Political Economy and Immigration: A Seven Nation Study

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Abstract

In this paper we seek to understand the effects of immigration attitudes on the strategic environment of political parties and leaders. While immigration attitudes are substantially driven by social attitudes, economic forces have played an important role in the recent emergence of immigration as a political issue. We show, based on evidence from a comparative study conducted by YouGov in Spring of 2015, that the rise of immigration as an issue had by that time driven a wedge between the major parties – those that regularly play a role in government – and their supporters. This "immigration gap" opened up enormous space for new political movements to form, either inside existing parties or outside. We suggest that the potential for this kind of destabilization of existing parties or party systems has probably been present for years and that it is rooted both in effects of the long term movement toward global and regional markets, as well as in the effects of shorter term responses to the Great Recession and its prolonged aftermath.

Introduction

The world is facing a crisis of globalization which was exacerbated by the onset of the Great Recession as well as by the efforts of the advanced economies to restore economic health. Opening up domestic economies to global competition creates winners and losers. Labor markets are particularly vulnerable as workers, especially low skilled workers, are forced to compete with overseas labor. This may drive down domestic consumer prices and boost wages in emerging markets but, even if host economies as a whole gain from such change, some workers suffer as their jobs are lost and wages adjust downwards. And tax burdens may increase, too, in some cases as counties seek to soften the blows due to globalization and provide services to immigrants.   Even if the aggregate costs are small or even negative, however, globalization can undermine the sense of national unity or "identity," as parts of society lose the faith that we are all "in this together." Not surprisingly, therefore, globalization

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produces complex patterns of individual attitudes and it can make for difficult psychological adjustments. And these forces can be exacerbated by cyclical downturns or secular declines in economic performance. These complicated reactions may be a big political problem for the governing parties if they cause electorates to turn against the free trade policies.

In this paper we focus on immigration, as it is the most visible aspect of globalization. We seek to understand the effects of immigration attitudes on the strategic choices that must be made by political parties and leaders. We show that, based on the evidence available to us in early 2015, immigration has driven a wedge between the major parties – those that regularly play a role in government – and their supporters, and that this wedge opened up enormous space for new movements either inside existing parties or outside. Of course now, in early 2017 -- following Brexit and the Trump election, and the rise of new political parties on the continent – this finding may seem obvious. But we suggest that the potential for this kind of destabilization has actually been present for years and that it is rooted both in the longer term movement toward global and regional markets and in the shorter term responses to the Great Recession and its prolonged aftermath.

We build on extensive recent work that seeks to explain the formation of anti-immigration attitudes. This literature suggests that, while both short and long-term economic forces can play a role, cultural anxieties and stereotypes remain the most important generator of anti-immigrant attitudes.[1] Hainmueller and Hopkins, based on their survey of the literature, conclude that "Overall, hypotheses grounded in self-interest have fared poorly, meaning that there is little accumulated evidence that citizens form their attitudes about immigration based on its effects on their personal economic situation. This pattern has held in both North America and Western Europe, in both observational and experimental studies."[2]   The findings reported by those authors held up in our study as well: we do not find strong evidence for *narrow* self-interest in explaining attitudes toward immigrants (see Appendix A). People are more likely to be guided in forming judgments by cultural and sociotropic considerations – how their nation is doing economically – rather than by their own or their family's

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[1] See the extensive survey of the literature in Jens Hainmueller and Daniel J. Hopkins, "Public Attitudes Toward Immigration," Annual Review of Political Science. 2014. 17:225–49, which reports findings up to its publication date. For more recent research see Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash", Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series, August 2016. Their conclusions as to the relative importance of cultural and economic effects are similar.

[2] Op cit. p. 3.

narrow interests.[3] Moreover, cultural attitudes toward diversity seem more important in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes than either private attitudes or sociotropic judgments.

We think it is misleading, however, to infer from these robust findings that economic forces are unimportant causes of immigration attitudes. For one thing, nearly all of the relevant literature is based on cross-sectional studies but the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes is essentially a temporal phenomenon. There is no reason to think that the cross-sectional findings – that cultural attitudes are more powerful than economic attitudes in explaining "who" is opposed to immigrants – are inconsistent with an economic account of the rise in anti-immigrant attitudes. Indeed, we think the cross-sectional studies have much to tell us about how economic distress translates into anti-immigrant attitudes and subsequently into an increased willingness to support extreme parties or political movements. Indeed, economic theory gives powerful reasons to believe that lowering tariff barriers has adverse effects on some workers.[4] And recent work suggests that these adverse effects increase relative to the aggregate benefits as the tariff barriers are reduced.[5] It is very likely that these concentrated negative outcomes reflect themselves in social and political attitudes.

Our view is that the rise of populist anti-immigrant backlash is likely to be connected both to the persistent economic malaise and slow motion economic distress the world has experienced since 2008. Indeed, such intertemporal effects are noted in the literature which suggests that economic forces may be mediated by cultural attitudes and other psychological processes. We doubt that it could be otherwise.[6] In any case, we argue that the recent intensification of the immigration issue, which we believe is partly traceable directly to cyclical economic effects, has had significant political consequences. We will show that the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes has exposed the vulnerability of traditional political parties either to internal fracture or to entry by new parties or political leaders.

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[3] A person is said to make a *sociotropic* judgment if she decides according to how the nation or the economy (or some other large group) is doing rather than self interest.

[4] The classic statement of this idea is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for a simple two factor economy, presented in Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson, "Protection and Real Wages," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 9 (1941), 58-73.

[5] Dani Rodrik, "Populism and the Economics of Globalization," DP12119, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 2017. Rodrik generalizes the Stolper-Samuelson result to complex economies and argues that its effects extend beyond the removal of tariff barriers to globalization more generally. He acknowledges that nations can adopt policies to compensate the "losers" and notes that European welfare state policies have been more successful in moderating the effects of globalization in Europe compared with the United States. Indeed, he argues that recent pressures on welfare state protections may be the cause of increased anxieties over globalization in Europe.

[6] We emphasize the need to construct panel studies to address this issue. In fact, we plan to extend the current data into panels by re-interviewing respondents in the next few months.

It is not evident, however, that immigration actually is responsible for many of globalization's economic effects. Economic displacement may well be due to other, less visible, events and decisions. An industry goes offshore, machines replace labor in its production processes, or a firm's products become obsolete or uncompetitive and stop selling as they once did. Or a government fails to adopt policies to adapt to these changes and cushion the blows that may fall on some sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, immigration puts a recognizable face on events that may well be properly attributable to other forces. For that reason, attitudes toward immigrants are significant as an indicator of pain caused by less visible forces of globalization. And, as recent events in the advanced democracies show, immigration can trigger backlash against opening societies to external competition.[7] Immigration opens material and cultural expectations, perhaps even undermining the sense of security. The presence of people speaking incomprehensible languages, dressing strangely, and observing unfamiliar religious practices, can be threatening even if one is not suffering economically. People may simply resent the presence of new and different people in public spaces and sometimes feel as if they are losing control of "their" country. In that sense, the presence of large numbers of immigrants may raise issues of national or civic "identity" -- "who are we as a people?" or, "do these people share our values?"[8] Not surprisingly such concerns often lead to opposition to increases in immigration. In this respect, the opening of economies and societies to globalization has the potential to destabilize political systems.

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Our study is based on a new dataset that offers a unique perspective on the roots of the anti-immigrant reactions to the second globalization. From March to June of 2015, YouGov conducted a survey of seven nations (U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, France and Germany), asking identical questions to respondents about immigration and other issues. Obviously the YouGov sample is a cross section, and so we can say little about attitude dynamics. However, the different countries

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[7] For example, a recent and important study of attitude change in the U.K. begins this way: "In May 2014, immigration overtook the economy as the leading concern of British voters. The UK Independence Party (UKIP), campaigning on a platform of immigration control, came first in the May European elections with 27.9 per cent of the vote, two and a half points ahead of Labour, four more than the Tories. This was an unprecedented achievement for a third party in British politics. Since 2002, immigration has typically ranked among the electorate's top two priorities." Eric Kaufmann and Gareth Harris, Changing Places: Mapping the British Response to Ethnic Change. http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Changing_places_-_web.pdf, p.9.

