On the (Im)morality of the Death Penalty

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The agenda

The death penalty is an abomination, a moral stain on the states that still impose it. This is not the conclusion of this essay but its starting point. When discussing such a fraught topic as capital punishment, it is vain to feign intellectual detachment and value-neutrality. One starts from where one stands, and tries to elaborate considerations that clarify and justify one’s position as best one can. In doing so, I do not purport to canvass the entire age-old debate. Instead, I’d like to ground the position I hold in a particular moral outlook, which I find appealing, and which in one form or another enjoys considerable support. Although the issues I raise regarding the death penalty are distinctly moral, and so have universal scope, my arguments also relate to some specifics of American law. This is not a mere coincidence. The pivotal legal text bearing on the capital punishment debate in the U.S. is obviously the Eighth Amendment. And even if the key phrase, “cruel and unusual punishment,” does not wear its moral credentials on its sleeve, the Supreme Court’s interpretation does. According to this interpretation, “[a] penalty… must accord with ‘the dignity of man,’ which is the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.’”\(^1\)

Now the idea of human dignity has a long pedigree, leading all the way back to the Old Testament vision that humanity was created in the image of God. But although it is quite likely that this imago Dei theme still colors our contemporary attitudes, the religious provenance disqualifies it from serving as the direct source for constitutional interpretation, and indeed for a

\(^1\) Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, at 100 (1958).
secular morality focused on the ideal of humanity’s special moral worth. In seeking to understand the idea of human dignity, we need to look for some alternative sources. No one holds a copyright on the requisite secular conception of dignity, and various versions exist. But one thinker stands out. Immanuel Kant’s rendition of the notion of human dignity as the centerpiece of a moral theory is by far the most influential source of reflection on the subject in modern times. In the centuries that have elapsed since Kant, mountains of writing on his views have been generated, and his ideas have spread beyond philosophy and seeped into the general culture. It is possible today, especially for those sitting on the bench, to espouse the ideal of human dignity without mentioning Kant’s name. Even so, it is highly unlikely that the shape the ideal takes in contemporary hands is not at least in some way Kantian, if not quite Kant’s.

Kant stands in the wings of the American death penalty debate not only in his capacity as the author of a dignity-centered morality, but also due to his more direct contributions to the theory of punishment. Here too he often appears in present-day discussions incognito, disguised by the sometimes exotic costumes with which various commentators have fitted him over the years. The traces that lead back to Kant are also partially erased by the spread of his ideas and their absorption into mainstream legal and other public discourse. Writers, including judges, tacitly draw on these ideas without a felt need for attribution. To be sure, philosophers carry no formal authority, and enlisting them in support of this or that view does not have the force of precedent. Even so, tracing the Kantian origins of some central themes in the present discussion of the morality of the death penalty may increase clarity and add substance.

In doing so, however, we must acknowledge an uncomfortable fact: in mounting a dignity-based Kantian argument against the death penalty, we face at the outset a formidable opponent, Immanuel Kant. Famously, or rather notoriously, Kant himself was an avid proponent of the
death penalty. As it turns out, this does not present an insurmountable obstacle to drawing on Kant’s ideas in opposition to the death penalty. When it comes to applying his broader theory to specific instances, Kant is not always the best Kantian. As others have argued, Kant’s own arguments in favor of the death penalty are deficient and do not make a compelling case. They leave much room for constructing a case in opposition to the death penalty that usefully draws on Kant’s other views. I accordingly consider the death penalty within a broadly Kantian morality of dignity, showing why the death penalty is incompatible with human dignity, and so is at once immoral, and in the U.S., unconstitutional as well.

This view is of course not new. In supporting it I follow a distinguished chorus of philosophers and jurists who argued for it. But though I find many of their arguments cogent, in one respect they fall short. A salient feature of the ongoing debate is its intensity; the stakes appear to be particularly high. Whatever bolsters the death penalty’s advocates’ vehemence, the abolitionists would appear to be impelled simply by the enormity of death. But an exclusive focus on death does not quite explain the agitation. If the moral significance of the death penalty were to be calibrated to the magnitude of human slaughter perpetrated in other fields, it would shrink to insignificance; the death toll of capital punishment contributes barely a drop to this ocean of blood. Moreover, innumerable governmental actions and policies have a vastly greater impact on the incidence of death than the abolition of the death penalty would. And yet we don’t find an

