individual."[1] The logic underlying SQF is that weapons recovered as a result of these stops are taken off the streets and thus prevented from being used in future crimes. The NYPD has aggressively employed SQF over the last two decades, making over 5 million stops since 2002 (peaking at 685,724 stops in 2011).

There has been a robust debate about the success of SQF in preventing and reducing crime, as well as formal and informal discussions of the effect NYPD's widespread use of SQF on citizen attitudes toward the police. However, there has been no study of the program's effect on political participation.[2] Weaver & Lerman (2010) theorize that police interactions like those experienced under SQF may depress political participation since "citizens who have adversarial interactions with law enforcement become less likely to seek out government of

[1] http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/faq/faq_police.shtml#stop

[2] Lerman & Weaver (2014*b*) analyze the effect of SQF on 311 calls for service.

any kind." However, based on survey data, the authors found no evidence that having been questioned by police in the past was significantly correlated with voter turnout.[3]

There are two features of SQF in New York City that we argue had important consequences for political participation. First, an overwhelming majority of citizens stopped were not found by police to have committed any crime.[4] Of the stops conducted by the NYPD between 2002 and the first quarter of 2017, only approximately 12 percent of them lead to an arrest, summons, or seizure of contraband.[5] This high percentage of cases in which individuals were released by police has lead critics of the program to contend that stops were being conducted without reasonable suspicion (Fagan 2010).

Second, stops in New York City have not been evenly distributed by race. Approximately 50% of stops targeted blacks, 30% targeted Hispanics, and 10% targeted whites.These racial disparities appear even greater when taking into account the proportion of each race group at New York City: black (23%), Hispanic (29%), and white (33%).[6] Further, this disparity cannot be accounted for by crime rates (Gelman, Fagan & Kiss 2007, Goel, Rao & Shroff 2016). As a result, racial differences in the application of SQF have raised claims of racial discrimination (Fagan 2010).

[3]Several recent studies have documented the negative effect of incarceration on political engagement (Haselswerdt 2009, Hjalmarsson & Lopez 2010, Burch 2011, Weaver, Hacker & Wildeman 2014, Lerman & Weaver 2014*b*, Weaver & Lerman 2010, White 2015).

[4]Goel, Rao & Shroff (2016) make the important point that some individuals found to be engaged in criminal activity may not ultimately be arrested or given a summons. Police officers may have chosen not to take formal action.

[5]http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data

[6]These figures are for 2010 and 2014 based on the American Community Survey. Black and white denotes non-Hispanic black and non-Hispanic white population. The SQF figures come from http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data

Frequent stops of innocent and disproportionately black and Hispanic individuals have prompted feelings that the policy of SQF is procedurally unfair, thus eroding police legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens (Tyler & Huo 2002, Tyler & Fagan 2012). Based on a sample of young men in New York City, Tyler, Fagan & Geller (2014) found that the frequency and intrusiveness of police stops respondents reported in their neighborhood was associated with lower ratings of police legitimacy. Qualitative research (Gau & Brunson 2010, Solis, Portillos & Brunson 2009, Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel 2014) also suggests that the racial disparities in the administration of SQF may heighten the negative view of police held by black and Hispanic citizens. This notion is corroborated by a November 2012 Quinnipiac University poll; 70% of black and 64% of Hispanic respondents disapproved of SQF (compared to 39% of white respondents) and 42% of both black and Hispanic respondents disapproved of how the New York City Police Department were doing their job (compared to 19% of white respondents).

We hypothesize that the aggressive targeting of individuals who have not committed a crime generates negative feelings towards the police. These feelings then extend to government more generally, leading to reduced political participation (Soss 1999, Weaver, Hacker & Wildeman 2014, Lerman & Weaver 2014*b*, Weaver & Lerman 2010, Peffley & Hurwitz 2010). We further hypothesize that depressed participation should be strongest among individuals who are members of groups that were disproportionately targeted; black and Hispanic as well as younger and male citizens. Finally, we hypothesize the effect of SQF to be different depending on the type of election. We expect the negative effect of SQF on turnout among

individuals from groups disproportionately targeted to be weaker in mayoral elections since the mayor has direct control over stop-and-frisk policy. Higher turnout stemming from the desire to change the policy may counteract the depressing effect of SQF. Since voters are not considering candidates who have direct control over NYPD policy, we expect the negative effect of SQF to be stronger in midterm and and presidential elections.

In order to test the effect of SQF on political participation, we study voter turnout in the 2009 and 2013 New York City mayoral, the 2010 and 2014 federal midterm, and the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. These elections allow us to take advantage of a change in New York Police Department policy that dramatically reduced the number of stops. In August of 2013, a federal judge ruled that the NYPD's use of SQF violated the constitution due to a lack of reasonable justification for stops as well as indirect racial profiling (*Floyd v. City of New York. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, S.D.N.Y, 2013* N.d.). The ruling required that the NYPD reform rather than end the program; however, the newly elected Mayor of New York City effectively ended the widespread use of SQF in 2014.[7] The number of stops dropped 98% from 581,168 in 2009 to 12,404 in 2016.

While the court decision and mayoral election resulted in the change in the NYPD's policy, we cannot rule out the existence of omitted factors that may have affected both where the NYPD chose to administer SQF and voter turnout in those areas. To account for this

[7]Mummolo (2016) utilizes an NYPD internal memo on March 5, 2013 that instructed officers to provide a narrative description documenting the reasons that motivated each stop. Based on interviews of police officers, the author found that the new policy prompted officers to focus on stopping individuals for which there was strong suspicion of criminal activity. This resulted in an immediate steep drop in the overall number of stops.

possibility we take two steps. First, we include individual fixed effects to control for time-invariant factors that may influence a citizen's exposure to SQF and their decision to vote. Second, we include several control variables in our analysis. These include individual-level factors such as age and partisan affiliation as well as community-level factors such as racial and ethnic composition, socioeconomic status, economic conditions, and crime.