[8] The Kaufmann-Harris report focuses on changing notions of identity, arguing that "…the dynamics of the ethnic majority – not the nation, and not ethnic minorities – are critical for understanding these trends. During the 2000s, concern over integration and the 'parallel lives' led by minority communities rose to the fore while the fortunes of multicultural approaches waned. This was joined by a great deal of discussion of Britishness: the nature of British national identity. The ethnic majority, or white British, was not entirely overlooked, but the spotlight largely bypassed them. In other words, the key question for many is not 'What does it mean to be British in an increasingly diverse society?' but 'What does it mean to be white British in an increasingly diverse society?'" (p. 9)

were at different places in the business cycle in the spring of 2015 so that our measures of "country effects" may incorporate some cyclic elements, though fixed effects can also pick up cultural or other intercountry differences.[9] Thus, if we want to learn about attitude change we really need a follow-up survey.[10] Given that the surveys were administered prior to the Syrian diaspora, our paper might serve as a kind of baseline for future studies that might take account of more recent events.

The countries represented in our data vary widely in several important respects that might be relevant to immigration attitudes. Five are members of the EU (so far); four of those inside both the Euro and Schengen areas. Three are, to some extent, committed to what is sometimes called the Anglo-Saxon model of "flexible" labor markets and a common law legal system. The four continental countries have a history of relatively active government labor market policies. The electoral and party systems also vary widely: where some countries use variants of majority or plurality rule to elect representatives and others employ forms of proportional representation. A case can be made that each country is "exceptional" in some sense. But each also shares characteristics with others so that we can hope to isolate some institutional effects that do not depend on particular country characteristics.

However, the unique feature of this study is found in the extensive battery of questions permitting respondents to place both themselves and the political parties on the same scales for each of several issues. Placement data will allow us to ask about the effects of immigration attitudes on placements, distances and, ultimately, on vote intentions. Moreover, we can carry out this assessment within the framework of the two prominent theories of voting found in the political science literature: Prospective and Retrospective voting models.[11]

This survey posed two questions about immigration which may usefully help to discern its political effect. One question asks simply if the *level* of immigration is "too high." While there is significant cross country variation in the responses, across the seven countries a majority agrees that the current level is "too high." The second question, which seems less sensitive to temporal variation and more

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[9] For example, the economies in the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and Germany were performing relatively well (overall) in that period while Italy and, to some extent, France were still mired in economic doldrums. On the other hand, there are significant regional variations within even well performing countries that need to be taken into account in future work on this sample of countries.

[10] Which is in the field as we write this.

[11] For evidence of retrospective voting see Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Haven: Yale University press, 1981. Some theory is developed in John Ferejohn, "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control," Public Choice, vol. 50 (1986), 5-25. The classical motivation for prospective voting is presented in Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row, 1957. A theory of prospective voting and a comparison with retrospective is presented in James Fearon, "Elections and Representation, " in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard, Manin, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

focused on the respondent's view of her own society, concerns the degree to which immigrations should be *integrated* into society. In Table 1 we show dichotomized responses to the two questions – with the anti-immigrant response coded as 1 – and an Index constructed by adding the two responses together.[12]

Table 1 – Respondents' preferences on immigration items
in the 7-country CISE-Hoover Institution Comparative Partisanship Survey

	Encourage immigrants to leave		Decrease current level of immigration		Anti-immigration Index		
	Yes %	No %	Yes %	No %	0 %	1 %	2 %
Canada	27.2	72.8	44.0	56.0	55.3	25.7	19.0
Denmark	41.2	58.8	63.7	36.3	23.6	53.5	22.9
France	50.0	50.0	70.3	29.7	30.5	29.3	40.2
Germany	37.4	62.6	59.7	40.3	40.2	28.3	31.5
Italy	45.6	54.4	72.8	27.3	23.3	41.3	35.4
United Kingdom	41.3	58.7	74.2	25.9	27.8	34.0	38.2
U.S.A.	38.8	61.2	48.0	52.0	46.5	28.2	25.2
Overall	40.4	59.6	62.5	37.5	35.2	34.2	30.7

With respect to the <u>level</u> of immigration, only in the two North American countries do majorities oppose decreasing the level of integration and even in those countries, more than 40% favor decreases in immigration. Germany, at almost 60 percent in favor or reducing the immigration, is next lowest, while France, Italy and the U.K. have over 70 percent of respondents agreeing that levels of immigration should be cut. In regard to <u>integration</u>, Canada is most inclined to favor integration over forcing immigrants to leave, followed by Germany and the U. S., with anti-immigration percentages below 40%. All other countries are over 40 with France the highest at exactly 50 percent.

Evidently, taking both measures together, responses to immigration vary cross-nationally with Canada, the U.S. and Germany being most welcoming. And there is a substantial difference between responses to the two questions as well. It is somewhat hard to interpret these data as it is not clear what

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[12] To be clear, the first two variables are dummies separating respondents picking the anti-immigration stance (1) on that issues from those who do not (0). The index is a sum of these two dummies, counting how many times a respondent has taken the anti-immigration stance (0, 1, or 2). On the integration question, on which responses are measured on a 7-point scale, we considered as anti-immigration respondents placing themselves on the 5, 6, or 7 points (all those more anti-integration than the central value of 4). On the level question, which has three possible responses (increase it, decrease it, and keep the current level), we considered as anti-immigration those respondents stating they want to decrease it (again, all those more anti-immigration than the central value – keep it as it is, in this instance).

or whom the respondents are thinking about when they are asked these questions about immigration. Their reference group may not be immigrants but unassimilated or partly assimilated residents or citizens. The following table reports the percentage of immigrants and, for example, Muslims in each country.[13] Each of these might serve as referents for survey respondents, especially in contemporary Europe. Moreover, as can be seen, even if the percentage of immigrants is small, as it has been in Italy, the number may have risen quickly over a short time period and may be more salient for that reason.

Table 2 – Levels of immigrant and Muslim population in the different countries

	Immigrant population[14]		Muslims[15]
	2005	2013	2015
	%	%	%
Canada	18.8	20.7	2.1
Denmark	7.2	9.9	4.1
France	10.2	11.6	7.5
Germany	12.3	11.9	5.8
Italy	4.3	9.4	3.7
United Kingdom	9.0	12.4	4.4
U.S.A.	12.8	14.3	0.9
Average	10.7	12.9	4.1

While we cannot be sure what was in the minds of respondents early in 2015, we suspect that, had the survey been conducted now, respondents in European countries might have been thinking even more about Muslims and whether or not they were actually immigrants. This may also have been the focus of French respondents in 2015, with its large Muslim population, or in Denmark or the U.K., which had experienced recent terrorist events.

The object of our study is to examine the ways in which the political systems have responded to (or channeled) perceived immigration issues. This question can be asked at several levels. Do immigration attitudes shape electoral outcomes, or party programs? Or do they affect the structure of the party system itself in ways we suggested at the start – by displacing traditional left-right politics with a

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[13] We should point out that Muslims in France had been there for a long time and were mostly French speaking citizens whereas those in Denmark had mostly arrived after 1990, with much larger flows coming after 2000, and most had not become citizens and, indeed, many did not speak Danish.

[14] Source: UN Trend in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision.

[15] Source: UN Trend in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision.

center-periphery, or even a system vs antisystem, cleavage? Or, does the threat of such a displacement lead mainstream parties to push reforms in the electoral system to try to marginalize inter or intra party competitors? We think that any or all of these are live possibilities.

The survey asked respondents to place themselves and their country's political parties according to various issues. Table 3 contains average party placements on immigration issues for all parties receiving at least 10% of the votes in previous national elections. Average party placements correspond more or less to how we would intuitively think the parties would be placed on these issues by expert observers. Self and party placement data are especially valuable in connecting what party leaders are doing in government and in public space insofar as they represent information that has actually been absorbed by citizens. Of course we cannot know how this information was generated: does it come from the policies pursued in office (or their effects)? Or does it come from party position papers or manifestos? For our purpose this does not matter: what is important for us is what the citizens believe.

