Compliance and Resistance in Iraq under Saddam Hussein: Evidence from the Files of the Ba‘th Party

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Abstract

What explains patterns of compliance with and resistance to autocratic rule? This paper provides a theoretical framework for understanding how individuals living under dictatorship calibrate their political behaviors. I argue that the types of non-compliance observed in autocratic contexts differ depending on the intensity of expected punishment and the extent to which sanctions are directed at individuals, families or larger communities. Using data from documents captured by US forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, I use unanticipated political shocks to examine over-time discontinuities in citizen behavior in Iraq under Saddam Hussein during two distinct periods — before and after the First Gulf War and the associated Kurdish and Shi’a anti-regime uprisings. Prior to 1991 and the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Iraq, severe repression and widespread use of collective punishment created the conditions for Iraqi Kurds to engage in a widespread anti-regime rebellion. Before 1991, Shi’a Iraqis were able to express limited forms of political discontent; after 1991, however, Shi’a were forced to publicly signal compliance while shifting to more private forms of anti-regime activity. While Iraqis living in and around Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit almost universally self-identified as Ba’thists and enjoyed privileges as a result of close ties to the regime, Sunnis living in areas distant from Tikrit became increasingly estranged from the regime as international sanctions closed off economic opportunities.

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1 Introduction

The internal workings of an autocratic regime are often described as taking place within a “black box” – while some of the input and output characteristics are known, the inner dynamics of how power coalesces and is maintained remains opaque. Because collecting information in a non-democratic setting is so challenging, relatively little scholarship has sought to explain the mechanics of authoritarian control in the world’s most repressive regimes. It is virtually impossible to study the internal politics of such regimes while the dictator is in power. And even after regimes have been overthrown, new holders of political power may have an incentive to hide information about the repressive and control apparatuses due to the political implications of exposing the often widespread nature of societal complicity with the ancien régime (Nalepa 2010).

Determining the specificities of everyday political life in one of the 20th century’s most notorious dictatorships — Iraq under Saddam Hussein — is possible as a result of the availability of more than ten million internal security force and Ba’th party documents recovered after the overthrow of the Iraqi regime in 2003. The documents associated with this collection — currently housed at Stanford’s University’s Hoover Institution — provide a rich picture of the everyday practices of Iraq’s highly repressive autocracy. Using data from these captured documents, I provide empirical evidence about the political practices of citizens living under highly difficult political circumstances.

Previous scholarly work suggests that social and political grievance should be associated with higher levels of political agitation and non-compliance. Grievance only translates into resistance, however, under particular conditions. A primary argument of this paper is that the types of non-compliance observed in autocratic contexts are a function of the intensity of the expected punishment and the extent to which sanctioning tends to be individualized or directed at a collective. When a societal group is relatively opaque to the regime, transgressions result in wide-scale collective punishment without regard for the guilt or innocence of neighboring individuals. Knowing that the cost of information about opposition activity tends to be high, individuals can organize relatively freely, encouraging social cohesiveness. When the regime tries to put down opposition, dense social networks provide conditions ripe for a full-fledged rebellion. Groups with more individualized punishment and lower levels of punishment intensity, on the other hand, are able to publicly express forms of dissent but are not able to foster greater social cohesion. As punishment ramps up, however, forms of dissent tend to get pushed underground.

This framework is associated with a number of empirical regularities in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Iraqis living in and around Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit almost universally self-identified as Ba’thists and enjoyed privileges as a result of their close ties to the regime. Sunnis living in areas distant from Tikrit, however, become increasingly discontent with the Ba’th Party. Individuals living in the Shi’a south had serious grievances against the regime but became less able to publicly express discontent over the course of the 1990s. The prevailing punishment regime also had implications for the development of cohesion within communities. The use of collective punishment at the level of the extended family, tribe or village encouraged forms of social cohesion that supported the spread of destabilizing political rumors and acts of draft evasion. Kurds living in the Iraqi north had little to gain by joining the Ba’th Party. Indeed, strong norms of social cohesion meant that individuals who collaborated too closely with the regime could be sanctioned within the community. Severe forms of collective punishment against Kurdish populations encouraged an “all-in” strategy of resistance against the regime that ultimately resulted in the creation of an autonomous Kurdish governance zone within Iraq.

An aggregate analysis can only tell us so much about the incentives and disincentives faced by citizens as they contemplate how to translate grievance into acts of resistance. An important source of information about life in autcratic Iraq and the type of punishment regime to which individuals were subjected comes from the first-hand testimony of Iraqis. Between 2003 and 2008, documentary film makers associated with the Iraq Memory Foundation recorded the experiences of 190 individuals who survived repression of the Ba’th Party as part of an oral history project. These testimonials aired on al-Iraqiya – an Arabic-language satellite and terrestrial public television network in Iraq that serves 85
percent of the country’s population. I include the first-hand testimony of individuals interviewed for this project throughout the paper.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides historical information on the development of the Iraqi state and modern autocracy in Iraq. Section 3 describes relevant existing theoretical work on political behavior under autocratic regimes and provides a framework for understanding the choice set faced by individuals living under dictatorship. Section 4 describes the archival data sources used in the analysis. Section 5 provides evidence about patterns of compliance and resistance in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. A final section concludes.

2 Background

A defining characteristic of the Iraqi state is its multi-ethnic, multi-sect population. As a result, a typical starting point for historical studies of the country focus on modern-day Iraq’s geographic position on the historical boundary between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and Shi’a Safavid Empire, as well as contemporary Iraq’s adjacency to the historical homeland of the Kurdish people, an ethno-linguistic group indigenous to southwest Asia. As the Ottoman Empire came to consolidate its political control over the region that would become contemporary Iraq, the area was divided into three vilayet, or provinces, centered around the area’s major population centers — Mosul, Baghdad and Basra — which came to roughly correspond to the centroids of a Kurdish north, Sunni center and Shi’a south, respectively. Conversions from Sunni to Shi’a Islam took place almost continuously during the Ottoman period, gaining intensity over time, perhaps as a form of opposition to Ottoman rule.

The history of the modern Iraqi state following the British mandatory period has been well documented in a number of excellent studies (e.g., Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1990; Tripp 2000; Marr 2004; Dawisha 2009). The 1958 overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy introduced a period of political instability which ended with the consolidation of political power in the hands of Saddam Hussein who successfully sidelined his fellow Ba’thist, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, in 1979. Up until this period, forms of political control in Iraq followed a pattern quite similar to neighboring Arab states. Military overthrow of foreign-backed monarchs established Arab republics which repressed political opponents only to be overthrown themselves by other military or political party factions. The characteristic that seemed to most distinguish Iraq from its Arab neighbors was the persistence of the three-way population split between the Arab Shi’a (the numerical majority), Arab Sunni (relatively wealthy, political power holders) and the Kurds (whose ethnic ties cross borders to neighboring Iran, Turkey and Syria).

Ba’thist ideology, with its emphasis on Arab nationalism, sought to Arabize Kurdish populations of the north while reducing emphasis on the religious distinction between Sunnis and Shi’as. The Iraqi Shi’a population had seen important improvements in economic, social and political status beginning in the 1950s (Dawisha 2009, 141). Despite a narrowing of the gap in status and wealth between Shi’a

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1 The testimonials, including material not included in the original television broadcasts, are available for viewing in the Library and Archives of the Hoover Institution.

2 On the one hand, the individuals selected for participation in the oral history project were chosen because of their experiences with regime repression. Clearly not all Iraqis were subject to the type of abuses described in the footage. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein is believed to have killed as many as one million of his own citizens as a result of these abuses (See Dexter Filkins, “Regrets Only?” New York Times, October 7 2007) and many of the individuals subject to regime abuses did not survive the experience. Countless international human rights reports and journalistic accounts describe the widespread nature of Iraqi human rights abuses under the regime of Saddam Hussein (See “Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq And Its Aftermath,” Human Rights Watch, June 1992, and “Iraq’s Brutal Decrees Amputation: Branding and the Death Penalty,” Human Rights Watch, June 1995, for two examples). I am also not aware of any circumstance under which the testimony of these individuals has been refuted.

3 These conversions were most common in southern areas of Iraq which would have been influenced by Shi’a pilgrims traveling from the East to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.

4 The vast majority of the Kurdish population in Iraq are Sunni Muslims. In this paper, I use the shorthand designation of Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd to represent the Arab Shi’a, Arab Sunni and Shi’a and Sunni Kurdish populations, respectively.
and Sunni populations, Sunni Iraqis remained more prosperous and better educated than their Shi’a counterparts and the officer corps of the armed forces remained overwhelmingly Sunni (Dawisha 2009, 142). Because of the emphasis on Arab nationalism in this period, the distinction between Kurds and Arabs seemed to be more intractable than the divide between Sunni and Shi’a sectarian groups within the Arab population (Dawisha 2009, 143).

Although Saddam Hussein had been highly influential in Iraqi governance following the 1968 Ba’thist coup, he did not fully consolidate power until 1979 when he took on the title of President and led a bloody purge of political rivals. Government under Saddam Hussein has been described as having three main pillars — the party, the military and the bureaucracy — where the party dominated the other organizations (Sassoon 2012, 7). The intelligence agencies were an important part of the regime’s security apparatus and “recruited relatively large numbers from clans that owed total loyalty to Saddam Hussein” (Sasson 2012, 11). Sassoon describes the relationship between the party and the security agencies as one of “symbiosis” where thousands of secret documents were copied from the security agencies to the party (2012, 98). The form of governance to emerge relied on co-optation, repression and the cultivation of an elaborate ideological network of influence.

A first-order question might be “why Iraq?” In other words, why such oppressive governance in Iraq when compared to other Middle Eastern states? Although neighboring states were not particularly free, few developed the apparatus for coercion and the will to repress found in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. While an important and interesting puzzle, it is impossible to do more than speculate about the answer. Psychologists might argue that Iraq’s turn toward brutality was related to the personal history and psyche of Saddam Hussein himself. Others might point to the sectarian split in the country, where a geographically central and politically influential minority — the Sunnis — found that repression was the most effectively strategy for maintaining political power over larger Shi’a and Kurdish populations. Even if we are unable to answer the question of why Iraq emerged as among the most repressive autocratic countries of the 20th century, examining individual and community response to growing autocracy in Iraq provides a window into how forms of resistance and compliance emerge under such regimes. The following section provides a theoretical framework for understanding differential response across groups.

3 Theoretical Framework

A rich and influential scholarly literature offers important theoretical insights into why citizens comply with government directives. This section describes a theoretical framework for understanding forms of non-compliance in an oppressive political context. First, I elaborate on an existing theoretical scheme laid out in Petersen (2001) to consider the range of activities individuals might engage in with respect to an autocratic regime. Next, I discuss the concept of a punishment regime and connect this concept to the existing literature on authoritarianism and totalitarianism in comparative politics. Third, I consider both the determinants of the prevailing punishment regime as well as its impact on societal activities and interactions. Finally, I lay out an empirical strategy for considering predictions of the theoretical framework I have described.