Data and Specifications

To conduct our analysis, we combine individual voting histories obtained from the New York State Board of Election with the data on SQF from New York City Police Department.[8] Using the address information listed in the voter file and the SQF data, we geocode each individual voter and each incidence of stop-and-frisk.[9]

Our primary measure of stop-and-frisk activity is *surplus* SQF. This quantity captures the number of police stops that did not lead to arrest, issue of summons, or reporting of recovered contraband items. Since these stops are less likely to be based on strong suspicion of a crime, they are more likely to be viewed by citizens as illegitimate.[10]

To create a measure of SQF activity in an individual's immediate neighborhood, we used the geocoded data to draw a circle with radius 0.1 miles around each registered voter

[8]We obtained voter history files from the New York State Board of Election at http://goo.gl/tXOJEn and the SQF data from New York City Police Department at http://goo.gl/hSnJoe.

[9]Police officers fill out a "Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet" (UF-250 form) for each stop. The UF-250 form includes the timing and geographical location of the stop as well as information about the reasons for the stop, the stopped individual, and what happened during the stop (such as whether contraband was found).

[10]In an analysis of over four million stop-and-frisk records, Fagan (2010) found that a substantial proportion listed "furtive movement" as the sole reason for the stop.

in our sample (Dinesen & Sønderskov 2015, Bisgaard, Sønderskov & Dinesen 2016). We then aggregated all stops that took place in that geodisc over the course of the year.[11] This approach does a good job of capturing citizens' immediate social context but overcomes sometimes artificial barriers created by census blocks. For example, Dinesen & Sønderskov (2015) point out that measuring contextual effects based on a coarse administrative unit is particularly problematic for individuals living on the border of two or more administrative units. For such individuals, aggregating surplus stops at the census block level may result in an under- or overestimate of their true exposure to SQF.

We operationalize our dependent variables as whether a registered voter participated in the New York City mayoral (2009 and 2013), federal midterm (2010 and 2014), and/or presidential (2012 and 2016) elections. In order to avoid the possibility of individuals selectively moving into and out of areas based on SQF, we restrict our analysis to registered voters that resided on the same street during both elections. In addition, we only keep individuals that were registered to vote in all six elections and have the same date of birth on each of the voter files. This leaves us with 3,390,703 registered voters in our final sample.

One of our main hypotheses is that race is a crucial moderating variable. However, New York State does not require that voters report their race upon registration. We therefore use a recently-published method to calculate conditional probabilities that each individual voter belongs to white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and other racial categories given their surname and residence (Imai & Khanna 2016). The United States Census Bureau provides the list

[11] Unless otherwise noted, in the rest of main text when we refer to SQF we are referring to surplus stops aggregated at the geodisc level.

of surnames occurring 100 or more times in the 2000 Census and probabilities that each surnames belongs to one of the racial groups.[12] We combine this information with racial composition of each census block from the 2010 Census and assign each voter to the racial group with the highest predicted probability.[13] We examined the accuracy of this method using Florida voter records since Florida requires voters to report their race upon registration. A benchmark test shows that this approach identifies the race of Florida voters with 82-83% accuracy.

Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the distribution of SQF experienced by registered voters, based on the demographic group they belong to, in high (top panel) and low (bottom panel) SQF years. In 2009, 2010, and 2012, the average number of stops black and Hispanic registered voters experience in their neighborhood was more than three times that of whites. Age and gender groups, on the other hand, were more uniform in their exposure to SQF.

[Figures 1 - 3 are about here]

The three figures also make clear the dramatic change in SQF before and after 2013. For example, in 2010 24% of registered voters lived in neighborhoods that had no SQF while 4.8% of individuals lived in neighborhoods that had 100 or more stops. In 2014, 85% of registered voters lived in neighborhoods with no surplus stops and only 2 registered voters lived in a neighborhood with more than 100 stops. The average number stops in a neighborhood was 20.5 in 2010 compared to 0.6 in 2014. For black and Hispanic registered

[12]Last Access, Dec 17th 2015, http://goo.gl/LzEZ3A

[13]The Center for Data Science at New York University provided code for this prediction. For details about the methodology, refer to the appendix.

voters, the average number of stops in their neighborhoods fell from over 30 in 2010 to less than 1 in 2014.

The top panel of each figure also demonstrates the distinct SQF experiences of black, Hispanic, and white voters before 2013. For black and Hispanic voters in 2010, a neighborhood two standard deviations above the mean is associated with more than 150 stops per year compared to 51 stops for whites. Blacks and Hispanics were also much more likely than whites to live in areas with high SQF. In 2010, the racial breakdown of individuals living in neighborhoods with 100 or more stops is 53.8% black, 40.0% Hispanic, and 4.3% white.

To examine overall effects of SQF on voter turnout, we use the following specification:

$$\text{Voted}_{it} = \beta_1 \text{Surplus SQF}_{it} + \mathbf{X}\psi_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where i denotes a voter and t denotes an election year. The dependent variables *Voted*, is binary equalling 1 when registered voter i participated in election t and 0 otherwise. The main independent variable, *Surplus SQF*, is the total number of surplus stops in a registered voter's neighborhood, as defined by a geodisc of radius 0.1 miles, over the course of the year. The vector $\mathbf{X}$ denotes observable covariates at the individual and aggregated levels. To account for all time-invariant characteristics at the voter level, we include voter fixed effects α_i. Standard errors, ε_{it}, are clustered at the census block level. In order to test whether the effect of SQF on electoral participation is moderated by citizens' characteristics, we subset the sample by race, gender, and age.

While the voter fixed effects account for time-invariant factors, we also control for other covariates that could possibly influence both voter turnout and SQF activity. At the individual level, we control for age and party affiliation. At the census tract level, we control for foreign population, employment, income inequality, education level, median household income, total population, proportion of black population, proportion of Hispanic population, and proportion of white population.[14] In order to account for the fact that stops occurred more frequently in high-crime areas, we control for the total number of major felony offenses collected at the police precinct level.[15] Tables 1 - 3 presents the summary statistics for each variable by election type.

[Tables 1 - 3 are about here]

Results

Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the overall effect of SQF on voter turnout in the mayoral, midterm, and presidential elections. Column (1) in each table only controls for age while column (2) includes all controls. The coefficient represents the effect of each surplus stop in a registered voter's neighborhood, captured by the geodisc (with a radius of 0.1 mile) around them, on their likelihood of voting. In the models including all controls, each stop reduced the

[14]The individual-level variables are from the voter file and the aggregate-level variables are created at the census tract level based on a series of American Community Survey.