Not surprisingly, the major conservative or center-right parties in every country were seen as significantly more anti-immigrant, on both of our measures, than their center-left opponents. In the case of Denmark, U.K., and France, where there are relevant nationalist anti-immigration parties, those parties placed highest in our anti-immigration measures. Secondly, taking differences between center-left and center-right parties on the two variables, we can see there is a very strong positive correlation between differences on integration and differences on levels (the correlation is .7 and, if Denmark were dropped the correlation is .93), which suggests that there is a common factor connecting immigration attitudes.

Table 3 – Perceived parties' positions on immigration issues

	Encourage immigrants to leave		Decrease current level of immigration		Anti-immigration Index		
	Yes	No	Yes	No	0	1	2
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
CAN New Democratic Party	14.7	85.3	11.4	88.6	82.0	16.4	1.6
CAN Conservative Party	29.5	70.5	34.1	65.9	64.2	25.6	10.1
CAN Liberal Party	16.8	83.2	10.9	89.1	80.5	17.5	2.1
DEN Social Democrats (A)	35.3	64.7	17.5	82.5	58.1	37.0	4.9
DEN Dan People's Party (O)	43.8	56.2	95.8	4.2	14.5	49.1	36.5
DEN Left, Liberal Party (V)	32.0	68.0	71.9	28.1	36.3	45.6	18.1
FR Socialist Party	17.9	82.1	16.8	83.2	76.3	18.2	5.6
FR The Republicans	49.0	51.0	64.2	35.8	39.0	30.5	30.5
FR National Front	77.1	22.9	95.1	4.9	15.0	18.8	66.2
GER CDU	30.3	69.7	40.4	59.6	59.2	24.0	16.8
GER SPD	15.2	84.8	18.1	81.9	77.4	18.2	4.4
IT Democratic Party	15.4	84.6	41.0	59.0	61.2	31.3	7.5
IT Go Italy	58.3	41.7	77.2	22.8	26.2	28.3	45.5
IT M5D	37.0	63.0	67.4	32.6	40.7	34.2	25.1
U.K. Labour	15.8	84.2	35.7	64.3	66.7	26.6	6.7
U.K. Conservative	39.8	60.2	68.0	32.0	38.2	33.9	27.9
U.K. UKIP	82.1	17.9	94.6	5.4	13.2	17.8	69.1
U.S. Democratic	13.1	86.9	9.0	91.0	83.5	13.8	2.7
U.S. Republican	67.1	32.9	69.3	30.7	26.9	32.4	40.6

There is reason to think that party placements on both dimensions of the immigration issue are both meaningful and somewhat connected to one another. We think, therefore, that these data form a reasonable basis for comparing party and self-placements of voters. Given that respondents seem to be able to locate the various parties' positions on the immigration issues, we turn to the question of how partisan respondents place themselves relative to their own placement of their party (Figure 1): we call this "distance" the respondent's *subjective* distance from her party. We use the 0/1/2 anti-immigration

index described above to determine the average distance from partisans' personal positions compared to where they placed their party.

1. The Immigration Gap

We begin by pointing out a striking fact: in every country the major parties have positioned or are perceived as positioning themselves as more pro-immigrant than their adherents. In all countries, both center right and center left parties – which we may call "governable" parties -- are perceived as substantially more pro-immigrant than their partisans. In some countries (Canada and the U.K.) both parties are perceived by their adherents as much more pro-immigrant than partisans of both parties, while in others like the U.S. and Italy, one party is much more pro-immigrant than its own adherents.


Figure 1 - Average positions of partisans of the various parties (capital letters followed by the letter "s") and average perceived positions of the various parties for its own partisans (plain capital letters) on the anti-immigration index in the various countries[16]

It seems clear enough that this situation, plainly visible already early in 2015, shows that the in each of these countries the principal system parties (center left and center right) had become politically vulnerable on immigration issues. We cannot be sure why this was the case. Perhaps these parties had "moved' in a proimmigrant direction. Or possibly they had always been position in this way but exogenous events made their relatively liberal immigration stances more visible to the public. Or

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[16] In Canada the letter C stands for the Conservative Party and L is for the Liberal Party. In Denmark, the letter A is for the Social-Democratic Party and V for the Left, Denmark's Liberal Party. In France, S represents the Socialist Party, and R the Republicans. In Germany, S is for the SPD and C for the CDU-CSU. In Italy D represents the Democratic Party, and FI is for Go Italy. In the U.K. the letter L is for Labour Party, and the C for Conservative Party. In the U.S. D is for the Democratic Party, while R represents the Republican Party.

perhaps, for similar reason, parts of the the constituencies of the major parties had become less tolerant of immigration. In any case it seems that the mainstream parties, because they have some responsibility to govern, may be vulnerable to events that make immigration more salient and pro-immigration stances less popular. Whatever the explanation, we are seeing the consequences of this now it seems, both in the U.S. with Donald Trump's victory, in the UK in the Brexit vote, and across continental Europe in the various illiberal responses to the Syrian refugee crisis. Across the advanced democracies, voters seem to think that the traditional parties do not have answers for their immigration concerns. In that sense, these data (from the spring of 2015) appear to mark a harbinger of what was to come in Europe, as well as the United States!

What about those parties not included in Figure 1? All three anti-immigrant parties for which we have data (the FN in France, UKIP in the U.K., and the Danish People's Party) are perceived by their own adherents as much more anti-immigrant than other parties in the country. Significantly, the party's position in those cases is close to the average position of their partisans. In France, partisans of the FN were at 1.8 where 2.0 is as high as you could go on the scale, while in the U.K partisans of the UKIP also placed themselves around 1.8. The difference between the two of them is that in France the party was perceived by its partisans to be even more anti-immigration (only instance in which this happens), while in the U.K. the roles are reversed, with partisans slightly more anti-immigrant than the party. The only other anti-immigrant party, the Danish People's Party, was not as extreme (1.2) as were the FN and the UKIP, and its partisans are more anti-immigrant than the party. The Five-Star Movement in Italy and the New Democratic Party in Canada show more of an establishment pattern, with partisans being more anti-immigrant than their perceived position of the party.

There are two questions we need to address in the next part of the paper. First, how can we explain the wedge between system parties and their supporters? Second, what are the political consequences of the gap between parties and their supporters on immigration?

Broadly speaking, one can imagine an account that focuses on what the parties are doing either in a static or dynamic setting.   Maybe the governable parties – center right and center left -- have recently become more favorable to immigration. Another possibility is that the governable parties maintain an equilibrium position that is more 'liberal' than that of their voters on immigration issues in order to be able to supply other policies that their voters like when they are in office. A party may, for example, want to advance policies when in government favorable to economic growth or to lower consumer prices, policies which may favor openness to immigrants. This might be a part of a sensible strategy as long as immigration is not too salient in the electorate. But, when events occur that make immigration

a negative issue in the electorate (or at least in their own constituencies), a gap may open between the party position and its normal supporters.