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5The military was kept weak deliberately as part of a strategy of “coup proofing” (Sassoon 2012, 7).
6In the context of democratic governance, Levi (1997, 16) asks: “When are individuals actively consenting and when are they more passively engaged in conforming and acquiescing?” For Levi, multiple motivations play into individual decisions to comply or not comply. While both sanctions and incentives play a role in determining citizen behavior, Levi makes the case that at least some portion of observed compliance “expresses confirmation of a belief in the rightness of the policies and of the trustworthiness of the government actors implementing them” (1997, 18). This reflects a vastly different set of conditions when compared with the behavior of citizens in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. While there may have been a subset of the population who had faith in the government, I would argue those individuals were always in the minority and shrinking, as a group, over time.
3.1 Compliance, Cooperation and Resistance

Scholars who seek to characterize compliance with and resistance to onerous political and economic demands suggest that individual behavior reflects a complex set of material and cognitive considerations. Levi argues, for example, that “compliance and non-compliance are not the simple dichotomous variables they at first appear to be” (1997, 17), suggesting a range of possible activities that reflect varieties of consent, volunteerism and resistance. Scott makes the case for the existence of subtle forms of peasant resistance to economic domination that goes beyond characterizations of “blind submission and homicidal rage” (1985, 304). Instead, he argues that individuals engage in a repertoire of activities that reflect non-compliance with the status quo (Scott 1985). For Scott, compliance can result either from resignation or from more active forms of ideological support.

In his work on resistance to authoritarianism in Eastern Europe, Petersen (2001) identifies a series of threshold points over which individuals move from low risk forms of opposition activity, like scribbling graffiti or attending a rally, to more direct material or military support for anti-regime militia activities. Petersen describes the continuum of activities that might reflect an individual’s collaboration with the regime. Scott (1985) points out that rebellions — particularly among rural populations — are rare and everyday forms of resistance among peasants tend to stop short of collective defiance. Building on Petersen (2001), Figure 1 provides a schematic which represents a range of pro- and anti-government activities observed in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The core question of this paper, then, is to try to explain why we observe certain compliance and resistance outcomes, and for which sub-populations within Iraq.

3.2 Regime Type and Punishment Regime

While the dynamics associated with compliance and resistance to autocratic rule are closely tied to issues of authoritarian legitimacy, regime duration and the existence and success of secessionist movements, recent scholarly work on dictatorship has been primarily focused on institutional type with little attention paid to the everyday practices of governance. The most influential work in this tradition has focused on generating typologies of authoritarian regimes. Geddes (2003) argues that single party, military and personalist regimes are distinctive institutional types and that the strategic factors guiding politics in each context are different. Hadenius and Teorell (2007) contend that all dictatorships exhibit greater or lesser degrees of personalism, often in combination with more institutionalized governance structures. Magaloni (2008) concurs and develops a schematic which reintroduces monarchies as a distinctive regime type (previously excluded from the Geddes analysis); Magaloni focuses on a key difference within the set of party autocracies, particularly the distinction between single party regimes and hegemonic party regimes. One tension in this literature relates to how one should characterize those regimes that combine

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Figure 1: Building on Petersen (2001), this schematic depicts examples of pro- and anti-government activity, including both public and more private behaviors. Petersen (2001) argues that there exists a spectrum of community and individual level behavior that reflects both rebellious activity (positive) and activity which supports the regime (negative).
aspects of party organization, military rule, personalism and, sometimes, even hereditary succession. Geddes describes many of the regimes in the Middle East — like those in Egypt or Syria — as “hybrid” regimes exhibiting multiple institutional forms simultaneously.

The focus on institutional type (i.e., military, party, personalist regime or monarchy) represents a step away from a previous literature on non-democratic rule that offered reflections on how power was projected under autocracy and the lived experience of autocratic rule for citizenries. Arendt’s work on the origins and outcomes associated with totalitarianism is seminal; she defines totalitarianism as a “form of government whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking” (1966, 474). For Arendt, the use of terror and ideology are an outgrowth of the regime’s desire to dominate all aspects of citizen life. Although Arendt’s use of the term totalitarian has been criticized by scholars who argue that truly totalizing forms of social control are not possible even in the most repressive regimes (Wedeen 1999, 44), the ambition, or perhaps need, to create totalizing forms of social control would seem to be one dimension on which to distinguish such regimes from other types of autocracy.

Linz (2000) focuses on the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes without regard for the precise institutional form. Linz defines authoritarian political systems as ones with limited forms of political pluralism, without an elaborate guiding ideology and without extensive or intensive political mobilization (Linz 2000, 159). In such a context, a leader or oligarchic group exercises power within relatively predictable limits (Linz 2000, 159). Totalitarianism, on the other hand, is characterized by Linz as having an ideology, a single party and “concentrated power in an individual and his collaborators or a small group that is not accountable to any large constituency” (2000, 67). In Linz’s conceptualization, the role of the party would seem to be the critical component of totalitarianism; he writes that “only when the party organization is superior or equal to the government can we speak of a totalitarian system” (Linz 2000, 94).

One of the core theoretical debates in the literature on Iraq under Saddam Hussein relates to whether the regime should be categorized as authoritarian or totalitarian. Makiya argues that in Iraq under Saddam Hussein fear was “not incidental or episodic” but rather constitutive of the regime itself (1998, xi). Dawisha writes that “unlike earlier authoritarian periods in Iraq...Saddam’s Iraq was a country that was held hostage to the will and whim of one omnipresent tyrant” (2009, 241). For Dawisha, the authoritarianism of Saddam Hussein’s predecessors becomes dwarfed by “Saddam’s procrustean totalitarianism” (2009, 240). Sassoon, on the other hand, does not consider the regime totalitarian (2012, 5) despite the fact that he argues the Ba’th Party was involved with almost all aspects of life, from birth to death (2012, 9). Sassoon points out that “many Iraqis did not accept the Ba’th regime” (2012, 221). Further, some who did support the regime did so not as a result of duress, but rather out
of a desire for power and privilege (Sassoon 2012, 8 and 211). For Sasson, Iraq under Saddam Hussein — while brutal and controlling — should be classified as authoritarian, not totalitarian.\footnote{Linz defines authoritarian political systems as ones with limited forms of political pluralism, without an elaborate guiding ideology and without extensive or intensive political mobilization (Linz 2000, 159). In such a context, a leader or oligarchic group exercises power within relatively predictable limits (Linz 2000, 159).}

Part of the reason for this disconnect in how various scholars describe the regime relates to the differential treatment of citizens and groups of citizens across time and space within the context of a single Iraqi “regime.” For example, tolerance of dissent declined for certain populations over time, sometimes as a result of regional or geopolitical concerns. This variation in treatment across groups within a single country, as well as for particular groups over time, is certainly not unique; yet, empirical studies that use “regime” as the unit of analysis may place less emphasis on the issue of variation in governance forms within the borders of a single state. Instead, the treatment of citizens within a single autocratic regime might be characterized as falling along an authoritarian-totalitarian continuum. A primary, but not exclusive, determinant of location along this continuum is the prevailing punishment regime. While in some country cases, the same punishment regime might be applied to all citizens, in many examples, the prevailing punishment regime is different depending on the sub-population considered.

I define a country’s punishment regime as having two components. The first is the precision with which punishment is exacted and the second is the intensity of that punishment. Punishment precision refers to the use of more individualized or collective forms of punishment. Collective punishment is defined as punishment of a group as a result of the behaviors of a sub-set of individuals within that group; often those punished had no direct relationship to the “bad” act. Punishment intensity refers to the degree of severity. Reprimands are less severe than sanctions; incarceration less onerous than the death penalty. Punishment precision and punishment intensity do not increase together, necessarily. Indeed, communities are regularly sanctioned or deprived of resources in autocracies for non-compliance with government directives or expectations. For example, in Egypt under Mubarak, districts that voted for the Muslim Brotherhood in parliamentary elections received smaller improvements to their physical infrastructure (Blaydes 2011). Similarly, a close associate of the dictator might receive an individualized reprimand for a transgression which would represent a low-intensity, high-precision punishment. Yet, both punishment precision and punishment intensity relate to autocratic regime type in a systematic way even if we observe punishments that reflect every combination of precision and intensity.

A defining feature of totalitarianism relates to what some have called a “reign of terror” imposed upon a population. The prevailing punishment regime reflects one critical aspect of that condition. Totalitarian regimes are characterized — to a greater degree than their more authoritarian counterparts — by increasing intensity of punishment for political transgressions and decreasing precision of punishment. In other words, totalitarian regimes come down more harshly for non-compliance while simultaneously being more likely to punish large groups of non-transgressors for individual acts of transgression. Authoritarian rule, which tends to allow for some public expression of political dissent, tends to be associated with punishment directed at individuals or groups — participation in an opposition party or an anti-regime street protest might lead to incarceration, for example. Family members of that individual might be, under certain circumstances, targeted for arrest or abuse. Yet, severe and collective punishment of large groups of individuals for political crimes tends to be less common under what might be characterized as more authoritarian conditions. A next section examines the impact of the prevailing punishment regime on the types of political non-compliance and resistance observed.

### 3.2.1 Determinants of Punishment Regime and its Impact on Non-Compliance

One major challenge for autocratic rulers, like Saddam Hussein, involves identifying the individual or set of individuals deserving of punishment as a result of their transgressions against the regime. A starting point for this analysis assumes differential costs for collecting information about opposition across societal groups. When the cost of information tends to be low, this allows the regime to punish
individuals who transgress. As the costs of information gathering increase, this leads punishment to be less targeted and more diffuse. In the extreme, forms of collective punishment that target entire villages or regions might be observed. An implicit assumption of such an approach is that the regime prefers to target its punishment when possible. Why would that be the case? Knowing that repression has the potential to radicalize individuals, authoritarian regimes — all else equal — should prefer targeted to indiscriminate forms of repression.

What types of factors increase or decrease a group’s “legibility” from the perspective of the regime?\(^\text{11}\) Shared language is one critical factor. Geographic accessibility would also seem to influence a government’s ability to map an area, take a census or engage in other forms of information collection. In some cases, such factors might be overcome with a large investment in bureaucratic expertise; even then, however, costly investment does not translate readily into local knowledge.

The cost to government of information collection impacts the forms of social cohesion that emerge across communities. When acts of non-compliance are unobservable by the regime, individuals — knowing this — can organize relatively safely, encouraging the creation of dense networks with higher degrees of social cohesion. When a societal group is relatively opaque to the regime, transgressions result in wide-scale collective punishment without regard for the guilt or innocence of neighboring individuals who represent a form of “collateral damage.”