[15]The seven major felonies are murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny, and grand larceny of a motor vehicle. We merged the census block with the police precinct boundary. Note that the police precinct boundaries were changed in 2012, creating the 121st precinct from parts of the 120th and 122nd precincts. Our records do not reflect this change.

likelihood of voting by 0.002 and 0.006 percentage points in mayoral and midterm elections respectively. In presidential elections, stops have no effect on turnout.

[Tables 4 - 6 about here]

The overall effect of SQF in these elections masks important heterogeneity. Given that SQF was not uniformly administered by the NYPD, we hypothesize that its demobilizing effect will vary based on citizens' race. In addition to racial disparities, SQF varies greatly by gender and age group; the police mainly targeted males as well as individuals under the age of 30. If frustration due to unequal application of SQF discourages registered voters from participating in elections, the negative effect may be stronger among male and younger individuals.

The heterogenous effect of SQF on turnout in mayoral elections is presented in Tables 7 and 8. The first five columns of Table 7 display the effect of each stop on turnout for each racial group and the last two columns display the effect for males and females.

[Table 7 and Table 8 are about here]

SQF had demobilizing effect on white registered voters in mayoral elections but slightly increased turnout among black registered voters. There was no effect on turnout among Hispanic registered voters. Stops also reduced turnout among male and female registered voters. The negative effect of SQF on turnout in mayoral elections is not strongest among registered voters in their 20's and 30's but rather among those in their 60's or older.

To illustrate the effect of living in a low SQF neighborhood compared to a high SQF neighborhood, Figure 4 presents the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in SQF on turnout in mayoral elections among registered voters from different racial, gender, and age groups.[16]

[Figure 4 is about here]

Overall, a two standard deviation increase in surplus SQF is associated with a 0.8 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of voting. Among Hispanic registered voters, a two standard deviation change is not associated with a significant change in turnout while among black registered voters, a two standard deviation change is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in turnout. In contrast, a two standard deviation change in SQF among white registered voters reduces turnout in mayoral elections by 1.2 percentage points. A two standard deviation increase in SQF among men and women is associated with a reduction in turnout by 0.6 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively. The negative effect of a two standard deviation increase in SQF on voter turnout within the different age groups ranges from 0.4 to 1 percentage points.

The heterogenous effect of SQF on turnout in midterm elections is presented in Tables 9 and 10. In the midterm elections, SQF reduced turnout among individuals from all racial groups; however, the effect of a surplus stop in a black registered voter's neighborhood is larger than in a Hispanic or white registered voter's neighborhood. SQF had a demobilizing

[16]The standard deviations for SQF within each group are presented in Table 1.

effect for both males and female registered voters, however the effect on males is slightly stronger than for females. Similar to our findings for mayoral elections, the negative effect of SQF is strongest among older rather than younger registered voters.

[Table 9 and Table 10 are about here]

Figure 5 presents the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in SQF on turnout among registered voters in midterm elections from different racial, gender, and age groups.[17]

[Figure 5 is about here]

A two standard deviation increase in SQF is associated with a 1.7 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of voting in midterm elections. For black and Hispanic registered voters, a two standard deviation increase in SQF is associated with a reduction in turnout of 1.7 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively. For white registered voters, turnout is reduced by 0.4. A two standard deviation increase in SQF for men and women is associated with a reduction in turnout by 2 and 1.4 percentage points, respectively, and the effect within the different age groups ranges from 1 to 1.9 percentage points.

Finally, the heterogenous effects for presidential elections are presented in Tables 11 and 12. In presidential elections, a surplus stop is associated with increased turnout among white registered voters but slightly decreased turnout among black registered voters. SQF had no significant effect on turnout among Hispanic registered voters. The effect of a surplus

[17]The standard deviations for SQF within each group are presented in Table 2.

stop slightly decreased turnout among males but did not have a significant effect on females. Among registered voters younger than 60 years old, SQF is associated with increased turnout; for those 60 or older, surplus stops reduced turnout.

[Table 11 and Table 12 are about here]

Figure 6 presents the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in SQF on turnout in presidential elections among registered voters from different racial, gender, and age groups.[18]

[Figure 6 is about here]

A two standard deviation increase in surplus SQF is associated with no reduction in the likelihood of voting. For black registered voters, a two standard deviation change is associated with a 1.5 percentage point reduction in turnout but a 0.5 percentage point increase for white registered voters. A two standard deviation increase in SQF is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in turnout among men and ranges from a 0.3 to 0.9 percentage point increase among registered voters under 60. For those 60 and older, a two standard deviation increase in SQF is associated with a 0.5 percentage point decrease in turnout.

[18]The standard deviations for SQF within each group are presented in Table 3.

Discussion

Many of our findings are consistent with our expectations. We find that SQF had the overall effect of demobilizing the New York City electorate in mayoral and midterm elections. However, exposure to SQF had a different impact depending on one's racial, gender, and/or age group. SQF had the biggest negative impact on black registered voters, the racial group most stopped by police. For black registered voters, SQF led to reduced turnout in midterm and presidential elections. SQF is associated with slightly higher turnout among black registered voters in mayoral elections. However, this may be due to the fact that the demobilizing effect of SQF is offset by a desire to change SQF policy. SQF also reduced turnout among Hispanic and male registered voters in midterm elections.

Some of our findings do not comport with our expectations. First, while SQF had a demobilizing effect on black and Hispanic registered voters in midterm and mayoral elections, surplus stops had no effect on Hispanic registered voters in presidential elections. In addition, contrary to our hypothesis, the negative effect of SQF on turnout in midterm elections was strongest among older rather than younger voters.

Our findings add to the growing literature examining the influence of contact with the criminal justice system on civic engagement. To this point, scholars have primarily focused on the demobilizing effect of incarceration. Here, we show that experiencing aggressive policing within one's community, specifically the stopping and questioning of innocent citizens, also serves to reduce civic engagement.

Since our analysis focuses on turnout among registered voters, it provides us with a somewhat incomplete picture of how SQF affects political participation. It is possible that stop-and-frisk discouraged individuals from registering to vote in the first place; therefore, our results represent a lower bound. This is especially likely to be the case among younger cohorts; younger citizens coming of age during the era of SQF may not register to vote.