The other possibility, which we can hope to address with the present data set, is more discussed in the press and in the academic literature as well. Because of recent events, some parts of a party's base may have moved toward favoring anti-immigrant policies. If that is the case, we might be able to identify which supporters of a governable party are most likely to be alienated from their party's immigration position. We will assume that the deviations are to the illiberal side of that position and count those (few) who deviate in the liberal direction the same as those who continue to favor the position of their party. Thus, we run Tobit regressions where only those who deviate in the illiberal direction take positive values. The following table presents the results for the parties in government and the principal opposition (which we count the governable parties):

Table 4: Tobit regressions of distances to governable parties on individual characteristics

	G-integration	G-levels	Opp-integration	Opp-levels
Age	.001	.003**	.001	.04***
Male	-.028	-.063*	.025	-.070**
College	-.151***	-.122**	-.191***	-.126***
Income	-.254***	-.067	-.012	-.039
Extremism	.080	.004	.133**	.035
Govt evaluation	-.322***	-.228***	-.184*	-.162**
Family worse off	.030	.130*	.114	.056
Country worse off	.131**	.031	.122**	.044
Active worker	.055	.008	.025	.072*
Denmark	.079	.290***	.211	-.403***
France	-.062	.357***	.057	-.388***
Germany	-.064	-.023	.022	-.048
Italy	-.090	-.115	.185*	-.448***
UK	.086	-.066	-.020	-.196***
US	.020	.315**	-.151	-.483***
Constant (canada)	.352**	.310**	-.039	.519***
N/	1711/.033	1570/.058	1303/.056	1207/.116

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Country effects must be read as relative to Canada which is omitted from the regressions. The country effects are especially striking in the last column of the table, in which opposition parties in all the other nations exhibit smaller anti-immigrant gaps than did the Canadian opposition (the pro-immigrant Liberals who remained in opposition until October 2015). Also striking is the fact that governing parties in Denmark, France and the US exhibit a very large gap on the preferred level of immigration. Liberal governing parties in these countries were unable to persuade their partisans to support a pro-immigrant stance.   Note that older people and males are more likely to prefer reducing the number of immigrants but are not necessarily opposed to integrating those who are already present into society. On the other hand, the effect of college, higher income, or favorable evaluations of the government reduce anti-immigration deviations. Dissatisfaction with how the economy is doing also disposes people to deviate to the right of their party on the integration variable rather than on reducing levels. The overall picture has become increasingly familiar with time. Liberal governing parties exhibit large gaps on immigration, whereas conservative parties in government (in Germany, Canada, the UK) are less vulnerable on the issue. At least this was so until the massive wave of Syrian immigrants began to appear in Europe.

2. *Votes and Immigration attitudes: Two models*

Political Scientists have taken two general approaches to the study of voting behavior. The oldest tradition sees voting in elections as essentially forward looking. Voters were thought to vote for the candidate who would do the best job. This entailed forming beliefs as to what the candidates would do in the future. There is disagreement as to how such beliefs may be formed: would they depend on the candidate's past record in office, her party affiliation, her endorsement by interest group, or her promises on the stump? But the essential point is that many scholars have thought that prospective voting is the way that any minimally rational voter would make decisions. This view is opposed by those who think that voting is essentially backward looking or retrospective. V.O. Key characterized voters as "Gods of Vengeance and Reward." [17] By this account, when an incumbent candidate (or party) asks for her vote, the voter decides based on the past record rather than promises for the future. To be sure, these two models are not so easy to tell apart: voters could use past record to form beliefs

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[17] Key, V. O., Jr. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed.). New York: T. Y. Crowell, 1964.

about future performance. But, in some cases, we can hope to separate the two models as we attempt below.

a. *A Retrospective voting model*

We examine the effects of immigration attitudes on votes for the incumbent governing party. As we have pointed out, the establishment parties tend systematically to be more pro-immigrant than their partisans. This seems to place them in a vulnerable position if popular attitudes shift in an anti-immigrant direction. In the first model in this section, we take a "retrospective" view of elections and ask whether a party pays a price for being out of step with those who voted for it. We can define *party loyalty* as the propensity to vote for the same party that constituents voted for last time and look only at loyalty to parties for various levels of immigration attitudes. The question of how the immigration issue affects an individual's vote for his or her party is shown in Table 5. We calculated how far a respondent is from her preferred party[18] (the one voted in previous national general elections) and compare that against the probability they would vote for that party in the future[19].

The results show that both distance on immigration level and integration have independent negative and significant effects on vote propensity for the respondents' preferred party (no matter which alternative distances, objective or subjective, we look at). The further one is from their preferred party on both dimensions, the less likely they will be to vote for that party in future elections, as measured by the future vote propensity question. Again, regardless of whether measured objectively or subjectively, the distance on the integration variable has a coefficient twice the size of the immigration level. It could be that this result is due to reactions to immigrants who are already in the country and are not yet fully assimilated according to the respondent, making the integration problem more immediate in time than future immigration. Subsequent work will have to determine whether that is true. It is, nevertheless, true that a retrospective model that places weight on immigration attitudes has

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[18] We proceeded in two alternative ways to define party positions, the ones from which to calculate respondent's distance. First, we simply looked at respondent's placement of the party. This is the "subjective" distance. However, we do not have this measure for those respondents failing to place the party. This is a particularly relevant issue when many issue distances are used in a single analysis, as in Table 6, where this strategy results in a significant drop in the number of observations. The alternative, which allows us to overcome this problem and make use of all respondents who placed themselves, consists in using the average placement of the party in the whole sample as the reference point from which to calculate distance. This we call the "objective" distance.

[19] To form an estimate of this probability we used the Expected-Vote-Frequency scores collected in the 7-countries CISE-Hoover Institution Comparative Partisanship Survey. For each relevant party, respondents were asked how often they will vote for it in the future. Complete question wording is reported in the Appendix A. To perform the tests reported in Table 5, we created a dichotomous dependent variable, scoring 1 if the highest Expected-Vote-Frequency was for the party voted in previous elections, 0 otherwise.

explanatory power compared to models that do not. This is a warning to establishment political leaders that deviating from party supporters' views on immigration (which are generally more conservative than party leaders) can threaten reelection.

Table 5 – Effects on Vote Propensity for the party voted in previous general elections[20]

	Objective distances		Subjective distances	
Distance on integration	-0.439***	(0.000)	-0.552***	(0.000)
Distance on immigration level	-0.213*	(0.030)	-0.250***	(0.000)
Constant	-0.112	(0.668)	-0.0312	(0.919)
N	3,899		3,048	
pseudo R^2	0.196		0.208	

p-values in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

b. *Prospective voting model*

We can now turn to a prospective voting model. We assume that voters form future oriented projections as to how the candidates would perform in office by using a simple spatial model. Vote propensity is a variable that allows the respondent to vote for any party with her reported propensity score. Thus, the data takes the form of a *stacked* data matrix.[21] Because each respondent appears several times, as many as the parties she has assigned a nonzero vote propensity score to, in the following table we need to take account of correlation in the error structure. Table 6 presents two ordered logit analyses of the propensity to vote for a party as a function of the distance between the party and the respondent on each issue. As a control, we include a Left-Right scale which, in principle, ought to be related to the spatial judgments. We also control for some plausible measures of cultural attitudes (the death penalty and gay marriages variable).[22] The left hand column presents the results for

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[20] Logistic regressions. Fixed effects and SES controls are omitted. We also included a PID dichotomy, scoring 1 if respondent declared voted party was the party she feels particularly close to, 0 otherwise. See question wording in the Appendix A. Country fixed effects are operationalized through country dummies. Full regression estimates are reported in the Appendix B (See Table A1). We replicated these regressions allowing both slopes and intercept to randomly vary by country in multi-level regression analyses. Findings are reported in the Appendix B (see Table A2) and generally confirm what is presented here.

[21] We use the 5 possible Expected-Vote-Frequency scores (see question wording in the Appendix A) to create an ordinal vote-propensity variable for each party-respondent combination (the unit of analysis).

[22] A British commentator notes that "Nobody has been out campaigning on [the death penalty], yet it strongly correlates with Brexit voting intention. This speaks to a deeper personality dimension which social psychologists …dub Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). A less judgmental way of thinking about RWA is order versus openness. The order-openness divide is emerging as the key political cleavage, overshadowing the left-right economic dimension. This was noticed as early as the mid-1970s by Daniel Bell, but has become more pronounced as the aging West's ethnic transformation has

"objective" differences – where we define the party position as the average placement of the party in the whole sample. The "subjective" difference – the difference between the respondent's self-placement and her placement of the party – is in the right hand column. The analysis is clustered by respondent in order to correct for correlated errors. As above we suppress the estimates of SES controls and country fixed effects. The last row of the table shows that respondent's distance from a party on the Left- Right dimension is a powerful predictor of vote propensities as would be expected if voting behavior were largely driven by a one-dimensional model.