At the opposite extreme, a high level of regime penetration into a community means that punishment for transgressing regime norms tends to be more individualized. The ease with which information is gathered about opposition to the regime leaves disgruntled individuals with little incentive to hide their beliefs; agents of the regime are likely to ferret out their preferences anyway. Social cohesion is discouraged since individual citizens recognize that regime penetration of their potential network means that anyone in this network might report their opposition beliefs to the government. Weak social networks also discourage societal groups from reigning in individuals who might transgress. For middling levels, the regime might have some idea about who perpetrated the transgression but not enough information to identify an individual transgressor. Under such circumstances, trust and social cohesion develop at the group level, most often to include members of a tribe, clan or extended family.\(^\text{12}\)

The second aspect of the punishment regime relates to the intensity with which transgressions are punished. As mentioned previously, the same transgression, committed by two different people within the same country, might yield very different responses. For example, sharing sectarian identification with the regime leadership might provide a form of political “cover” for individuals engaged in non-regime threatening forms of non-compliance. For highly oppressed portions of the citizenry, even small acts of public non-compliance, however, might be viewed as a form of resistance and, therefore, would be too costly for individuals to attempt. Indeed, with greater repression, higher levels of grievance do not strictly translate into public acts of resistance. Under highly oppressive rule, individual acts of rebellion can lead entire villages or geographic areas to be severely punished.

\(^{11}\)See Scott (1998) on the efforts of high modernist states to render society as “legible.”

\(^{12}\)There are at least two alternative points of departure for this theoretical framework that are conceptually distinct from an explanation related to informational costs. Both lead to similar conclusions, however, regarding the likely punishment regime to emerge and likely work together as a constellation of associated factors. The first relates to the hierarchical ordering of groups within society (Horowitz 2000) and the second to identity and coalitional concerns (Posner 2004). Within Iraqi society there has existed a relationship between ethnic group affiliation and class where Sunnis have historically been at the top of a hierarchical ordering of ranked social groups. In this context, the relatively underdeveloped north left Kurds at the bottom the an economic hierarchy. If the value of individual life within society was determined, in part, by location on this ethno-economic hierarchy, a Kurdish life have been less valued than a Sunni life. This would suggest that the collateral damage associated with collective punishment might be differentiated across societal groups. Shi’a Iraqis would fall between these two extremes. A second approach would suggest that the value of ethnic groups to the political coalition might influence the treatment of group members. Sunnis — hard-pressed to rule Iraq without complicity from at least one of the two major minority groups — pursued policies promoting Arab nationalism. Such policies tended to extend perquisites to Shi’a Iraqis — who shared Arab identification with Sunni Arabs — over Kurdish Iraqis. Again, Sunni represent the core of the political coalition with Kurds as peripheral to the governing coalition. Under such circumstances, perhaps less effort is made to avoid causalities among individuals in the Kurdish community.
The intensity of the punishment is determined by a variety of factors, including ethnic identification, relevance of the sub-group to the political coalition or even racist attitudes leading ruling elites to believe that some citizens are more deserving of harsh punishment than others. While ethnic group and the attitudes held by elites toward that group are slow to change, the relevance of a particular sub-group to the political coalition can shift both rapidly and, sometimes, unexpectedly. How does the severity of punishment impact the social dynamic within a community? When punishment is severe and collective, individuals may come to believe that share a “linked fate” with their fellow group members, further enhancing group solidarity.

For individuals who enjoy close regime ties, along with the associated political and economic benefits, there are few incentives not to comply with the directives and expectations of the dictatorship. Social cohesion within this group may be low but the extent to which it exists, it relates to a desire to exclude out-group members from political and economic power. For groups just outside of the inner circle, and upon whom the regime relies for political and social support, public forms of non-regime threatening dissent are possible. But, when social groups come under more severe and more collective forms of punishment for forms of non-compliance or dissent, anti-regime activity tends to be pushed into the private realm. This shift to private non-compliance is aided by the forms of social cohesion that tend to develop when communities are more severely and collectively punished. When punishment moves toward it maximum in terms of its collective nature and its severity, dense social networks encourage a strategy of “all-in” resistance that can cascade into full-fledged rebellion.

Why are social bonds critical to the creation of rebellion against dictatorship? Gurr’s models of political grievance suggest that when grievances are large and societal groups have elaborate networks with strong, cohesive identities, rebellion is most likely (1970). Petersen (2001) argues that strong communities push individuals into more and more dangerous forms of non-compliance, despite the costs. He argues that in addition to the shared values and beliefs of tight-knit communities, there also exist important status rewards that serve as incentives to individuals calibrating their actions (Petersen 2001, 20). While not all rebellions are successful, certain conditions may foster the possibility of revolt. This argument suggests a mechanism by which populations living under autocracy may move from forms of passive compliance to widespread rebellion.

Table 1 provides a conceptual scheme for how the prevailing punishment regime relates to the form of non-compliance observed. While surely the forms of past non-compliance impact the form of punishment used, I will make the case in the next section for an empirical strategy which suggests the two key determinants of punishment regime — the legibility of the sub-population and the position of that sub-population within the dictatorship’s coalition configuration — enjoy a degree of short-term exogeneity (in the case of the population’s legibility) or are subject to unanticipated political shocks (in the case of the coalition configuration) that allow for forms of both cross-sectional and temporal comparison of effect.

3.3 Foreign Policy Shocks and Predictions

The previous section has argued that variation in the informational environment and location of a group within the coalition configuration create a punishment regime which has important implications for both the types of social cohesion to emerge and the prevailing forms of non-compliance observed. The determinants of punishment regime vary over space and time, respectively. While the legibility of a sub-population may be altered as a result of a dictator’s investment in intelligence and a larger state presence within that population, over the short and medium term, this factor is difficult to change. But to what extent might a sub-population move in or out of a dictator’s coalition over time?

During Saddam Hussein’s almost thirty years of de facto rule, the Iraqi regime was impacted by foreign policy shocks and initiated a series of externally-oriented military interventions that had difficult to anticipate consequences for domestic coalitional concerns. While there is little doubt that Iraqi-initiated foreign policy actions were undertaken with domestic political considerations in mind, evidence
Table 1: Conceptual scheme for relationship between punishment regime and form of non-compliance.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punishment Regime</th>
<th>Social Cohesion</th>
<th>Form of Non-compliance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individualized Low Intensity</td>
<td>Low ⇒ Public</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Group Middling Intensity</td>
<td>Middling ⇒ Private</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective High Intensity</td>
<td>High ⇒ Rebellion</td>
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from a variety of sources suggest that the regime leadership often anticipated vastly different outcomes than those actually observed and Iraqi leaders were poorly positioned to predict some of the domestically-relevant externalities associated with their foreign policy choices.

Perhaps the most significant of those decisions, from the perspective of the survival of the Iraqi regime, was the decision to invade Kuwait in August 1990. When Saddam Hussein believed he received clear signals from US Ambassador April Glaspie that the US would not intervene in the event of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein moved forward with the invasion. The result was that Saddam Hussein “seriously miscalculated Arab and Western opposition to Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait” (Davis 2005, 227). The 1991 Gulf War between Iraq and the United States (with its coalition partners) was a military conflict that Iraqi leaders did not anticipate would take place but, nonetheless, had far-reaching consequences for domestic Iraqi coalitional concerns. Most importantly, in March and April of 1991, an anti-regime insurgency erupted in Shi’a and Kurdish regions of Iraq that, at its peak, left fourteen of eighteen Iraqi governorates outside of government control.  

The theoretical framework I have described suggests a series of empirical predictions for societal groups within Iraq at different points in time. In the years leading up to the First Gulf War and associated uprisings, Kurdish populations had high levels of grievance against the regime. They were also subjected to brutal forms of collective punishment throughout Saddam Hussein’s time in power, leading Kurds in Iraq’s north to have which fostered high levels of social cohesion. Prior to 1991, most Kurds had little to gain by being Ba’thists and might have also subjected themselves to within-group sanctioning for collaborating with the regime. Kurdish populations took advantage of regime weakness following the 1991 Gulf War to establish an autonomous Kurdish zone in the north.

Because Iraqi Shi’a remain governed by Saddam Hussein’s regime even after the 1991 Shi’a and Kurdish uprisings, we can compare behavior of the Shi’a community both cross sectionally and over time. The Shi’a of southern Iraq went from being, first, an oppressed minority group where non-compliance was a costly — but not necessarily devastating — act to widespread (but not universal) resistance to, finally, totalitarian conditions where collective punishment became the norm for even relatively small acts of political non-compliance. For the Shi’a, a shared language made their community more legible than the Kurds but still less accessible than the greater Sunni community, given the local knowledge held by the regime. As a result, punishment was meted out on the level of the extended family; security forces may have had some knowledge about the identity of transgressors but less than the full information required to identify individual perpetrators. The result was that forms of social cohesion did emerge, particularly at the tribal level. According to Sassoon, after 1991, organized resistance to the regime

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among Shi’a meant that if an individual was caught, “there was no mercy for either them or their extended families” (2012, 221). Social cohesion at the tribal level allowed for forms of in-group policing as well as mobilizational capacity at critical moments of rebellion. One observable implication of this narrative would be that over-time levels of public non-compliance should decrease in Shi’a areas of southern Iraq over time replaced by more private acts of resistance. By the late 1990s, the expected punishment from having an independent political orientation among Shi’a was so high that we expect to observe a type of “pooling” equilibrium where everyone signals that they have a Ba’thist political orientation despite strong anti-regime sentiment among Shi’a. The use of collective punishment at the level of the extended family or tribe encouraged forms of social cohesion that supported the spread of rumors, the act of draft evasion and the possibility for political uprising. Widespread Shi’a uprisings following the 1991 Gulf War suggest the existence of sufficient social cohesion to allow for collective mobilization.

Examination of Iraq’s Sunni community behaviors, too, might be observed over time as well as in comparison to other ethnic groups. In addition, a cleavage existed within Iraq’s Sunni community during this period related to differential treatment and preferences of Sunnis from the area in and around Saddam Hussein’s home town of Tikrit in Salah al-Din province and those in more western provinces of Iraq closer to the Syrian border. Sunnis from Tikrit and its environs received the largest potential benefits from having a Ba’thist political orientation while simultaneously enjoying the lowest levels of grievance against the regime. If Sunnis living in the Tikriti heartland are indeed the group with the greatest opportunity to reap government benefits, we should observe privileged status for this subgroup. In addition, Sunnis in and around Tikrit should see a low percentage of individuals with a politically independent orientation, as well as minimal rumormongering and draft dodging.

Yet, not all Sunnis enjoyed the same degree of privileged opportunity and at least some portion of that access related to proximity to the regime’s center of power in Tikrit. For Sunnis living at some distance from Tikrit — particularly in the Upper Euphrates region of Anbar governorate — there existed the freedom to engage in small-scale acts of public dissent. Sharing sectarian identification with the regime leadership provided a form of political “cover” for these Sunni Iraqis; indeed, for highly oppressed portions of the citizenry, even small acts of public non-compliance could be viewed as a form of resistance and, therefore, were not feasible given the costs associated with such behaviors. But Iraqi Sunnis from western Iraq came to enjoy fewer and fewer economic and political privileges over the course of the 1990s as the international sanctions regime against Iraq intensified. This discontent should be seen in publicly observable measures because such individuals are less likely to suffer punishment for transgressions against the regime as a result of their status as Sunnis. As such, outlying Sunni populations had less to gain from being Ba’thists than their Tikriti counterparts yet also less fear of potential punishment for failing to comply with regime expectations than non-Sunnis.

In the next section I provide background on the archival data sources that I use to construct a series of datasets associated with acts of compliance and resistance in Iraq under Saddam Hussein.

