Cities, Lobbyists, and Representation in Multilevel Government

Julia A. Payson[†]
Department of Politics
New York University

September 12, 2018

Click here for the most recent version.

Abstract

Why do some municipalities hire lobbyists to represent them in state government? And why do cities lobby in certain years but not others? I argue that local officials hire lobbyists to substitute for formal representation when elected state lawmakers fail to adequately meet local needs. I develop a variety of indicators to measure the quality of representation between cities and their elected state officials and use nearly a decade of original data on municipal lobbying in all 50 states to test how these relationships affect the lobbying decisions of cities across the country. Using panel data methods and a supplementary RDD analysis, I demonstrate that cities are particularly likely to lobby when they are represented by state legislators from the opposite political party. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental lobbying in which local officials purchase advocacy to compensate for the representational gaps that sometimes emerge in multilevel government.

[†]Julia Payson (julia.payson@nyu.edu | http://www.juliapayson.com/) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University. For comments and suggestions the author thanks Pat Egan, Sandy Gordon, Patricia Kirkland, Dimitri Landa, Terry Moe, Becky Morton, and Hye Young You.

1 Introduction

> "It's important that the city has a lobbying presence in Harrisburg, and it's doubly important that Philly, which is a Democratic city, has access to GOP leadership who basically run the show."
>
> — Pennsylvania Lobbyist Larry Ceisler

When and why do some local governments hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? Elected officials of all types lobby each other frequently—both in the U.S. and other federal systems—and these efforts can dramatically impact intergovernmental transfers and other policy outcomes (De Figueiredo and Silverman 2006; Sorensen 2003; Goldstein and You 2017; Payson 2018). But existing theories of lobbying focus primarily on the behavior of interest groups and corporations and are ill-equipped to explain variation in the intergovernmental context. As a result, we know little about why local governments sometimes choose to pay for lobbyist representation.

One of the features that distinguishes local governments from other types of organizations that lobby is that they are geographically nested within state and federal legislative districts that serve the same constituents. They are, by definition, represented by elected officials whose job is to advocate for local needs at the state and federal level. But not all local governments receive equal representation. For example, regions that are overrepresented in national legislatures due to malapportionment enjoy a variety of bargaining advantages, which can translate into increased funding (Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002; Dragu and Rodden 2011), more responsive policies (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008), and less local inequality (Ardanaz and Scartascini 2013). And local officials that are politically aligned with their representatives in the central government receive more discretionary transfers (Levitt and Snyder 1997; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008) while local political opponents suffer a funding penalty (Brollo and Nannicini 2012).

But regional actors are not powerless when it comes to manging their relationships with

elected officials in other levels of government. I argue that hiring lobbyists allows local governments to substitute for weak formal representation at the state and federal level. While some localities may be satisfied with the performance of their delegates in higher office, others may face an uphill battle to secure funding and favorable policies. When local officials are unhappy with the elected representation they receive by virtue of their political geography, lobbying allows them to purchase additional advocacy in their statehouses and Washington, D.C.

To test this theory, I develop a variety of indicators to measure the quality of representation between municipalities and their elected state officials. Municipalities are not the only local governments that engage in lobbying: counties, school districts, water boards, transportation agencies, and other special districts also lobby both the state and federal government. But cities are some of the oldest statehouse lobbyists. Their advocacy efforts date back to the mid-1880s (Teaford 1984), and cities are twice as likely to lobby the state government as they are the federal government (Payson 2018). Municipalities also have the benefit of being well-defined geographic units with relatively stable boundaries and a wealth of data available about their finances, demographics, and political outcomes.

Using nearly a decade of panel data on annual municipal lobbying activity in all 50 states, I find support for the idea that paid lobbying can substitute for formal representation. For example, cities are more likely to hire lobbyists when they are represented by state legislators who are mismatched in terms of either partisanship or ideology. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental lobbying in which local governments purchase advocacy to compensate for the representational gaps that sometimes emerge in multilevel political systems.

At the same time, I also find that size and wealth are major determinants of the decision to lobby. While hiring lobbyists might help cities communicate their needs to their elected representatives, the data show that smaller, less affluent communities are less likely to participate in this market for advocacy. While intergovernmental lobbying may play an

important role in facilitating representation between different levels of government, it appears that larger and more affluent communities are the most likely to take advantage of this opportunity.

2 Explaining the Demand for Lobbying

Cities are generally transparent about their lobbying objectives. They want more money, greater autonomy, fewer mandates, and increased institutional power (Payson 2018). By way of example, Figure 1A in the Appendix is an excerpt from a report filed by the city manager of Palo Alto, California. The report explicitly states that the city intends to hire a lobbyist to "protect local revenue sources," "protect and increase funding for specific programs and services," and "protect and increase local government discretion," among other reasons. But assuming that all local governments would like more money, power, and autonomy, why do some local officials take the step of paying for lobbyist representation?

Interest group scholars typically focus on two primary determinants of lobbying: political stakes and organizational resources (Lowery and Brasher 2004). Classic pluralist theories posited that groups are more likely to become politically active when the policy stakes are high (Truman 1951), and the empirical literature has demonstrated that this plays out in a variety of settings. For example, firms lobby more when their industries are more heavily regulated (Stigler 1971; Hansen and Mitchell 2001), when they are more dependent on the government for sales and contracts (Tripathi 2000; Hart 2001), and when their business operations are more sensitive to potential government interventions (Salamon and Siegfried 1977; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994).

Organizations are also more likely to get politically involved when they have more resources at their disposal—including members, assets, and employees (Drope and Hansen 2006; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011). Scholars have proposed various mechanisms to explain these findings. Smaller companies generally have only intermittent political concerns that

don't warrant the expense of a lobbyist, and they may lack the the political expertise to influence outcomes (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014). Similarly, Drutman, Grossmann, and LaPira (2014) argue that only an elite "top tier" of interest groups can afford to spend enough money on political advocacy to stand out in today's complex policy environment. These high fixed costs might deter groups with fewer resources from entering the lobbying arena.