Table 6 – Effects of party-respondent distances on Vote Propensity for a party[23]

	Objective distances		Subjective distances	
Integration	-0.240***	(0.000)	-0.315***	(0.001)
Immigration level	-0.478***	(0.000)	-0.192**	(0.007)
Death penalty	-0.0506	(0.192)	-0.0601	(0.227)
Gay marriages	-0.166***	(0.000)	-0.0445	(0.353)
Credit to foreign buyers	-0.204*	(0.018)	-0.0287	(0.545)
Income inequality	-0.209**	(0.002)	-0.474***	(0.000)
Minimum wage	-0.322***	(0.000)	-0.245**	(0.001)
Unemployment benefits	-0.263***	(0.000)	0.00651	(0.927)
Firing employees	-0.170**	(0.008)	-0.126	(0.058)
Governmental businesses	-0.0506	(0.433)	-0.108*	(0.029)
Retirement age	-0.0552	(0.308)	-0.112	(0.090)
L/R dimension	-1.299***	(0.000)	-1.163***	(0.000)
N	10,123		3,371	
pseudo R^2	0.192		0.239	

p-values in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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accelerated. See Eric Kaufmann, "It's NOT the Economy, Stupid: Brexit as a Story of Personal Values." *EUROPP*. LSE, 09 July 2016. Web. 05 Aug. 2016. We think the same argument can be made for attitudes toward gay marriage as it is very likely to be connected to order-openness in Kaufmann's terms.

[23] Ordered logistic regressions. Fixed effects and SES controls are omitted. Country fixed effects are operationalized through country dummies. Full results are reported in the Appendix 2 (See Table A3). Again, we replicated these regressions with random effects by country in multi-level regression analyses. Findings confirm what is presented here and are available at request.

The results in Table 6 show that, even after controlling for party-respondent distances on the Left-Right dimension, issue distances also have strong effects on the vote propensity, and this is particularly the case for the immigration issues. On both level and integration, the coefficients for party-respondent distance both objectively and subjectively defined are highly significant. The only other specified issues for which this is true are income inequality, and minimum wage where the sign is also negative. Thus, over nine issue positions, the two immigration questions stand out, suggesting that not only is the electoral politics in these countries multi-dimensional, the effects of immigration attitudes stand out as real and powerful drivers of voting preferences, independent of traditional left-right party positions. We suspect that this political configuration – in which the traditional parties seem unable to absorb new and important issues – may presage a political realignment (or realignment) in the advanced democracies.

3. Conclusions

We can learn some hard lessons from the first globalization era – roughly from 1850 to 1920 – and how it ended. The expanding economies of the world drew vast migrations of workers from other less vigorous economies around the world. In the United States and Canada, six and thirteen percent of the population were immigrants. And that was nothing compared to Argentina's 43 percent.[24] In many cases, employers actively recruited workers in Eastern and Southern Europe both to supply workers in tight labor markets and to resist unionization. Anti-immigrant attitudes had important political consequences. The reactions against the Tammany Hall machine, and other nineteenth century political organizations, may have been partly (or even mostly) driven by anti-immigrant sentiment, but they led to Progressive Era reforms of voting and the political process. Moreover, as the Panic of 1893 took hold, many nations – including the United States – adopted protectionist policies, raising tariffs and other trade barriers – and they also moved to close down immigration.

These events were often violent. Anti-Chinese riots in San Francisco and elsewhere, in response to the influx of Chinese (and other Asian) labor, exemplified the political backlash. California led the American states in producing anti-Chinese legislation.[25] Indeed, the main stimulus for the 1879

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[24] Freiden, J., 2006, Global Capitalism, New York, Norton.
[25] "Denis Kearney and the Workingmen's Party of California (WPC) became the voice of urban workers who saw themselves as victims of corporate interests and whose livelihoods were threatened by Chinese laborers." Arthur Rolston,

California Constitution was the rise of the virulently anti-Chinese Workingman's Party which, together with the Grangers, elected most of the convention delegates.[26] Both urban and rural radicals were convinced that big companies, railroads, and big farms and ranches were importing cheap immigrant labor in order to hold down white workers' wages. Soon afterwards, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) which restricted access to citizenship. The Democratic Party's 1896 platform took advantage of the populist sentiments by proposing to limit "the importation of pauper labor." Then as now, the United States was not alone in reacting against immigrant labor. After 1897, anti-immigration policies were established in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and the U.K.[27] Indeed, it is not farfetched to argue that reactions against immigration were the political motor driving the rise of Protectionism that put an end to the first globalization early in the 20th Century.

As the American examples show, anti-immigration policies often took the form of cultural and racial exclusionary legislation and some of it stuck for a long time. Australia retained its "white only" immigration policy as late as the 1970s.[28] And, as mentioned, the United States not only prohibited Chinese immigrants from becoming citizens, it eventually shut down immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe.[29] And these policies were reflected not only at the national level but extended down to states and cities as well. It wasn't only that national majorities wanted to limit the adverse effects of competition with cheap immigrant labor, but that they did not want to see immigrants as part of their community or "nation" either.

"Capital, Corporations, and Their Discontents in Making California's Constitutions, 1849–1911," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (November 2011), p. 537.

[26] While anti-Chinese language pervades the document, some parts stand out for their explicitly discriminatory requirements:Art. XIX, Sec. 2 states "No corporation now existing or hereafter formed under the laws of this State, shall, after the adoption of this Constitution, employ directly or indirectly, in any capacity, any Chinese or Mongolian (…) Art. XIX, Sec. 4 The presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens of the United States is declared to be dangerous to the well-being of the State, and the Legislature shall discourage their immigration by all the means within its power. Asiatic coolieism is a form of human slavery, and is forever prohibited in this State, and all contracts for coolie labor shall be void. All companies or corporations, whether formed in this country or any foreign country, for the importation of such labor, shall be subject to such penalties as the Legislature may prescribe."

[27] See Timmer, A. and Williams, J., "Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s: Labor Markets, Policy Interactions and Globalization Backlash," Population and Development Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec, 1998), pp. 739-771.

[28] There was immense antagonism to imported Chinese laborers in the mines from the 1850s and it spread to the factories with the rise of organized labor. Soon after Federation, the Parliament enacted the *Immigration Restriction Act1901*, which limited immigration to preferred groups and provided for deportation of others.

[29] The radical anti-immigrant factions lost on many issues and, where their views prevailed, courts undid most of their reforms. Still, they left their mark: "the convention was virtually unanimous in adopting anti-Chinese provisions intended to deprive the Chinese of employment and to empower local governments to exclude them as undesirables." Rolston, p. 543. See also Freiden, J., 2006, Global Capitalism, New York, Norton.

The same issues have arisen in the current, second, great transformation of the world economy.[30] Scholars have shown that immigration attitudes are related to economic vulnerability. "People with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question."[31] Other studies have shown other ways that economics plays a role in shaping a country's views toward immigration.[32] In addition to the economic impact of globalization on attitudes toward immigration, cultural and psychological variables also come into play when explaining contemporary attitudes toward immigrants.[33]

Immigration has once again become an explosive issue in the developed countries and especially in those with democratic traditions, because liberal democratic institutions generally permit the rapid translation of social dislocations into political voice. In the United States, concerns about large numbers of undocumented people from Mexico and Latin America have been present for years and have increasingly divided the political parties. Similar and more acute concerns have broken out in Europe over the vast and sudden influx of Syrian refugees (and others) fleeing chaos and civil war in the Middle East. Recent events have raised public concerns that disorderly flows of immigrants may hide infiltration by terrorists or criminal elements. Efforts by leaders in the advanced economies to attempt to settle refugees have, for that reason, triggered popular backlashes. It is not clear that democratic institutions, either in Europe or the United States are managing these issues very well.