There are two important limitations of our design. First, we hypothesize that stop-and-frisk undermines trust in the police and government in general (Weaver & Lerman 2010, Lerman & Weaver 2014*a*). As Lerman & Weaver (2014*a*, p.121) describe, "citizens who are not actually engaged in criminal activity, or where there is little evidence of criminal wrongdoing, now have contact–sometimes repeatedly–with state authorities who treat them with suspicion." However, rather than disengaging from the political process due to reduced trust in the police and government, SQF may reduce turnout by depleting social capital and undermining trust citizens have in one another (Kumlin & Rothstein 2005, Rothstein 2004, Rothstein & Stolle 2003, Oskarsson, Svensson & Öberg 2009). Given our data we are not able to directly test these, or any other, causal mechanism.

Second, we are not able to directly measure whether individuals in our sample have been stopped and questioned by police. Rather, we are able to quantify the level and type of stop-and-frisk activity taking place in the communities where they live. However, previous research has demonstrated that perceptions of the police are strongly shaped by the experiences of other members of the community (Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins & Ring 2005, Gau & Brunson 2010, Brunson & Weitzer 2011, Tyler, Fagan & Geller 2014).

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Table 1: Summary statistics - Mayoral Elections (2009 and 2013)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Voted (Mayoral)	0.225	0.418	0	1	6781406
Surplus SQF (0.1 Mile)	80.254	154.62	0	3347	6781406
Surplus SQF White	34.894	69.115	0	2326	2667908
Surplus SQF Black	126.547	211.654	0	3347	1794656
Surplus SQF Hispanic	119.376	179.984	0	3347	1591772
Surplus SQF Asian	44.836	77.823	0	3347	613054
Surplus SQF Other	48.163	80.009	0	2568	63062
Surplus SQF Male	78.077	151.579	0	3347	2993758
Surplus SQF Female	81.974	156.961	0	3347	3787648
Surplus SQF 20s	90.408	167.137	0	3347	951254
Surplus SQF 30s	81.137	152.187	0	3347	1371894
Surplus SQF 40s	83.419	160.745	0	3347	1391320
Surplus SQF 50s	77.781	151.911	0	3347	1258664
Surplus SQF 60+	73.527	146.066	0	3347	1808274
Age (Cont)	50.24	16.318	18	87	6781406
Democrats	0.681	0.466	0	1	6781406
Foreign Born (%)	16.066	9.69	0	63.141	6781406
Employed (%)	57.321	10.109	0	100	6781406
Enrolled (%)	25.867	7.647	0	97.849	6781406
Gini	0.457	0.069	0	0.706	6781406
HH Median Income (Log)	10.836	0.524	9.07	12.429	6778234
Total Population (Log)	8.407	0.525	0.693	10.25	6779626
Black Population (%)	23.947	29.191	0	100	6779626
Hispanic Population (%)	26.558	23.264	0	100	6779626
White Population (%)	35.722	32.203	0	100	6779626
Crime	3089.239	1150.9	140	7804	6780988

Table 2: Summary statistics - Midterm Elections (2010 and 2014)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Voted (Midterm)	0.237	0.425	0	1	6781406
Surplus SQF (0.1 Mile)	63.671	136.173	0	3389	6781406
Surplus SQF White	29.191	73.231	0	2510	2667908
Surplus SQF Black	96.239	173.775	0	2510	1794656
Surplus SQF Hispanic	96.127	168.088	0	2510	1591772
Surplus SQF Asian	37.222	81.318	0	3389	613054
Surplus SQF Other	44.390	80.852	0	2256	63062
Surplus SQF Male	62.177	134.857	0	3389	2993758
Surplus SQF Female	64.852	137.193	0	3389	3787648
Surplus SQF 20s	71.370	144.825	0	2510	824892
Surplus SQF 30s	64.866	134.627	0	3389	1346766
Surplus SQF 40s	65.930	139.623	0	3389	1407096
Surplus SQF 50s	62.526	135.830	0	2510	1275540
Surplus SQF 60+	58.650	130.789	0	3389	1927112
Age (Cont)	51.24	16.318	19	88	6781406
Democrats	0.681	0.466	0	1	6781406
Foreign Born (%)	16.045	9.618	0	62.129	6781406
Employed (%)	57.154	9.968	0	100	6781406
Enrolled (%)	25.762	7.565	0	91.938	6781406
Gini	0.458	0.068	0	0.694	6781406
HH Median Income (Log)	10.849	0.525	9.159	12.429	6778152
Total Population (Log)	8.41	0.523	0.693	10.25	6779823
Black Population (%)	23.829	29.048	0	100	6779823
Hispanic Population (%)	26.643	23.172	0	100	6779823
White Population (%)	35.657	32.059	0	100	6779823
Crime	2984.673	1134.633	166	7502	6780988

Table 3: Summary statistics - Presidential Elections (2012 and 2016)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Voted (Presidential)	0.333	0.471	0	1	6781406
Surplus SQF (0.1 Mile)	57.822	135.608	0	2347	6781406
Surplus SQF White	26.267	67.516	0	1835	2667908
Surplus SQF Black	87.267	174.534	0	1835	1794656
Surplus SQF Hispanic	88.655	172.685	0	1858	1591772
Surplus SQF Asian	32.005	72.509	0	2347	613054
Surplus SQF Other	34.205	73.677	0	1779	63062
Surplus SQF Male)	56.384	133.369	0	2347	2993758
Surplus SQF Female	58.959	137.340	0	2347	3787648
Surplus SQF 20s	65.616	147.981	0	1835	592596
Surplus SQF 30s	60.023	135.919	0	2347	1303906
Surplus SQF 40s	59.383	137.966	0	2347	1408248
Surplus SQF 50s	57.831	136.595	0	1858	1311456
Surplus SQF 60s	53.343	129.439	0	2347	2165200
Age (Cont)	53.24	16.318	21	90	6781406
Democrats	0.684	0.465	0	1	6781406
Foreign Born (%)	15.882	9.386	0	60.042	6780519
Employed (%)	57.47	9.960	0	100	6780519
Enrolled (%)	25.447	7.471	0	89.147	6780519
Gini	0.462	0.067	0.019	0.681	6779052
HH Median Income (Log)	10.869	0.532	9.177	12.429	6778118
Total Population (Log)	8.423	0.52	0.693	10.272	6780519
Black Population (%)	23.534	28.693	0	100	6780519
Hispanic Population (%)	26.845	23.074	0	100	6780519
White Population (%)	35.326	31.662	0	100	6780519
Crime	4799.57	2588.058	0	14783	6781406