If the same logic applies to the lobbying decisions of local governments, we would expect larger and more economically affluent cities to be the most active lobbyists. The stakes are clearly high for populous metropolitan areas. Urban centers have historically been underrepresented in state legislatures and are often disproportionately impacted by state policy (Nice 1987). Major cities also tend to provide a variety of services to socioeconomically diverse populations and often struggle to raise additional revenue without alienating their tax base (Peterson 1981). Given the enormous fiscal and administrative control that states exercise over their local units (Haider 1974), large cities thus face particularly strong incentives to lobby.

The existing literature also suggests that we should expect to see more lobbying by resource-rich local governments, all else equal. Affluent cities like Palm Beach and Beverly Hills might be more likely to lobby because they can more easily foot the bill. And the residents of these communities are more likely to be politically active, which would further drive the demand for lobbying (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). An alternative possibility is that disadvantaged cities might lobby more in order to secure revenue—particularly if they are constrained in their ability to raise revenue locally. But the analyses presented in the following sections are more consistent with the former story. Economic capacity appears to matter for intergovernmental lobbying as well as in the private sector.

3 How Local Governments Are Different: Lobbying and Representation in Federal Systems

Institutional size and economic capacity are two organizational characteristics that predict lobbying for interest groups generally. But there are also several important distinctions between governments and other types of institutions that lobby. Local governments are part of the federal system and are embedded in political districts represented by other levels of government. Put another way, local governments are provided with elected representation by state and federal officials whose job is to represent local interests. But the quality of this representation varies based on the relationship that a city has with its elected legislators—as well as its relationships with the state and federal government more broadly.

When these relationships work well, local officials can often get everything they need in terms of policy and funding without hiring lobbyists. As a former Airport Director in Flint, Michigan, observed: "We've just never really needed [lobbyists]...we've been successful enough using our senators and congressman."[1] The mayor of Springfield, Illinois, explained that his city relied on the Illinois Municipal League and the city's elected delegation to represent the cities interests in state government.[2] And the mayor of Kenai, Alaska, was even more explicit in acknowledging the importance of relationships with state elected officials. "I've got a great relationship with all of our legislative delegation. I felt like local government shouldn't have to hire a lobbyist to lobby our legislators. We should go directly to them."[3]

But not all local governments enjoy such cozy relationships with their representatives. Sometimes, local officials struggle to get the attention of their state and federal counterparts.

[1] http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2009/12/taxpayers_pay_when_local_gover.html

[2] http://www.sj-r.com/article/20130811/News/308119958

[3] https://www.adn.com/politics/article/alaska-communities-school-districts-paying-more-lobbyists-cash-strapped-capitol/2016/02/15/

For example, a progressive urban city might sit in a predominantly conservative district with a Republican congresswoman. Or, a town might be cut into multiple legislative districts, introducing coordination problems across its representatives. If local governments aren't getting what they want through their elected officeholders—whatever the reason—hiring lobbyists provides them with the opportunity to purchase an alternative form of advocacy.

Perhaps not surprisingly, state and federal officials generally claim that municipal lobbying is unnecessary. According to the Chief of Staff of Congressman Bill Young (R-Florida), "When asked the question whether a city or county needs to hire a lobbyist, he has always told them they don't need to hire a lobbyist to work with their own congressman. That's his job. Those are the people he was elected to represent. He doesn't need to work through somebody else to schedule a meeting with a mayor or a city council member."[4] State Representative Greg Davis of Minnesota was even more explicit: "It's insulting that [they] need to hire a lobbyist when we're elected to make sure our cities are in great shape."[5]

But representatives likely would not admit to having poor relationships with their local governments. After all, their jobs depend on adequately representing their constituents. But the fact remains that if mayors and city managers could simply pick up the phone and get everything they wanted from their elected officials in terms of funding and favorable policy, they wouldn't allocate scarce city revenue toward hiring lobbyists. This is the key assumption underlying my argument: if cities could get what they needed from their state representatives without paying for lobbyist advocacy, they would. The rest of this paper uses a variety of measures to operationalize the quality of representation between state and local officials and demonstrates that these dynamics consistently affect the lobbying decisions of cities.

---

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/02/washington/02earmarks.html

[5] http://www.startribune.com/governments-spend-millions-lobbying-government/373685161/

4 Lobbying Disclosure Data: Descriptive Overview

The state-level lobbying data used in the following analyses are the product of a multi-year data collection effort that involved gathering, cleaning, and compiling lobbying disclosure data from all 50 states. Each state has its own lobbying disclosure law requiring lobbyists to report their communication with state officeholders—and each state law is at least as restrictive as the 1995 Federal Lobbying Disclosure Act (Lowery and Brasher 2004). But while every state regulates lobbying, this information is more difficult to access than federal disclosure data because each state has its own reporting standards. Some states make their lobbying information publicly available on-line; other states are less transparent and only provide data upon request—and sometimes for a fee.[6]

This 50-state lobbying database runs from 2006 to 2014 and contains nearly half a million total observations. Armed with information about all of the organizations that were lobbying in a given state in each year, I could identify which cities employed lobbyists by matching the names from the disclosure data with the universe of municipalities enumerated by the Census of Governments. The Census of Governments is conducted every five years by the U.S. Census Bureau and "identifies the scope and nature of the nation's state and local government sector; provides authoritative benchmark figures of public finance and public employment; classifies local government organizations, powers, and activities; and measures federal state, and local fiscal relationships."[7]

There are a few additional things to note about using disclosure filings to measure lobbying. First, cities (and other organizations) are required to disclose the lobbying activities of both in-house employees as well as external firms. For example, if a large city were to hire a full-time staff member to lobby on its behalf, it would need to report that information. To

[6] https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/50-state-assessment-of-lobbying-expenditure-data/

[7] https://www.census.gov/govs/cog/about_the_data.html

be sure, lobbyists and their clients sometimes try to skirt the system and fail to disclose their attempts to influence. But due to the often visible nature of their work, lobbyist disclosures of their clients are generally reliable.[8]

Second, as discussed in the previous section, local officials can also "lobby" by communicating directly with their state representatives. In fact, this happens all the time. State house members spend up to half of each week in their districts attending meetings with local elected officials and constituents (Jewell 1982), and city mayors and council members often have close relationships with their state delegation. The following analyses specifically examine the logic of *paid* lobbying, whereby municipal officials hire an outside firm to lobby on their behalf. To the extent that informal lobbying communication also occurs between cities and their state members, this should attenuate any findings that I report.

After determining which city governments filed state disclosure reports, I merged this information with financial, demographic, and political data from a variety of other sources. These include the American Community Survey, Missouri Census Center geography data, state legislator ideology estimates from Shor and McCarty (2014), city ideology estimates (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014), and information from the National Center for Money in State Politics. The final dataset contains information about municipal lobbying and city characteristics for each of the roughly 4,600 cities in the U.S. with a population of at least 5,000 and spans the period from 2006 to 2014.[9]

One limitation of the data is that the financial outcomes are not measured in every year for every city. At a minimum, each city contains fiscal observations for the years 2007 and 2012, which were Census of Government years. In non-census years, the Bureau conducts a Survey of Government Finances, which provides annual fiscal data for all cities with a population

[8]More common is underreporting total client spending or failing to document the specific bills these clients are lobbying on behalf of: `https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/08/25/15344/lobbying-disclosures-leave-public-dark`

[9]Note that 2014 is the last year for which state representative ideology estimates were available at the time of writing.

Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Lobbying Cities, Population 5,000+. City lobbying is widespread across the U.S.

of over 25,000 as well as for a sample of smaller cities. The result is an unbalanced panel, with complete financial data available for 5 out of the 9 years for each city, on average. Fortunately, the random sampling procedure used to identify smaller cities for inclusion in the survey is likely independent from their lobbying decisions in a given year.

City lobbying is common across the U.S. and is not limited to a single state or region. Figure 1 maps every city with a population of 5,000 or more and shows which cities lobbied at least once between 2006 and 2014. Cities hire lobbyists in every state, with particularly high numbers of cities lobbying in Washington, California, Texas, and Florida. States also experience significant variation in the proportion of cities that lobby, and exploring the cross-state institutional features that predict local government lobbying is a topic ripe for further research.

In general, cities that employ lobbyists tend to be major population centers. Table 1

Table 1: City Lobbying by Population. As city populaton increases, lobbying becomes more common. Regardless of size, cities are more likely to lobby their state than the federal government.

		% Lobbying	
Population	N	State	Federal
5,000 - 10,000	1,653	5	1
10,001 - 30,000	1,728	10	4
30,001 - 50,000	455	27	12
50,001 - 100,000	422	44	27
100,001 - 500,000	223	72	52
Over 500,000	33	85	79

highlights the relationship between city size and the likelihood of lobbying. Size is clearly an important factor in the decision to lobby. While only 5% of cities with a population between 5,000 and 10,000 lobby their state government, that proportion increases steadily as city population grows, with large majorities of cities with populations over 100,000 lobbying. Note that across all city sizes lobbying the state governments is more common than lobbying Washington, D.C., although this gap decreases among the largest cities.

This finding mirrors an empirical regularity in the corporate lobbying literature, which is that firm size is one of the most consistent predictors of corporate political activity (Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 2004; Drope and Hansen 2006). Theoretical explanations for the phenomenon typically emphasize that larger companies are disproportionately impacted by the political and economic environment and thus face greater incentives to shape that environment through lobbying and PAC contributions (Mitchell, Hansen, and Jepsen 1997). At the same time, these companies also have more resources at their disposal to engage in political activities. A similar logic likely applies to cities. Larger cities have greater demand for services and are especially affected by state policies (Zimmerman 2012). Subsequent analyses will demonstrate how municipal population contributes to the decision to lobby after accounting for other factors and will examine other characteristics

that contribute to city lobbying behavior.

5 Explaining Cross-Sectional Variation in City Lobbying

I begin by establishing some general correlations between city characteristics and lobbying activity. Table 2 shows the predicted probability of lobbying across a variety of covariates for every city in the sample. These marginal correlations are estimated via pooled OLS. Demographic and financial variables include measures of city population, median income, own source revenue, racial diversity, and median house value. The model also contains two variables that begin to capture how representational dynamics might correlate with local lobbying.[10]

First, I include the number of lower house members representing each city. Larger cities are frequently split into multiple legislative districts; however, this also occurs regularly for smaller municipalities, especially after redistricting. When multiple legislators represent a city, local officials might have more trouble coordinating a cohesive legislative strategy. Transaction costs increase as municipal officials attempt to communicate across districts, and legislators may also have an incentive to shift blame and unduly claim credit for state actions affecting the city (Chen 2010). As a result, the expectation is that cities are more likely to lobby when they are represented by multiple house members.

The other representational variable is a measure of delegate polarization in cities represented by multiple legislators. This is operationalized as the difference in ideology scores between the two most extreme legislators representing a city. A value of 0 indicates a city is represented by a single member or two members with identical scores, and larger values indicate higher degrees of incongruence between the state elected officials. If greater ideological heterogeneity between a city's delegation makes it more difficult to coordinate across legislators, we would expect this measure to also correlated positively with lobbying.

[10]Descriptive statistics for all of these variables can be found in Table A1.

Table 2: Correlates of City Lobbying State Government, 2006-2014. After controlling for a variety of city demographics, two representational variables correlate with city lobbying. The probability of lobbying increases as more state house members represent a city and as the ideological distance between those representatives increases.

	Probability of Lobbying
# House Representatives	0.006*
	(0.001)
Ideological Distance Between Reps.	0.012*
	(0.004)
Population (Log)	0.109*
	(0.005)
Median Income (Log)	0.733*
	(0.253)
Median Income Squared (Log)	−0.035*
	(0.012)
Own Source Revenue (Log)	0.032*
	(0.004)
% White	−0.332*
	(0.068)
% White Squared	0.168*
	(0.054)
Median House Value (Log)	0.026*
	(0.009)
State-Year FEs	✓
Observations	22,040
# Cities	4,714
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.21

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Consistent with other findings from the interest group literature, Table 2 indicates that city population is one of the strongest predictors of lobbying across cities. Each time the size of a city's population doubles, the probability of lobbying increases by about 10 percentage points—holding other city characteristics fixed. The results from the multivariate linear probability model confirm what was evident from the simple cross-tabulations presented earlier in the paper: large cities lobby often.

In fact, 63% of the 100 most populous cities reported hiring lobbyists in every year between 2006 and 2014. Perpetual government lobbyists include New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, as well as Miami, Phoenix, and St. Louis. But many large cities paid for lobbying in some years but not others, like San Francisco and Newark, and a few cities didn't pay for lobbyist representation at all during this period—including Boston. Small and mid-sized cities were even more heterogeneous in their lobbying decisions. After accounting for population, what other city characteristics predict the choice to hire a lobbyist?

Local own-source revenue availability is another important correlate of municipal lobbying. Own-source revenue is generated by cities themselves, usually through property taxes and also through user fees and charges and sometimes local sales taxes. But cities vary in their ability to raise local revenue, depending on the value of the property and the affluence of their tax base. Cities that are able to raise more revenue locally are generally more well-off economically and rely less on transfers from the state and federal government. And Table 2 shows that cities with more local, own-source revenue available to them are more likely to hire lobbyists, all else equal. This finding suggests that municipal resources play a role in the decision to lobby.

Interestingly, the median income of a city's residents does not have a linear relationship in predicting cross-sectional city lobbying. Rather, the probability of lobbying steadily increases with income—and then falls for cities at the very top of the income distribution. This likely reflects the fact that some of the most affluent municipalities in the U.S. are quite small and provide relatively few public services. Some of these communities, like Atherton, California, were incorporated expressly with the purpose of allowing residents to control property taxes. Local government might simply not be active enough in these cases to warrant lobbying. In subsequent within-city analyses, I find that simple linear increases in income predict city lobbying.

City size and own-source revenue capacity are predictors of municipal lobbying with theoretical analogues in the interest group literature. But Table 2 also introduces some initial

evidence that representational dynamics are associated with the decision to lobby. First, the probability of lobbying increases with each additional lower house member representing a city. This finding is consistent with the idea that coordinating across multiple representatives is costly for cities. An employee of the Springfield Metro Sanitary District in Illinois illustrates the logic: "We have multiple people [state representatives], but sometimes Springfield is on the fringe of a district. The actual district may be centered elsewhere. We feel it's better to have [lobbyist] representation, someone on your side if you have a particular issue."[11]

Among cities that have more than one state legislator, the ideological distance between those members also predicts lobbying. The results indicate that the farther apart a city's house representatives are in terms of ideology, the more likely a city is to lobby. Again, these correlations provide some initial evidence that cities may use lobbyists to coordinate among representatives with conflicting agendas.

Figure 2 visually depicts the predicted probability of lobbying across some of the covariates in Table 2. The top row demonstrates the non-linear relationship between a city's median income and the percentage of white residents with the decision to lobby. The bottom row shows the marginal predicted probability of lobbying across the total number of lower house members representing a city as well as the absolute value of the ideological between them. These correlations suggest that, after accounting for demographic and financial characteristics, how cities are represented by their elected officials might influence their decision to lobby.

6 Within-City Determinants of Lobbying

The previous section modeled the cross-sectional probability of lobbying across cities and indicated that several covariates correlate with municipal lobbying. But these correlations may or may not reflect a causal relationship. Cities that are larger or that elect represen-

[11] http://www.sj-r.com/x369946631/Local-governments-split-on-hiring-lobbyists

Figure 2: Probability of City Lobbying State Government. Marginal predicted probability of lobbying by city racial composition, median income, and ideological characteristics of state representatives.



tatives with diverging ideologies might differ from other cities in a variety of unobservable ways—and these differences could be the true drivers of the decision to lobby.

Panel data can help address some of these issues. By observing the same cities over time, we can examine how time-varying conditions affect lobbying choices *within-city*. The following analyses use city and different combinations of year and state-by-year fixed effects to account for two types of confounders. Year fixed effects control for environmental shocks that might lead all cities to lobby more or less in a year—like the financial crisis of 2007–2008. And city fixed effects control for time-invariant characteristics that could drive the demand for lobbying.

Table 3: Within City Determinants of Lobbying, 2006 - 2014. Population growth continues to predict within-city lobbying in different years, as does median income. A change in the number of state house representatives—usually due to redistricting or an unexpected departure from office—also increases the probability of lobbying by just over 1%.

	Probability of Lobbying			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ # Representatives	0.015*	0.014*	0.014*	0.012*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Population (Log)		0.117*	0.114*	0.109*
		(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.044)
Median Income (Log)			0.057*	0.050
			(0.026)	(0.028)
Own Source Revenue (Log)			0.003	0.003
			(0.004)	(0.003)
% White			0.037	0.071
			(0.089)	(0.088)
Median House Value (Log)			0.007	−0.004
			(0.027)	(0.031)
City FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	
State-Year FEs				✓
Observations	41,271	41,271	41,237	41,237
# Cities	4,714	4,714	4,714	4,714
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

The panel regression approach yields important insight into the cross-sectional results. The results in Table 3 demonstrate that population still has the greatest effect on the probability of lobbying, and the coefficient estimates are fairly similar to what was reported in the previous section. The probability of lobbying rapidly increases as city size grows. Median income level is also still predictive of lobbying, although diagnostic tests show that a simple linear specification is a better fit than the quadratic specification used in the previous section. However, city own-source revenue, racial composition, and median house value are less important in explaining the decision to lobby within-city. The ideological distance measure

included in the pooled cross-sectional analyses is also so small and statistically noisy that I drop this variable from subsequent panel analyses.[12]

However, the number of representatives serving a city still has an impact on lobbying behavior. The change in number of representatives variable takes a value of 1 if the city was represented by more house members in year t than in year t-1. This often occurs following state legislative redistricting. An increase in the number of house members leads to a modest 1% increase in the probability of lobbying. While not a huge effect, the average probability of a city lobbying in a given year is only 16%. Moreover, placebo tests show that this effect only occurs in the year of the switch and in subsequent periods—increasing the number of state representatives in a city's delegation does not affect the probability that the city lobbies the state government in the previous year (results in Table A2 in the Appendix).

7 Measuring Representational Congruence Between Cities and State Legislators

A change in the number of elected lawmakers representing a city is a fairly blunt measure of representation. A more intuitive way to operationalize the quality of representation between cities and their state officials is by comparing the congruence of their ideology. Data on city ideology are available for just over 1,244 of the cities in my sample based on estimates by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014). These estimates rely on hundreds of thousands of public opinion survey responses from city residents across the country and use multilevel regression with post-stratification to assign ideal points to cities. The analyses in this section are performed on this subset of cities.

Data on state legislator ideologies are the Shor and McCarty scores introduced in the previous section. The Tausanovitch and Warshaw and Shor and McCarty estimates each provide information about the relative ideological preferences of cities (compared to other

[12]This is likely due to insufficient within-city variation in the distance measure over time.

cities) and state representatives (compared to other state representatives). However, it is important to note that these measures were derived on different scales. For a city with a given MRP ideology estimate, it's unclear which state legislator ideology score comes closest to representing the preferences of that city. Nevertheless, the two measures correlate strongly. Cities with more liberal Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores have, on average, representatives with more liberal Shor and McCarty scores.

Figure 3 plots state representative ideology measures (lower chamber) against city ideology estimates.[13] Positive values are more conservative, and negative values are more liberal. While the range of the city ideology scores is more compressed than that of the legislator scores, the relationship is clear. The most liberal city in the sample is Berkeley, California. At the same time, cities and their representatives in the south tend to be more conservative.

However, some cities appear to be ideologically more distant from their state legislators than others. Several relatively liberal cities are represented by more conservative representatives, and vice versa. For example, Little Rock, Arkansas, is a fairly liberal city. Its residents are 40 percent African-American and include many well-educated white voters, and a majority of the city voted for Obama in 2008. But one of the state legislators representing part of Little Rock in 2012 was Allen Wade Kerr (R-Pulaski County), an ultra-conservative who supported abortion bans and co-sponsored legislation allowing handguns to be carried on church and school properties.[14]

To test whether these types of ideological mismatches affect city lobbying, I specify a variety of different measures of congruence between cities and state legislators. The general strategy is to bin both cities and their representatives into different quantiles based on their partisan and ideological characteristics and to flexibly estimate how various representational patterns affect city lobbying. This allows me to avoid making assumptions about

[13]When a city is represented by more than one legislator, the y-axis shows the average ideology score across legislators.

[14]`https://votesmart.org/candidate/key-votes/80920/allen-kerr`

Figure 3: Correlation Between City and State Representative Ideology. On average, a city's ideology correlates strongly with the ideology of its state representative. Negative values are more liberal; positive values are more conservative.



the functional form of the relationship between the continuous city and legislator ideology scores (which again were derived on different scales). Instead, I can see how cities that are relatively more liberal (conservative) or Democratic (Republican) respond when they are represented by state delegates that fall at different points along the ideological and partisan distribution. Critically, the results are very consistent across a range of specifications. Whether using measures of city vote share and legislator partisanship or the MRP and Shor-McCarty estimates and across a variety of specified thresholds, the following analyses show that representational dynamics matter for city lobbying.

7.1 Partisan Mismatches Promote City Lobbying

I begin by looking at the relationship between city presidential vote share in 2008 and the partisan composition of its lower house delegation. I divide cities into terciles based on Democratic vote share and specify a partisan mismatch when a Democratic city is represented by a Republican state legislator or when a Republican city is represented by a Democratic state legislator.[15] I exploit the fact that cities elected different types of representatives over time to estimate the effect of a partisan mismatch on lobbying probability.

Table 4 presents results from a panel regression design with city and year or state-by-year fixed effects. This approach demonstrates what happens when the same city is represented by state legislators that are either aligned or mismatched in terms of partisanship. The key variation comes from the fact that there were 776 observations of partisan mismatches that occurred over the course of the panel. After controlling for time varying city characteristics, the results indicate that when a city elects a representative from the opposite political party, the probability of lobbying increases by nearly 5%.[16] Given the mean lobbying probability of 36%, this reflects a substantial increase.

I perform several robustness checks to ensure the validity of this approach. First, I include leads and lags of the treatment variable (in this case, a partisan mismatch between a city and its lower house representatives) to examine if pre-treatment trends are a concern. Figure 4 shows the effects in graphical form. Unfortunately, due to the short nature of the panel, I could include one lead and one lag before the sample size became too reduced to recover reliable effects. But the results are still constructive.

Interestingly, it appears that cities might be starting to lobby more in the year before they become mismatched from their representative. Although this estimate is not statistically

[15] Or, in the case of a multi-member city, when more than 60% of the delegation comes from the opposite party.

[16] The results are even stronger when I bin cities into medians rather than terciles based on their partisan vote share in 2008.

Table 4: Effect of Partisan Mismatch on City Lobbying. A mismatch between a city's partisanship and the party of its state representative increases the probability of lobbying by nearly 5%

	Probability of Lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Mismatch	0.049*	0.048*
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Population (Log)	0.105	0.110
	(0.091)	(0.101)
Median Income (Log)	0.011	0.011
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Own Source Revenue (Log)	0.047	0.005
	(0.076)	(0.079)
% White	−0.289	−0.298
	(0.237)	(0.247)
Median House Value (Log)	0.078	0.076
	(0.056)	(0.069)
City FEs	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	
State-Year FEs		✓
Observations	11,016	11,016
# Cities	2,487	2,487
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.36	0.36

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

distinguishable from zero, this raises the possibility that cities begin to lobby when they anticipate electoral turnover among their state legislators. As a result, the causal effect of electing a mismatched candidate should be interpreted somewhat cautiously. On the other hand, if cities hire lobbyists when they anticipate changes to their state delegation, this would still be consistent with a story in which representational dynamics influence the decision to lobby. Additional tests will be required to determine how to properly interpret these results.

I also examine a subset of cities in the sample to assess the parallel trends assumption. Generating pre-treatment trends is difficult with my data because cities become mismatched with their state legislators at different times, and the panel is also quite short. However,

Figure 4: Partisan Mismatch: Leads and Lags. When a state representative from the opposite political party takes office, cities are more likely to lobby.



there were 173 cities in the sample that followed a pattern of not being mismatched for two years before electing a mismatched representative. Comparing the probability of lobbying for these cities with a matched control sample provides evidence that the two groups of cities had very similar trends before the treatment (Figure A2 in Appendix.)

Next, I turn to analyses using the MRP and Shor-McCarty ideology estimates. Again, I divide cities into terciles, this time based on their ideology scores. Cities in the most liberal third of the distribution are coded as "Liberal," while cities in the most conservative third of the distribution are coded as "Conservative." I then assign legislators to quantiles (consisting of "Most Liberal," "Liberal," "Moderate," "Conservative," "Most Conservative"), which allows me to flexibly estimate the effect of representative ideology when cities elect members from different points in the distribution.[17]

[17]I use a variety of other techniques to code cities and state legislators as more or less conservative (liberal) to account for the fact that the measures were derived on different scales. These include

Table 5: Effect of Representative Ideology on City Lobbying. Cities are especially likely to lobby when they are represented by a house member with a relatively extreme opposing ideology.

	Probability of Lobbying	
	Liberal Cities	Conservative Cities
	(1)	(2)
Liberal Rep.	−0.006	−0.091
	(0.033)	(0.064)
Moderate Rep.	0.020	−0.051
	(0.044)	(0.057)
Conservative Rep.	0.049	−0.080
	(0.053)	(0.055)
Very Conservative Rep.	0.116*	−0.107*
	(0.058)	(0.054)
City FEs	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓
Observations	2,541	3,011
# Cities	362	433
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.51	0.37

Models control for population, income, own source revenue, percent white, and median house value. Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Using the same panel regression approach as before, I estimate the effect of lobbying across a variety of city and state legislator ideology pairings. Table 5 shows the results for liberal and conservative cities. The omitted category for state representative ideology is "very liberal," and the coefficients show the probability of lobbying across legislator ideology types compared to this baseline. This flexible approach demonstrates that the probability of lobbying increases as state legislators become more extreme in their ideology. Liberal cities are almost 12% more likely to lobby when represented by a very conservative house member compared to a very liberal representative. Similarly, conservative cities are 11% *less* likely to lobby when they elect an extreme conservative as opposed to an extreme liberal.

re-scaling both sets of measures by their rank correlation and using liberal (conservative) indicators that are above (below) the mean and median of each scale. The following results are very similar and consistent across all of these different specifications.

Figure 5: Effect of Ideological Mismatch on Lobbying. City fixed effects models demonstrate that cities are more likely to lobby when they are represented by a house member with a relatively extreme opposing ideology.



Figure 5 illustrates the marginal effect of representative ideology on the probability of lobbying, broken down by conservative and liberal cities. The prediction intervals are a bit imprecise given the relatively small sample size in each condition, but the pattern is clear. When state house members are elected with opposing ideologies, cities are more likely to hire lobbyists to represent them in state government. Note that all of these specifications include city and year fixed effects as well as all time-varying controls.

7.2 Extension: Regression Discontinuity Design

The previous section identified the effect of different types of partisan and ideological mismatches on city lobbying using panel regression techniques. This approach compares the

lobbying decisions of cities before and after they elect representatives with different ideological characteristics. Another approach would be to try to identify cities that narrowly elect either aligned or mismatched candidates. If a sufficient number of these close elections occur, a regression discontinuity design can uncover the local average effect of state representative alignment on city lobbying.

To employ the RDD, I merged data on state legislator election returns with the dataset used in the previous analyses. The running variable is the margin of victory for the mismatched candidate. If a mismatched candidate gets 50.1% of the vote, she wins election; if she gets 49.9%, she loses. The key assumption for the design to recover a valid estimate is that candidates are not able to sort around the 50% threshold and that potential outcomes for cities are continuous at the cutpoint.

Table 6 shows the results of implementing the RDD using the `rdd` package in R. Bandwidths were selected via the Imbens and Kalyanaraman procedure. When a mismatched statehouse candidate narrowly wins election, cities dramatically increase their probability of lobbying by over 16% (column 1). This local estimate is much higher than the one recovered by the panel regression analyses and provides further evidence that one of the ways in which cities respond to representational mismatches with their state legislators is by hiring lobbyists.

Table 6: RDD Results. When an election leads a city to be narrowly represented by a mismatched statehouse representative, the probability of lobbying increases dramatically.

	Probability of Lobbying		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mismatched Candidate Wins	0.1625*	0.1930*	0.1286
	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.066)
N	797	537	1,099
RDD Bandwidth	3.020	1.510	6.041

Imbens and Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth. *p<0.05

Figure 6 displays these results graphically. While cities with mismatched state representatives are more likely to lobby, on average, there is a sharp increase in this probability right at the cutoff. However, these results should be interpreted with caution. One of the assumption necessary to recover valid estimates from an RDD is that candidates are not able to manipulate election results around the cutoff. But a McCrary sorting test shows that aligned candidates are much more likely to barely win their elections than non-aligned candidates (Figure A3 in Appendix). This shouldn't be too surprising given that it is much more common for state representative to be ideologically aligned with their cities, and aligned candidates also tend to be incumbents. But even if close elections are not completely randomly assigned, the RD results provide further descriptive evidence that something important happens at the city-level when representational mismatches emerge.

Figure 6: Effect of Narrowly Electing Mismatched Legislator on City Lobbying (RDD). Local linear regression estimates. Imbens and Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth.



8 Does Representative or Chamber Ideology Matter More?

The previous sections demonstrated that cities are more likely to lobby when they are represented by lower statehouse officials that are ideologically opposed to them. But how does the general ideological composition of the state legislature affect municipal lobbying? Are cities lobbying in response to ideological mismatches with their own representative or with the chamber as a whole? Table A3 in the Appendix tests whether cities lobby as the proportion of legislators from the opposite political party increases in the state lower house.

There is some weak evidence that cities lobby more as the proportion of members from the opposite party comprise a larger portion of the legislature. However, this effect is small and imprecisely estimated. The results show that cities are much more likely to lobby when they face ideological mismatches with their own representatives. These findings are consistent with the qualitative evidence provided from interviews with local government officials. City officeholders regularly discuss the importance of their relationship with their particular delegation. They view their elected members as local representatives in the state legislature, and they often mentioned the role of individual legislators in securing earmarks and other favorable policies.

9 Exploring Mechanisms: Evidence From Missouri

If individual legislators matter so much for city lobbying, we would expect to see municipal lobbying efforts geared primarily toward a city's district representative rather than other members of the legislature. Although few states keep this type of information on file, Missouri is an exception and collects detailed information on all meetings between lobbyists and state officials, as well as the clients being represented. These data show that a majority of municipal lobbying meetings target a city's own elected officials. However, this rate is higher for small cities. Table 7 shows the percentage of city lobbyist meetings that are with a

city's district representative, broken down by city size. Smaller municipalities like Branson, Centralia, and St. Peters contacted their own district legislators almost exclusively. Lobbyists for large cities like Kansas City and Springfield also met most often with local district lawmakers, but just under half of their meetings were with other state house members.

Table 7: City Lobby Contacts in Missouri. While small cities contact their district representative almost exclusively, larger cities are more likely to contact other representatives as well as their own.

	N	% Lobbyist Contact with Own-District Rep.
Population < 10,000	876	95%
Population < 75,000	65	78%
Population 75,000+	8	52%

When thinking about the goals of local government lobbyists, it makes sense that cities largely target their own representatives. These are elected officials representing the same constituents, and the requests that local governments make directly affect the ability of state legislators to serve district constituents. And historically, getting the state delegation on board was the most important step in passing particularistic policy that would affect an individual district. According to Teaford (1984), "In state after state, a favorable recommendation by the local delegation [representatives from a specific district] was virtually tantamount to passage" (91). While the evidence from Missouri is obviously a bit preliminary, it lends some credence to the idea that local officials are, in fact, focusing their lobbying efforts on the representatives serving their districts.

10 Discussion

Local governments are some of the most prolific but understudied statehouse lobbyists in the U.S. This paper developed a simple theory of intergovernmental lobbying that emphasizes the importance of political geography. Local governments differ from other interest groups by virtue of their position in the federal system. Because they are nested in legislative districts that are responsible for representing local interests, cities are particularly attuned to their relationship with their state lawmakers when deciding whether to invest money in lobbying.

The interest group literature has consistently found that larger, more economically powerful groups are more likely to participate in politics. This paper demonstrated that this is also true for local governments lobbying in the statehouse: Cities with more residents and higher median incomes are the most active lobbyists. But the data also indicate that a variety of representational dynamics affect municipal lobbying behavior. Specifically, local officials are more likely to lobby when they are represented by state house members with opposing ideologies. Liberal cities are especially sensitive to the ideology of their state house representatives. When these cities are represented by conservative lawmakers, they are dramatically more likely to hire a lobbyist.

Research on this topic is in its early stages, and much remains to be done. In particular, we would need to know more about what happens in districts that elect mismatched legislators in order to understand if representational mismatches are driving city lobbying or if some other change in local conditions leads extreme legislators to be elected while also spurring lobbying. The Tausanovitch and Warshaw measures of city ideology and partisan turnout used in this paper are also time invariant, so developing a more dynamic measure of city preferences—perhaps from precinct-level election returns—would allow me to more precisely control for temporal changes in city ideology. Finally, this paper examines only the relationship between cities and their state representatives in the lower chamber. Incorporating information about state upper chambers and congressional representation would

demonstrate the generalizability of the argument.

Nevertheless, the results in this paper provide some of the first evidence highlighting one of the potential benefits of intergovernmental lobbying. If local governments are not adequately represented by their elected legislators in other levels of government, lobbying offers an alternative channel through which cities can voice their needs in the statehouse. This might potentially increase the quality of representation when state and local interests diverge—a common occurrence in multilevel government. At the same time, if larger, wealthier cities are more likely to take advantage of the opportunity to purchase representation through lobbying, then important questions remain about whose interests are really being represented.

References

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Alan Gerber, and Jim Snyder. 2002. "Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States." *American Political Science Review* 96(4): 767–777.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and James M. Snyder. 2008. *The End of Inequality: One Person, One Vote and the Transformation of American Politics.* WW Norton.

Ardanaz, Martin, and Carlos Scartascini. 2013. "Inequality and Personal Income Taxation: The Origins and Effects of Legislative Malapportionment." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(12): 1636–1663.

Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Franceso Trebbi. 2014. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process." *American Economic Review* 104(12): 3885–3920.

Brollo, Fernanda, and Tommaso Nannicini. 2012. "Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil." *American Political Science Review* 106(4): 742–761.

Chen, Jowei. 2010. "The effect of electoral geography on pork barreling in bicameral legislatures." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 301–322.

De Figueiredo, John M., and Brian S. Silverman. 2006. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying." *Journal of Law & Economics* 49(2): 597–625.

Dragu, Tiberiu, and Jonathan Rodden. 2011. "Representation and Redistribution in Federations." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108(21): 8601–8604.

Drope, Jeffrey M., and Wendy L. Hansen. 2006. "Does Firm Size Matter? Analyzing Business Lobbying in the United States." *Business and Politics* 8(32): 1–17.

Drutman, Lee, Matt Grossmann, and Tim LaPira. 2014. "The Interest Group Top Tier: More Groups, Concentrated Clout." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, `http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2453733` (Accessed Aug. 2, 2017).

Goldstein, Rebecca, and Hye Young You. 2017. "Cities as Lobbyists." *American Journal of Political Science* .

Grier, Kevin B., Michael C. Munger, and Brian E. Roberts. 1994. "The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986." *American Political Science Review* 88(4): 911–926.

Haider, Donald H. 1974. *When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying.* New York: The Free Press.

Hansen, Wendy L., and Neil J. Mitchell. 2001. "Globalization or National Capitalism: Large Firms, National Strategies, and Political Activities." *Business and Politics* 3(1): 5–19.

Hart, David M. 2001. "Why Do Some Firms Give? Why Do Some Give a Lot? High-Tech PACs, 1977-1996." *Journal of Politics* 63(4): 1230–1249.

Hillman, Amy J., Gerald D. Keim, and Douglas Schuler. 2004. "Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda." *Journal of Management* 30(6): 837–857.

Jewell, Malcolm E. 1982. *Representation in State Legislatures*. University Press of Kentucky.

Levitt, Steven D., and James M. Snyder. 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes." *Journal of political Economy* 105(1): 30–53.

Lowery, David, and Holly Brasher. 2004. *Organized Interests and American Government*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lux, Sean T., Russell Crook, and David J. Woehr. 2011. "Mixing Business With Politics: A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Political Activity." *Journal of Management* 37(1): 223–247.

Mitchell, Neil J, Wendy L Hansen, and Eric M Jepsen. 1997. "The determinants of domestic and foreign corporate political activity." *The Journal of Politics* 59(4): 1096–1113.

Nice, David C. 1987. *Federalism: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Payson, A. Julia. 2018. "Cities in the Statehouse: How Local Governments Use Lobbyists to Secure State Funding." Working Paper.

Peterson, Paul E. 1981. *City Limits*. University of Chicago Press.

Salamon, Lester M., and John J. Siegfried. 1977. "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy." *American Political Science Review* 71(3): 1026–1043.

Solé-Ollé, Albert, and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro. 2008. "The Effects of Partisan Alignment on the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for Spain." *Journal of Public Economics* 92(12): 2302–2319.

Sorensen, Rune J. 2003. "The Political Economy of Intergovernmental Grants: The Norwegian Case." *European Journal of Political Research* 42(2): 163–195.

Stigler, George J. 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2(1): 3–21.

Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. "Representation in Municipal Government." *American Political Science Review* 108(3): 605–641.

Teaford, Jon C. 1984. "The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America, 1870–1900.".

Tripathi, Mickey. 2000. "PAC Contributions and Defense Contracting." *Business and Politics* 2(1): 53–73.

Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Public Interests and Public Opinion.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Zimmerman, Joseph F. 2012. *State-Local Governmental Interactions.* Albany: SUNY Press.

A On-line Appendix

Cities, Lobbyists, and Representation in Multilevel Government

Supplementary information intended for on-line publication

Figure A1: Palo Alto City Council Meeting Memo.



CITY OF PALO ALTO

City of Palo Alto

City Council Staff Report

From: City Manager

Lead Department: City Manager

Recommendation

1. Approve a recommendation from the Policy & Services Committee to hire a state lobbyist.
2. Approve the staff recommendation to issue a request for proposals (scope attached) for state legislative advocacy services and return to the Policy & Services Committee for direction on final contract scope of services.

    1. Protect local revenue sources and prevent unfunded mandates.
    2. Protect and increase local government discretion, balancing that with City values and priorities.
    3. Ensure that legislation, policies and budgets retain or increase, but generally don't decrease, the amount of local discretion held by the City and protect local decision making.
    4. Oppose legislation, policies and budgets that reduce the authority and/or ability of local government to determine how best to effectively operate local programs, services and activities. The City retains the right to exceed State goals, standards or targets.
    5. Protect and increase funding for specific programs and services.
    6. Proactively advocate on behalf of the City.
    7. Identify key legislative areas to monitor annually. Take a proactive role in working with Federal and State legislators to draft and sponsor legislation around key City priorities.

Table A1: Municipal Descriptive Statistics, 2006–2015.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Lobby State Government					
All Cities	45,990	0.16	0.37	0	1
Never Lobby State	32,920	0.00	0.00	0	0
Sometimes Lobby State	13,070	0.58	0.49	0	1
# of State Lower Representatives					
All Cities	45,850	1.97	2.18	1	66
Never Lobby	32,810	1.65	1.14	1	18
Sometimes Lobby	13,040	2.77	3.54	1	66
State Rep Ideological Distance					
All Cities	36,861	0.32	0.63	0.00	5.19
Never Lobby	26,298	0.23	0.49	0.00	4.00
Sometimes Lobby	10,563	0.54	0.84	0.00	5.19
Population					
All Cities	45,987	38,095.74	165,017.50	1,792	8,550,405
Never Lobby	32,919	19,089.26	34,682.69	1,792	998,714
Sometimes Lobby	13,068	85,974.09	299,330.90	3,701	8,550,405
Median Income					
All Cities	45,893	55,203.25	25,284.75	13,149	250,000
Never Lobby State	32,840	55,233.06	26,174.58	13,149	250,000
Sometimes Lobby State	13,053	55,128.24	22,894.36	17,250	250,000
Own Source Revenue (Log)					
All Cities	27,811	17.38	1.29	8.35	25.09
Never Lobby	18,668	16.97	1.06	8.35	22.02
Sometimes Lobby	9,143	18.22	1.32	11.50	25.09
% White					
All Cities	45,893	0.78	0.18	0.00	1.00
Never Lobby	32,840	0.80	0.18	0.00	1.00
Sometimes Lobby	13,053	0.72	0.19	0.01	0.99
Median House Value					
All Cities	45,872	216,866.50	174,152.90	32,600	2,000,000
Never Lobby	32,821	206,918.50	169,288.20	32,600	2,000,000
Sometimes Lobby	13,051	241,883.90	183,462.70	35,700	2,000,000

Figure A2: Parallel Trends. When a city elects a statehouse delegation with members from the opposite political party, they become more likely to lobby.



Table A2: Within City Determinants of Lobbying, Leads and Lags.

	Probability of Lobbying, t
Δ # Representatives, t-1	0.016*
	(0.008)
Δ # Representatives, t	0.020*
	(0.009)
Δ # Representatives, t + 1	0.009
	(0.008)
Population (Log)	0.085*
	(0.041)
City FEs	✓
State-Year FEs	✓
Observations	32,092
# Cities	4,585

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Figure A3: RDD Sorting Test. Aligned candidates are much more likely to win election than unaligned candidates, meaning RDD results should be interpreted with caution.



Table A3: Effect of Individual Representative vs. Chamber Mismatch on City Lobbying.

	Probability of Lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Mismatch	0.059*	0.060*
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Chamber Mismatch	0.031	
	(0.029)	
Party Control Mismatch		−0.004
		(0.046)
City FEs	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓
Observations	5,403	5,439
# Cities	734	738
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.47	0.47

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05