It makes matters worse that, since 2008, immigrants have arrived in depressed and roiled economies with high unemployment levels. But, perhaps more importantly, some political leaders have sought to exploit the issue for their own purposes. This has happened both inside and outside the established political parties and has sometimes resulted in splits or in the formation of new parties. These political reactions to immigration may have the potential to reshape party competition, either by putting new issues or parties to the front or by changing the relative political appeal or balance among existing parties. This seems especially likely given the linkages that some politicians seek to make between immigration and public safety and their loudly shouted refusal to accept the received 'social

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[30] Spence, M., 2011, The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.
[31] Hainmueller, J. and Hiscox, M., 2007, "Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe," International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring, 2007), pp. 399-442. The effect of education on immigration attitudes appears to be complex. See Bram Lancee and Oriane Sarrasin, "Educated Preferences or Selection Effects? A Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Educational Attainment on Attitudes Towards Immigrants," European Sociological Review, 2015, 1–12
[32] Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y., and Hyunjung Mo, C., 2008, "Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing Between Prevalence and Conditional Impact," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 959-978.
[33] Brader, T., Valentino, N., and Suhay, E., 2008, "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 959-978.

contract.' In this respect immigration attitudes and the political reactions to them have potential systemic effects – as they did during the first globalization.

We are already seeing signs that the established party systems are not managing these new forces very well. Openings have been found, both on the left and the right, for new political actors. The appeal of these new players is not fully comprehensible in traditional left-right discourse. Rising political leaders increasingly seek votes by appealing to notions of national "identity" or unity – by proposing protectionist and anti-immigrant policies. The appeal of these policies cuts across the party lines in every country, breaking down traditional political distinctions between left and right and shifting the political discourse to a fight between the center and the periphery, where the center consists of the traditional "governable" parties and periphery is made up of outsiders represented by new parties (which may be left or right or ambiguous in coloration depending on the national context). This displacement of traditional parties has increasingly been accompanied both by the distrust of the political class and, at the same time, the rise of new and threatening political leaders, who seek to appeal directly to the "people" in some sense. At the same time, this popular appeal involves a controversial definition of who the proper people actually are: the identity of the nation, if you will. We do not know how far these changes will go, of course, but they appear to have potential 'constitutional' ramifications in every country, undermining traditions of representative government in favor of something else. In seeking to understand the effects of immigration attitudes on prospective and retrospective political choices by political leaders and parties, we found that the immigration issue has exposed an enormous vulnerability of traditional parties either to internal fracture or entry by new parties or political leaders.

We argued in the introduction that it is important to put the immigration issue in the context of the more general phenomena of globalization which is, in its nature, a dynamic phenomenon. Globalization has two aspects: the first is economic, exposing local workers to world-wide labor markets and specifically to competition from workers in emerging nations. The second is cultural – by increasing diversity and threatening cultural norms and a sense of identity. Many studies suggest that the fear of diversity may be a very powerful determinant of immigration attitudes independent of economic factors.[34] But it is also true that people and communities are exposed differentially to the impacts of globalization and that national policies differ in how effectively these impacts are modulated. These

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[34] See the recent findings in Inglehart and Morris *op cit*. as well as Brady, Ferejohn and Paparo, 2016.

two phenomena are linked, of course, and nowhere more so than in immigration practice and policy. We hasten to add, however, that immigrants in many countries are not the only (and perhaps not the most) important source of perceived diversity. In some countries, negative attitudes toward diversity may be driven by the presence of long-time citizens and other residents who have refused to assimilate, or been prevented from assimilating, to the majority culture, independently of immigration rates.

In this paper we used a seven-nation survey to compare attitudes toward immigration in regard to levels of immigration and integration into the country. The results showed sharp differences across countries but, concerning the causes of these attitudes, economic frustration appears to play a role. Our findings in this respect are consistent with those of earlier work by John Sides and Jack Citrin who drew from a 2002-3 European Social Survey.[35] The similarity of our findings to the early studies is particularly noteworthy in view of the changed circumstances of the two surveys. Immigration is a much bigger issue now than it was then and its impact is probably felt differently in different countries. Previous work on this data found that cultural factors were somewhat more powerful than economic factors. Thus, we agree with Sides and Citrin (and others) that "at the individual level, cultural and national identity, economic interests and the level of information about immigration are all important predictors of attitude." Furthermore, we found that among economic measures, sociotropic judgments were more powerful bases for attitude formation than self or family regarding assessments. Indeed, if one believes that the disposition to weigh sociotropic over personal economic judgments is itself culturally determined, culture effects may be even more powerful.

One contribution is to assess the impact of economy on anti-immigrant attitudes, something that the timing of the YouGov Survey permits. And because our instrument also asked respondents to assess political and issue judgments, we were able to get estimates of the political impact of anti-immigrant attitudes. Indeed, the most innovative part of our paper is in connecting immigration attitudes to politics. We were able to show that political parties, at least those with prospects for joining a government, were viewed as being systematically much more pro-immigrant than their voters. This makes these parties vulnerable to competition from anti-immigrant parties, especially when immigration concerns intensify. We also estimated the effect that disagreement between respondents and parties on immigration issues have on voters' propensity to vote for parties they had previously supported, showing that parties lose votes because of their divergence from the immigration

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[35] John Sides and Jack Citrin, "European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), pp. 477-504. See Brady, Ferejohn and Paparo, op cit, for more analyses of cultural and economic effects in our dataset.

preferences of their previous supporters. This probably makes parties less willing to take pro-immigrant positions than they might otherwise be. In other words, even as parties reveal themselves as more pro-immigrant than their voters, this may actually understate the divergence.

Moreover, when we analyzed the respondent's vote propensities prospectively, the results showed that, even controlling for the traditional left-right factor and other issue distances, immigration issues have an impact on future vote dispositions. These results – retrospective and prospective – raise the question of whether immigration has the chance to become a realigning issue in modern democracies. We can only raise that issue here without settling it. Our hope is that these results, particularly the political implications, can become a baseline for future research.

In addition to the social science implications of our study, there are also public policy implications. There has been a powerful surge of anti-globalization political sentiment, which has spawned significant new political patterns: the President of the United States promises to erect protectionist barriers around the American economy; the British electorate voted to exit the European Union; and across Europe anti-immigration parties and movements are rising. To some extent this is a bottom-up phenomenon, but new political leaders have begun to exploit it in ways that may threaten the postwar political consensus. It is important to understand where the opposition to immigration and trade is coming from. This research shows that. in large part, those who perceive themselves or their national community as having lost out economically are more anti-immigrant. In addition, cultural conservatives are more anti-immigrant than are social liberals across all of our countries. Together, these groups appear to make up a large part of the electorate in many advanced democracies. The fact that all establishment political parties in our survey have taken positions that are more pro-immigration than their own supporters makes them particularly vulnerable to anti-system or periphery parties. While it may be a good thing from a policy perspective, that "governable" parties tend to take pro-global positions, the political consequences could be catastrophic. We have seen this movie before; it ended with isolation and beggar the neighbor policies or with democratic collapse. Neither of the endings is very pleasant.

We do not relish playing Cassandra. But our research shows that many voters are willing to vote against parties they have supported in the past unless their party adjusts its position. Policy makers need to take heed of this and move cautiously lest they generate trends, which would be similar to those that ended the first transformation of the world economy. Immigration issues are especially treacherous now, when many of the major economies are mired in economic slowdowns and as the Middle Eastern wars have fueled a flood of people seeking places in safer and more prosperous societies. Perhaps the

best policy advice is to try to fix these issues without doing too much damage to our values or our economic prospects and hope that immigration politics will become less treacherous than they are today. As always, politics is the art of the possible. More than that is too much and too dangerous to wish.

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Appendix A. Anti-immigrant attitudes vary with economic performance

The following two tables (a3 and a4) summarize the effects of economic judgments on anti-immigration attitudes. Table a3 shows the effects of *sociotropic* judgements about the economy on attitudes toward immigrants. The striking feature here is that in Canada, Denmark (and to some extent the U.K.) the belief that the economy is suffering does not lead to a significant increase in overall anti-immigrant sentiments. That said, large majorities of respondents in both Denmark and the U.K. want to decrease the number of immigrants while most Canadians welcome immigration. At the same time, among those perceiving a bad economy, most respondents outside of Denmark and Canada would encourage existing immigrants to leave.