Table 4: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Mayoral Elections - Overall Effects

	(1)	(2)
Surplus SQF	-0.00003***	-0.00002***
	(0.000004)	(0.000004)
Age	-0.01159***	-0.01209***
	(0.000162)	(0.000178)
Democrat		0.04726***
		(0.003212)
Foreign Born		0.00322
		(0.002570)
Employed		-0.00893***
		(0.002962)
Enrolled		-0.00948***
		(0.002433)
Gini		-0.00092
		(0.002583)
Median Income		0.01342***
		(0.003756)
Total Population		0.01152*
		(0.006899)
Black Population		0.01050
		(0.009307)
Hispanic Population		0.01847***
		(0.006256)
White Population		0.05064***
		(0.009381)
Seven Major Crimes		0.03045***
		(0.003461)
Constant	0.81021***	0.79552***
	(0.008291)	(0.009265)
Obs	6781406	6778150
R^2	0.76446	0.76460

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 5: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Midterm Elections - Overall Effects

	(1)	(2)
Surplus SQF	-0.00006***	-0.00006***
	(0.000004)	(0.000004)
Age	-0.02597***	-0.02604***
	(0.000211)	(0.000232)
Democrat		0.00815**
		(0.003250)
Foreign Born		0.00653**
		(0.003203)
Employed		-0.00390
		(0.004253)
Enrolled		-0.00325
		(0.003347)
Gini		0.00471
		(0.004254)
Median Income		-0.00291
		(0.005101)
Total Population		0.03462***
		(0.011806)
Black Population		0.01808
		(0.012238)
Hispanic Population		0.01736*
		(0.009243)
White Population		0.03014**
		(0.012688)
Seven Major Crimes		0.00812***
		(0.003133)
Constant	1.57200***	1.56018***
	(0.010976)	(0.011468)
Obs	6781406	6778068
R^2	0.77332	0.77334

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 6: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections - Overall Effects

	(1)	(2)
Surplus SQF	-0.00000	-0.00000
	(0.000004)	(0.000005)
Age	-0.03421***	-0.03550***
	(0.000278)	(0.000613)
Democrat		-0.01442***
		(0.003704)
Foreign Born		-0.00134
		(0.004568)
Employed		0.00677
		(0.004290)
Enrolled		0.01117***
		(0.003870)
Gini		0.00921***
		(0.003193)
Median Income		0.00853
		(0.005838)
Total Population		-0.01501
		(0.011456)
Black Population		0.01345
		(0.015093)
Hispanic Population		-0.00745
		(0.010020)
White Population		-0.03153**
		(0.013101)
Seven Major Crimes		0.00702**
		(0.002911)
Constant	2.15435***	2.23603***
	(0.014946)	(0.032237)
Obs	6781406	6778118
R^2	0.76010	0.76015

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 7: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Mayoral Elections - Race and Gender Subsets

	(1) White	(2) Black	(3) Hispanic	(4) Asian	(5) Other	(6) Male	(7) Female
Surplus SQF	-0.00009***	0.00001**	-0.00000	-0.00002	-0.00001	-0.00002***	-0.00003***
	(0.000020)	(0.000004)	(0.000004)	(0.000019)	(0.000038)	(0.000004)	(0.000004)
Age	-0.01429***	-0.00412***	-0.01170***	-0.02086***	-0.01056***	-0.01259***	-0.01169***
	(0.000298)	(0.000329)	(0.000274)	(0.000479)	(0.001297)	(0.000193)	(0.000211)
Democrat	0.03609***	0.06946***	0.04882***	0.02092**	0.02943	0.03925***	0.05295***
	(0.005570)	(0.006155)	(0.006158)	(0.009308)	(0.025832)	(0.004871)	(0.004154)
Foreign Born	0.00316	-0.00494	0.00770**	-0.00183	0.01016	0.00507*	0.00156
	(0.004818)	(0.003984)	(0.003454)	(0.006796)	(0.013546)	(0.002806)	(0.003089)
Employed	-0.01396***	-0.00399	-0.00207	0.01175	-0.00293	-0.00436	-0.01246***
	(0.005041)	(0.004292)	(0.004362)	(0.007882)	(0.016014)	(0.003238)	(0.003530)
Enrolled	-0.00242	-0.00300	-0.00350	0.00177	-0.00733	-0.00585**	-0.01234***
	(0.003942)	(0.003930)	(0.003462)	(0.006454)	(0.015866)	(0.002648)	(0.002878)
Gini	-0.00832**	0.00585	0.00076	0.00701	0.01815	-0.00156	-0.00030
	(0.004143)	(0.004265)	(0.003567)	(0.007058)	(0.016630)	(0.002767)	(0.003100)
Median Income	0.03038***	0.00668	0.00698	0.02193**	-0.01346	0.01001**	0.01630***
	(0.006496)	(0.005943)	(0.004921)	(0.009879)	(0.022490)	(0.003953)	(0.004510)
Total Population	-0.02497**	0.00904	0.00821	0.04500**	0.01586	0.00643	0.01608*
	(0.011202)	(0.011714)	(0.010241)	(0.019282)	(0.043540)	(0.007550)	(0.008361)
Black Population	-0.02447	0.03311**	0.00310	0.03454	-0.02484	0.00883	0.01204
	(0.021101)	(0.013990)	(0.013376)	(0.028790)	(0.044168)	(0.009938)	(0.011161)
Hispanic Population	0.01015	0.01870	0.01003	-0.01966	0.00276	0.01510**	0.02100***
	(0.009975)	(0.011365)	(0.009163)	(0.014046)	(0.027769)	(0.006886)	(0.007349)
White Population	0.03260**	-0.01972	0.00094	0.03625*	0.05239	0.04740***	0.05323***
	(0.013534)	(0.021589)	(0.014134)	(0.018617)	(0.058402)	(0.010230)	(0.010826)
Seven Major Crimes	0.00326	0.01574***	0.01597***	-0.02738**	-0.00019	0.01862***	0.03903***
	(0.007703)	(0.004743)	(0.004067)	(0.011453)	(0.020234)	(0.003689)	(0.004051)
Constant	0.96882***	0.34237***	0.69094***	1.20443***	0.67840***	0.81897***	0.77663***
	(0.017302)	(0.019008)	(0.014505)	(0.025181)	(0.065463)	(0.010176)	(0.011110)
Obs	2667326	1793864	1591327	613026	63056	2992116	3786034
R^2	0.77340	0.76629	0.74125	0.73460	0.73533	0.77010	0.76035