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4 Opponents of the death penalty are of course also alarmed by additional factors, such as the risk of wrongful executions, racially discriminatory administration of the death penalty, and other such weighty worries. But these are all derivative from the perceived enormity of the death penalty relative to other penalties, or from the special significance of punishment relative to other deprivations, which I discuss later.
intense public or scholarly engagement with, say, changes in traffic laws as we find in connection with capital punishment. In this respect, tying the death penalty to human dignity is a step in the right direction, but it does not fully explain the perceived magnitude of the moral concerns. One challenge we face then is to explain why our preoccupation with the death penalty is not simply a reflection of our anxiety about causing death. We need inquire into the distinctive threat to human dignity punishment poses. After all, there is a constitutional provision limiting punishment, and no corresponding provision regarding the innumerable other lethal government actions and policies.  

Another feature of the lay of the land in this area is perhaps less visible but no less troubling. There is a puzzle at the heart of the American constitutional debate that arises from the Supreme Court’s decision that banishment is precluded by the Eighth Amendment. This holding creates what appears as a startling inconsistency: if banishment, sometimes described metaphorically, and with some hyperbole, as “civil death,” is unconstitutional, how could the death penalty, inflicting as it does the real thing, be permissible? Pointing out the inconsistency is one thing; removing it, another. For consistency can be attained in two ways. An abolitionist with regard to capital punishment hoping to leverage the inconsistency in her favor will encounter the opposite response, illustrated well by Justice Frankfurter’s rhetorical flourish when advocating the constitutionality of banishment: “Is constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?” If the desired consistent

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5 To be sure, though other government policies can increase mortality, unlike the death penalty they do not involve the deliberate and direct killing of a particular individual. But if our concern were purely with the incidence of death, why would this difference matter? Providing an answer to this question is one of the challenges a moral theory has to meet.

6 Trop v. Dulles, note 1 supra. Terminology in this area is not entirely settled, and includes such terms as expatriation and denationalization. For the sake of simplicity, I use “banishment” to combine withdrawal of citizenship with deportation.

7 Trop v. Dulles, at 125.
approach to the penalties of banishment and death would deem both unconstitutional, we need an account that explains why both violate the standard of human dignity set by the Court.

In trying to meet this challenge, one more item in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is noteworthy, and helps set our present agenda. It is the prohibition against slavery as a form of punishment. The backdrop to this prohibition is a shameful fact: that in abolishing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment explicitly exempts slavery as punishment. Even so, in order to be a constitutionally permissible penalty, slavery must meet the Eighth Amendment standard of dignity, and it plainly does not. This then provides another fixed point of reference in terms of which the shape of the dignity standard can be explored.

My suggestion is that, duly understood, the dignity-based prohibitions against banishment and slavery casts some new light on the indignity of the death penalty as well. There is indeed an opposition between the ideal of dignity and the death penalty, but the opposition is not a straightforward and not as clearly visible as the dominant exponents of this opposition in the current debate would make it seem. To appreciate the immorality of capital punishment, we need to ponder with greater care both the role of dignity within a more comprehensive moral theory, as well as the meaning, within such a theory, of killing as a form of punishment. We need also rethink some fundamentals of the prevailing interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, so as to place the opposition on firmer theoretical grounds, and to fully appreciate the high moral

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9 There is a burgeoning legal literature on the conflict between dignity and the death penalty. For two recent contributions, see Kevin Barry, “The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses,” 102 Iowa L. Rev. 383 (2017); and Phyllis Goldfarb, “Arriving Where We’ve Been: Death’s Indignity and the Eighth Amendment,” 103 Iowa L. Rev. 386 (2018).
stakes. All this obviously combines to a rather hefty agenda; within the confines of the present essay, I can only chart the main steps in the argument, and must move at a swift pace.

**Eighth Amendment criteria – a critique**

In order to pursue the line of argument I propose, we need first take a look at some fundamentals of the current debate. Though this debate is highly charged, there are a few points of broad agreement. Chief among them is the view that the discussion regarding capital punishment, and of the Eighth Amendment more generally, is about proper limits on the severity of punishment. As already mentioned, this is interpreted to require that punishment must comport with human dignity. But what does this mean? The Supreme Court’s answer, shared by proponents and opponents of the death penalty alike, is that “[t]his means, at least, that the punishment not be ‘excessive.’” The Court offers in turn two criteria for excessiveness. “First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Call these, respectively, *pointlessness* and *proportionality*. Upon inspection, neither turns out to be of much help. Starting with the latter, proportionality is unhelpful in this context since it addresses a different question than the one before us. As others have observed, proportionality provides only an ordinal, not cardinal, criterion. Assuming any given ranking of offenses and any ranking of punishments, the requirement of proportionality insists that the two rankings correspond to each other: a less severe offense should not meet with a harsher punishment than a more severe offense. But when

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11 Id.
it comes to the moral assessment of the death penalty, the principal question is whether the penalty is ever permitted, independently of the type of crime. For this inquiry, proportionality is simply beside the point.