Table a3 – Percentages picking the anti-immigration stance by perceived change in economy

	Encourage immigrants to leave		Reduce immigration Level		Anti-immigration Index (=2)	
	Worse (W)	NW	W	NW	W	NW
Canada	28.3	26.5	47.1	41.7	21.0	18.8
Denmark	33.2	42.3	65.7	63.6	23.3	22.9
France	58.3	33.5	77.9	54.9	48.3	24.9
Germany	58.0	33.5	77.9	56.1	46.5	28.5
Italy	52.1	37.7	73.7	71.5	41.1	28.3
United Kingdom	48.3	39.8	72.4	74.6	42.5	37.3
U.S.A	63.7	29.0	70.7	38.5	45.9	17.0
Average	50.6	35.1	70.2	58.5	40.3	25.7

Table a4 shows how immigration attitudes respond to judgments of how one's own family economic circumstances have either weakened (W) or did not weaken. (NW). For these private-regarding judgments, Denmark and the U.K. stand out in that recent economic experience seems unrelated to immigrant attitudes. It needs to be stressed, however, that respondents in every country wish to reduce the numbers of immigrants who are admitted when their own economic fortunes are poor.

Table a4 – Percentage picking the anti-immigration stance by change in family economy situation

	Encourage immigrants to leave		Reduce immigration Level		Anti-immigration Index (=2)	
	W	NW	W	NW	W	NW
Canada	33.2	25.1	56.3	39.8	26.3	16.5
Denmark	34.8	42.2	71.2	62.6	26.4	22.4
France	57.9	41.5	77.2	62.1	47.4	32.6
Germany	52.2	33.2	70.8	56.4	45.2	27.5
Italy	52.3	41.5	72.8	73.5	41.0	31.9
United Kingdom	42.1	40.8	74.4	74.0	38.6	38.0
U.S.A.	57.2	32.1	66.3	40.8	44.3	18.5
Average	49.8	36.4	71.3	58.7	40.7	26.4

If we focus on the anti-immigration index, we see that Denmark and the U.K. (and perhaps Canada) are distinct from the other countries in that neither anti-immigrant attitude depends strongly on how either the economy's or the family's financial situation has changed.[36] Of course, in Denmark and Canada the values of the anti-immigration Index are at the low end (less than 25) while in the U.K., regardless of economic changes, the attitudes are much more anti-immigrant. In the other four countries, the gap between those thinking thechanges t (national or family) economy is worse and those who don't is at least 10 points and in the U.S. above 25 points.

We also asked respondents how they saw the unemployment situation in their country.[37] The respondent may report unemployment as normal (N) or abnormally high (H) and the results are shown in Table 5.[38]

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[36] Drawing on a wide variety of survey and census data in the U.K., Kaufman and Harris argue "… economic hardship and political mistrust are not the main drivers of majority unease. Instead, we claim the pace of ethnic change has temporarily outstripped mechanisms of accommodation; (…) rapid ethnic change drives a wedge between the ethnic majority and what they consider to be 'their' nation. Local experiences feed national imaginings. Residents of communities undergoing ethnic change often experience disorientation while those who live in whiter neighborhoods or outlying areas of diverse cities and local authorities may fear impending change." Op cit. p. 11.

[37] Again, question wording is reported in Appendix C.

[38] We coded as high (H) respondents saying unemployment was "somewhat high" or "very high", while those saying it was "normal", "somewhat low" and "very low" were coded as normal (N). Once again the criterion for being assigned a trait (in this case considering the unemployment high) is being beyond the central position (in this case "normal").

Table a5 – Percentages of respondents picking the anti-immigration stance by evaluation of current unemployment level

	Encourage immigrants to leave		Reduce immigration Level		Anti-immigration Index (=2)	
	High	Normal	H	N	H	N
Canada	27.7	27.8	45.9	40.0	19.9	18.8
Denmark	39.6	46.0	64.3	61.4	22.3	26.3
France	51.3	29.5	71.2	43.7	41.9	11.6
Germany	44.0	30.8	68.0	49.6	38.0	25.5
Italy	46.0	34.3	72.7	64.4	35.6	23.4
United Kingdom	41.7	43.0	73.6	75.1	37.7	41.3
U.S.A.	45.9	26.6	54.4	35.1	31.1	15.5
Average	43.2	35.2	65.5	54.2	33.4	25.9

The figures in this table (a5) look roughly like those in Table a3. Respondents in Canada, Denmark and the U.K. do not become more anti-immigrant when they believe that unemployment is very high, although, again, Canada and Denmark are much less anti-immigrant than the U.K. In the other four countries, those perceiving unemployment as abnormally high were more anti-immigrant, with regard both to level and integration. The similarity of findings to those regarding the impact of overall economic judgments is to be expected as both tables pose a sociotropic question: asking about the economy and unemployment in general and not about their own family's circumstance.

We attempted to summarize the total effect of the economic variables by creating an index combining judgments on unemployment, perception of the national economy, and status of family income. Table a6 summarizes overall economic effects by examining an economic performance index which counts how many times out of the three economic perceptions the respondent has been coded with a 1 (worse or worried) value.

**Table a6 – Percentages of respondents picking the anti-immigration stance
for different values of the economic performance in the previous 12 months index**

	Encourage immigrants to leave				Reduce immigration Level				Anti-immigration Index=2			
	0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
Canada	26.2	24.9	27.0	34.5	38.9	39.5	47.5	55.9	16.9	15.7	21.5	26.1
Denmark	44.3	41.1	32.6	34.1	60.9	64.6	71.4	54.6	22.5	23.1	23.9	20.3
France	22.3	30.4	53.0	60.7	37.2	53.5	71.2	80.1	6.2	23.2	41.7	51.0
Germany	28.5	34.3	58.5	60.7	46.7	64.9	69.3	82.8	23.8	28.3	50.0	52.9
Italy	24.3	38.0	47.0	54.4	62.5	73.3	71.4	73.9	18.7	28.0	37.9	42.4
United Kingdom	40.8	39.6	42.4	48.8	75.3	72.7	76.5	71.1	39.0	35.8	40.9	40.5
U.S.A	20.4	33.6	61.6	62.2	30.2	43.0	62.7	75.7	10.4	19.6	42.0	50.2
Average	32.9	35.0	46.1	54.9	53.4	60.0	66.9	74.3	23.3	25.0	36.9	44.7

The results show significant cross national variation; in France, Germany, Italy and the U.S., poor economic performance produces anti-immigrant attitudes, while in neither Canada nor the U.K. are immigration attitudes strongly related to negative economic judgments; in fact, in Denmark the effect may even be inverted. Moving from no economic problem to three negatives in these three countries does not increase anti-immigrant attitudes. In Germany, France and the U.S., however, each step up the economic Index produces an increase in both anti-immigrant variables. Overall, it appears that anti-integration attitudes respond strongly to negative economic judgments in France, Germany, Italy and the U.S., while there are only weak effects in Canada. With respect to Levels, economic judgments make no difference in Denmark and the U.K.

These results suggest that perceived economic outcomes can have an effect on immigration attitudes but that this relationship is complex and varies cross nationally. They also show that, except for Canada, respondents in every country think that too many immigrants are arriving. And they suggest that, except in Canada, Denmark and the U.K., respondents are disposed to send immigrants out of the country during hard times.