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". Each column indicates subset of voters. All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 8: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Mayoral Elections - Age Subsets

	(1) Age 20s	(2) Age 30s	(3) Age 40s	(4) Age 50s	(5) Age 60+
Surplus SQF	-0.00001***	-0.00002***	-0.00001***	-0.00002***	-0.00003***
	(0.000005)	(0.000005)	(0.000005)	(0.000006)	(0.000007)
Age	-0.00638***	-0.00734***	-0.00742***	-0.01030***	-0.02294***
	(0.000264)	(0.000228)	(0.000259)	(0.000312)	(0.000318)
Democrat	0.03983***	0.04736***	0.03787***	0.05329***	0.04926***
	(0.006059)	(0.006972)	(0.007105)	(0.007633)	(0.007338)
Foreign Born	0.00317	-0.00083	0.00163	0.00047	0.00977**
	(0.003606)	(0.003204)	(0.003834)	(0.004742)	(0.004947)
Employed	-0.01191***	-0.00859**	-0.00433	-0.00666	-0.01244**
	(0.004220)	(0.003741)	(0.004363)	(0.005298)	(0.005587)
Enrolled	-0.00652*	-0.00767**	-0.00435	-0.01508***	-0.00968**
	(0.003493)	(0.003052)	(0.003527)	(0.004343)	(0.004405)
Gini	0.00583	0.00050	0.00055	-0.00002	-0.00716
	(0.003712)	(0.003323)	(0.003735)	(0.004520)	(0.004818)
Median Income	0.01305**	0.00772	0.01449***	0.01137*	0.01397**
	(0.005414)	(0.004982)	(0.005400)	(0.006413)	(0.006697)
Total Population	-0.00496	-0.00179	-0.00429	0.00843	0.01784
	(0.010083)	(0.008704)	(0.010277)	(0.013342)	(0.013261)
Black Population	0.01085	0.00346	0.00924	0.01552	0.00909
	(0.013087)	(0.011907)	(0.013663)	(0.016679)	(0.016899)
Hispanic Population	0.01177	0.00923	0.01592*	0.02943***	0.02025*
	(0.009022)	(0.007971)	(0.009353)	(0.011162)	(0.011365)
White Population	0.00949	0.01914	0.02973**	0.05566***	0.07585***
	(0.013519)	(0.011796)	(0.013638)	(0.015945)	(0.016324)
Seven Major Crimes	0.03018***	0.02968***	0.02789***	0.03219***	0.03265***
	(0.004267)	(0.003823)	(0.004670)	(0.005576)	(0.007539)
Constant	0.24120***	0.35951***	0.52368***	0.83984***	1.92892***
	(0.008447)	(0.009671)	(0.013042)	(0.018324)	(0.023321)
Obs	950761	1371298	1390595	1258072	1807424
R^2	0.67159	0.72321	0.75730	0.76565	0.77053

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". Each column indicates subset of voters. All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 9: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Midterm Elections - Race and Gender Subsets

	(1) White	(2) Black	(3) Hispanic	(4) Asian	(5) Other	(6) Male	(7) Female
Surplus SQF	-0.00003***	-0.00005***	-0.00003***	-0.00005***	-0.00008**	-0.00007***	-0.00005***
	(0.000010)	(0.000005)	(0.000004)	(0.000012)	(0.000035)	(0.000006)	(0.000004)
Age	-0.02957***	-0.02588***	-0.01931***	-0.02250***	-0.02448***	-0.02642***	-0.02574***
	(0.000341)	(0.000347)	(0.000296)	(0.000508)	(0.001320)	(0.000255)	(0.000255)
Democrat	0.00679	0.00307	0.01250**	0.00167	-0.01030	0.00536	0.01026**
	(0.005580)	(0.006280)	(0.006346)	(0.009296)	(0.026624)	(0.004936)	(0.004157)
Foreign Born	-0.00501	0.00829	0.01414***	0.00425	0.02527	0.00631*	0.00673*
	(0.005732)	(0.005407)	(0.004484)	(0.007501)	(0.019130)	(0.003672)	(0.003657)
Employed	0.01181	-0.00244	0.00564	-0.00646	-0.04204*	-0.00641	-0.00185
	(0.007778)	(0.006269)	(0.005839)	(0.009302)	(0.022774)	(0.004741)	(0.004730)
Enrolled	0.00167	0.00358	-0.00064	0.00612	-0.00294	-0.00568	-0.00132
	(0.005462)	(0.004705)	(0.004626)	(0.009186)	(0.021054)	(0.003794)	(0.003710)
Gini	0.00409	0.00696	0.00261	-0.00430	-0.00136	0.00506	0.00441
	(0.008816)	(0.004609)	(0.004850)	(0.007213)	(0.020516)	(0.004335)	(0.004816)
Median Income	-0.00328	0.00181	-0.00530	0.00528	0.03010	-0.00223	-0.00349
	(0.008384)	(0.007949)	(0.006654)	(0.011739)	(0.030063)	(0.005762)	(0.005549)
Total Population	0.01665	0.01555	0.04226***	0.00630	-0.02558	0.03612***	0.03351**
	(0.019273)	(0.017737)	(0.015905)	(0.030745)	(0.062753)	(0.013145)	(0.013076)
Black Population	0.01780	0.02422	0.02061	0.02092	0.06896	0.01935	0.01694
	(0.027221)	(0.017741)	(0.016632)	(0.031367)	(0.055601)	(0.013626)	(0.014048)
Hispanic Population	0.00844	0.02806*	0.01109	0.00238	0.03690	0.01769*	0.01693
	(0.018329)	(0.015204)	(0.011070)	(0.014543)	(0.034077)	(0.009512)	(0.010680)
White Population	0.01536	0.02754	0.03264*	0.01610	0.06785	0.04346***	0.01907
	(0.021463)	(0.025529)	(0.018488)	(0.019874)	(0.071837)	(0.013364)	(0.014565)
Seven Major Crimes	-0.03239***	0.02048***	0.01744***	0.00960	-0.00646	0.00794**	0.00828**
	(0.005115)	(0.004810)	(0.004485)	(0.008992)	(0.022868)	(0.003591)	(0.003588)
Constant	1.82687***	1.54947***	1.11476***	1.31375***	1.44681***	1.56755***	1.55364***
	(0.017314)	(0.021391)	(0.016029)	(0.024233)	(0.070489)	(0.013343)	(0.012590)
Obs	2667323	1793854	1591300	613026	63056	2992078	3785990
R^2	0.78569	0.76836	0.74697	0.74139	0.74468	0.77848	0.76933

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". Each column indicates subset of voters. All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 10: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Midterm Elections - Age Subsets

	(1) Age 20s	(2) Age 30s	(3) Age 40s	(4) Age 50s	(5) Age 60+
Surplus SQF	-0.00005***	-0.00004***	-0.00005***	-0.00007***	-0.00007***
	(0.000005)	(0.000005)	(0.000005)	(0.000006)	(0.000006)
Age	-0.01903***	-0.01956***	-0.02304***	-0.02826***	-0.03367***
	(0.000318)	(0.000257)	(0.000292)	(0.000349)	(0.000386)
Democrat	-0.00048	-0.00319	0.00443	0.00714	0.02329***
	(0.006720)	(0.007114)	(0.007084)	(0.007678)	(0.007110)
Foreign Born	0.00968*	0.00930**	0.00583	0.00486	0.00604
	(0.005234)	(0.004492)	(0.004913)	(0.005822)	(0.005219)
Employed	-0.01359**	-0.00373	-0.00028	-0.00006	-0.00584
	(0.006568)	(0.005487)	(0.005895)	(0.007107)	(0.006939)
Enrolled	0.00430	0.00209	-0.00159	-0.00386	-0.00707
	(0.004944)	(0.004355)	(0.004759)	(0.005512)	(0.005410)
Gini	0.00733	0.00104	0.00762	0.01006	0.00039
	(0.005391)	(0.004473)	(0.004975)	(0.006269)	(0.008096)
Median Income	0.00391	-0.01141*	-0.00558	-0.00148	-0.00283
	(0.007686)	(0.006346)	(0.007000)	(0.008213)	(0.007860)
Total Population	-0.00039	-0.01162	0.02037	0.04787**	0.06063***
	(0.017309)	(0.014653)	(0.016521)	(0.019061)	(0.019794)
Black Population	0.03417*	0.02965*	0.02034	-0.00722	0.01448
	(0.018159)	(0.016085)	(0.017092)	(0.020287)	(0.020944)
Hispanic Population	0.02886**	0.01465	0.01184	0.01201	0.01860
	(0.012013)	(0.010358)	(0.011952)	(0.014246)	(0.016561)
White Population	0.00474	-0.01019	0.01388	0.03240	0.05577**
	(0.017935)	(0.014819)	(0.016665)	(0.020140)	(0.022495)
Seven Major Crimes	0.01500***	0.00398	0.00726	0.00589	0.01134**
	(0.004982)	(0.004460)	(0.004586)	(0.005403)	(0.005082)
Constant	0.62861***	0.85224***	1.27122***	1.89006***	2.72977***
	(0.010266)	(0.010969)	(0.014341)	(0.019855)	(0.025919)
Obs	824429	1346159	1406380	1274904	1926196
R^2	0.67683	0.72510	0.76221	0.77359	0.78467

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". Each column indicates subset of voters. All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 11: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections - Race and Gender Subsets

	(1) White	(2) Black	(3) Hispanic	(4) Asian	(5) Other	(6) Male	(7) Female
Surplus SQF	0.00004**	-0.00004***	0.00000	0.00004**	0.00002	-0.00002***	0.00001
	(0.000014)	(0.000005)	(0.000007)	(0.000015)	(0.000040)	(0.000005)	(0.000006)
Age	-0.04143***	-0.04817***	-0.02962***	-0.01953***	-0.02657***	-0.03446***	-0.03652***
	(0.001004)	(0.001054)	(0.000725)	(0.001113)	(0.002912)	(0.000590)	(0.000701)
Democrat	-0.01135*	-0.02778***	-0.01478**	-0.00233	-0.03033	-0.02665***	-0.00446
	(0.006193)	(0.007207)	(0.007353)	(0.010702)	(0.031252)	(0.005722)	(0.004720)
Foreign Born	0.00136	-0.00462	-0.00804	0.00180	-0.00393	-0.00403	0.00062
	(0.009263)	(0.005673)	(0.005494)	(0.007139)	(0.016701)	(0.004526)	(0.005165)
Employed	0.01510**	-0.00266	0.00485	0.01061	0.00622	0.00641	0.00687
	(0.007335)	(0.005726)	(0.005533)	(0.007827)	(0.021219)	(0.004281)	(0.004923)
Enrolled	0.00092	0.00361	0.00632	0.00993	0.00596	0.00800**	0.01331***
	(0.006384)	(0.005795)	(0.004688)	(0.006717)	(0.019930)	(0.003826)	(0.004450)
Gini	0.01572***	0.00219	0.00374	0.00878	0.00565	0.00798***	0.01010***
	(0.005218)	(0.004675)	(0.003499)	(0.005910)	(0.014119)	(0.003055)	(0.003618)
Median Income	0.00341	0.01068	0.00645	-0.00279	-0.03699	0.00536	0.01048
	(0.011405)	(0.007501)	(0.007216)	(0.010449)	(0.031799)	(0.005845)	(0.006685)
Total Population	-0.01383	0.02032	0.00005	0.00100	-0.05016	-0.00878	-0.01991
	(0.018429)	(0.018741)	(0.015685)	(0.023716)	(0.072415)	(0.011537)	(0.013355)
Black Population	0.01935	0.00327	-0.02660	0.00057	-0.04265	0.00742	0.01668
	(0.032514)	(0.022022)	(0.019218)	(0.032368)	(0.049073)	(0.014910)	(0.017550)
Hispanic Population	-0.01400	0.01718	-0.00316	0.01402	0.01453	-0.00826	-0.00645
	(0.019320)	(0.016685)	(0.011897)	(0.016483)	(0.035771)	(0.010150)	(0.011398)
White Population	-0.01835	0.07535***	0.01907	0.00626	-0.03177	-0.01813	-0.04212***
	(0.019717)	(0.027041)	(0.019778)	(0.021737)	(0.074040)	(0.013597)	(0.014885)
Seven Major Crimes	0.04655***	0.00699	0.01458***	0.01107*	0.03005*	0.01873***	-0.00117
	(0.005493)	(0.004505)	(0.003244)	(0.006703)	(0.015945)	(0.002755)	(0.003435)
Constant	2.62129***	2.94614***	1.85371***	1.33910***	1.75503***	2.15303***	2.31142***
	(0.055023)	(0.057616)	(0.037989)	(0.058359)	(0.152922)	(0.030958)	(0.037096)
Obs	2667114	1793734	1591138	613014	63053	2991948	3786170
R^2	0.75770	0.76673	0.76000	0.75793	0.75456	0.76036	0.75920

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". Each column indicates subset of voters. All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 12: Surplus SQF and Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections - Age Subsets

	(1) Age 20s	(2) Age 30s	(3) Age 40s	(4) Age 50s	(5) Age 60+
Surplus SQF	0.00003***	0.00002***	0.00002***	0.00001*	-0.00002***
	(0.000009)	(0.000006)	(0.000006)	(0.000007)	(0.000007)
Age	-0.02297***	-0.01986***	-0.02366***	-0.03764***	-0.05333***
	(0.000912)	(0.000559)	(0.000640)	(0.000835)	(0.000915)
Democrat	-0.01782*	-0.04707***	-0.03487***	-0.00665	0.00451
	(0.010126)	(0.008466)	(0.007868)	(0.007846)	(0.007115)
Foreign Born	0.01075	0.01056**	-0.00136	-0.00092	-0.01214*
	(0.007284)	(0.004712)	(0.005005)	(0.006312)	(0.006455)
Employed	-0.00390	-0.00568	0.00801	0.00718	0.01644***
	(0.006994)	(0.004682)	(0.005052)	(0.006124)	(0.006251)
Enrolled	0.01714***	0.01228***	0.01353***	0.01192**	0.01037*
	(0.006365)	(0.004094)	(0.004443)	(0.005377)	(0.005668)
Gini	0.00217	0.00160	0.00820**	0.01265***	0.01436***
	(0.004390)	(0.003166)	(0.003373)	(0.004095)	(0.004656)
Median Income	0.01129	0.00103	0.00090	0.00214	0.00630
	(0.009869)	(0.006161)	(0.006861)	(0.008275)	(0.008626)
Total Population	-0.05688***	-0.04373***	-0.04437***	-0.01652	0.00952
	(0.020243)	(0.012672)	(0.014082)	(0.016456)	(0.016594)
Black Population	0.04619*	0.01926	0.01451	-0.00115	0.01630
	(0.025151)	(0.016392)	(0.018346)	(0.020917)	(0.022688)
Hispanic Population	0.00349	-0.00911	-0.00783	-0.01390	0.00111
	(0.017006)	(0.010879)	(0.011995)	(0.014622)	(0.014095)
White Population	-0.05264**	-0.04945***	-0.05786***	-0.05140***	-0.01377
	(0.023629)	(0.014564)	(0.016468)	(0.019531)	(0.018614)
Seven Major Crimes	-0.01799***	-0.00528*	-0.00097	0.01006**	0.02237***
	(0.004500)	(0.002984)	(0.003282)	(0.004024)	(0.004228)
Constant	0.96708***	1.00728***	1.44620***	2.53068***	4.23621***
	(0.026423)	(0.021032)	(0.029869)	(0.046791)	(0.065621)
Obs	592288	1303353	1407546	1310741	2164190
R^2	0.73314	0.77005	0.78116	0.75664	0.74779

Note: A dependent variable is *Voted*, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". Each column indicates subset of voters. All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Figure 1: Distribution of Surplus SQF by Registered Voter in Mayoral Elections



Note: Figure depicts the distribution of surplus SQF within the geodisc of each individual registered voter broken down by their racial, age, and gender group. The number below denotes the average and the number above denotes the two standard deviation above the average.

Figure 2: Distribution of Surplus SQF by Registered Voter in Midterm Elections



*N*ote: Figure depicts the distribution of surplus SQF within the geodisc of each individual registered voter broken down by their racial, age, and gender group. The number below denotes the average and the number above denotes the two standard deviation above the average.

Figure 3: Distribution of Surplus SQF by Registered Voter in Presidential Elections



Note: Figure depicts the distribution of surplus SQF within the geodisc of each individual registered voter broken down by their racial, age, and gender group. The number below denotes the average and the number above denotes the two standard deviation above the average.

Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Surplus SQF by Voter in Mayoral Elections



*N*ote: Figure depicts how the marginal effect of SQF on individual turnout decisions changes among different subset of voters. A dot indicates an average estimate of marginal effect associated with a 2 standard deviation change in SQF. A bar around the dot indicates its 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Surplus SQF by Voter in Midterm Elections



*N*ote: Figure depicts how the marginal effect of SQF on individual turnout decisions changes among different subset of voters. A dot indicates an average estimate of marginal effect associated with a 2 standard deviation change in SQF. A bar around the dot indicates its 95% confidence interval.

Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Surplus SQF by Voter in Presidential Elections



*N*ote: Figure depicts how the marginal effect of SQF on individual turnout decisions changes among different subset of voters. A dot indicates an average estimate of marginal effect associated with a 2 standard deviation change in SQF. A bar around the dot indicates its 95% confidence interval.