4 Archival Data Sources

This paper makes primary use of documents from the Iraq Memory Foundation collection at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, which contains detailed information about the behavior of Iraqi citizens over a period of more than twenty years. Because of the conditions under which the US invaded Iraq and the insurgency which was to follow, the US government had a powerful incentive to collect and preserve a huge number of internal government documents captured during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The Hoover Institution acquired the Iraq Memory Foundation collection in 2008. The Iraq Memory Foundation collection includes a number of discrete document collections including the Ba’th Party Regional Command files, Ba’th Party membership files, Ministry of Information documents, the School Registers collection as well as special collections related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Kurdish
insurgency in the north. Previous scholarship using Iraq Memory Foundation documents has focused primarily on the Ba’th Party Regional Command files and, to a lesser extent, the North Iraq Data Set.\footnote{In my citation of the documents, I list the full document number beginning with the boxfile and subsequently the folder and document number. If a date is listed on the document or associated memos, I list that date after the document number. If the date associated with the memorandum is not listed or possible to infer from accompanying documents, no date is listed with the document number.}

Within the Iraqi Memory Foundation documents, I make particular use of two collections, the School Registers collection and the Ba’th Party Regional Command files. I describe each of those collections in greater detail in this section.

4.1 The School Registers Collection

The Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein cared a great deal about youth mobilization in the service of the Ba’th Party. According to Sassoon (2012, 54), the party sought to recruit students at an early age, even when they were in high school. One aspect of this mobilization process involved the collection of an annual inventory of students (al-jard al-tulāb al-sanawi), described in the Iraq Memory Foundation documents as the School Registers collection. The School Registers collection represents the official party records for each high school student in Iraq.\footnote{This is an annual accounting of the nationwide student population by the party with a focus on boys from ages 12 to 18. The entire School Registers collection consists of 162,628 pages (1,036 volumes) for years 1983-2002.} Sassoon (2012, 55) writes “one main purpose of the School Register... was the potential recruitment of these students.” The desire to mobilize and recruit went hand-in-hand with the need to control and coerce. Schools were an important place of observation for the regime where teachers and students were being constantly monitored (Sassoon 2012, 116). As a result, the School Registers include information about students and their families beyond name and address to also include data on political orientation, family reputation as well as other activities with political significance.

Information about how the School Registers were collected as well as the various uses for the Registers by the regime can be gleaned through a reading of associated memoranda. The Registers were collected for every academic year beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing until the overthrow of the regime. The content of the Registers changed in important ways following the 1991 Shi’a and Kurdish uprisings. While previously information was only collected about the political orientation of the student and the reputation of his family (along with name, address and other basics), the expanded format asked a series of additional questions.

One document details instructions for collection of the student inventory for the 2000-1 academic year. The officer charged with collecting the data was to do his job undercover and to perform his duties secretly. The name of each student and school was to be documented and address confirmed. The information was to be indexed and then signed and stamped by the appropriate administrators.\footnote{See Boxfile Doc Nos. 01-3025-0001-0098, 01-3025-0001-0099 and 01-3025-0001-0100.} Additional, everyday documents describe the process by which the party comrade charged with ensuring that the registers were finished and collected would receive a car and driver (most often a Mitsubishi) to travel to various schools.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 01-3025-0001-0104, February 26 2001; Boxfile Doc No. 01-3025-0001-0039, August 10 2001} Specific instructions were sent to party branch leaders about how to compile the information in the Registers, for example the need for each school to be put into its own file and to be signed by party officials.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 01-2971-0001-0001} Party officials required that information be carefully checked every year.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 01-2496-0003-0200} Meetings were held to assist party cadre in avoiding mistakes made in previous years.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 01-3025-0001-0008, April 13 2002} Because information in the Registers reflected the child and family’s security status, cooperation across various governmental units including the security services, party and police was required.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 01-2496-0003-0037, 1996}
Party memoranda frequently reflect a need to provide the information provided in the Registers in a timely manner. A most pressing concern was to provide information to the armed forces and military and police academies as they began screening individuals for government service suitability. Determining the good standing of young men who might receive training and scholarships from the regime appears to have been a very important matter and great lengths were taken to make sure no one with a questionable background might accidently be incorporated into the regime’s security apparatus.

Student information in the School Registers took the following form: one row was recorded for each student, including his address and parent names. The name of the school appeared at the top of each sheet of students. The following ten questions composed the basic format for the Registers, as well as room for a narrow comments section:

1. Political orientation
2. Reputation of the student and his family
3. Nationality (i.e., Arab, Kurd, Turkman)
4. His and his family’s position on the “Mother of All Battles”
5. His and his family’s position in terms of treachery and treason
6. Does he have close ties to someone sentenced for hostility to the party or the revolution
7. Is he or his father among the close friends of the leader (God protect him)
8. Was a close relative (brother or father) martyred in either “Saddam’s Qadisiyya” or the “Mother of All Battles”
9. Has he in the past or will he volunteer for Saddam’s fedayeen and, if so, what is his rotation number
10. Did he participate in the “Day of Pride” national training exercises

Political orientation in this context identified students as either being Ba’thists or as politically independent (mustaqill). While the vast majority of students are identified in the Registers as Ba’thists, there do exist students who are identified as independent and the percentage of politically independent students varies over space. Reputation of the student and the family is fairly straightforward and the vast majority of students have a “good” reputation in the School Registers. Nationality (qaumiyah) does not refer to Iraqi nationality but rather whether the student is an Arab, Kurd or, much less frequently, Turkman or other group member. Sectarian identification in terms of the Sunni-Shi’a designation does not appear at any point in official documentation. For the fourth item, the “Mother of all Battles” refers to the student and his family’s position on the First Gulf War. There is very little variation on this measure. The fifth item describing treachery and treason (ghadr wa khiyana) is a reference to participation in the 1991 Shi’a and Kurdish uprisings. Again, there is a little variation on this outcome for the 2001-2 academic year (as most individuals from treasonous backgrounds may have been purged from the school system). The next item refers to individuals with hostility to the Ba’th Party or the Ba’thist Revolution.

The seventh item refers to a student or his father’s designation as a close friend of the leader, referred to by Sassoon as a “Friend of the President.” This was an official designation that emerged after the First Gulf War that afforded “Friend of the President” cardholders special privileges. These

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22 Boxfile Doc No. 01-3025-0001-0091, March 2001
23 Boxfile Doc No. 01-3025-0001-0097, January 10 2001
24 Boxfile Doc No. 01-3025-0001-0030, March 12 2002
privileges included additional “points” added to his children’s school applications, the honor of meeting the president once a year, special grants and holiday bonuses, priority over others Iraqis in meeting with government officials and an annual gift of two summer suits and two winter suits, among other things (Sassoon 2012, 209). One main way that someone might receive such an identity card was related to the eighth item on the list of questions — was someone in the immediate family killed in either the “Mother of all Battles” or “Saddam’s Qadisiyya.” “Saddam’s Qadisiyya” was the regime’s name for the Iran-Iraq War, referencing the 636 CE Arab Muslim defeat of the Sassanid Persian army. After the First Gulf War, individuals who died in the Iran-Iraq War or the First Gulf War were posthumously awarded the “Friend of the President” designation (Sassoon 2012, 157). There exists variation in the distribution of war martyrs across Iraq and this variation will be explored in a separate paper. For the purposes of this paper, because of the close link between war deaths and “Friend of the President” designation, I will use war martyrs as a covariate rather than as a dependent variable.

The ninth question relates to whether the student volunteered to participate in “Saddam’s fedayeen.” Sassoon (2012, 150) describes this group as a militia established after the disappointing performance of local Ba’th Party and army units in the wake of the 1991 uprisings. The group was headed by Uday Hussein, the notorious son of the president, and differed from other state-sponsored militias — like the Jerusalem Army — as its officers were permanent and came from the Republican Guard or Iraqi army (Sassoon 2012, 150). The final question that appears in the Registers relates to student participation in “Day of Pride” (Yaum al-Nakhwa) national training exercises. Following the 1991 uprisings, Saddam Hussein designated a day dedicated for national military training (Sassoon 2012, 148). Students were expected to participate in these training activities and could suffer consequences if they did not participate. According to one memo from 1998, students seeking acceptance to Iraqi military academies needed to provide a certificate of completion for the national training exercises. Indeed, acceptance to these schools could be canceled if they could not prove their participation.

Participation rates across Iraq were very high.

4.2 Ba’th Party Regional Command Files

In addition to information compiled from the School Registers collection, I have also gathered data from documents in the Ba’th Party Regional Command files. These documents provide important information on the incentives one might have to become a Ba’th Party member, as well as the potential downsides for doing so. What benefits might one confer from being a Ba’thist? Party membership was not mandated by law. According to Sassoon, many Iraqis voluntarily joined the party either because of their commitment to the ideology or for the perquisites (2012, 53). For example, to be accepted to a broad range of public educational opportunities, particularly those supported by Ministry of Defense funding, students had to pass a strict background investigation. Sassoon writes that in the 1970s and early 1980s, the military colleges sometimes accepted applicants who were political independents deemed to be ripe for party indoctrination (2012, 135). By the late 1980s, however, it appears that only committed Ba’thists were admitted (Sassoon 2012, 135). Candidates for acceptance to such programs had to receive

\[25\] Boxfile Doc No. 01-2496-0003-0001, 1998

\[26\] Boxfile Doc No. 01-2496-0003-0003

\[27\] What do we know about the process by which individuals became Ba’th party members? To be designated a Ba’thist in terms of one’s political orientation in the School Registers did not — as far as I am aware — require the same process by which individuals entered the hierarchy of party membership. Prospective party members had to fill out extensive questionnaires; indeed, the Iraq Memory Foundation collection is littered with Ba’th Party membership applications. There existed a strict hierarchy within the Ba’th Party where individuals could move up the following ranks: sympathizer, supporter, advanced supporter, candidate, active member, division member, section member, branch member and secretary general (Sasson 2012, 46). To become even a sympathizer, one would need to reveal past political affiliations or be hanged; joining another political party after being a Ba’thist meant a seven-year prison sentence (Sasson 2012, 73).
clearance from both the security apparatus and the local party branch, which provided additional details about the applicant and his family (Sassoon 2012, 134).28

Being a close associate of the regime and party conferred important benefits but complicity was not costless. Reports from a 1995 file from southern governorates of Basra and Dhi Qar provide some insight into the risks associated with being tied to the party. In one case, a group of “agents” burned down the mudhif, or traditional communal house, of a shaykh who was reported to be a supporter of the party and “revolution.” Although checkpoints were set up in the area, the agents escaped.29 In another case, a local shaykh who was a friend of the party had his house attacked; the sons and cousins of the shaykh fired back on the attackers.30 Examples of attacks on party facilities were also common in southern areas. One memo documents arrests associated with an anti-regime attack. Agents had planned an attack against a local party headquarters but a guard they had approached about helping them turned them into the police. The agents had a gun, grenade and a semi-automatic weapon.31 The guards responsible for raids on insurgents were praised in party memos, sometimes receiving awards or bonuses for their activities. These types of incidents would appear to have been quite common in the south and a number of similar events can be identified in the collection.32

The files also contain numerous other documents that provide information about the population, particularly information useful to a regime seeking to exercise social and political control. Because the regime and party were so meticulous about documenting the transgressions of the population for purposes of understanding forms of political dissent, there exist hundreds of memoranda from which to understanding the societal patterns of compliance and resistance. For example, the Iraqi regime was highly interested in collecting information about rumors circulating in the population. I was able to identify in the collection a set of files that included all the rumors collected by the Ba’ath Party for the years 1997 through 2002. There were a total of about 1,500 rumors included in these files and each rumor has been coded for its content, the Ba’ath Party branch that reported the rumor and the date of the memorandum in which the rumor is mentioned.

The regime also spent considerable resources trying to locate individuals who failed to complete their compulsory military service. Not only did draft evasion have serious implications for military readiness, it was during compulsory military service that the regime was able to exercise total control over the lives and well-being of cohorts of young Iraqi men. The failure to complete military obligations to the state also had important political and social implications. Draft dodging suggested a form of political defiance that had the potential to undermine claims of regime legitimacy. In addition, draft evaders were often forced into marginal or illegal economic activities that worked against state attempts to fix prices and control markets.

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28 The Ba’ath Party Regional Command boxfiles include dozens of letters and memoranda related to student applicant status at one of more than a dozen Ministry of Defense funded institutions of higher education. Students could be denied admission for any number of reasons, despite having high-level ties to the Ba’ath Party — failing to submit graduation records on time, scoring low on the psychological portion of the interview or even being unable to pronounce the letter ra’ (i.e., having a lisp) (Boxfile Doc No. 01-3847-0003-0100, 1993). Being a political independent could also lead a student to be rejected, however, despite the student’s merit as an applicant (Boxfile Doc No. 01-3847-0003-0100, 1993). In one memorandum describing the 1993 selection process for Military Medical College students, instructions were given to automatically accept Ba’athist students who have the “Friends of the President” designation, whose father had such a designation or who were the brothers of war martyrs. Secondary consideration was then given to 271 Ba’athist students for whom security and party information had been collected and deemed acceptable. The remaining student applicants were thought to have non-encouraging applications and it was instructed that they be rejected (Boxfile Doc Nos. 01-3847-0003-0101 and 0102).

29 Boxfile Doc No. 01-3874-0004-0017
30 Boxfile Doc No. 01-3874-0004-0028
31 Boxfile Doc No. 01-3237-0000-0061, 1993
32 Boxfile Doc Nos. 01-3874-0004-0106 and 01-3874-0004-0171
5 Empirical Evidence

In this section, I describe the political equilibrium in Iraq as it existed before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The most pressing political concern of both the Iraqi regime and people during the 1980s was surviving the devastating eight-year war against Iran. A next section describes the 1991 uprisings and the impact of political protest on coalitional politics in Iraq. Finally, I will characterize the array of political behaviors observed from 1991-2003 with particular attention to the over-time impact of the international sanctions regime.

5.1 Political Equilibrium before the 1991 Uprisings

The Islamic Revolution in Iran represented an early, ideological challenge to Saddam Hussein’s presidency. Fearing that Iran would act on its self-stated goal of exporting its influence to Iraq (Baram and Rubin 1993, xii), the Iraqi regime deported tens of thousands of Iraqi Shi’a and, in September 1980, preemptively attacked Iran citing a series of border disputes as a primary motivation for the instigation of hostilities. Iraqi officials believed that they would enjoy a quick, and relatively easy, victory over the new Iranian regime but these expectations were confounded as the conflict degenerated into a war of attrition lasting eight years and resulting in at least hundreds of thousands of causalities.

Surviving the Iran-Iraq War became the defining political challenge of the regime during the 1980s. War became routine for the population during this time, allowing the Ba’th Party to consolidate forms of social control through its dominance of the “internal front” (Khoury 2013, 48). Given the sensitivity of the regime to the Shi’a “threat” posed by Iran, political organizations with a particular Shi’a religious orientation came under increasing scrutiny. During the 1980s, the regime cracked sharply on any individual believed to be involved with the Da’wa Party, for example. A Shi’a theology student, who was only fifteen years old at the time, was arrested in 1981 and spent ten years at Abu Ghurayb prison where he saw a former teacher of tortured so severely that it led to the teacher’s death in prison.33 One informant from a rural family in the strategically important Shatt al-Arab region near Basra recalls that in 1986 — during the Iran-Iran War — he was convicted of being a member of the Da’wa Party and sentenced to a life term in jail where he was beaten, electrocuted and had his arms dislocated from his body.34

Despite regime fears of Iraqi Shi’a acting as a “fifth column,” there are strikingly few reports of Iraqi Shi’a seeking to undermine the country’s war effort in any way. Indeed, Shi’a citizens — many of whom were low-ranking infantry men in the Iraqi army — fought and died at numbers much larger than their share of the general population. Khoury provides the most detailed analysis of military recruitment patterns for this period. She finds that much of the conscripted infantry came from the predominantly Shi’a southern and Euphrates regions of Iraq (2013, 63). Documents from the Iraqi Memory Foundation also provide information about war causalities in the first four years of the Iran-Iraq War.35 These memoranda were dated October 1984. Khoury has argued that after 1984-5 desertions among rank and file members of the Iraqi military increased exponentially (2013, 73), suggesting that the casualty estimates generated in October 1984 would not be highly impacted by desertions. In order to calculate the number of causalities per capita, I calculate a weighted average of the 1977 and 1987 province-level population estimates from the Iraq census.

The upper-left quadrant of Figure 2 provides information about the ethnic breakdown of the Iraqi population.36 This map suggests that the southern portions of Iraq are predominantly Shi’a while

33 Testimony of Na’im Hadi Jafatta Al-Hasouna, Recorded on September 27 2007
34 Testimony of Iyad Jari Tehran, Recorded September 29 2007
35 See Boxfile 01-2202-0003.
36 The map for ethnicity in Iraq in 2003 was produced using a shapefile available on the ESOC website (https://esoc.princeton.edu/) which relied on data from the Gulf/2000 Project at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.
Figure 2: Upper-left, ethno-religious population distribution; upper-right, killed per 1000 population in Iran-Iraq War by October 1984; lower-left, percent independent students, 1987-88; lower-right, percent families with father or brother killed in Iran-Iraq War or First Gulf War measured based on student survey undertaken during the 2001-2 academic year.
the northern portions of the country are primarily Kurdish. The central portion of the country is populated by Sunni Arabs while the area surrounding Baghdad and Baghdad itself is a mix of Sunni and Shi’a Arabs. The upper-right quadrant shows the October 1984 estimates of individuals killed per 1000 population for the provinces of Iraq. Southern provinces, which are predominantly Shi’a, saw an average of 4.9 individuals killed per 1000. In the Iraqi north, which has a large Kurdish population, the average was only 1.7 per 1000. For the central provinces of Salah al-Din and Diyala, predominantly but not exclusively Sunni provinces, the average number killed was 2.4 per 1000 and for Anbar province in the Sunni west, the rate was 2.7 per 1000. Within these same documents are additional data on Iraqi soldiers who were either missing in action (MIA) or prisoners of war (POW). The number killed, MIA or POW for southern provinces as 11.0 per 1000 compared to 3.7 in the north. Salah al-Din and Diyala averaged 5.7 killed, MIA or POW per 1000 while that figure was 6.2 in Anbar. This suggests that the predominantly Shi’a southern areas of Iraq not only saw higher rates of war deaths but also more MIA and POW soldiers. The Kurdish areas saw the smallest number killed, missing or taken prisoner.

It is perhaps not surprising that Iraqis from Kurdish regions were killed, missing or taken prisoner at lower rates than their Arab counterparts. Some elements of the Kurdish population were engaged in cross-border cooperation with the Iranians during the war. Kurds were also less systematically drafted to the front because of their potential for mutiny; indeed, many Kurdish Iraqis were exempted from military service on the front in exchange for serving in government militias tasked with controlling the northern region (Rohde 2010, 35). Special units to govern the north were necessary because of anti-regime, insurgent activities were commonplace in those areas.

Resistance to Ba’thist rule in northern Iraq can be compared to other parts of the country. For example, the summary table of a 1987 report, which I reproduce in Table 2, considers the number of attacks against Ba’th Party headquarters and party comrades. The “North” refers to northern, predominantly Kurdish districts. The “Central” region refers to Anbar, Diyala and Salah al-Din province (where Tikrit is located). The “Euphrates” region includes the Shi’a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala as well as neighboring areas. The “South” refers to Basra and the other southern most parts of the country. Both the “Euphrates” and the “South” regions are predominantly Shi’a. It is also important to keep in mind that a large percentage of residents of Baghdad are also Shi’a. The number of attacks in the North is so relatively large that individual areas within the northern region are broken out to describe the full variation. It is notable that such attacks existed in southern Iraq (the Euphrates and South areas) but were rare in Baghdad and the Central areas.

Most of the attacks against Ba’th Party offices and leaders in the north were undertaken by individuals associated with the Kurdish anti-regime militia fighters known as the Peshmerga. Kurds believed to

Table 2: Number of attacks against party headquarters and party comrades from a 1987 report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th># Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euphrates</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Mosul</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Ninawa</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Erbil</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Tamim</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Sulaymaniya</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Duhok</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37See Boxfile Document Nos. 01-2135-0004-1222 to 0129.
have participated in or provided material support to the Peshmerga were subject to arrest and abuse. Suspected association with Peshmerga forces often led to terms in Abu Ghurayb prison where individuals were subject to physical and psychology torture, sometimes even being forced to donate blood to the Ba’th Party.\textsuperscript{38} It was not unusual for army units to storm villages, arresting large numbers of villagers, including entire families. Battles between Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army could last for days as military planes and helicopters would bomb homes, killing civilians and rebels alike.\textsuperscript{39}

Among the most notorious of incidents relates to the Anfal campaigns against the Kurdish populations of Iraq during the final years of the Iran-Iraq War. Kurdish informants report fleeing to the mountains during aerial bombings of villages.\textsuperscript{40} Despite the difficult conditions of the mountains where families would have little food to eat and poor shelter, the persecution in Kurdish towns and villages was often worse. Houses were burned, with families and children inside of them.\textsuperscript{41} The 1988 chemical weapons attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja stands out as among the most horrifying atrocities committed during the Anfal campaign. One informant — who was just ten years old when the Halabja attack took place — reports that his entire family was killed including his mother, his four brothers, his grandmother as well as the families of his aunt and his uncle.\textsuperscript{42}

Given both the intensity and the collective nature of punishment imposed on the Kurdish community for support of insurgent activity during the Iran-Iraq War, it is not surprising that many Kurds were highly reluctant to identify as Ba’thists. The decision to express a Ba’thist political orientation as a student or to join the Ba’th Party as an adult often engendered forms of extreme psychological discomfort for individuals. While some individuals had personal or familial experience with the effects of regime repression, others felt as though their ethnic group, religious order or tribe had been mistreated in a way that decreased their affinity for the regime. A belief in the “linked fate” of others from the same ethnic or tribal group might lead individuals to oppose the regime in the absence of a negative personal experience.

The lower-left quadrant of Figure 2 shows the distribution of final year high school students for the 1987-88 academic year who are identified as having an independent political orientation; in other words, these are students who refused to be identified as Ba’thist in their political orientation. Darker areas have higher percentages of political independents and lighter areas have lower percentages of political independents. Relatively uninhabited desert areas have no data as a result of few inhabitants. Other areas have no data because of gaps in data availability in the archive or because the regime did not collect data from those locales in that year. There are a number of notable patterns. First, areas of the Kurdish north have very high levels of political independents. Second, the next largest concentration of political independents is in predominantly Shi’a Basra — the largest city in the south of Iraq. Sunni areas of western Iraq, particularly Anbar province, see relatively low numbers of political independents.

We can draw a number of inferences from this information. First, large percentages of Kurdish Iraqis were unwilling to identify as Ba’thist, despite intense government pressure to do so. Part of the reason for this is because their community was already being collectively and severely punished to a degree that Kurds were approaching a “ceiling” in terms of their capacity to be additionally sanctioned. I suspect, though have not identified the data to test, the existence of strong social norms against joining the party within the Kurdish community.

The existence of relatively large numbers of political independents in Shi’a areas of Iraq is also significant. At this historical juncture, the Shi’a community of Iraq had suffered tremendously as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. Basra, in particular, was so hard hit by casualties that the Ba’th Party prepared special memos documenting the number of young men killed, MIA or POW from each village.

\textsuperscript{38}Testimony of Abdel Baqi Kader Muhammed, Recorded March 13 2008
\textsuperscript{39}Testimony of Abdullah Muhammed Hussein, Recorded March 8 2008
\textsuperscript{40}Testimony of Asad Mahmud Ahmed, Recorded March 5 2008; Testimony of Habiba Ahmed Abdallah, Recorded March 13 2008
\textsuperscript{41}Testimony of Habiba Ahmed Abdallah, Recorded March 13 2008
\textsuperscript{42}Testimony of Daron Nuri Muhammad Hilmi, Recorded on March 5 2008
and neighborhood in Basra province in order to allow the Ba'th Party to target particular benefits and
high-level visits. The willingness of Shi'a youth to refuse to express a Ba'thistic political orientation,
however, is not purely a function of grievance. Punishment of the Shi'a community was also less severe
at this time, making it possible for a larger percentage of the population to express their independent
political orientation. This provides an important counterpoint to later patterns of the same measure
when the regime’s incentive to punish becomes much more intense. Finally, Sunni areas of Iraq outside
of Tikrit see about 5-15% of young men expressing an independent political orientation.

Less than two years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait. The most
common explanation given for why Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion relates to the severe levels
of Iraqi debt accumulated during the course of the Iran-Iraq War. Kuwait had previously refused to
forgive billions of dollars of Iraqi debt to Kuwait and had also failed to slow oil production as part of
an OPEC bid to drive up oil prices. The First Gulf War proved to be particularly costly for citizens of
the Shi'a south. Much of the aerial bombing by coalition forces hit targets in the south, where many
of the country’s oil refineries and petrochemical complexes were located. Eventually over 90 percent
of power stations in Iraq were destroyed as well as more bridges, roads and railroads (Rouleau 1995).
Southern areas were also impacted by the land invasion of coalition troops moving in from Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. According to one analyst, the Shi'a bore the brunt of the war in terms of both causalities
and damage to infrastructure (Rodhe 2010, 34).

The lower-right quadrant of Figure 2 provides information on the distribution of the percentage of
final year high school students for the 2001-2 academic year reporting that they had either a father
or brother killed in the Iran-Iraq War or the First Gulf War. While this data is self-reported about
family members killed (as opposed to government records as presented earlier), it has the advantage of
including both the entire period of the Iran-Iraq War as well as First Gulf War casualties. Again, the
summary map suggests that areas of the Shi'a south saw some of the largest numbers of war dead in the
two conflicts. The uneven distribution of costs associated with these two major wars, combined with
preexisting political, social and economic grievances, all played a role into the uprisings which were to
follow.

5.2 The 1991 Kurdish and Shi'a Uprisings

The 1991 anti-regime uprisings were a turning point for Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party. On
February 10, 1991 a crowd in the southern city of Diwaniyah — frustrated by the impact of the regime’s
foreign police choices, among other things — killed ten Ba'th Party officials (Mackey 2002, 286). A few
weeks later, a tank driver aimed at and shot a mural of Saddam Hussein in Basra (Mackey 2002, 287).
Shortly thereafter, Ba'th Party headquarters and party officials were attacked and, often, killed by mobs
across the Iraqi south. In some cases, lower ranking Ba'th Party officials joined the uprising rather than
be killed by rioters (Rohde 2010, 63). Eventually, the insurgency spread to all of the major Shi'a cities
of the south. On March 4, the Kurdish Iraqis in the north also rebelled.

A decision was made to focus the efforts of regime loyalists from the “geographic spine” of the Ba'th
Party — the Sunni heartland — on repressing the southern uprising (Mackey 2002, 289). According
to Dawisha, “purposeful bombardment was aimed at houses with little regard for its occupants, and
people were indiscriminately shot in the streets...within less than three weeks, over 30,000, including
women and children, had been killed, and some 70,000 had fled the country, mainly to neighboring Iran”
(2009, 226). According to Mackey, “the Shi'a would fall subject to a level of ruthlessness previously
applied only to the Kurds” (2002, 289). Although the Shi’a revolt failed in its objectives to overthrow
the incumbent regime, the Iraqi government never fully regained control over the northern, Kurdish part
of the country.43

43The question of why the revolts failed to unseat Saddam Hussein has been explored by numerous scholars. Mackey
argues that one important factor was that some of the important Shi’a tribes did not participate in the uprising or remained
neutral during the rebellion (2002, 296). Dawisha suggests that the tribally-oriented Sunni Iraqis from Anbar and Salah

20
Following the regime’s successful repression of the southern uprising, forms of collective punishment increased, including strategies of abusing the families of Shi’i suspected of anti-regime activities. Disappearances became common and individuals who were not involved with the 1991 protests became victims of state abuse. According to one Iraqi from Najaf, he was serving in the military in 1991 and when he returned to his family home he found that his family’s property had been seized and his brother arrested (and remained missing) even though his family did not take part in the uprisings.\textsuperscript{44} In 2008, Shi’a Iraqis would have little incentive to lie that they had not been involved in the 1991 uprisings if, in fact, they had participated. An Iraqi from the town of Rumaythah reports that his 75 year-old father was arrested following the 1991 uprisings and it was not until 2003 that he found his father’s remains in a mass grave, identifiable by an ID card, prayer beads, eyeglasses and other personal items.\textsuperscript{45} Narratives like this, and countless others, suggest that for Shi’a Iraqis, punishment became not only more intense after the 1991 uprisings but also less precisely meted out with important implications for the political behavior of this community.

5.3 Political Equilibrium after the 1991 Uprisings

In this section, I use data from the School Registers collection and information drawn from the Ba’th Party Regional Command files to provide evidence for the differential forms non-compliance observed across autocratic Iraq. I examine cross-sectional variation on five issue areas related to compliance and non-compliance with the autocratic regime of Saddam Hussein. The first two refer to outcomes associated with high school students through information reported in the School Registers: self-identification as having a Ba’thist vs. independent political orientation and an individual or his father’s designation as a “Friend of the President.” A third outcome of interest relates to which individuals who were willing to volunteer themselves for paramilitary groups tasked with using extreme measures to defend the regime and party. A fourth area of investigation involves the number of draft dodgers and military deserters by region. Finally, I investigate the number of politically significant rumors circulating, again, by region.

5.3.1 Party Orientation and Regime Ties

Although the Ba’thist regime under Saddam Hussein has typically been described as having a Sunni basis, the relative standing of various Sunni tribes and geographic groupings has varied over time. In particular, Ba’thist rule under Saddam Hussein came to increasingly rely on the four major clans — the Bakr, Talfah, al-Majid and Ibrahim — from in and around his hometown of Tikrit (Bengio 2000, 97). Coveted positions were filled by individuals drawn overwhelmingly from loyalists who hailed from the provincial towns neighboring Tikrit (Marr 2004, 264). This was particularly so for staffing the Iraqi Republican Guard, as Saddam Hussein felt confident in his ability to rely on tribal relations for stalwart support. The reliance on Iraqis from Tikrit and neighboring areas represented a decrease in political importance for those from Upper Euphrates towns, like Ana and Ramadi, in Anbar governorate (Sakai 2003, 144).

Tension within the Sunni classes became more and more apparent after the 1991 Gulf War, particularly as the economic contraction associated with sanctions impacted more and more Iraqis. As a result of regime-induced hyperinflation, civil servant salaries fell to an average of US$2-3 per month from 1993 to 1999 (Gordon 2010, 92). As state sector expenditures fell, Saddam Hussein and his immediate family increasingly monopolized the few opportunities that remained to generate income (Davis 2005, 232-4). There was also a major effort to downsize the Iraqi military (al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 186). This

\textsuperscript{44}Testimony of Hamed Suhail Najim, Recorded December 12 2008

\textsuperscript{45}Testimony of Muhammad Abdel Hasan al-Zalimi, Recorded May 6 2008
type of downsizing particularly hurt western Sunnis who were prominently represented in these units. The net result was that tribes that had been previously loyal to the regime — many of which were Sunni — “reacted against the economy’s continued deterioration” (Davis 2005, 234).

The mid-1990s witnessed a series of attempted military coups, emanating particularly from tribes with a basis in western Iraq. In 1993, officers associated with the Ubaid tribe were suspected of coup plotting. Dulaimi tribesmen — who had been critical in putting down the 1991 Shi’a uprisings following the First Gulf War — revolted against the regime in 1995 after the execution of General Muhammad al-Dulaimi and a number of other Dulaimi officers. Al-Dulaimi was suspected of plotting a coup against Saddam Hussein. A number of other tribes, including the Jumailat, Anis, Rawis and Kubaysis — were reported to sympathize with the Dulaimi at this time. Press reports from that time suggest that the rebellion was also linked to a shrinking of Saddam Hussein’s power base over time through the purge of various Sunni tribes. It was reported that as many as 1,000 soldiers and officers from a Republican Guard unit were involved in the uprising. A battalion led by General Turki al-Dulaimi is reported to have attacked a radio transmitter and helicopter base at Abu Gharayb, on the outskirts of Baghdad. In 1996, officers associated with the al-Duri tribe — also from Anbar province — were accused of attempting a coup. By 2003, the “winning coalition” of the regime had narrowed to include tribesmen from central Iraq, some Shi’a tribes and some tribes from the Sunni periphery.

Figure 3 displays six maps of Iraq. The panel in the upper-left shows the distribution of politically independent students for the 1991-2 academic year. This map presents a very different picture of the same indicator presented for the 1987-88 academic year in Figure 2. First, notice that there does not exist data for many of the far northern districts. This is because these areas were already enjoying forms of Kurdish autonomy as a result of the 1991 uprisings in the north. Many of the areas bordering the autonomous zone, where relatively large numbers of Kurds continued to live, do see large numbers of political independents. While Tikrit and its neighboring districts have relatively low numbers of political independents, districts south of Baghdad see a sizable percentage of the student population self identifying as political independents. It was in this year that the regime appeared to be highly vulnerable and, for many, the uprisings of earlier in the year had increased individuals levels of grievance with the regime. It may have also been relatively unclear at this point if the regime had the capacity to crack down on large numbers of political independents.

The upper-right quadrant presents the percentage of politically independent students in the 1995-6 academic year. This represented the worst period of the economic sanctions era as the sanctions had been in effect for five years already and the UN oil-for-food program had not yet been implemented. It is important to note, however, that even though Sunni areas show relatively large numbers of students who are identifying as non-Ba’thists, students in the south are starting to comply at higher rates with government expectations to demonstrate a Ba’thist political orientation. By 2001-2 (center-left quadrant), we observe that the primarily Shi’a districts of the south have extremely low percentages of political independents. Tikrit and some of its neighboring districts also observe very low numbers of students with an independent political orientation. Areas of Anbar governorate, including the districts of Qa’im, Anah, Falluja and Ramadi, maintained some political independents despite being primarily Sunni areas. Mosul and two surrounding districts in the Iraqi north also saw relatively large numbers of political independents.

From an empirical perspective, we can estimate the effect of a series of covariates on the percentage of students from a particular district identify as having an independent political orientation. Table 3 reports the results of four regressions where percent political independents serves as the dependent variable using data from the 2001-2 academic year. Model 1 estimates the association with percent Sunni, percent Kurdish, distance of the centroid of the district to the centroid of the Tikrit and the

46 Ed Blanche, Iraqi Rebels Claim Sunni Clans Gathering Against Saddam, Associated Press, June 18 1995
48 Blanche, 1995
Figure 3: Upper-left, percent independent students, 1991-2; upper-right, 1995-96; center-left, 2001-2; center-right, percent of students with “Friends of Saddam,” designation, 2001-2; lower-left, percent with “Friends of Saddam” designation after controlling for war casualty in family, 2001-2; lower-right, percent of students who volunteered for Saddam’s fedayeen.
interaction of percent Sunni with distance to Tikrit. Model 2 adds a variable measuring the average level of wealth in the district based on a survey taken just after the 2003 invasion based on the value of items in a household. Model 3 replaces the variable measuring wealth with a measure of population density. Model 4 includes both the wealth index and population density measure. Wealth and population density are both positively associated with percent of political independents.

What is the impact of ethnic group on the outcome variable? The predicted probability that a Sunni student from Tikrit will be a political independent is 0% [95% CI: 0-4], holding wealth and population density at their means; a Sunni student living 200 miles from Tikrit, however, has a predicted probability of 10% [95% CI: 7-14], again, holding constant wealth and population density. Shi’a districts 200 miles from Tikrit have a 1% [95% CI: 0-4] predicted probability of politically independent students. Kurdish areas 200 miles from Tikrit have a 5% [95% CI: 2-9] predicted probability. The data for the Kurdish areas is limited, however, to those districts over which the Iraqi government still maintained control in 2001-2.

One of the conjectures common in the qualitative literature is that Sunnis from Tikrit received important benefits and privileges as a result of the regime’s dependence on clan and family members to staff key positions in the bureaucracy and security apparatus. To what extent were those benefits enjoyed by the Sunni citizenry more broadly? The center-right panel shows the percentage of Iraqi high school seniors or their fathers who have been designated “Friend of the President.” Because a relatively large number of individuals and their families received that designation for having a war martyr in the family, I also map the percent with a “Friend of the President” designation after netting out the percentage of war martyrs for that district (lower-left panel). The two maps show a largely similar pattern. Lighter areas represent a smaller percentage with “Friend of the President” designation while darker areas represent a larger percentage with that designation. The center-right panel shows that southern, Shi’a areas of the country see smaller percentages of the population with the “Friend of the President” designation; those percentages become even lower as reflected in the lower-left panel (i.e., after taking into account families with war martyrs). The Sunni areas of the country tend to have relatively high percentages of individuals with that designation with Tikrit and its neighboring district appearing at the highest levels.

Table 4 reports the coefficients associated with four models where the dependent variable analyzed is the percent of a district with the “Friend of the President” designation after subtracting the percent of war martyrs for that area (since having had a brother or father killed in one of the major wars was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Sunni</td>
<td>-4.92</td>
<td>-5.52</td>
<td>-2.88</td>
<td>-4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.92)</td>
<td>(3.54)</td>
<td>(3.72)</td>
<td>(3.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Kurdish</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.42)</td>
<td>(2.29)</td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
<td>(2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to Tikrit</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Sunni*Distance to Tikrit</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth Index</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>-10.52</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>-9.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td>(4.11)</td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
<td>(4.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Coefficient estimates for dependent variable, percentage of politically independent students, by district for the 2001-2 academic year.
Table 4: Coefficient estimates for dependent variable, percentage of students whose families enjoy the “Friend of the President” designation, by district for the 2001-2 academic year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Sunni</td>
<td>23.56</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>21.69</td>
<td>21.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.89)</td>
<td>(6.88)</td>
<td>(6.92)</td>
<td>(6.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Kurdish</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.25)</td>
<td>(4.45)</td>
<td>(4.31)</td>
<td>(4.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to Tikrit</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Sunni*Distance to Tikrit</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth Index</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>10.62</td>
<td>17.84</td>
<td>9.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.27)</td>
<td>(8.00)</td>
<td>(4.55)</td>
<td>(7.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

one route to receiving the designation yet not channel that would reflect special privilege). Like in the previous analysis, I consider the impact of an area’s sectarian identity, its distance from Tikrit, the interaction between Tikrit and percent Sunni as well as covariates for wealth and population density. While the coefficient on the variable measuring wealth is positive in each of the two specifications where it is included, it is not statistically significant in either. Population density appears to be negatively associated with “Friend of the President” designation.

For Sunnis living in Tikrit, the predicted probability for “Friend of the President” designation is 38% [95% CI: 30-48], assuming mean levels of wealth and population density. For Sunnis living 200 miles from Tikrit, the prediction is only 25% [95% CI: 18-32]. For Shi’a areas, the predicted probability is 17% [95% CI: 2-12]. Kurdish districts have a predicted probability of 18% [95% CI: 10-25]. Again, the Kurdish figure only reflects those Kurdish areas that remained governed by Iraq in 2001-2. As expected, Sunni areas in and around Tikrit had very high percentages of individuals with the “Friend of the President” designation, even after controlling for wealth and population density. Sunni areas at some distance for Tikrit were — on average — more than 10 percentage points lower. Shi’a areas saw the lowest percentage of individuals with this designation.

5.3.2 Volunteering to Sacrifice Oneself for the Regime

Volunteerism, particular the decision to volunteer for a dangerous or costly activity, is puzzling. Even more puzzling is the decision to volunteer explicitly for the purpose of sacrificing oneself for a country that was unpopular, even hated, by the vast majority of its citizens. In the months and years directly following the 1991 uprisings, hundreds of Iraqs sent personal letters volunteering themselves, and sometimes their relatives, for “suicide” or “sacrifice” operations (‘amaliyāt fidāiyya). One boxfile within the Ba’th Party Regional Command files is a collection of these letters. Most of the volunteers promised to defend the nation and the revolution at whatever cost. In one letter, the head of the Al-Kartan tribe offered more than two dozen tribesmen from across the country in the service of Saddam Hussein and the regime.49 Volunteers from the western province of Anbar are also found in the file.50

49 Boxfile Doc. No. 01-3032-0001-0016-0017, January 1993
50 Boxfile Doc. No. 01-3032-0001-0009, January 1993, and Boxfile Doc. No. 01-3032-0001-0012, January 20 1993
Table 5: Number of volunteers trained or in training by geographic location and unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>Trained</th>
<th>Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euphrates</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Guard</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Security</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Security</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit Training Camp</td>
<td>993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7,152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most volunteers, however, came from individuals living in the heavily Shi'a provinces of southern Iraq. A September 1991 letter from two female volunteers from Wasit promised to defend Iraq and the revolution to the death, signing their letters with bloody thumbprints as a token of their commitment.\(^{51}\) In addition to male volunteers from Wasit, additional documents commit multiple individuals from Qadisiyah, another Shi'a area.\(^{52}\) Dozens of individuals from Basra and other southern areas offered themselves for such operations.\(^{53}\)

An undated table found in a boxfile containing a number of documents from 1991 provides a summary of how many individuals trained in training had been trained to engage in such activities.\(^{54}\) The largest numbers of individuals trained in training came from the Shi'a Euphrates area and the South. Why would individuals from a community which was subjected to serious political and social repression volunteer to sacrifice themselves for Saddam Hussein, the Ba'ath Party and Ba'athist revolution? Even more so than members of the Sunni community, Shi'a Iraqis needed to find costly ways to signal their commitment to the regime if they were to be viewed as compliant. One way that an individual might signal this commitment was to volunteer for a suicide militia of this sort.

Over time, the training of volunteers for these operations became institutionalized in the form of an organization known as Saddam’s fedayeen, or those who sacrifice themselves for Saddam. Al-Marashi and Salama (2008, 187) describe Saddam’s fedayeen as a paramilitary militia that grew to between 15,000 to 25,000 men following its establishment in October 1995. Saddam’s fedayeen came to develop a reputation for being a kind of criminal gang under the control of Uday Hussein, responsible for acts of extreme violence (Bashir 2005). Independent from the Ministry of Defense, Saddam’s fedayeen served as a counterweight to the Special Republican Guard controlled by Saddam Hussein’s younger son, Qusay.

The 2001-2 School Registers included a question which asked if the student had volunteered for Saddam’s fedayeen and, if so, what was his rotation number. The variation in volunteer rates across Iraqi districts is mapped in the lower-right panel of Figure 3. The map shows that there existed considerable geographic variation in the level of volunteerism for the organization. Tikrit and neighboring Al-Hawiga both have a relatively large number of volunteers. Yet, rates of volunteerism in areas just south of Basra are also very high relative to the national average. These areas are almost exclusively Shi’a.

Table 6 reports the results of a series of regressions where the percentage of students who volunteered for Saddam’s fedayeen is the dependent variable. Volunteerism is statistically significantly higher in Sunni areas for all four specifications (Models 9-12), controlling for other factors. Wealth and popu-

\(^{51}\)Boxfile Doc. No. 01-3032-0001-0093, September 1991
\(^{52}\)See Boxfile Doc. No. 01-3032-0001-0038, September 28 1992 and Boxfile Doc. No. 01-3032-0001-0014, January 20 1992
\(^{54}\)Boxfile Document No. 024-5-2-0121
Table 6: Coefficient estimates for dependent variable, percentage of students who had volunteered for Saddam’s fedayeen, by district for the 2001-2 academic year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Sunni</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Kurdish</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to Tikrit</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Sunni*Distance to Tikrit</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth Index</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>-0.351</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The flip side of volunteering for the fedayeen was the avoidance of mandatory military service. A major problem for the Iraqi regime related to the relatively large numbers of young men who either deserted from the army or engaged in forms of draft evasion. According to Sassoon, most deserters and draft dodgers in the early 1980s were Kurds who could find refuge in mountain areas controlled by Kurdish guerrillas (2012, 152). By the late 1980s, it would appear that the problem of desertions was common in the south as well. According to a report focusing just on deserters from the governorates of Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadissiyah and Muthanna, there were 15,482 deserters from that area for the period April-August 1987 alone. According to a report focusing just on deserters from the governorates of Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadissiyah and Muthanna, there were 15,482 deserters from that area for the period April-August 1987 alone.

The First Gulf War and associated domestic uprisings intensified the problem of desertions (Sassoon 2012, 152). In 1994 — after offering a short window for clemency if they rejoined their assigned units — the Ba’th Party began to offer financial inducements for anyone who provided information about the whereabouts of a deseter (Sassoon 2012, 153). Beginning in June 1994, Saddam Hussein ordered that deserters would be punished with ear amputations. This practice did not end until March 1996.

These individuals are described in the memos as *mutakhallifin*, literally the stragglers, and refers to those who failed to report for their required military service.

Boxfile Doc Nos. 01-2135-0004-0032 and 01-2135-0004-0033

Associated Press, “Saddam Orders End To Ear Amputations For Deseters,” March 17 1996
Table 7: The number of draft dodgers and deserters arrested by area and the number of these individuals who had an ear amputated (January 1995).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Draft Dodgers &amp; Deserter</th>
<th>Ears Amputated</th>
<th>Percent Amputated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad – Karan – Khalid</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad – Karan – Hamza</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad – Karan – Abu Ja’far</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad – Rusafa – Saddam</td>
<td>2,336</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad – Rusafa – Sa’d</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad – Rusafa – Rashid</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad – Rusafa – Adhamiya</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala – Diyala</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din &amp; Anbar – Salah al-Din</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din &amp; Anbar – Al-Mu’tasim</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din &amp; Anbar – Anbar</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din &amp; Anbar – Gazira</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra &amp; Dhi Qar – Basra</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra &amp; Dhi Qar – Dhi Qar</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan &amp; Wasit – Miysan</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan &amp; Wasit – Wasit</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil, Karbala &amp; Najaf – Babil</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil, Karbala &amp; Najaf – Karbala</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil, Karbala &amp; Najaf – Najaf</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisiyya &amp; Al-Muthanna – Qadisiyya</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisiyya &amp; Al-Muthanna – Al-Muthanna</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninawa, Mosul, Duhuk &amp; Irbil – Ninawa</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninawa, Mosul, Duhuk &amp; Irbil – Mosul</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninawa, Mosul, Duhuk &amp; Irbil – Duhuk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninwa, Mosul, Duhuk &amp; Irbil – Irbil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ta’im &amp; Sulaymaniya – Al-Ta’im</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ta’im &amp; Sulaymaniya – Sulaymaniya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Doctors were arrested and, in some cases, even executed for refusing to carry out ear cutting and amputations for other crimes — like theftery.\(^{58}\)

Table 7 provides information about the number of deserters caught from a 1995 report.\(^{59}\) Areas with the largest number of deserters are the Saddam neighborhood of Baghdad (a large Shi’a slum) and the southern governorates of Basra and Dhi Qar. The number of deserters from Sunni areas like Salah al-Din and Anbar is small. Table 7 also provides information about the degree to which local authorities complied with the demand to amputate the ear of deserters. There exists considerable variation on this measure. Notably, northern areas saw the largest percentage of ears amputated as a percentage of draft dodgers and deserters.

In what sense might draft desertion be considered a “private” rather than public act? While the identity of the deserter is known with certainty, there continues to exist some ambiguity about the political orientation of the individual — the relevant “private” dimension. Because individuals avoid the draft for a variety of reasons, most importantly fear of injury or death during the course of military service, evasion of military service is not a clear marker of political opposition. Draft evasion was an

\(^{58}\)“Iraq’s Brutal Decrees Amputation: Branding and the Death Penalty,” Human Rights Watch (June 1995)

\(^{59}\)Boxfile Doc Nos. 01-3874-0004-0502 through 01-3874-0004-0529, January 9 1995
5.3.4 Circulation of Destabilizing Rumors

After the 1991 Gulf War and associated Shi‘a and Kurdish uprisings, it became increasingly clear that most forms of public, political non-compliance were no longer feasible options for Iraqi Shi‘a. This does not suggest, however, that Shi‘a did not continue to harbor grievance against the regime; indeed, the brutality of methods used to put down the uprisings intensified anti-regime sentiment as it combined with a preexisting belief on the part of Shi‘a that they were simultaneously underrepresented in government and overrepresented among the war dead. The growing disconnect between the aspirations of Iraqi Shi‘a and government repression created the conditions which favored more subtle forms of political subversion.

One of the few behaviors Iraqi Shi‘a might engage in that worked against the objectives of the regime related to the circulation of rumors. In this section, I argue that the circulation of rumors (isha‘āl) in Iraq might be interpreted as a form of political non-compliance, even if those rumors did not directly criticize the Ba‘thist regime. One reason for this is that the regime sought to maintain a monopoly on all forms of information — both political and non-political — thus rendering alternative communications a threat to this monopoly control. This interpretation of the political role rumors might play is in line with scholarly research which suggests that rumors can have important effects on a population even if they are not believed (DiFonzo and Bordia 2007, 42).

This interpretation of rumormongering as a political act connects to existing scholarly work which seeks to document the everyday forms of resistance available to those living under forms of political or economic subordination. For Scott (1985, 29), peasant resistance is the “prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents and interest from them.” Slander constitutes one of the weapons available to the peasantry, in Scott’s analysis. In authoritarian Syria, Wedeen (1999, 87) argues that “resistance is made up primarily of mundane transgressions that do not aim to overthrow the existing order.” She points to the popularity of political cartoons and jokes unfavorable to the ruling regime as evidence that “although Syrians may not challenge power directly, neither do they uncritically accept the regime’s version of reality” (Wedeen 1999, 87). Given the increasing impossibility of direct political critique, the circulation of rumors, many of which worked against the regime’s desired monopoly on information and discourse, served to undermine the objectives of the Iraqi regime.

I argue that under dictatorship, rumors can represent a narrow, but relatively safe space for discourse, assuming that there exists a high level of interpersonal trust between the individuals sharing information. DiFonzo and Bordia (2007, 13) define rumors as “unverified and instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation that arise in contexts of ambiguity, danger, or potential threat that function to help people make sense and manage risk.” For Kapferer (1990, 215), rumors are “the media of what goes unsaid: they allow one to bring up in public subjects that the political tradition forbids one to mention openly.” Private discourse of what would otherwise be publicly unspeakable depends on the existence of both interpersonal trust and social cohesion. Previous scholarly research suggests that rumors tend to move between with existing social circles as individuals are only likely to share with those individuals close to them (Allport and Postman, 1947 35). One would imagine that under dictatorship, this would restrict rumor circulation even further to exist only between individuals with social ties. Even small indiscretions could lead one to be the subject of regime repression. Iraqis accused of spreading rumors about the regime were imprisoned and, in some cases, killed.60

Although among the more subtle forms of non-compliance, Ba‘th Party officials were concerned with the destabilizing effects of rumormongering. What do we know about the content of rumors circulating in

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autocratic Iraq? Memoranda from the Ba’th Party Regional Command files provide information about the types of rumors of concern to the regime. For example, a security file focusing on spring 1993 contains a number of examples related to internal security. A rumor circulating in the Kurdish community in March of 1993 suggested that state authorities were deporting Kurds.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0027, March 26 1993} It was also rumored that on April 28, 1993 a military parade held in Baghdad on the occasion of the birthday of Saddam Hussein would be bombed by a joint American-Israeli air strike.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0039, April 22 1993} A rumor was circulating that the Minister of Interior was going to be fired.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0069} The same memorandum reports that prisoners had escaped from Abu Ghurayb prison.\footnote{Ibid.} Rumors also circulated about assassination attempts against the sons of the president, Uday and Quay Hussein, and coup attempts.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0564, February 9 1993}

Another set of rumors also circulating that spring related to the agricultural sector. One rumor suggested that Saddam Hussein would nationalize farmlands and place agricultural lands under the control of his son, Uday.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0141, April 16 1993} It was also rumored that the president’s family had manufactured a tomato shortage in order to drive up the price of tomatoes they were selling.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0147, April 10 1993}

The majority of rumors reported at this time were in some way related to Shi’a Iraqis or to predominantly Shi’a areas. In the Najaf area, it was rumored that three thousand Iranians would be entering Baghdad and that Iraqi government security forces would be harassing all bearded men, as a result.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0001, April 24 1993} The same document also suggests that there would be an uprising in the days to follow which the state will attempt to crush and that clashes would take place between security forces and bearded men.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0001, April 24 1993} The following Thursday was reported to be a date for resistance against the government in all cities and Karbala and Najaf would be surrounded by security in a bid to catch draft dodgers and deserters.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0032, April 24 1993} In the same month, it was rumored that the Minister of Interior had been shot in the predominantly Shi’a “Saddam” (now Sadr) neighborhood of Baghdad by a fellow security service officer and that the Saudi media had reported on this incident.\footnote{Boxfile Doc No. 005-3-3-0032, April 24 1993} The government was also reported to be deporting residents of the “Saddam” neighborhood.\footnote{Ibid.}

Figure 4 charts the relative number of rumors for each of the major regions of Iraq, controlling for the population of each region, based on a collection of 1,500 rumors collected for the period 1997 to 2002. As suggested by Figure 2, although the relative number of rumors per area can vary, the number of rumors being collected in North and Central regions is relatively small compared to areas with large or predominant Shi’a populations.

6 Conclusions

Recent work in the field of authoritarian politics has focused on institutional regime type without considerable emphasis on how power is projected under dictatorship and the impact of autocratic governance for the lived experience of citizenries. I suggest that existing studies of authoritarian regime type — particularly those which stress the authoritarian versus totalitarian nature of governance — often belie considerable variation in treatment of populations within a country’s borders. Indeed, a willingness

\footnote{Ibid.}
to break with regime expectations of appropriate behavior often brings different forms of punishment depending on the type of behavior and the individual transgressor.

In this paper, I provide a theoretical framework for understanding the varied political behaviors of citizens of dictatorships. Using evidence drawn from an unusually rich set of archival documents from Iraq under Saddam Hussein, I seek to explain the variation in forms of non-compliance undertaken by individuals seeking to balance a complicated series of concerns when negotiating their relationship with the Ba’thist regime. While the autocratic regime in Iraq under Saddam Hussein represents an extreme case of repression and centralized control, many of features that characterized Ba’thist rule continue to exist in a variety of non-democratic contexts. From an empirical perspective, I provide evidence regarding cross-sectional variation on a number of indicators, including political orientation, “Friend of the President” designation, circulation of rumors and draft evasion. I am also able to examine forms of temporal variation as they relate to foreign policy-related “shocks” that had important, yet unanticipated, implications for domestic politics.

References