Appendix B: Additional Tables

Table b1 – Effects on Vote Propensity for the party voted in previous general elections

		Objective distances		Subjective distances	
Distance on integration		-0.439***	(0.000)	-0.552***	(0.000)
Distance on immigration level		-0.213*	(0.030)	-0.250***	(0.000)
Age class=	Less than 30	.		.	
	30/44	0.183	(0.174)	0.205	(0.196)
	45/64	0.399**	(0.002)	0.440**	(0.003)
	65 or more	0.606***	(0.000)	0.603***	(0.000)
Gender (Male)		0.0703	(0.373)	0.0938	(0.303)
Education level=	No high school degree	.		.	
	High school degree	0.111	(0.415)	0.0854	(0.587)
	Some college	0.558*	(0.025)	0.561*	(0.046)
	I-level college degree	-0.0708	(0.640)	-0.0266	(0.879)
	II-level college degree	0.221	(0.143)	0.223	(0.192)
	Post-university degree	0.172	(0.387)	0.0652	(0.769)
Family income=	missing	.		.	
	Less than 20,000$, £ or €	-0.0849	(0.585)	-0.281	(0.122)
Between 20,000$, £ or €and 49,999$, £ or €		-0.0636	(0.642)	-0.196	(0.226)
Between 50,000$, £ or €and 99,999$ or €		-0.0350	(0.815)	-0.171	(0.335)
More than 1,000,000$, £ or €		0.0819	(0.684)	-0.0433	(0.857)
Country=	Canada	.		.	
	Denmark	-0.0603	(0.682)	0.0336	(0.852)
	France	-0.380**	(0.008)	-0.405*	(0.022)
	Germany	-0.0450	(0.777)	-0.0134	(0.944)
	Italy	-0.574***	(0.000)	-0.498**	(0.007)
	United Kingdom	0.309*	(0.048)	0.447*	(0.019)
	U.S.A.	0.362*	(0.024)	0.410*	(0.034)
PID with party voted in previous elections		2.277***	(0.000)	2.212***	(0.000)
Constant		-0.112	(0.668)	-0.0312	(0.919)
N		3,899		3,048	
pseudo R^2		0.196		0.208	

p-values in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table b2– Effects on Propensity-To-Vote for the party you voted for in last general elections (country random slopes and intercepts)

		Objective distances		Subjective distances	
Distance on integration		-0.448**	(0.005)	-0.481***	(0.000)
Distance on immigration level		-0.170	(0.192)	-0.249***	(0.001)
Age class=	Less than 30	.		.	
	30/44	0.178	(0.186)	0.207	(0.194)
	45/64	0.409**	(0.001)	0.445**	(0.003)
	65 or more	0.616***	(0.000)	0.607***	(0.000)
Gender (Male)		0.0739	(0.351)	0.0961	(0.292)
Education level=	No high school degree	.		.	
	High school degree	0.103	(0.451)	0.0740	(0.639)
	Some college	0.557*	(0.025)	0.557*	(0.047)
	I-level college degree	-0.0767	(0.614)	-0.0474	(0.787)
	II-level college degree	0.215	(0.155)	0.207	(0.229)
	Post-university degree	0.168	(0.396)	0.0449	(0.840)
Family income=	missing	.		.	
	Less than 20,000$, £ or €	-0.0875	(0.575)	-0.272	(0.139)
Between 20,000$, £ or €and 49,999$, £ or €		-0.0804	(0.558)	-0.204	(0.209)
Between 50,000$, £ or €and 99,999$ or €		-0.0462	(0.758)	-0.168	(0.343)
More than 1,000,000$, £ or €		0.0834	(0.678)	-0.0343	(0.886)
PID with party voted in previous elections		2.280***	(0.000)	2.221***	(0.000)
Constant		-0.189	(0.493)	0.0126	(0.968)
var(distance_integration[country]) Constant		0.0876	(0.321)	0.126	(0.348)
var(distance_level[country]) Constant		0.0437	(0.439)	0.0487	(0.481)
var(Constant[country]) Constant		0.115	(0.170)	0.131	(0.189)
N		3,899		3,048	
pseudo R^2		0.225		0.238	

p-values in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table b3 – Effects on Vote Propensity for a party

	Objective distances		Subjective distances	
Distance on: Integration	-0.240***	(0.000)	-0.315***	(0.001)
Distance on: Immigration level	-0.478***	(0.000)	-0.192**	(0.007)
Distance on: Death penalty	-0.0506	(0.192)	-0.0601	(0.227)
Distance on: Gay marriages	-0.166***	(0.000)	-0.0445	(0.353)
Distance on: Credit to foreign buyers	-0.204*	(0.018)	-0.0287	(0.545)
Distance on: Income inequality	-0.209**	(0.002)	-0.474***	(0.000)
Distance on: Minimum wage	-0.322***	(0.000)	-0.245**	(0.001)
Distance on: Unemployment benefits	-0.263***	(0.000)	0.00651	(0.927)
Distance on: Firing employees	-0.170**	(0.008)	-0.126	(0.058)
Distance on: Governmental businesses	-0.0506	(0.433)	-0.108*	(0.029)
Distance on: Retirement age	-0.0552	(0.308)	-0.112	(0.090)
Distance on: L/R dimension	-1.299***	(0.000)	-1.163***	(0.000)
PID with target party	3.390***	(0.000)	2.619***	(0.000)
Governing party	0.327***	(0.000)	0.389***	(0.000)
Age class= Less than 30	.		.	
30/44	-0.142	(0.162)	-0.228	(0.189)
45/64	-0.309***	(0.001)	-0.404**	(0.007)
65 or more	-0.428***	(0.000)	-0.623***	(0.000)
Gender (Male)	-0.0139	(0.783)	0.0356	(0.736)
Education level= No high school degree	.		.	
High school degree	-0.0561	(0.546)	-0.122	(0.498)
Some college	-0.422**	(0.004)	-0.697*	(0.013)
I-level college degree	-0.128	(0.203)	-0.110	(0.567)
II-level college degree	-0.273**	(0.005)	-0.273	(0.128)
Post-university degree	-0.278*	(0.028)	-0.324	(0.168)
Family income= missing	.		.	
Less than 20,000$, £ or €	0.291**	(0.004)	0.357	(0.115)
Between 20,000$, £ or €and 49,999$, £ or €	0.165	(0.051)	0.419*	(0.033)
Between 50,000$, £ or €and 99,999$ or €	0.144	(0.108)	0.318	(0.122)
More than 1,000,000$, £ or €	0.121	(0.325)	0.496	(0.061)
Country= Canada	.		.	
Denmark	-0.919***	(0.000)	-0.764***	(0.000)
France	-0.338***	(0.001)	-0.138	(0.483)
Germany	-0.491***	(0.000)	-0.342	(0.062)
Italy	-0.294**	(0.006)	-0.0374	(0.855)
United Kingdom	-0.543***	(0.000)	-0.0879	(0.669)
U.S.A.	0.614***	(0.000)	0.907***	(0.000)
Cut1_Constant	-2.273***	(0.000)	-1.709***	(0.000)
Cut2_ Constant	-1.075***	(0.000)	-0.603	(0.094)
Cut3_ Constant	-0.442*	(0.033)	0.0318	(0.929)
Cut4_ Constant	1.170***	(0.000)	1.502***	(0.000)
N	10,123		3,371	
pseudo R²	0.192		0.239	

p-values in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C: Question Wordings in the 7-countries CISE-Hoover Institution Comparative Partisanship Survey

Immigration items [Anti-immigration index]

What is [your/party's] position on immigration?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Help integrate immigrants
into [national] society

Encourage immigrants
to leave [country]

Do (you/party) think current levels of immigration into [country] should be changed? (*Increased / Kept the same / Decreased*)

Perceptions of the economy [Economic performance index]
Over the last 12 months has the [national] economy...
(Gotten better / Stayed about the same / Gotten worse)

And over the last 12 months has your own family's financial situation...
(Gotten better / Stayed about the same / Gotten worse)

What is the current unemployment rate in [country]?
Please tell us the percentage of adults who want to work that are currently unemployed and looking for a job. If you don't know, please make your best guess.

How would you describe this level of unemployment?
*(Very high / Somewhat high / Normal / Somewhat low / Very low / Don't know)*

Vote propensity [Expected-Vote-Frequency]
In the future, how often do you think you will vote for (candidates from) the following political parties?
(Always / Most of the times / About half of the times / Occasionally / Never)

Left/Right self-placement and party placement
Where would you place [yourself/party] on the following 7-point scale?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Left

Right

Party-closeness
Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party?

Follow-up questions only for respondents answering "Yes" to the previous question:

Which party do you feel close to? [Open-ended answer. Only one answer is possible]

Do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer?