Securing Losers' Consent for India's Constitution: The Role of Directive Principles

-- Tarunabh Khaitan

1. Introduction

Constitution-making in deeply divided societies poses a dilemma. On the one hand, the usual aspiration to create an enduring constitution demands a broad consensus over its contents. On the other hand, its very potential endurance signals to groups that believe they have lost out in the constitutional negotiation that their loss might be permanent, encouraging intransigence. This article explains how a widely used, if little studied, tool—directive principles—could sometimes help resolve this dilemma.

Directive principles are constitutional directives to the political organs of the state to programmatically secure certain transformative goals. Constitutional texts typically describe them as ‘not enforceable by any court’ but ‘nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country’.2 They are called by various names, including directive principles of state policy, directive principles of social policy, fundamental principles of state policy, fundamental objectives, national objectives or some combination thereof. I will refer to them as ‘directive principles’, ‘constitutional directives’, or simply ‘directives’. Although the South African Constitution famously rejected directive principles as inadequate for its transformative agenda, they have—alongside preambles—been rather popular with framers seeking to enshrine transformative ideals in their constitutions elsewhere. Despite this, they have largely, and surprisingly, been overlooked by international and comparative constitutional law scholarship.

What little scholarly attention they have received has often been critical. Largely because of their non-justiciable character, they have been characterized at best as provisions with a ‘mere moral appeal’3 and ‘no practical implication’,4 at worst as ‘design flaws’.5 Their off-hand dismissal by scholars is at odds with their persistent popularity with framers of constitutions. If they are so

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2. Constitution of India, art 37. Some scholars find the bar on ‘enforcement’ to be compatible with judicial cognizance of directive principles that falls short of enforcement: Joseph Minattur, The Unenforceable Directives in the Indian Constitution, SUPREME COURT CASES (JOURNAL) 17(1975). Without disputing this doctrinal claim, I will use the terms 'enforceability' and 'justiciability' interchangeably.
3. DEJO OLOWU, AN INTEGRATIVE RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 96-8 (Pretoria University Law Press. 2009)
4. CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT, DR AMBEDKAR AND UNTOUCHABILITY: ANALYSING AND FIGHTING CASTE 112 (Hurst. 2005).
useless, why have over 31 constitutions adopted them in some form or the other?\(^6\) If there was no point to them, why has India bothered to amend them to add several new directives since independence?\(^7\) Indeed, why did Nigeria and Nepal retain these provisions even as they enacted new constitutions?\(^8\) The cynical answer might be that they allow framers to express adherence to lofty ideals without actually creating a system that can realize those ideals. A comparativist might attribute their popularity to their early adoption by certain influential jurisdictions, especially India and Nigeria, and their subsequent transplant to other post-colonial Asian and African legal systems.\(^9\) But if we are to permit some idealism and thoughtfulness to the framers of over 31 constitutions, explanations must reach beyond these hypotheses.

When it is not dismissive, existing scholarship has focused mostly on what (mainly Indian) courts have managed to do with these supposedly non-justiciable constitutional provisions, especially in relation to fundamental rights.\(^10\) Very few scholars have assessed their impact on their own terms, i.e. by looking into the political realization of these constitutional directives.\(^11\) Another important recent contribution is Harel’s defense of these directives (when they embody moral rights) on non-instrumentalist grounds, where he claims that their duty-imposing character is valuable for its own sake, quite apart from their impact.\(^12\) This echoes King’s characterization of constitutions with directives as ‘mission statements’.\(^13\) This expressive role becomes especially important in polities where the constitution itself comes to acquire a sacrosanct status over time.\(^14\)

In this paper, I will not conduct a political impact assessment of directive principles in the future governance of the state. Rather, I will look to uncover an additional reason why they might be an attractive tool for some constitutional framers, i.e. apart from their potential future impact and their non-instrumentalist value. I will argue, using India as a case study, that constitutional directives can be a key tool for securing the consent of groups that lose out in constitutional negotiations in deeply divided societies. They have an instrumental value at the very moment of constitutional founding, inasmuch as they can secure the buy-in of warring groups for the constitutional project, and generate a broad consensus over the document as a whole. The two consent-seeking strategies that can be seen in the relevant type of Indian directives (that I will label ‘deeply contested directives’) are containment and constitutional incrementalism. These strategies

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11. Weis
14. Levinson, Constitutional Faith

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give enough hope of future victories to the losing groups to keep them on board, without accommodating them so much that their opponent groups in turn leave the constitutional negotiation table. As one of the most enduring examples of post-colonial constitutions, the contained and incrementalist accommodation of the losers through the directive principles of the Indian Constitution might well be key to its remarkable survival. The inquiry will be conducted by paying close attention to the political speeches and interventions made by representative players in the debates of India's constituent assembly. Two caveats: first, I do not wish, in this paper, to get into the potential role that the framers' original intent might have on constitutional interpretation by future generations. All I wish to do is to present a conceptual and normative reading of the positions adopted by some key drafters. What weight, if any, the original intentions of the framers deserve from us today is a separate question. Second, I am not suggesting that directive principles necessarily played a similar role outside India, or even that all Indian directives played such a role. The Indian example is meant to reveal one (of possibly several) possible functions they could perform: securing the consent of losers. Whether they played a similar role elsewhere is a matter for another study. This study of one of the most enduring post-colonial constitutions brings together the growing scholarly interest in the longevity of national constitutions and in constitution-making in deeply divided societies.

Section 2 will provide the historical context of the late 1940s in which India framed its Constitution. It will identify the chief characteristics of the largely liberal-democratic-secular Draft Constitution. Drawing upon the debates in the constituent assembly that finalized the Constitution, it will also identify and explain the three main losers: groups whose hopes, aspirations and ideals found little, if any, place in the draft document. These groups can loosely be called socialists, Gandhians and cultural nationalists. Section 3 will first analyze the nature of directive principles generally, and identify their key conceptual features: these directives are constitutional, directive and directional, political, programmatic and transformative. It will then give an overview account of the directives found in the Indian Constitution, and classify them on the basis of the degree of (dis)agreement that surrounded them. The least contested directives in the first category are the social rights directives; the second category includes the distributive justice directives whose goals were accepted by almost everyone but the means to secure these goals were seriously contested; and the third category includes the deeply contested directives. Section 4 will discuss the two strategies that qualified the accommodation of the dissenters' agendas: containment and constitutional incrementalism. The three containment tools used by the framers were dilution, instantiation and qualification. Constitutional incrementalism was secured by the deferral of the realization of the directives to future politics. The section will also explain that the directives are not just incrementalist in the constitutional sense: at least Ambedkar thought that the duties they impose ought to be realized in a politically incrementalist fashion. These strategies represent a fine balancing act that maintained the overall normative coherence of the Draft Constitution while providing limited, and deferred, accommodation to the dissenters, thereby securing a broad consensus over the eventual Constitution of 1950. The concluding section will briefly discuss the

15. It is tempting, though, to cite Fontana: "the most relevant dimensions of a country that explains its orientation towards originalism is whether or not its constitution created the nation that lives under the constitution, or whether the constitution merely reorganized the institutions of the country but did not create the nation that lives under the constitution. In other words, was the constitution revolutionary, or reorganizational?" David Fontana, "See Also: Response to Comparative Originalism" 88 Texas Law Review (2010) 189-199, 190.

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afterlife of the contested directives and suggest that the losers’ hope of future political realization will be vindicated somewhat, albeit in a contained and incremental manner.

2. Divided India

It is sometimes assumed that the founding of India and its early post-independence politics rested on a broad consensus within its governing elite, framed by a liberal, multicultural, democratic, secular, planned-economy vision of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister. While Nehru did embody these ideals, no such consensus actually existed amongst the ruling elite, which is unsurprising given the almost proverbial scale of India’s diversity. Churchill had once remarked that "India is an abstraction...It is no more a united nation than the Equator." The constituent assembly, even though largely made up of Congress Party members and the rump of the Muslim League that stayed behind after Partition, was ethnoculturally diverse and ideologically a deeply divided body. This was in part due to the diversity and division within the Congress itself, and because of its policy of accommodating on the party's ticket the candidacy of party outsiders who represented minorities or possessed technical expertise. It therefore represented all influential shades of Indian public opinion, including socialism, despite the assembly’s boycott by key socialists. The Indian polity at its founding witnessed deep disagreements—not only in the sense that the dissenters were politically significant but also that the dissent concerned fundamental matters and was strongly felt, strongly enough to potentially get in the way of their accepting the Constitution.

Our narrative of a divided India framing its Constitution starts in the middle: when Dr Ambedkar--a key architect of India's Constitution, the Law Minister in Nehru’s interim cabinet and a prominent leader of the so-called ‘untouchable’ castes--formally placed the Draft Constitution (DC) before the constituent assembly on the 4th of November 1948. Various aspects of the DC had been drafted in different sub-committees of the assembly, and then finalized into one document by the drafting committee, under Ambedkar's chairpersonship. The document had drawn upon a long history of proto-constitutional thinking in India, primarily in the Congress Party, leading up to independence in August 1947; and on comparative constitutional practices, mainly from Western democracies. The DC was, on the whole, a liberal, secular, egalitarian, democratic, quasi-federal document, with entrenched civil and political rights, limited minority protections (non-discrimination, religious freedom and cultural autonomy, but no special political representation), and social rights and redistribution directives to the State to achieve 'economic

19. Austin, Cornerstone, 12-14. Ambedkar himself, a political opponent of the Congress, was elected on a Congress ticket after he lost his seat due to the country's partition.
20. 7 CAD 4 Nov 1948 31.
23. On group rights and liberalism in the Indian constituent assembly in particular, see Rochana Bajpai, Debating Difference: Group Right and Liberal Democracy in India (OUP 2011) 76. Special political representation was

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It sought to forge a common national identity for Indian citizens based on the *jus soli* principle, i.e. citizenship tied to the land rather than to ethnicity. As Jayal explains, "In the absence of a singular ethnocultural basis for nationhood, the Indian nation was substantially a political entity under construction." Although the place of liberalism in Indian political thought is complicated and seriously contested, the DC opted for liberal institutions such as fundamental human rights, common citizenship, and state secularism, albeit adapted to Indian circumstances. The document had been in the public domain for eight months, and the drafting committee had made certain revisions in light of the comments it received, before introducing it before the assembly.

Before we proceed, a note on Ambedkar's role is warranted, as we are going to talk a lot about him. By all accounts, most substantive decisions in relation to the DC were undertaken by the sub-committees. Although the drafting committee under his chairpersonship did make significant changes, the DC did not fully reflect Ambedkar's thinking. On social rights, for example, we know that Ambedkar himself would have preferred full justiciability. But after the assembly started considering the DC, he transformed into its chief defender, with significant help from leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Gopalaswamy Ayyangar. At least in the debates on directive principles, the assembly invariably accepted floor amendments that Ambedkar accepted, and rejected amendments that he rejected. He energetically coaxed and cajoled, persuaded, sometimes admonished, occasionally cut deals, always driven by a strong commitment to the DC and a pragmatic concern to build a broad coalition to support it. As this article will demonstrate, his role in the containment of and the incrementalist co-option of the three main dissenting groups to the constitutional agenda was indispensable.

I will refer to the group of influential members of the assembly—such as Ambedkar, Nehru and Ayyangar—who were senior politicians involved in various sub-committees of the assembly, as the *defenders* of the liberal-egalitarian-democratic DC. To the extent that this is a coherent group, it is hard to put an ideological label on them and make it stick. Ambedkar "subscribed to a political order informed with rights, democracy and socialism." Nehru was also a committed...

generally denied to religious and linguistic minorities, but was provided for the so-called ‘Untouchable’ castes and certain indigenous tribes.
24. "By parliamentary democracy we mean 'one man, one vote'...it is also the desire that we should lay down as our ideal economic democracy ..., whereby, so far as I am concerned, I understand to mean, 'one man, one value'.": BR Ambedkar, CAD 19 Nov 1948 494. The reports actually say 'vote' rather than value' this must be a mistake. This was confirmed by HV Kamath’s speech, which quotes him: "Dr. Ambedkar said that to his mind, political democracy means one man, one vote; economic democracy means one man, one value." CAD 23 November 1948 533.
27. Jayal insightfully explains the possible causes of this shift in Ambedkar’s views by pointing to various tensions in his ideological worldview: NIRAJA GOPAL JAYAL, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS DISCONTENTS: AN INDIAN HISTORY 52 (Harvard University Press. 2013) 151-3.
socialist. At any rate, they were liberal enough to believe that beyond certain key broadly agreed egalitarian goals, economic policy should mostly be left to politics rather than be settled by the Constitution. To quote Ambedkar:

"What should be the policy of the State, how the society should be organised in its social and economic side are matters which must be decided by the people themselves in accordance to time and circumstances. It cannot be laid down in the Constitution itself, because that is destroying democracy altogether."  

Nehru had already set a similar tone while moving the Objectives Resolution before the assembly:

"...in such a Resolution, if, in accordance with my own desire, I had put in, that we want a Socialist State, we would have put in something which may be agreeable to many and may not be agreeable to some and we wanted this Resolution not to be controversial in regard to such matters."  

In this sense, at least, they could be called 'liberal constitutionalists'. Rochana Bajpai draws from a different aspect of their belief system to call them 'secular nationalists'. Some think that 'republican' is a better label for such leaders. Above all, they were pragmatists. As Rodrigues tells us, "an employment of concepts and ideological persuasions in Ambedkar goes along with an avowal of pragmatism, which is reflectively adhered to." For all these reasons, I will stick to the relatively ideology-insensitive term 'defenders' of the DC to describe this group.

Even as he introduced the DC, Ambedkar was fully aware of the challenges such a constitution was likely to face: "Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realise that our people have yet to learn it. Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic." The challenges came quickly and furiously. The DC got an extremely hostile reception from three powerful groups in the assembly: socialists, Gandhians and cultural nationalists. It became clear quickly that these three challengers had to be carried along if the Constitution were to be acceptable to all.

So who comprised these three dissenting groups, and what were their demands? The labels I have stuck on them are rather loose, and not unproblematic. Like the ‘defenders’, these 'groups' are, by no means, insular, and many members straddle multiple ideological worlds. Even so, the labels are a useful heuristic. Each of them had a strong presence within the broad church that Congress was, but socialists and the cultural nationalists were also influential outside the Congress Party. The socialists benefited from the global political turn leftwards after the Second World War, that intensified with the start of the process of decolonization around the same time. Gandhians

29. Austin 42: Austin says that while Nehru was influenced by Fabian and Laski, he became an 'empirical gradualist' with regard to the means of achieving socialism. This has important echoes with the incrementalist ideal that this paper is concerned with.
30. 7 CAD 5th Nov 1948 402.
32. Bajpai 78.
33. Manjeet Ramgotra, Tejas Parasher
34. Rodrigues 144.
35. Ambedkar, 7 CAD 4 Nov 1948 38.
sought reflected glory the immense personal aura of the recently assassinated Father of the Nation who was instrumental in securing India’s independence. Cultural nationalists hoped to find their strength in the Hindi-speaking Hindu majority of the partitioned country. Although it is difficult to say how far they would have been willing to go to stall the constitutional process, and how successful they might have been in challenging Nehru’s populist appeal, they seem to have had sufficient mischief-making power to merit accommodation.

Let us start with the socialists. These members of the assembly, like DS Seth and KT Shah, leaned further left of an already Fabian/Laski-ite majority in the assembly, and would have preferred a full-blown socialist Constitution. It is important to note that the Socialist Party had (after some equivocation) boycotted the assembly because the latter wasn’t elected on universal suffrage, so the ‘socialists’ we discuss here are the those who belonged to other parties and wanted not just a socialist government but also a socialist constitution. The socialists in the assembly tended to support the DC on cultural questions, but favored the Gandhian agenda on decentralization of state power. Their key demands included a constitutional mandate for the nationalization of the means of production, prohibition of private monopolies, co-operative organization of industry and agriculture, and other such socialist economic policies. They also wanted the right to work and education to be recognized as fundamental rights rather than as directive principles. So strongly did the socialists feel excluded from the DC that KT Shah moved to amend draft Article 1 to describe India as a ‘socialist’ state. The socialist opposition, although strong, was less powerful than it might have been for three reasons. First, their presence in the assembly, although vociferous, was tempered by the fact that many prominent socialists and communists had boycotted the assembly because it wasn’t elected on universal adult franchise. Second, senior Congress leaders, including Prime Minister Nehru, were themselves avowed socialists. Third, the DC did contain some of their agenda as directive principles, just not as categorically as they would have liked. The other two groups had stronger reasons to feel comprehensively excluded from the DC.

Gandhians coalesced around Mahatma Gandhi’s anti-modern localist vision of a radically decentralized India: a union of autonomous, communitarian, simple and autarkic village republics, where the slaughter of cows—revered by the Hindus—and alcohol consumption would be prohibited, and small-scale cottage industry and subsistence farming would ensure economic self-sufficiency. The DC, on the other hand, envisaged a powerful centre, with relatively weak states and no provision for local government. The Nehruvian vision of a strong, cosmopolitan state with a centrally planned economy—that the DC facilitated—was particularly at odds with the Gandhian ideal of an anti-modern, anti-state autarky. As Mahavir Tyagi lamented, “I see nothing Gandhian in this Constitution.” Cultural nationalists found enough of a Hindu tinge in the Gandhian blueprint to support the Gandhians. On decentralization of power (shorn of its Hindu overtones),

36. Austin, Cornerstone 41.
37. Austin 14.
39. DS Seth 7 CAD 5 Nov 1948 213.
40. 7 CAD 5 Nov 1948 399. This goal will be realized by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution in 1976, under Indira Gandhi’s premiership.
41. Mahavir Tyagi 7 CAD 9 Nov 1948 359-62.
42. 7 CAD 9 Nov 1948 360.
43. SL Saksena, CAD 5 Nov 1948 216.
even the socialists fantasized about "a village Soviet as the unit of our Constitution". It was the socialist KT Shah who moved to amend Article 1 to require the establishment of village 'panchayats' (units of local rural government) within ten years of the Constitution. In fact, Ambedkar's tactless description of the village as "a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism" while introducing the DC cost him dearly. It drew much hostility from the three dissenting groups, who made common cause on the localism question. As we will see, Ambedkar learnt quickly from this initial tactical misstep.

Apart from supporting the majoritarian demands of the Gandhians in relation to village panchayats, cow slaughter and alcohol consumption prohibition, cultural nationalists imagined Indian nationhood in emphatically Hindu terms and made strong assimilationist demands on minorities. Although the main cultural nationalist party—the Hindu Mahasabha—was nominally absent from the assembly, three of its members were elected on other platforms, two of them on the Congress ticket. Their meager numbers made little difference though, as the Congress itself had staunch cultural nationalists like Purushottam Das Tandon within its ranks. They agitated for an 'indigenous' name for the country ('Hindustan' or 'Bharat'), a national language (Hindi), a national script ('Devanagari'), a national anthem ('Vande Mataram'), a national flag ('Sudarshan'), and a uniform civil code (to replace religion-based 'personal laws'), all of these framed in majoritarian terms. In fact, SL Saksena moved an amendment to enshrine a whole new Chapter 1A to the DC, which was essentially a Hindu-Hindi majoritarian cultural manifesto for the identity of the new state. The cultural nationalist sentiment was best captured by Seth Govind Das, who thundered:

"we have accepted our country to be a secular state; but we never thought that that acceptance implied the acceptance of the continued existence of heterogenous cultures...We do not want it to be said that there are two cultures here."

Although all these three dissenting groups had their detractors, the cultural nationalists faced the fiercest resistance from socialists, secularists and pluralists as well as religious and linguistic minorities. Nehru's agnosticism was well known; the DC's failure to invoke God was itself controversial. KT Shah, always the radical, wanted to go further, demanding Article 1 should explicitly declare India a 'secular' state. "It is vividhata [diversity] that India stands for", said Shankarrao Deo in response to Das, adding that he "would like to maintain the variety of cultures,

44. Maulana Hasrat Mohani CAD 5 Nov 1948, 429.
45. KT Shah 5 Nov 1948 426.
47. For the backlash, see HV Kamath 7 CAD 5 Nov 219; Seth Govind Das, 22 Nov 1948 523; SL Saksena 5 Nov 213; AC Gaha 7 CAD 22 Nov 1948 256; Goklbhai Daulatram ibid 316.
48. Austin 15.
49. Govind Malviya 7 CAD 8 Nov 1948 342.
51. 7 CAD 5 Nov 1948 415.
52. 9 CAD 12 Sept 1949, 1328.
53. KT Shah 7 CAD 15 Nov 1948 399. The ambition will also be realized through an amendment to the Preamble by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976.
the different languages, each without obstructing, hindering or killing the unity of the country."

The most vociferous resisters of the Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan agenda were the remaining members of the Muslim League, such as Muhammad Ismail, who stayed behind after most of the party's members left for Pakistan after Partition. Members from non-Hindi-speaking, especially Southern, states joined forces with Muslim advocates of Hindustani (a composite language that draws from Hindi as well as Urdu) to challenge the Hindi nationalists. The support of the minorities to the defenders was often restricted to matters that affected their particular group; on other matters they were extremely diverse. On alcohol consumption, for example, many Muslim members sided with the Gandhians in demanding prohibition. Linguistic minorities also wanted the reorganization of federal units on a linguistic basis. Minority members tracked the full gamut of ideologies mentioned in this section and were even less of a coherent 'group' than the others.

The battle lines were drawn early, as soon as the assembly began debating Ambedkar's motion. Each of these influential dissenting groups found little to be pleased about, and moved wrecking amendments to the very first provisions of the DC. Each of these groups was acutely aware of the defenders' Achilles' heel: the assembly was constituted by indirect elections on a limited franchise in the dying days of the colonial empire, rather than through universal adult franchise. This made it easy for them to portray the DC as "imported from outside and built from the above downwards," and reflecting attitudes "typical of the urban highbrow." Each of these groups claimed to speak for the people, or, at least, the 'real' people of India--the poor if you were socialist, the villagers if you were Gandhian, and North Indian Hindus if you were a cultural nationalist. It was clear early on that securing their consent for the DC wasn't going to be a cakewalk.

Despite their disagreements, these groups did agree with the defenders on two things, which might have helped in securing their consent. First, almost all members of the constituent assembly signed up to political democracy, and were united in their strong preference for politics over violence as the mechanism for resolving their disputes. Gandhi’s successful non-violent struggle against the colonial Empire must have strengthened the ideological aversion to organized political violence, at least in the Congress ranks. Post-partition bloodshed did not leave any appetite for more. The belief of the dissenters that they had the 'people' behind them might even have encouraged them to accept programmatic directives in a democratic Constitution, on the assumption that the political realization of their respective agendas would be relatively straightforward as long as the Constitution permitted (or, better still, directed) such realization.

Second, given the appalling living conditions of the majority of the people in the country, they understood the burden of the expectations they all carried, and instinctively knew that the new constitution had to be transformative if it had to have any durability or legitimacy. Indeed, writing

54. 9 CAD 13 Sept 1949, 1431.
55. Kazi Syed Karimmuddin, CAD 19 Nov 1948 496; Mohamed Ismail Sahib ibid 497, Pocker Sahib Bahadur ibid 499.
56. DS Seth 7 CAD 5 Nov 1948 212
57. HV Kamath 7 CAD 5 Nov 219.
58. HV Kamath, 23 Nov 1948 CAD VII 533: "If political democracy is allowed to evolve, to grow, into economic, social democracy, then we would not have strife, we will not have wars, we will not have a totalitarian form of Government"
pseudonymously almost a decade before he would actually become Prime Minister. Jawaharlal Nehru was reflective enough to see his own popularity as a threat to democracy:

"Men like Jawaharlal with all their capacity for great and good work are unsafe in democracy...A little twist and Jawaharlal might turn a dictator sweeping aside the paraphernalia of a slow-moving democracy."

India's first Prime Minister knew full well that democracy must deliver real social transformation if India was to avoid populist authoritarianism: a fear his daughter Indira Gandhi would realize disastrously, if briefly, a few decades hence. The great story-teller Manto passed a devastating verdict on the reform-oriented Government of India Act 1935: "What new constitution? It's the same old constitution, you fool". The framers could not afford a similar assessment of the constitution they were drafting. They knew it had to make a difference to the lives of the people, that it had to matter. What they profoundly disagreed over was the shape and direction this transformation should take.

Their transformative disagreements as well as their strong preference for politics over violence were shaped not only by their long involvement in the (mostly non-violent) struggle for independence but also by the political context of the late 1940s postcolonial India: Mahatma Gandhi had recently been assassinated by a Hindu nationalist, post-Partition religious riots had seen mass population transfers and the murder and rape of millions of people across India and Pakistan, the new nation-states had already been to war over Kashmir, the fear of a Communist uprising was rife, the Cold War between the US and the USSR had begun on the heels of the disastrous Second World War, and many of the 562 semi-autonomous princely states were toying with independence. All this at a time when the colonial state had partitioned the country on religious lines and transferred power in such a remarkable hurry and with such unconscionably meager preparation that any new indigenous administration would have had enough on its plate even without the accompanying litany of horrors. This is the context in which bitterly divided Indians decided to write up a Constitution, adopting universal adult suffrage for a huge, illiterate and extremely poor population with vast cultural, linguistic and religious diversity.

As politicians dealing with day-to-day problems, the members of the assembly would have been well aware of the challenges that faced India—although acutely aware of its distinct roles, the constituent assembly doubled up as independent India’s interim legislative assembly and supplied its interim government headed by Nehru. They hoped not only that the Constitution would endure, but also that it would secure a state that would strive towards their respective partisan utopias.

61. T Prakash 22 Nov 1948 CAD VII 522: "Let me tell you above all that Communism—the menace the country is facing ... Communism can be checked immediately if the villages are organized in this manner and if they are made to function properly."
62. M Tyagi 23 Nov 1948 CAD VII 531: "In Russia, they say, there is already achieved economic democracy, but this economic democracy in Russia has concentrated all power in the hands of the State, with the result that the State has become autocratic."
63. On the immediate political and economic context, see Austin 43f.
64. As a member referred to “the government” when the house sat as the constituent assembly, another member was quick to chide him: “What has this House got to do with the Government?” TT Krishnamachari 7 CAD 19 Nov 1948 490.
65. This hope wasn’t shared by all. In fact, Nehru himself thought that this Constitution would be temporary, and that a fully elected assembly would draft a new one before long. REF
Most of the DC made it to the final text—the defenders clearly enjoyed the support of most of the assembly. The three dissenting groups, on the whole, lost out in the constitutional bargain. Even so, they did not rock the boat and eventually, if reluctantly, signed up to the Constitution they did not like very much. This was, in large part, down to the fact that some of their key demands—contained and incrementalized—were accommodated as directive principles in the final Constitution. They didn't get what they wanted, not even close. But they got enough to sustain the hope that they would fight another day—and win.

3. What are Directive Principles

Before we examine their role in securing the losers’ consent in the Indian context, a slight detour to understand directive principles more generally will be worth our while. Directive principles are constitutional directives primarily to the political organs of the state to programmatically secure certain social, political or economic goals of a 'transformative' character. Even when they seek ‘preservation’ or ‘conservation’—usually of the environment—this conservationist goal typically requires serious socio-economic transformation to ensure sustainability. In other words, these directives usually militate against business as usual. Constitutional texts tend to describe them as ‘not enforceable by any court’ but ‘nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country’. Let us examine some of their key features.

Key Features of Directive Principles

First, directive principles are constitutional. There are no doubt examples of comparable directives contained in legislation, which may or may not have a constitutional character, but in this article, I am particularly interested in the reasons that framers of big-C constitutional codes have for incorporating directive principles. This feature also distinguishes them from mere moral or political norms, at least in the sense that they are posited social facts that can be found in constitutional documents.

Second, these are directives. Through them, framers intend to impose certain duties on the political organs of the state. Entailed in their character as 'constitutional directives' is the fact that they are relatively specific and determinate. An over-broad constitutional directive to the legislature asking it merely to do what is good, or right, isn't much of a directive. It is true that some directive principles are rather broad and vague, but these broad directives are usually

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67. See, for example, UK Child Poverty Act 2010.
68. HAREL, Why Law Matters 154 2014: Harel has a broader understanding of what he terms 'constitutional directives', and suggests that they may be found in other social facts too, such as conventions, practices and institutional history. This may well be true, but here I am interested only in those posited in constitutional documents as 'directives'.
69. King, Constitutions as Mission Statements. 2015 87. See also, HAREL, Why Law Matters 180 2014: “to the extent that the legislature fails to honour these directives, it is subjected to effective condemnation.”
70. Id. at 154.
71. For example, the directive to 'promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.' Article 38(1), Constitution of India.
supplemented by more specific and determinate ones. In general, therefore, they are 'directive' in two different senses: in the first sense they are directions or imperatives addressed to the legislature. In the second sense, they determine and specify the direction of travel for the future state's policy.

Third, these directives are primarily addressed to the political organs of the state, i.e. the executive and the legislature. This feature is connected to their supposed non-enforceability by courts. In most constitutions that contain them, their non-justiciability is expressly provided for in the text. Article 37 of the Indian Constitution, for example, says:

"The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws."

In other constitutions, such exclusion may be through implication or convention. Non-justiciability is a key reason for the controversy surrounding directive principles, and for their rejection in the South African Constitution, which opted instead for justiciable rights. Many courts have found ways to do something with these principles, even when they are prohibited from 'enforcing' them. Even in the Indian debates, non-justiciability was controversial. KT Shah decried that "It is no use putting down these mere pious hopes and aspirations or general directives that may be enforced if and when circumstances permit. It is possible that circumstances will never permit until you compel them to permit you."

But the key design feature of the directive principles is that they are primarily addressed to the legislature and the executive.

Fourth, they are programmatic rather than being exclusively performative. A performative act is one that may be performed simply by an utterance. For example, saying 'I promise to do x' is (in ordinary circumstances) the same as actually promising to do x. Some legal systems recognize the utterance of 'talaq' as performing the act of divorce. A constitution that declares that 'all existing laws of the previous regime shall continue to have the force of law' confers on them legal validity simply by saying so.

Programmatic acts are different, even though they may have a performative dimension. Mere utterance does not secure their realization. There is a time lag between the (performative) adoption of the goal and its realization. Sometimes this gap may be short: a constitution may require Parliament to pass a law outlawing a certain practice, and it may be that Parliament does so in very little time. A program to set up a new administrative machinery might take longer. Social transformation of the sort that directive principles seek is programmatic in a more complicated sense: as we will see while discussing political incrementalism, they typically require sustained,

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72. Article 39, Constitution of India, for example, which directs the state to secure the right to an adequate means to livelihood, distribute communal resources to subserve the common good, prevent concentration of wealth to common detriment, equal pay for equal work for men and women and so on.
73. I don’t intend to deny that courts too are/can be political. But, usually, they are political in a different—attenuated—sense.
75. See references in note 10 above.
76. KT Shah, 19 Nov 1948 CAD VII 480.
multi-pronged and multi-stepped effort over a long period of time. As Naziruddin Ahmad put it in the context of the language directive, "You cannot make a language suitable for a modern world by legislative vote." Use of verbs such as 'strive', 'direct', 'take steps', 'make effective provisions for', 'endeavour' and 'promote' confirm the programmatic character of directive principles.

Finally, as already seen, directive principles set out a transformative agenda for the state being constituted. ‘Transformative’ constitutionalism is a neologism coined by Karl Klare to describe the South African Constitution:

“By transformative constitutionalism, I mean a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed … to transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political process grounded in law. I have in mind a transformation vast enough to be inadequately captured by the phrase ‘reform’, but something short of or different from ‘revolution’ in any traditional sense of the word.”

With Klare, I use the term ‘transformative constitutionalism’ to signify a constitutionally mandated change of a large scale to be brought about using legal-political means (i.e. means that are compliant with the rule of law). My use of the term, however, diverges from Klare’s in two respects. First, I use the term ‘transformative’ in a literal and value-neutral sense. For Klare, as the emphasized words in the quote above suggest, transformative constitutionalism must seek what he calls a ‘postliberal’ democratic and egalitarian ideal. But some transformative efforts could and, as we will see in the Indian example, did travel in different directions. While I mostly agree substantively with Klare’s democratic and egalitarian ideal, it is unwise to restrict the concept of constitutional transformation to what one might consider ‘desirable’ transformation: that task should be left to qualifying adjectives.

Second, Klare writes in the context of the South African constitution, which expressly rejected non-justiciable directive principles in favor of a more rights-based and judiciary-led transformation. My use of the term remains agnostic with regard to the constitutional mechanism constructed to seek such transformation, as it does with respect to the direction of the transformation. In fact, Weis claims that at least some of the ‘rights’ guaranteed in the South African Constitution are actually better understood as directive principles. Furthermore, directive principles have tended to include a broader transformative agenda than social rights: to use Rawlsian terminology, social rights have mostly been restricted to ‘constitutional essentials’ required by his ‘first principle’ of justice, including the right to food, shelter, education and so on.

77. Ahmad 9 CAD 12 Sept 1949 1330-1.
80. Weis.
Directive principles, on the other hand, also tend to include redistributive agendas seeking to reduce income and wealth inequalities, required by the ‘difference principle’ of justice. As such, I take transformative constitutionalism to mean a constitutional mandate to transform a society, economy and polity on a large scale through legal-political means.

On this understanding, directive principles clearly qualify as tools in the service of transformative constitutionalism. They are not the only tool, as the South African example demonstrates. They may not even be the best tool for the purpose, although their relative efficacy in securing the constitutionally mandated transformation is not a question this paper is concerned with.

**Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution**

We can now return to the Indian context. Directive principles emerged as a potential tool to secure the consent of the three losing groups—socialists, Gandhians and cultural nationalists—soon after the assembly started its consideration of the DC. As a response to the wrecking amendments proposed for Article 1, Ambedkar assured the socialists that much of their agenda was already contained in the chapter on directive principles; Ayyangar argued that the faction-ridden village life needed to be gradually prepared for democratic principles, requesting the withdrawal of decentralization amendments in lieu of a promise that he himself would move an amendment to that effect as a directive principle. Why they might have decided to accommodate these agendas as directive principles will become clearer in the next Section. First, I want to give readers a quick overview of the directives that ultimately made it to India's Constitution of 1950.

India borrowed the concept of directive principles from the Irish Constitution and the International Bill of Rights drafted by Hersch Lauterpacht in 1945. Most of the directive principles in the Indian Constitution are to be found in chapter IV of the document. Some, however, such as the directive to promote the spread and enrichment of Hindi language, may be found elsewhere. Most of these directives can be classified into three categories based on the degree of agreement surrounding their content in the assembly debates. Some directives—concerning foreign policy in the Cold-War world, protection of national monuments, separation of the lower judiciary and the executive—are not included in the classification that follows as they are not directly relevant to the account in this paper.

The agreement-sensitive classification that follows tracks the degree of consensus around specific directives, rather than disagreement over the status and place of directive principles

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81. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 47-8. See also Political Liberalism 228-9.
82. Ambedkar 7 CAD 5 Nov 1948 402.
83. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, 7 CAD 5 Nov 1948 428.
84. As this paper focusses on the role of directives in securing consensus during the framing of the Constitution, most of the later constitutional amendments to directive principles will be ignored. The focus will remain on the directives as originally enacted.
85. Subba Rao ref.
86. Art 351, Constitution of India. See also, Art 350A directing the state to endeavor 'to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups'.
87. Article 51.
88. Article 49.
89. Article 50.
generally. Some members were against the whole idea of directive principles: either because they
(or at least the less controversial ones initially proposed in the DC) were "obvious truths" that did
not need legislating,\(^9\) or because they were "certain principles of a particular school of thought"
and therefore "contrary to the principles of parliamentary democracy",\(^1\) or because they should
have been guaranteed as fundamental rights instead.\(^2\) We will ignore this sort of meta-
disagreement for now.

This agreement-sensitive classification results in three categories of directives: first, the
social rights directives, over which there was almost no disagreement. The second category-- the
distributive justice directives--saw broad agreement over the general goal of achieving social,
economic and political justice, but deep disagreement over the best means to secure that. In the
final category were the deeply contested directives, the legitimacy of whose very goals were
seriously disputed.\(^3\) It is interesting to note that this descriptive consensus-sensitive classification
maps onto Weis's conceptual categories rather neatly. Weis identifies three distinct reasons why
framers put directive principles into constitutions: resource constraints, information constraints
and deep moral disagreements.\(^4\) It seems plausible that the first category of directives, comprising
social rights, were put in as directives because the framers did not think the state had the resources
for immediate realization. Regarding the second category, as we will shortly see, the epistemic
disagreement was clearly based on whether socialism or capitalism was the best way to achieve
the justice ideal. Ambedkar's speech, quoted below, explicitly recognized the epistemic constraints
that prevented them from knowing which of these techniques was optimal. The final category is,
by definition, constituted by directives over which there was deep moral disagreement in the
assembly. It is also important to note that the DC mostly contained the consensus directives.
Almost all of the contentious directives were later additions. Let us examine these categories one
by one.

The first class of these directives (the 'social rights directives') include those over which
there was no or negligible disagreement in the assembly: neither were the stipulated goals disputed,
nor was there any serious debate over the means for securing them. These directives were
contained in the DC and made it to the final document more or less unscathed. The most important
set of directives in this category relate to basic social rights, or what Rawls called 'constitutional
essentials'.\(^5\) These included the right to livelihood,\(^6\) equal pay for equal work for men and
women,\(^7\) right to work and unemployment benefit,\(^8\) maternity relief,\(^9\) a living wage,\(^10\) and free
and compulsory education for children.\(^11\) The main debate on these provisions was over their
status, with several members demanding that they be enacted as immediately enforceable

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90. Naziruddin Ahmad, 7 CAD 5 Nov 1948 225.
91. Mahboob Baig Sahib Bahadur 19 Nov 1948 488.
92. KT Shah, Subba Rao, vol 2, 192; Kazi Syed Karimuddin 7 CAD 19 Nov 1948 473.
93. For another classification of the Indian directives, see Villiers, SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
94. Weis, forthcoming.
95. Ref
96. Article 39(a)
97. Article 39(d).
98. Article 41.
99. Article 42.
100. Article 43.
101. Article 45, as originally enacted; since translated into a fundamental right in Article 21A in 2002.
fundamental rights.\textsuperscript{102} The main reason for enacting them as directives was that some lawyers prevailed in convincing the drafting committee that guaranteeing them as rights was not 'practicable' as they are "not normally either capable of, or suitable for, enforcement by legal action."\textsuperscript{103} This category include the directives that the Indian Supreme Court would later go on to read into the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 anyway.\textsuperscript{104}

The second category contains directives relating to distributive justice (the 'distributive justice directives'). For this category, there is a broad agreement in the assembly over a general aim that the state should seek, encapsulated in Article 38:

"The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life."

Article 38 may even be considered the master directive, its abstract pursuit of welfare and justice hardly contestable. Every transformative vision believed that their route would lead to this ultimate utopia. It might even be seen as having some controlling impact on how all other directives were justified in the assembly, i.e. as particular manifestations of this overall goal.

But beyond this agreement over the abstract goal of socio-economic justice, there were deep divisions over the appropriate means that would get us there. The agreed-upon basic social guarantees would help, sure, but what else was needed? Khardekar, speaking in the context of foreign policy, clearly understood the means-end dilemma that the socialism-capitalism debate represented:

"To Russia, we may and should say, 'we accept and we appreciate your aims and ideals, but your means are rather crude, sometimes they are very doubtful.' To England and America, we must say, 'we have very many misgivings about your ... ideals. Your means are very polished, very very civilised'."\textsuperscript{105}

A few further distributive justice directives, slightly more specific, also make it to the final text: one to secure that 'ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good,'\textsuperscript{106} another to prevent 'the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment,'\textsuperscript{107} a third to 'endeavour to secure ... a living wage ... and, in particular, ... promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis'.\textsuperscript{108}

The reference to cottage industries was a later addition following a floor amendment. Viewed on their own they may sound somewhat socialistic, but this must be viewed in the context of what the socialists were vociferously asking of the assembly (nationalization of resources, prohibition of private monopolies, co-operative farms and industry, explicit adoption of state socialism)\textsuperscript{109}:

\textsuperscript{102} See, for example, KT Shah 7 CAD 19 Nov 1948 480.
\textsuperscript{103} BN Rau, 'Notes on Fundamental Rights' 2 Sept 1946, in B Shiva Rao vol II, p 33. See also, JAYAL, Citizenship and its Discontents: An Indian History 150 2013.
\textsuperscript{104} Khaitan and Ahmed, Constitutional Avoidance. Ref
\textsuperscript{105} BH Khardekar 25 Nov 1948 CAD VII
\textsuperscript{106} Article 39(b).
\textsuperscript{107} Article 39(c).
\textsuperscript{108} Article 43.
\textsuperscript{109} DS Seth 7 CAD 19 Nov 1948 486, Hussain Imam ibid 491, KT Shah 7 CAD 22 Nov 1948 506-8, Jadubans Sahaya ibid 516-8.

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"If we really want that something should be done for the masses, and their real welfare
secured, that can only be possible through a socialist democratic order. And if we are really
keen to establish such an order, we should lay down in this Constitution that the order
which we are going to establish will be a socialist democratic or democratic socialist one.
The wording should be as clear as possible so that its meaning may not be changed when
it is in the interest of the ruling classes to do so."^{110}

Given that context, these were relatively weak and open-ended means of securing
distributive justice. Ambedkar steadfastly opposed all socialist attempts to specify the means of
achieving economic democracy. He asked rhetorically:

"Have we got any fixed idea as to how we should bring about economic democracy? ... there
are those who believe in individualism as the best form of economic democracy; there
are those who believe in having a socialistic state as the best form of economic democracy;
there are those who believe in a communistic idea as the most perfect form of economic
democracy. ... having regard to the fact that there are various ways by which economic
democracy may be brought about, we have deliberately introduced ... language that ... is
not fixed or rigid. We have left enough room for people of different ways of thinking ... to
strive in their own way, to persuade the electorate that it is the best way of reaching
economic democracy."^{111}

The third category of directives (the 'deeply contested directives') were those whose goals
themselves were vehemently contested. Most of these directives were later additions to the DC,
through amendments from the floor, as concessions that the defenders made to various dissenting
groups. These included a directive to 'take steps to organise village panchayats ... as units of self-
government',^{112} to 'endeavour to secure ... a uniform civil code',^{113} to improve public health and 'in
particular ...endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption ... of intoxicating drinks',^{114}
to 'organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and ... in particular,
take steps for ... prohibiting the slaughter of cows',^{115} and to 'promote the spread of the Hindi
language, to develop it' by assimilating Hindustani, Sanskrit and other Indian languages.^{116}

Most of the advocates of these divisive directives belonged to one of the three groups that
lost out overall in the constitutional bargain: Gandhians, socialists and cultural nationalists. These
directives acknowledged and accommodated some of their agendas in the Constitution and thereby
mitigated their opposition to the DC. This accommodation was, however, a qualified one: it was
contained and incrementalist. The next section will show how.

110. DS Seth, 19 Nov 1948 CAD VII 487.
111. BR Ambedkar, CAD 19 Nov 1948 494.
112. Article 40.
113. Article 44.
114. Article 47.
115. Article 48.
116. Article 351.
4. Securing Losers’ Consent

Constitutional theorists have started paying sufficient attention to constitution-making in deeply divided societies relatively recently.117 A key feature of such societies is very high decision costs, which Dixon and Ginsburg describe as “a form of transaction costs” that include “the costs of deliberating, negotiating and finalizing an agreement”.118 Given these high transaction costs in such societies, drawing up a constitution that simultaneously satisfies normative legitimacy constraints (that, in the liberal conception for example, rest on the centrality of individual freedom) and sociological stability constraints (that require sufficient popular allegiance to a constitution to ensure the survival of a political community) can be extremely hard.119 The stability constraint, our primary concern here, requires “self-enforcement” as a feature of successful constitutions, i.e. “those within the constitutional bargain must have a stake in the successful implementation of the document for it to endure. Even though constitutional bargains may have relative winners and losers, they will endure to the extent that parties believe they are better off within the current constitutional bargain than in taking a chance on, and expending resources in, negotiating a new one.”120

Several innovative tools that reduce decision costs have been analyzed. These tools can be categorized into two distinct sets: one deals with power-sharing and institutional design concerns, another addresses disagreements over the values, identity and key functions of the putative state. The two are obviously interrelated, for institutional choices (such as whether to devolve state power to villages) often reflect the values of the state. Even so, it is helpful to distinguish the institutional and the ideological questions.

The first set of tools, better-developed in the literature, primarily relates to the institutional arrangements of the future state, and whether each warring tribe can be sufficiently reassured that it will wield adequate power and influence in the state being constituted. These are tools such as consociation, centripetalism, federalism, and so on.121 The tools evolved for institutional power-struggles may lay down procedures for resolving ideological disputes over value politically when the constitution becomes operational. But they are usually not equipped to deal with such disagreements during the framing of the constitution itself. So long as groups are interested not just in winning ideological battles in the future, but also in some constitutional endorsement of their positions to begin with, institutional tools will be important but insufficient to address disagreements over values in deeply divided societies.

Thus, the second toolbox relates not so much to institutional power-sharing, but mostly to the disagreements over normative values that constitutions (as mission-statements) endorse (or fail to

117. See generally, Sujit Choudhry, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford University Press. 2008).
121. See generally, John McGarry, et al., Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Sujit Choudhry ed. 2008) 42.
endorse). Divergent groups are invested not only in their share of power in the future state, but also in the moral identity of that state: they worry about what this state will be like, what symbols will represent it, what values it will cherish, and what goals it will pursue. Very few constitutions can get away with simply constituting an institutional framework and ignoring all normative and expressive questions. Even the minimalist US Constitution had to grapple with the morally divisive issue of slave trade, dealt with through a classic deferral tool: freezing the status quo for twenty years and passing the problem on to Congress.\(^\text{122}\) The problem of settling the normative identity and future direction for a self-consciously transformative constitution is, evidently, bigger. This is because these ideological battles have a higher decision cost in a constitutional context than in the political context: the general features we have come to associate with constitutionalism, such as supremacy, legality, durability and entrenchment, are the very features that raise the stakes in any ideological constitutional settlement.\(^\text{123}\)

One way to avoid these costs is to minimize the ideological commitments that a constitution makes. This, we know, is almost impossible in societies where the liberal framework is itself viewed as partisan, rather than one that merely provides a level-playing field for other ideologies to battle it out. But for transformative constitutions which have to make further ideological choices, the problem is this: how do you secure the consent of groups that lose this ideological battle? Losers’ consent is critical for the normal functioning of any democratic polity, especially if rebellion or civil war are to be averted.\(^\text{124}\) Securing their consent for a constitution is even more fundamental, if the constitutional state is to have any chance of taking off. Transformative constitutions are, therefore, particularly vulnerable because securing the consent of the groups that lose the normative battle in a potentially enduring constitutional settlement is harder.

The obvious way to secure the consent of any dissenting group is through accommodation of their normative agenda. As we saw in the previous section, this is exactly what the framers of the Indian Constitution did, by incorporating some of the key socialist, Gandhian and cultural nationalist demands as directive principles in the Constitution. But straightforward accommodation in the face of deep disagreement creates a new problem as it solves another, because accommodation of one group is likely to anger another. Taking everyone along requires a fine balancing act, one that offers enough sops to the losers, but not so many that their detractors in turn feel tempted to jump ship. Furthermore, the defenders’ conception of legitimacy constraints would also place limits on how far they can go with accommodating their illiberal dissenters. The framers of the Indian Constitution used two key techniques to achieve a balanced accommodation: containment and constitutional incrementalism. Containment is a strategy of deradicalization: even as the agendas of the dissenters were accommodated, the defenders defanged and contained them so far as they were able to. The key containment tools they used were dilution, instantiation and qualification. Constitutional incrementalism is a strategy of deferral: while the agenda is accommodated, its realization is postponed to a future date, and thereby reducing the tension somewhat. Both tools seek to reduce the high decision costs associated with constitution-making in a deeply divided context. I do not claim that either tool is exclusive to directive principles. My

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\(^\text{122}\) Article 1, section 9, US Constitution.

\(^\text{123}\) It is no coincidence that Usman saw the absence of some of these very features in directive principles as ‘design flaws’: Usman, MICHIGAN STATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (2007) 645.


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claim in what follows is simply that the contested directives in India tended to be contained, and that directive principles, by virtue of being directive principles, generally entail constitutional incrementalism (even though there may be other tools to achieve such incrementalism). The following sub-sections will examine each of these tools in some detail.

**Containment**

Although these bitterly divisive directives did make their way into the Constitution, the defenders—chiefly Ambedkar—made a number of strategic interventions to contain them, take the sting out somewhat, and move each radical agenda somewhat closer to the centre-ground. The containment tools they used were dilution, instantiation and qualification.

*Dilution* was used with respect to the Gandhian directive concerning village panchayats. Many members wanted the directive to specify not only the localist goal of rural 'self-government' but also the autarkic objective of 'self-sufficiency'. Fully conscious of the backlash that followed his remarks about villages while introducing the DC, Ambedkar lost no time in assenting to the most diluted amendment that sought self-governing panchayats, without any mention of self-sufficiency. The demand for a directive to promote co-operative cottage industries was diluted by Ambedkar adding 'individual or' before the phrase 'co-operative', to permit both forms of organizations. The relevant part of the diluted directive finally required that “the State shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas.” Dilution was also used in provisions other than directives too. Ayyangar, for example, moved for the recognition of Hindi not as a 'national' language--as the cultural nationalists demanded--but rather as an 'official' language of the Union.

*Instantiation* was another strategy that Ambedkar used frequently to temper the radicalism of a demand. He did so by adding the radical demand as an instance of a more general (and more generally accepted) principle, thereby giving the broader acceptable principle a controlling role in determining the meaning of the particular contested directive. He killed an attempt to introduce a self-standing directive on alcohol prohibition by successfully cutting a deal to have it introduced as a particular instance of another general directive, one that required the state to raise nutritional standards and public health, joining the two directives with a cleverly introduced "in particular" at the last minute. The instantiated directive that became Article 47 finally read: “The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption … of intoxicating drinks…” (emphasis added)

Similarly, the socialist demand for the promotion of cooperative cottage industries in villages was tempered by making it a particular and illustrative instance of the general directive to secure a living wage and decent standards of living. The compromise formulation Ambedkar

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125. T Prakasam 7 CAD 22 Nov 1948 521-2; V Subramanian 525; L Krishnaswamy Bharati ibid 525.
126. K Santhanam 7 CAD 22 Nov 1948 520.
130. Ambedkar 7 CAD 22 Nov 1948 566.
131. TA Ramalingam Chattier 7 CAD 23 Nov 1948 530, supported by Ambedkar ibid 535.
agreed upon with Thakur Das Bharagava made the prohibition of cow slaughter a particular means of seeking the general organization of agriculture and animal husbandry 'on modern and scientific lines'.

His acceptance of these instantiated directives facilitated the withdrawal of far more radical and self-standing versions of these objectives, and the controlling instantiation of these goals nested within broader--uncontroversial--goals left some hope for the dissenters.

Instantiation might in fact explain Ambedkar's odd understanding of the nature of the political duty that the alcohol prohibition directive imposed. Throughout the debates on the uncontested directives, Ambedkar had unwaveringly insisted that although not justiciable, the political duties imposed by these directives were real and the state had no option but to act:

"It is the intention of this Assembly that in future both the legislature and the executive should not merely pay lip service to these principles enacted in this part, but that they should be made the basis of all executive and legislative action".

But when it came to the prohibition directive, he surprisingly said this in response to the liberal objections of Professor Khardekar:

"There is … no compulsion on the State to act on this principle. Whether to act on this principle and when to do so are left to the State and to public opinion. Therefore, if the State thinks that the time has not come for introducing prohibition or that it might be introduced gradually or partially, under these Directive Principles it has the full liberty to act."

The part of this statement that suggests that the state has the liberty to decide when and how to act is in keeping with the partial deferral account that I will provide in the next sub-section. But, the claim—that it is also open to the state to decide whether to act at all--seems surprising. It is clearly at odds with his earlier, and oft-repeated, claims about the nature of directive principles. It is true that Ambedkar is primarily a politician, and we need not expect him to always be coherent or consistent. Even so, we can read the two claims coherently if we accept that instantiation relegates the instantiated directive to be applicable only if, when and to the extent that it serves the controlling general directive, which remains the primary duty of the state.

This reading is further supported by the manner in which the cow slaughter debate proceeded in the assembly. The directive on cow slaughter prohibition was controlled by a general directive to organize agriculture on scientific lines. Speaking in support of the directive, Thakur Dass Bhargava insisted that he did "not appeal to you in the name of religion; I ask you to consider it in the light of economic requirements of the country", mainly a secure supply of milk. In response, Syed Muhammad Saiadulla decried the hypocrisy of the Hindu nationalists using pseudo-scientific arguments to support the directive, asking them to come out openly by declaring their real religious motives upfront. The fact that Bhargava and others felt constrained to offer 'scientific' reasons for prohibiting cow-slaughter suggests an acceptance of the controlling nature of the general directive to which the directive on the prohibition of cow slaughter was instantiated.

133. BR Ambedkar 10 Nov 1948, CAD VII 476. See also, K Hanumanthaiya 7 CAD 19 Nov 1948 490.
134. BR Ambedkar 24 November 1948 CAD VII 566 (emphasis added). In this speech, Ambedkar appears to have confused BH Khardekar with another assembly member HJ Khadekar—the liberal objections against alcohol prohibition were raised by the former.
135. TD Bhargava 24 November 1948 CAD VII 570.
136. SM Saiadulla 24 November 1948 CAD VII 578.

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If this reading is correct, as I think it is, the framers accepted that the state's latent duty to prohibit the consumption of alcohol may kick in only if alcohol consumption becomes a threat to public health and nutritional standards; cow slaughter prohibition is required only when doing so is in service of organizing agriculture on scientific lines; cooperative cottage industries need support only if they help secure a living wage and a decent standard of living. Instantiation may have the potential to substantially transform the nature of the political duty a directive imposes.

The third containment strategy—qualification—is most obvious in the language directive. The cultural nationalists wanted Hindi as the national language and the Muslim minority wanted Hindustani—a composite language comprising Hindi and Urdu. Some nationalists even wanted the classical language Sanskrit to be revived as a spoken language and adopted as a national one. So divisive was the issue that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a prominent Muslim Congress politician, had resigned from the drafting committee after it opted for Hindi as the official language. The Ayyangar formula finally adopted for the language directive in Article 351 was rather complicated, requiring the Union to 'promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India, and to secure its enrichment by assimilating ... the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India..., and by drawing ... for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages'. The qualification of the support for Hindi with references to India's 'composite culture' and 'Hindustani' were partly in response to Azad's resignation, and allowed secularists like Nehru to reluctantly endorse it. These containment tools therefore allowed the framers to walk a fine line that the context necessitated.

**Incrementalism**

A key technique to reduce decision costs under such circumstances is *constitutional incrementalism*. The key to incrementalist negotiation is that each group tests the incremental or marginal value of the proposal on the table: not whether the proposal is ideal objectively, but whether it is better than a plausible alternative. Under an incrementalist approach, "The test of a 'good' policy is typically that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without also agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective)." The idea, characterized as "muddling through" by Charles Lindblom, has echoes in the later works of several other theorists. Incrementalism ensures that the winner does not take it all, and that the losers are left with enough (either now or in the future) to agree to endorse the package. It should be obvious

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137. Azad 9 CAD 13 Sept 1949 1456. There was another linguistic battle between Hindi and English as the preferred official language: this was resolved through a ‘by-law’ provision to be discussed in the next sub-section.
139. Azad 9 CAD 13 Sept 1949 1456.
140. Nehru 9 CAD 13 Sept 1949 1411.
142. Id. at. 81.
that incrementalism can be key to meeting the stability constraints for constitutions in deeply divided societies.

To the extent that constitutionalization usually comes with entrenchment and incrementalism requires a step-by-step approach to change, constitutional incrementalism may seem oxymoronic. It is not so. What constitutional incrementalism seeks to do is to transfer at least some of the decisional weight away from the present to the future, and away from the constitution to politics: i.e. adopting at least a two-step approach rather than doing all the heavy lifting at once. As Lerner puts it: "All constitutional strategies included in the incrementalist toolbox are intended to defer to the future controversial choices regarding the foundational aspects of the constitution in order to permit some form of agreement on a constitution to be reached."\footnote{Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies 2011 39.} So long as losers believe they are likely to succeed in the future even as they lose right now, they may consent to an incrementalist settlement.

Another apparent contradiction may lie in using an 'incrementalist' device to seek 'transformation'. However, as Lindblom explained, "incrementalism in politics is not, in principle, slow moving. It is not necessarily, therefore, a tactic of conservatism. A fast-moving sequence of small changes can more speedily accomplish a drastic alteration of the status quo than can an only infrequent major policy change..... incremental change patterns are, under ordinary circumstances, the fastest method of change available....They do not rock the boat, they do not stir up the great antagonisms and paralyzing schisms as do proposals for more drastic change."\footnote{Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 Public Administration Review 517(1979) 520.} This, of course, may not always be the case. But at least sometimes, incrementalism is not only not in tension with transformative constitutionalism, it may even be the most efficient way of securing it.\footnote{See also, Jeff King's advocacy of judicial incrementalism in the judicial enforcement of social rights in constitutions that permit them to do so: King, Judging Social Rights 289f 2012.} Indeed, the larger the scale of the transformation sought, the larger is the gap between the status quo and the end goal. The sheer impossibility of bridging this gap immediately would give reasons even to the staunchest advocates of the transformation to accept some deferral. For example, on the debate on official language, most Hindi-nationalists accepted that some time was required to get an administration that has transacted mostly in English to switch to Hindi, and also for residents of non-Hindi speaking states to learn the language.\footnote{Purushottam Das Tandon, 9 CAD 13 sep 1949 1443.} Thus, far from being in tension with incrementalism, transformative constitutionalism seems to demand it.\footnote{Even in the South African Constitution with judicially enforceable social rights, Jeff King describes the Constitutional Court's approach to these rights as incrementalist.}

Dixon and Ginsburg provide an excellent account of a classic constitutional incrementalist tool: "by law" clauses, through which "constitution-makers self-consciously choose not to bind their successors", instead they "explicitly delegate certain constitutional questions to future legislatures".\footnote{Dixon and Ginsburg 637.} By 'deciding not to decide', they reduce the decision costs and potential error costs at the time of framing the constitution. Although Dixon and Ginsburg don't use the label 'incrementalism', they locate 'by-law' clauses in the same family of decision-cost-reducing tools such as easy amendability, vagueness and 'sunset' provisions.\footnote{Dixon and Ginsburg 638.} Lerner adds ambiguity,
opaque and internal contradiction to this list of deferral tools. All these tools facilitate deferral of current, constitutional, controversies to future, political, ones.

Framers of the Indian Constitution understood the value of deferral. Nehru explicitly pleaded for the deferral of the language controversies before the assembly:

"I would not have thought that this [linguistic reorganization of states] was a question of that primary importance, which must be settled here and now today. It is eminently a question which should be settled in an atmosphere of good-will and calm and on a rather scholarly discussion ... when heat and passion are there, the mind is clouded...treat it as a thing which should be settled not in a hurry when passions are roused, but at a suitable moment when the time is ripe for it. The same argument ... applies to this question of [official] language...if in trying to press for a change, an immediate change, we get wrapped up in numerous controversies and possibly even delay the whole Constitution, ... it is not a very wise step to take...Because it is vital, it is also an urgent matter; and because it is vital, it is also a matter in which urgency may ill-serve our purpose."

The assembly listened by enacting a slew of by-law clauses. Article 3 of the Constitution provided that "Parliament may by law" reorganize states, normally after consultation with the states concerned. Article 343 recognized Hindi as the "official language" of the Union, but provided for the continuation of English for a period of fifteen years which may be extended by Parliament "by law". As it happened, Parliament did reorganize the states six years after the Constitution came into force, and it did extend the use of English as an official language before the sunset clause expired. What is pertinent to note is that the Constitution did not require Parliament to do any of this: these 'by law' clauses were constitution permissions, not mandates. We could describe this as a full deferral: the future Parliament had the full power to decide whether to act and how to act. The Constitution merely settled the default position if Parliament did nothing. On the organization of states, the constitutional default was the continued existence of the existing state boundaries. On official language, the constitutional default was the expiry of English's status as an official language after fifteen years. But beyond setting a default, the Constitution did not direct Parliament in any manner. The determination of whether and how was left to politics. Even the question of when to act was left entirely open on the reorganization question, although the Constitution did set Parliament a deadline of fifteen years with respect to the official language question.

By-law clauses were not the only deferral tool used in the Indian Constitution. Chiriyankandath explains how ambiguity was used to adopt multiple variants of secularism in the Indian Constitution, so that most groups felt able to sign up to their own interpretations. Abstract was specifically adopted while specifying distributive justice goals. Ambedkar resisted most specification attempts by the socialists by insisting that the clauses "have been drafted in general language deliberately for a set purpose;" that purpose evidently being to

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152. 7 CAD 8 Nov 1948 320-1. See also, T Prakasam, welcoming the compromise directive on panchayats which allowed them to proceed "without interrupting the progress of the Constitution at this stage." 7 CAD 22 Nov 1948 521-2.
secure what Sunstein would call an 'incompletely theorized agreement' between divided groups. Even contradiction was used: some of the distributive justice directives were in tension with the fundamental right to property, and at least some of the Hindu-majoritarian directives contradicted the fundamental right to freedom of trade and freedom of religion. These tensions were noted in the Assembly debates, and would be fertile battleground for continuing legal and political debates for decades after independence. Above all, the easy amendability enshrined in Article 368 was itself a constitutional incrementalist device. For most matters that did not affect the states, the future Parliament—elected directly on universal franchise—was vested with the constituent power to amend the Constitution through a simple majority. Nehru explicitly recognized this as necessary in part to make up for the democratic deficit in the constituent assembly. Losing groups knew they had the opportunity to revisit aspects of the constitutional settlement. This is indeed what happened. Many of the socialist demands, for example, would be satisfied by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution in 1976, and the Gandhian localist agenda would be constitutionalized by the 73rd Amendment in 1992.

What makes directive principles, qua directive principles, a deferral device? A few scholars have recently mentioned their role as deferral tools in the Indian context, most of them incidentally. Lerner identifies a reason why directive principles, as such, are a deferral tool—she claims it is down to their non-justiciability. Even as she makes this connection, a clear explanation for the same is not forthcoming. Although non-justiciability is important, it is in fact the programmatic character of directives which really explains the inherent incrementalism of such principles. Recall that this feature acknowledges that there will be a time lag between the adoption of a directive and its ultimate realization. It is true that some directives can be realized relatively quickly: a uniform civil code can simply be legislated. But we are not, for the moment, speaking of a programmatic approach. What makes directive principles, qua directive principles, a deferral device? A few scholars have recently mentioned their role as deferral tools in the Indian context, most of them incidentally.

155. Sunstein, Designing Democracy 50: where parties agree to constitutional practices even though they have different underlying reasons for supporting it.
156. Former Article 19(1)(f), since relegated to a mere 'constitutional' (rather than a fundamental) right in Article 300A.
157. Article 19(1)(g).
158. Article 25
159. JAYAL, Citizenship and its Discontents: An Indian History 158f 2013; Bhatia, Directive Principles of State Policy. 2016; Namita Wahi, Property, see id. at; Flavia Agnes, Personal Laws, see id. at; Shraddha Chigateri, Negotiating the ‘Sacred’ Cow: Cow Slaughter and the Regulation of Difference in India, in DEMOCRACY, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND THE LIBERAL DILEMMA OF ACCOMMODATION (Monica Mookherjee ed. 2011).
160. The Supreme Court put major constraints on Parliament’s amendment power in the Kesavananda case. See Krishnaswamy.
161. Nehru 7 CAD 8 Nov 1948 page. “while we, who are assembled in this House, undoubtedly represent the people of India, nevertheless I thinks it can be said, and truthfully, that when a new House, by whatever name it goes, is elected in terms of this Constitution, and every adult in India has the right to vote - man and woman - the House that emerges then will certainly be fully representative of every section of the Indian people. It is right that House elected so - under this Constitution of course it will have the right to do anything - should have an easy opportunity to make such changes as it wants to.”
162. Lerner’s account is, relatively speaking, the most developed in this regard: see Hanna Lerner, The Indian Founding: A Comparative Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (Sujit Choudhry, et al. eds., 2016) 67. In a lecture in Melbourne in April 2016, Sudhir Krishnaswamy also referred, in passing, to directive principles as deferral provisions in a public lecture on a different topic. Similarly, in a forthcoming paper, Weiss says, albeit without much explanation, that one of the reasons that drafters adopt directive principles is deep moral disagreement (resource and epistemic constraints being the other reasons that result in directive principles).
163. Id. at.
the deferral of a problem from the current constitutional domain to a future (in this case, political) domain. Constitutional incrementalism entails at least two steps in problem-solving: a constitutional recognition of the problem and a subsequent political resolution of the same. This is exactly what the deeply divisive directives achieved. By enshrining the prohibition of cow-slaughter and alcohol consumption, the enactment of a uniform civil code, and the accommodation of the cooperative and other socialist agendas as directives, the Constitution ensured that these issues will remain on the political agenda of the future state. But by recognizing them as directives, the framers simultaneously avoided having to make a costly political decision on these divisive questions at a fraught constitutional moment. These issues had to be addressed, but not now; by future politics rather than by the present constitutional text.

Having said that, directive principles do not just envisage constitutional incrementalism, they also require political incrementalism. The political duty they impose is akin to 'progressive realisation' duty recognized with respect to social rights in the South African Constitution. The use of programmatic verbs such as 'strive', 'direct', 'take steps', 'make effective provisions for' by the Indian directives suggests that they expect the future political realization of these directives to also be a multi-step process rather than a single-step event. As such, they also demand political incrementalism. Remember that these steps can be taken in quick succession or over a longer period: what is key is that the character of the third step depends on the success (or otherwise) of the second, the fourth on the third and so on. In the debates, Ambedkar clearly envisaged that the nature of the political duty being imposed was programmatic. Even on the question of the uniform civil code, he reassured the dissenting minorities by suggesting that it should be pursued in a programmatic manner:

"I quite realise their feelings in the matter, but I think they have read rather too much into Article 35, which merely proposes that the State shall endeavour to secure a civil code for the citizens of the country. It does not say that after the Code is framed the State shall enforce it upon all citizens merely because they are citizens....in the initial stage the application of the Code may be purely voluntary. Parliament may feel the ground by some such method..."165

Notice especially the reference to Parliament 'feeling the ground' with a voluntary code first, and implying it should push ahead only after evaluating its reception. In fact, he may even be implying a duty on the state to constantly evaluate whether the original reasons responsible for the deferral of the directive in the first place continue to obtain. So, if the reason for deferral was resource constraints, the realization duty applies in proportion to available resources, and when that reason is no longer operative, the state's duty to realize the directive becomes fully manifest. On information-sensitive directives concerning the economic organization of the State, Ambedkar was of the view that it was up to each ideological group "to persuade the electorate that it is the best way of reaching economic democracy."166 So, the test he laid down for making decisions in the context of information scarcity was a democratic one, and therefore reversible when a different ideological party came to power. With respect to deeply divisive directives, there is some suggestion in his advice to 'feel the ground' that a mere majoritarian political decision will not do, and that the views of the dissenting minority will be key. In fact, the President of the assembly,

164. Sections 26(2), 27(2) etc. On the incrementalist judicial enforcement of these rights, see King...
165. BR Ambedkar 23 Nov 1948 CAD VII 551 (emphases added).
166. BR Ambedkar, CAD 19 Nov 1948 494.
Rajendra Prasad, opened the language debate by reminding members “that it will not do to carry a point by debate in this House. The decision of the House should be acceptable to the country as a whole.” This was supported by Gadgil, who said of the language directive that the "Hindi people [have to] ... win over the rest by propaganda, not in an aggressive manner but in a persuasive manner". So, directive principles are incrementalist in the constitutional as well as the political sense.

The second feature of their character as deferral tools is that they envisage partial rather than full deferral. To understand the distinction, consider some of the possible questions one could ask in relation to a practical decision:

1. Whether to act on the relevant issue at all?
2. If yes, what should the action seek to achieve?
3. Once we know that, how should one go about achieving it?
4. And finally, when would be a good time to act?

I am not suggesting that most, or even any, administrators actually decide in this way. Lindblom was probably right in suggesting that this means-end separation is not how decision-making actually works in practice. The suggestion simply is that because the conceptual separation of these stages in decision-making is possible, it is open to a constitution-maker to defer some, but not all, of these questions to a future legislature. A full deferral entails the deferral of all of these questions to the future, whereas a partial deferral settles some of these questions constitutionally but leaves others for politics to sort out later.

Directive principles do not postpone all decision relating to their subject matter: they are 'directives' both in the sense of being directions to the legislature as well as in the sense of being directional, i.e. charting the direction of travel. The when question is clearly deferred, usually so is the how question. On the other hand, subject to the remarks made with reference to the instantiated directives in the previous sub-section and political incrementalism in this one, the whether and the what questions are not deferred. As Ayyangar told the assembly in relation to rural decentralization, "The only question is about the method and pace with which this object should be achieved." As such, directive principles are tools of partial deference. This partial deferral is an especial feature of directive principles.

This characterization militates against a more cynical reading of the role that directive principles played in India. Jaffrelot is one of the adherents of such cynicism, who more or less views these principles as a constitutional dustbin for irritating ideas:

"Ambedkar accepted an emphatic reference to the village in a section of the Constitution whose articles had no practical implication. In this manner he succeeded in defusing a very strong Gandhian demand that could have questioned the overall framework of his project. In the same manner he sealed the fate of many other Gandhian propositions."  

167. 9 CAD 12 Sept 1949 1312. Emphasis added.
168. NV Gadgil 9 CAD 13 sept 1949 1371.
169. (Muddling Through).
170. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, 7 CAD 5 Nov 1948 429.
171. JAFFRELOT, Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability 112 2005.
Even though some members in the assembly were similarly cynical about directive principles,\footnote{172 Hussain Imam, 19 Nov 1948 CAD VII 492: "these principles have been brought in just to silence criticism and to have a good sign-board that we have good intentions, without having any intention of following those directions..." \footnote{173 LERNER, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies 2011 41. \footnote{174 L Sahu, 11 CAD 17 Nov 1949 613-4. \footnote{175 ZH Lari 24 November 1948 CAD VII 577.}} this reading cannot be correct. The three key dissenting groups in the Indian constituent assembly--Gandhians, socialists and cultural nationalists--did know that they were settling for far less than their ideal solutions. But their representatives were clever people. The ideological battles over directive principles in the assembly would hardly have been as fierce as they were had they thought they were fighting for nothing. Indeed, if Ambedkar himself thought that directive principles 'had no practical implication', he would not have bothered to incorporate his own cherished ideals--distributive justice, free primary education, and promotion of the interests of the 'lower' castes as directive principles. Incrementalism is not meant to pull the wool over the eyes of dissenters: it may offer them little, but that little has to be sufficient to secure their consent. It wasn't a risk-free victory for defenders of the DC either—we will see in the next section that some of these contested directives will be realized in independent India, albeit incrementally. Lerner argues that four key principles underpin constitutional incrementalism: non-majoritarianism, a non-revolutionary approach, representation of ideological differences and transferring the problem from the constitutional to the political sphere.\footnote{173} All these principles, including the representation of ideological differences through the contested directives, underpin the Indian Constitution.

5. Conclusion

The framers successfully negotiated a Constitution that deeply divided groups could sign up to. In part, they did so by accepting some of the transformative agendas of the groups that lost out in the constitutional bargain as directive principles. But these agendas were, first, contained through tools such as dilution, instantiation and qualification. Second, they were made subject to both constitutional and political incrementalism.

Not everyone was satisfied with the outcome, of course. The very tool of accommodating disagreement through containment and incrementalism was attacked. Lakshminarayan Sahu called the Constitution a 'mixture', an 'unnatural product' that lacked 'daring', and predicted that it would last no more than two or three years.\footnote{174 L Sahu, 11 CAD 17 Nov 1949 613-4.} Lari, a Muslim member, did not like the ambiguity that incrementalist strategies engendered:

"It is for the majority to decide one way or the other...if the House is of the opinion that slaughter of cows should be prohibited, let it be prohibited in clear, definite and unambiguous words. I do not want that there should be a show that you could have this thing although the intention may be otherwise."\footnote{175 ZH Lari 24 November 1948 CAD VII 577.}

These calls for sincerity and ideological purity were, however, rare. Most losers, like Seth Govind Das, were sufficiently mollified:
"...we are not fully satisfied with [only partial recognition of Bharat, cow-protection and Hindi as the national language]...But the fact that these three things have found place in this Constitution is a matter of gratification."176

And they had good reasons to be mollified with partial deferral. They were able to hold out hope that there will be another opportunity to battle the issue out at the implementation stage. Advocates were satisfied that the issue would remain on the political agenda. Given the support the defenders had in the assembly, this was the best they could have achieved, short of violent means (which, in turn, would have been very expensive politically). On the other hand, because implementation was likely to be gradual, dissenting minorities could frustrate, delay or negotiate accommodations in attempts to realize the contested directives.

What also helped was that each of the three main losing groups had reasons to believe that they would win any future democratic contest. Gandhians believed that the vast majority of Indians who lived in the villages would endorse their radical localist agenda.177 Socialists could be forgiven for thinking that the mostly poor population would endorse socialism in the polls. Cultural nationalists, with their Hindu-Hindi majoritarian agenda, must have thought that they would have the support of enough voters for victory in a first-past-the-post electoral system. So confident they were that Dhulekar even mocked the cosmopolitan defenders in the language debate: "Are they afraid of democracy?"178 That the democratic optimism of each of these groups was going to be complicated by the radical diversity of India's electorate would not be discovered until later. At the time of the Constitution's framing, India had never been to polls on the basis of universal adult franchise. No one really knew what lay in store for them politically, so the negotiators in the assembly can be said to have been operating behind a kind of Rawlsian veil of ignorance.179 This may even suggest that ironically, had the assembly been elected on such franchise, some groups might have been wiser, and possibly more intransigent, if their poor performance wiped out their democratic optimism before the Constitution was adopted.

The details of how these hopes and fears were borne out is a matter for another paper. Briefly, though, the Congress Party would turn even more socialist for a decade or so under Indira Gandhi in the 1970s. Limited rural decentralization would take place in the early 1990s, but accompanied with guaranteed political participation for the ‘lower’ castes and women in the local government. The same period that would witness the beginning of the end of state socialism, and economic liberalization would become the dominant state policy. Cultural nationalists would become politically powerful (and even form governments at the federal level) from the late 1990s onwards and well into the present. Limited implementation of the directives relating to cow-slaughter and alcohol prohibition would happen in some states. Although several aspects of religious personal laws would be reformed incrementally (especially to make them more gender just), India does not yet have a uniform civil code. Most of these contested directives remain extremely polarizing to this date, and very much on the political agenda. As regards the consensual

177. K Hanumanthaiya, 11 CAD 17 Nov 1949 617: "Though our constitution-makers have not adopted the course of decentralisation, still I have faith in the people of India. They will be able to assert themselves in times to come..."
178. Dhulekar 9 CAD 13 Sept 1949 1350.
179. See generally, Rawls.... There were also anxieties about universal franchise. See generally, Udit Bhatia, ‘Epistocracy in the Indian Constitutional Assembly Debates’ in Jon Elster, Roberto Gargarella and Bjorn Rasch eds. (forthcoming).

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directives, the Congress-led government would put the rudiments of a welfare state in place over a decade starting 2004, finally implementing some of the social rights directives concerning education and employment.\textsuperscript{180}

It seems that the acceptance of directives by the losing groups wasn’t necessarily, from their partisan viewpoint, a mistake. While I cannot defend the claim here, even from the point of view of the defenders, it seems that the future efforts towards the realization of the deeply divisive directives have largely been politically incrementalist. What is clear is that at least at the time of enacting the Constitution, directive principles played a crucial role in securing the consent of the groups that lost in the constitutional negotiation, and may well have facilitated the surprising longevity of India's post-colonial Constitution.