In elaborating the criterion of pointlessness, the Court explains that “the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”\(^\text{13}\) But for two reasons, this criterion in not very useful either. First, rather than offering a limitation on punishment, this criterion merely states a tautology. If a particular imposition does not serve any legitimate penological purpose, and amounts to the infliction of gratuitous suffering, it is “punishment” in name only, akin to “punishing” the innocent. Just as the government’s failure to label a particular imposition “punishment” does not immunize that imposition against Eighth Amendment scrutiny,\(^\text{14}\) attaching that label to an imposition does not by itself bring it within the amendment’s ambit. If a purported “penalty” turns out to be an exercise of naked power, then it falls outside of the scope of the Eighth Amendment, and is subject instead to other general limitations on violence.

The second drawback of the pointlessness criterion is that it is radically at odds with the way Eighth Amendment limitations are commonly treated. The question whether a form of punishment offends against human dignity and so is “cruel and unusual” does not arise in a void. There are a number of paradigm penalties, “such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like,”\(^\text{15}\) that are taken to be beyond the pale, thus forming an essential backdrop for the consideration of any contested penalty, such as death. These paradigms provide

\(^{13}\) *Gregg v. Georgia* 183.


the measures of adequacy for any standards by which the Eighth Amendment is to be applied; they are not treated as inviting an investigation into the potential benefits of meting out these penalties. Indeed, had such an invitation been issued and accepted, the results would be highly uncertain. For what, say, is the assurance that this or that ghastly punishment would not have an incremental effect on deterrence?\textsuperscript{16}

We can draw from this critical observation a more positive point. Especially in light of the strategic location within the Eighth Amendment terrain, as well as within the corresponding moral landscape, of the kinds of paradigms just mentioned, the overall role assigned to the amendment by different parties to the death penalty debate appears to be the same. It is best characterized in terms of a more general normative stance that has become widely accepted in recent years. Seen from that point of view, the Eighth Amendment imposes on punishment a set of \textit{deontological side-constraints}.\textsuperscript{17} What in the present context gives such constraints their bite is not their barring “penalties” that perform no useful function, but rather their barring of some penalties even if they do. Though deontology and the moral constraints it implies are not exclusively tied to Kant, by far the most prevalent appeal to this approach takes place within a broadly Kantian framework. Within this framework, the point of letting considerations of human dignity exclude potentially beneficial policies and practices is precisely to mark the moral

\textsuperscript{16} Justice Brennan offers four principles for the applicability of the Eighth Amendment, summarizing his position as follows: “The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.” \textit{Furman v. Georgia}, 408 U.S. at 283. I don’t believe this added complexity helps resolve the issues I discuss in the text.

primacy of humanity’s moral worth over other advantages such policies and practices might secure. And as we have just seen, interpreting the Eighth Amendment as concerned with “excessive” punishment defeats this purpose by reintroducing, through a back door as it were, the kinds of considerations the ideal of dignity is meant to exclude.

Neither proportionality nor pointlessness provide satisfactory criteria for whether punishment offends human dignity and so violates the Eighth Amendment. But this conclusion implies a more fundamental challenge to the broad consensus that underlies the death penalty debate. As I have mentioned, it is generally taken for granted that the Eighth Amendment codifies a concern about the harshness of punishment, so that the issue raised by the death penalty is allegedly its extreme severity. The standard of excessiveness (with its two subordinate criteria, pointlessness and proportionality) allegedly addresses this concern. But talk about excessiveness misses the target when the target is the congruence of punishment with the dignity of man. Excessive is a quantitative term, designating something of which there is too much. In what sense, though, can punishment be excessive? What quantitative dimension serves as the underlying metric for such assessment? The seemingly obvious answer, severity and its quasi-cognates such as harshness and cruelty, won’t do. These terms focus on the negative experiential quality of punishment, on the suffering it involves. Such negative experiences are assumed to form a scale, and excessive severity is reached when punishment exceeds a certain point on this scale. This picture does not, however, accurately describe how judgments under the Eighth Amendment are actually made. It

18 Even though Kant advocates the death penalty (see note 2 above), his view of punishment comports with the dignity-based side-constraints approach presented here. On Kant’s view, the morally adequate sanction is the joint product of two considerations, lexically ordered. The sanction must be equivalent to the crime; in this case, a death for a death. But this measure is dominated by a second one: “But the death of the criminal must be kept entirely free of any maltreatment that would make an abomination of the humanity residing in the person suffering it.” Ibid. This limitation applies notwithstanding the possibility that the murder itself may have involved such “abomination” of the victim’s humanity. See Nelson T. Potter, Jr., “Kant and Capital Punishment Today,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 36(2002): 267–282.
is hard to illustrate this point without wallowing in the details of the atrocities people perpetrate in the name of justice, but two examples out of many will suffice. First, objections to various forms of punishment are rife with such adjectives as horrible or gruesome, which do not refer to the victim’s experience but to the spectator’s. One result of invoking the criteria these adjectives represent is that an execution that is less agonizing to the inmate but more shocking to the spectator, such as beheading, is banned in favor of harsher forms of execution, such as the electric chair, that have the opposite effects. As to the second example, one reliable measure of harshness is the offender’s own preference. But in a number of cases, courts have overruled the offender’s preference, such as when sex offenders were denied the option of castration, which they preferred to a long prison term, on the ground that castration violates the Eighth Amendment whereas a lengthy prison term does not. In neither of these instances do judgments of impermissible punishment align along a dimension of severity, where severity measures the suffering or the deprivation visited on the offender.

If the Eighth Amendment does not serve (exclusively) to limit the severity of punishment, what is its role? Relatedly, if excessiveness and its two auxiliary criteria, proportionality and pointlessness, do not provide adequate guidance for the indignity of punishment, what does?

19 For examples of these adjectives used in assessing forms of execution, see, e.g., Martin Gardner, “Executions and Indignities – An Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment,” 39 Ohio St. L.J. 96, 114-128 (1978).
21 E.g., 30 years in one case, State v. Brown. 326 S.E. 2d 410 (S.C. 1985). See generally Jeffrey Kirchmeier, “Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment,” Conn. L. Rev., 1999; Lystra Batchoo, Note, “Voluntary Surgical Castration of Sex Offenders – Waiving the Eighth Amendment Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment,” 72 Brook. L. Rev., 689 (2007). The two dimensions of assessment here distinguished form a Venn diagram, in which the circles largely overlap: gruesome penalties, which upset the spectator’s sensibilities, such as flaying alive, tend to involve great suffering as well. Some adjectives commonly used in this context, such as barbaric, pertain to the entire area covered by the diagram, without differentiating the very different ways in which punishment may be offensive.
22 Recall that in spelling out the dignity standard, the Court says that “[t]his means, at least, that the punishment not be ‘excessive.’” Gregg v. Georgia, note 7 supra, at p. 173. The operative words here are “at least.”
These questions arise specifically in the context of American constitutional discourse, but as already mentioned, they echo the moral issues that arise outside this context as well. As we have also noted, the linchpin that ties the two domains, morality and the constitution, is the ideal of human dignity. This ideal has come to the fore in recent years, in law as well as more broadly in the public arena, and invoking it has acquired considerable rhetorical force. But in order to pursue our present agenda, we must go beyond the rhetoric, and probe dignity a bit further. We need a conception of dignity that will set the moral limits on punishment along lines that are not confined to the harshness of the sanction imposed. Such a conception of dignity should help us answer the following questions. What, other than harshness, is the dimension along which punishment may offend against dignity? How do various forms of punishment, in particular banishment and slavery, fare along that dimension? And how does all of this bear on the morality of the death penalty? A conception of dignity that answers these questions is not enough, however; it must meet a further cardinal challenge. Dignity must be shown to have such paramount importance as to be worthy of constitutional protection that excludes or overrides other considerations that would otherwise permissibly guide us in regard to punishment as they do in other fields.

A morality of dignity

I start by sketching a version of a Kantian morality of dignity, which will provide context and direction for the rest of the argument. Note the triple qualification. First, what follows is just a sketch, containing only the broad contours of the conception of dignity I wish to deploy. Second,
it’s only one version among several that have been proposed, in part because there may have been more than one strand in Kant’s own mind regarding the concept of dignity and its role within his moral outlook.24 And third, like many other writers in this field, my objective is not a definitive statement of Kant’s theory, but a train of thought that is recognizably Kantian in origin and inspiration.

The key to any Kantian morality of dignity is obvious; it is the Humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative, probably the most often cited statement in all of Kant’s work: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”25 But in order to successfully turn this key, we must relate it to what Kant says directly about human dignity. This is brief and merits quoting in full.

Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will … In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity… Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in himself; for only through this is it possible to be a law-making member in a kingdom of ends. Therefore morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity…

24 For a particularly illuminating version of this strand, see Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Onora O’Neill ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
For nothing can have a value other than that determined for it by the law. But the law-making which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity—that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth—for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word “reverence” is the only becoming expression.26

We can distinguish in these quotations three points: the equivalence between dignity and being an end; the view of people as ends and hence the ascription of dignity to them; and the claim that ascribing this value to people is the core of morality. To elucidate the concept of dignity embedded in these remarks requires that we understand these three points and their interrelation. The first step is Kant’s insistence on human intelligibility.27 In Kant’s own hands this idea is bound up with his metaphysics. However, purged of the metaphysical groundings, and in the sense relevant to the practical domain, this amounts to holding that all human action makes sense, has a point; it is, to use another idiom, meaningful. What makes action intelligible, what gives it meaning, is that it is done for the sake of something or other. That for the sake of which an action is done is its end. Now the same idea can also be expressed in the vocabulary of value. To act intelligibly requires that the end for which one acts be deemed worth pursuing, and so valuable. In this sense all action consists in the attempted realization of purported values. One goal of a theory of the practical domain is to account for the values we pursue. What Kant offers in this regard is a theory of value centered around a binary division between two types of value: price and dignity. Roughly, price expresses the value of things for us, that is for persons, whereas dignity expresses our own value; it is the value of persons.

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26 Ibid., at 90, 96–97.
27 For a helpful discussion of Kant’s uses of “intelligible” in this connection, see Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 214–229.
But this is too rough, since price is not a unitary value: Kant further distinguishes between *market price* and *fancy price*. Though he does not elaborate much on this subdivision, commentators tend to associate the latter with esthetic value, whereas market price designates what we may think of as pragmatic value. Building a house or a table is the realization of pragmatic value; listening to music, visiting a museum, taking a trip to the Grand Canyon, and playing basketball or soccer are realizations of esthetic value. This distinction requires a clarification of what it means for something to have value *for us*. The italicized expression is ambiguous between (1) serves our interests or satisfies our desires, and (2) is deemed valuable by us. Now some of the things we value, those that possess pragmatic value, are valuable for us in the first sense. But those possessing esthetic value are not. We enjoy or admire the *Mona Lisa* or the Grand Canyon because of the value they possess; they are not valuable because of the satisfaction they provide. Nevertheless, everything for the sake of which our actions are performed or toward which they are oriented, and so everything that is valuable, is valuable *for us* in the second sense: all the values we pursue, all the ends that make our actions, and more broadly our lives, meaningful and worthwhile, originate in us.

To view the values that guide our actions and our lives as originating in us is also to view ourselves as self-governing, and thus as autonomous. And this interpretation of our autonomy as a matter of being the authors of our lives naturally leads to a further idea, of being our own authority: we implicitly view ourselves as validating our values. To recapitulate: to be intelligible we must pursue ends, and this is the same as projecting and realizing values. Since we deem these values worth pursuing, we must endorse them. This is the sense in which, in

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pursuing any value at all, we must recognize ourselves as the ultimate authority. Now the key to the authority relationship is the notion of deference: to recognize an authority is to defer to it as a source of valid objectives, guidelines, and demands. Kant sometimes labels this attitude reverence, or less dramatically respect. In this sense, in projecting and fulfilling one’s goals and so in pursuing one’s values, each person must recognize herself as a definitive authority, implicitly enacting an attitude of self-respect.

But even if each person is the ultimate authority for the ends she pursues and so for the values she endorses, the resulting deference and the dignity it implies would seem to be distributive: I implicitly assert my own dignity; you, yours. Morality, however, is mostly concerned with respect for others’ dignity rather than for one’s own. To see why respect extends to humanity as a whole, we need to attend more closely to the notion of intelligibility. If to encounter a human being is to encounter an intelligible being, then it is to encounter a being with whom communication and, hence, mutual interpretation and understanding are in principle possible. For this to be the case, I must be able to see another’s objectives, no matter how different from mine, as values, that is as ends capable of making sense of her actions and more broadly of her life in the same way that my values make sense of mine. And this involves a further aspect of intelligibility: its dependence upon abstraction.

Consider the following scenario. When David puts on a suit and tie, he knows what he is up to: he is going to the opera, to see Fidelio. The italics draw attention to two possible descriptions of David’s end at different levels of abstraction. But though other formulations are possible, notice that some such abstraction is necessary in order to account for David’s dressing up. If instead of referring to the “opera” David were to conceive of a highly detailed, step-by-step depiction of the route that leads from his home to the opera house, and of a brick-by-brick description of this end
point, while omitting the designation of his destination as the opera, then despite the abundant detail, or rather because of it, he would be at a total loss to know what to wear.

The situation is similar when making sense of another person’s conduct. David observes Ruth wearing a t-shirt and jeans. Why? She explains that she is on her way to a soccer game. But suppose David has never heard of soccer. At this point, the more abstract idea of a ball game, or failing that, just a game, may help him make sense of Ruth’s attire. If this is not sufficient, the explanation of Ruth’s behavior may have to appeal to even more abstract notions, such as entertainment or edification, which David associates with his own venture. Why does Ruth put on this casual dress? Because like David she is “dressing appropriately for the occasion.” What is this occasion? As in David’s case, it is a form of entertainment or edification, or, like him, she is going to have a good time. Variation in dress style at the more concrete level is rendered intelligible by appeal to such notions as “dress code,” “appropriate,” and “occasion” at the abstract. In order for David and Ruth to be intelligible to themselves and so potentially to each other, they must in principle be able to see what they are each up to. And so they must be able to ascribe to each other ends, and thus values, that can be construed as ends and values, that is as pertaining to endeavors appropriate for a human life and making sense of it. This amounts to their viewing themselves as respectively articulating at a relatively high level of detail a shared cluster of more abstract meanings that they both associate with the very idea of a human life. Whereas the interpretation of these abstract meanings implicit in David’s life will differ in innumerable ways from the one implicit in Ruth’s, each of them manifests at a higher level of resolution content that at a high level of abstraction belongs to the category of humanity as such. Stated in reverse, in fixing their individual identities, both David and Ruth are enacting and
articulating a more abstract identity, their common identity as persons, which they share with everyone else.

This in turn has crucial ramifications for David’s and Ruth’s appropriate attitudes to each other. In going to the opera or to a soccer game, they each display their autonomy consisting in projecting and following their respective values. They thus implicitly treat themselves as the authority for deeming these endeavors worthwhile, and correlatively, they both occupy a stance of self-respect. But as we have just seen, this is not the end of the story. Once they realize that neither is alone in this regard, they discover that at a certain level of abstraction, the capacity in which they each respect themselves, that is, as an autonomous human being engaged in the projection and attempted realizations of values, thus as a person, is shared by the other. And so the respect they respectively owe themselves extends to each other as well.

Five points that are particularly germane to our topic follow. First, this account gives dignity a foundational, and so an especially secure position that other values lack. All other values are in principle contestable. But as long as we contest them, we are committed to the validity of some values. The very fact that we pursue any ends, and so have any values at all, quite apart from their content, implies our own worth, and so provides a foothold for a system of moral values designed to acknowledge this value and give substance to this acknowledgment. Second, dignity cannot be gained or lost; it accrues to all of us by virtue of being human, and so, at a suitable level of abstraction, persons: participants in the production of meaning and value. Third, impinging on someone’s dignity is not primarily a matter of that person’s experience but of the action’s meaning. An action is consonant with a person’s dignity insofar as it is respectful of her, and that requires that it recognize her as possessing the distinctive value dignity signifies. And contrarily, an action fails this test when it amounts to a denial of its target’s value. In either case,
the moral status of the action is measured by its meaning, by the message it conveys; it’s not just a matter of brute facts.

Fourth, respect (in the relevant sense) cannot be selective along individual lines. The respect underwritten by the idea of dignity is due to persons. It is grounded in the shared abstract meanings common to humanity as a whole, and consists in the recognition of each individual as instantiating such universal meanings. When the attitude one has toward any individual human being, including oneself, addresses that individual qua intelligible being, and so as a site of meaning, this attitude extends to everyone else. Conversely, disrespect for any person is a denial of abstract value as such, and so amounts to a repudiation of everyone’s moral worth. The final point concerns the preemptive force of dignity when embedded in the Eighth Amendment, and is the product of combining the first point and the fourth. In light of the foundational role of dignity in the system of values, to deny everyone’s dignity (by denying someone’s dignity), is to renounce the authority that upholds all values and so amounts to withdrawing the foundation on which their claim to validity rests.

Punishment and dignity

These points are entirely general, and so we need to examine now their implications for the issue under consideration, capital punishment. The crucial link between these general points and limitations on permissible punishment such as those imposed by the Eighth Amendment is of

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30 Here’s an analogy. Suppose you write the equation 2+2=4, and someone says, no, it should say 5. Then you write it again, expecting him to hold the same view, but when asked, he says, in this case it’s correct, it is 4. This won’t do. In denying the equation in the first instance, your interlocutor committed himself to denying it in the second instance too. Validity, which goes to the meaning of the equation, belongs to the type rather than to the tokens, and so to deny the validity of any token, is to deny the validity of the type, and so of all other tokens of that type.
course the view that these limitations are designed to protect the offenders’ dignity. So the first question before us is, why does punishment pose a special threat to human dignity? The question is not trivial. Call any government policy or action that has negative effects on some individuals, a deprivation: changes in traffic laws may increase road fatalities, fiscal policy may create unemployment, policies bearing on smoking will have predictable effects on the incidence of cancer, quarantine reduces people’s freedom of movement, and so on. As these examples remind us, deprivations can be severe, and indeed, lethal. Why is the deprivation involved in punishment special? What distinguishes it in regard to human dignity from other deprivations?

There is more than one answer to this question, but the distinguishing mark of punishment most pertinent to my argument is its apparent perversity. Normally, the negative effects of a deprivation provide a reason against the predicate policy or the action. The policy is adopted or the action performed only if there are some countervailing reasons in their favor that outweigh the negative effects; the negative effects are then deemed a regrettable necessity. In the case of punishment, by contrast, the negative effect is itself a reason in favor: at least part of the point of the practice is to inflict a deprivation on the offender. In this regard, punishment is an exception to a very wide rule: negative effects ordinarily count against an action, practice, or policy that has them. To better understand the exception, however, we must look closer at the rule. Note that the rule is not limited to effects on people. Deleterious effects on the rain forest or on the deer’s natural habitat provide a reason against a policy that would have those consequences. But though of wide application, the rule does not always hold; it all depends on the target of the negative effects. For example, extinguishing a fire has negative effects on the fire, and antibiotics destroy germs. Yet these negative effects are welcome, providing a reason for the relevant practices
rather than against them. Plainly, negative effects may favor an action or a policy when the targets, such as fires and germs, are ascribed a negative value.

These examples teach an important if unsurprising lesson. The apparent perversity of punishment simply reflects its evaluative character: punishment is predicated on a negative value judgment regarding the offender and is designed to give this judgment substance and expression. But this also highlights the potential threat punishment poses to the offender’s dignity. Though by dint of their criminality offenders merit a negative valuation, and so may justly deserve the deprivation visited on them, they are never the equivalents of fires or germs. The idea of human dignity denies that the negative judgment passed on offenders defines their value in toto. No matter how grievous the offense, the offender retains her dignity. Punishment cannot accordingly amount to an ascription to the offender of a net negative value; it must be limited to a pro tanto response to the badness displayed by the criminal act, without derogating from humanity’s moral worth that attaches to the offender as a person, and remains untouched by the crime. This requires that punishment be bound up with ways of treating the offender that confirm her positive value. For example, incarceration may do so by a limited term after which the offender will resume ordinary life, and by prison conditions that allow for a meaningful human existence while incarcerated.

The death penalty does not meet these criteria. By asserting the desirability of destroying the accused, the death penalty denies her value altogether. The moral gravity of doing so can also be now more fully appreciated. As I have argued, such a denial of moral worth cannot be

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31 Professor Joshua Kleinfeld makes a similar point: “the key to understanding what capital punishment means is to see that it is not just killing but killing as a penalty for wrongdoing. It is best interpreted as an expressive claim to the effect that the very worst wrongs are so serious as to forfeit one’s moral humanity and, with it, the rights grounded in one’s moral humanity, including the right to life.” In “Two Cultures of Punishment,” 68 Stan. L. Rev. 933, 985 (2016).
confined to the offender alone; it cannot be cabined in that way. When punishment crosses the partial, pro tanto, line and becomes total, it no longer addresses the offender’s own culpable actions. Instead, such punishment devalues the offender’s personhood, which is not unique to her, but is common to all. This amounts to devaluing humanity as a whole, and so to invalidating all valuation as such.

**Banishment, slavery, and death**

We can further clarify and support these points by returning now to the two kinds of punishment held to violate the Eighth Amendment mentioned at the outset, banishment and slavery, and to the puzzle they raise. Consider banishment first. Although some people may prefer death to being expelled from their society, it is nonetheless implausible that, as a general matter, banishment should be considered harsher than death. The same is true of slavery. Although slavery is of course associated with a wretched life, this is not its defining nor its morally decisive characteristic. No matter how shocking the actual fate of slaves has always been, we can still consider a hypothetical “lucky” slave, whose owner treats him humanely, so that the slave’s actual daily experience is no different from that of many non-slaves. (This, after all, does not set a very high standard!) And yet, this state of affairs would not annul the enslavement nor remove its moral stain. As long as we rank punishments exclusively on a harshness scale, forbidding banishment and slavery while upholding the death penalty is indeed “empty of reason” as Justice

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32 The reader may incline to deny this conclusion, and maintain, perhaps along some roughly rule-utilitarian lines, that what makes slavery a heinous institution is precisely the fact that real-world slaves are deprived of both welfare and freedom to a shocking degree. Stipulate away these incidents, and you have removed those features that make slavery the paradigm of injustice. But this would be a mistake. To describe someone as a slave is to pronounce him a victim of injustice, rather than to invite an investigation into the actual circumstances of his life.
Frankfurter complained. And since reasoning by analogy is a two-way street, the result of insisting on consistency could be licensing banishment (and slavery) as much as banning death. We are now, however, in a better position to block this option. In applying the Eighth Amendment to various forms of punishment, we’re not looking at the location of a penalty on a unitary scale of harshness relative to some cutoff point; we interpret instead the penalty’s meaning as regards human dignity. What banishment and slavery have in common, and what makes them impermissible forms of punishment, is not their excessive harshness, but their invidious meaning, a meaning that is shared by the death penalty as well.

To see the point we need return to the story of Ruth and David and the construal of human identity in terms of variable levels of abstraction it helps introduce. As illustrated by this example, person and individual label the two polar extremes on a spectrum of abstraction over which our identities range: person alludes to the abstract meanings common to humanity as such, whereas individual alludes to the vastly more detailed elaboration of those meanings in each human life. However, this spectrum contains innumerable intermediate levels, and one way in which these levels can be conceptualized is in terms of the various roles people occupy and of which their identities are partially composed. Many of these roles are nested: a cardiologist and a dermatologist are both physicians. In what sense do they occupy different roles and in what sense one and the same? Variable abstraction provides an answer: roles that diverge at lower levels of abstraction converge at a higher level. But here we need draw a further distinction. Both person and individual are comprehensive terms, in that at their respective levels of abstraction they each pertain to a human being as a whole, whereas cardiologist and physician are partial, pertaining to some aspects of their bearer’s identity but not at all to others. In addition to terms

33 Note 7 above.
that refer to partial roles, however, there is logical room for a comprehensive term that applies to a human being as a whole, but at an intermediate level of abstraction. *Citizen* is such a term.\(^{34}\) There is a long and no doubt checkered tradition in which an ideal of citizenship is conceived in this way.\(^{35}\) According to this view, to be French, for example, is to be constituted by a concatenation of meanings that at a suitable level of abstraction defines a common identity of the French. In the resulting picture, the social identity designated by *citizen* is intermediate between the discreet individual on the one hand and universal humanity, which *person* designates, on the other. Intermediate in what sense? One answer would be numerical, as *many* is intermediate between *one* and *all*. But thinking of human identity in the medium of intelligibility and meaning supports a way of relating individuality, citizenship, and personhood, in terms of levels of abstraction: the social is more abstract than the individual, and the universal, yet more abstract. Or stated in reverse, social meanings are a more concrete elaboration of universal meaning, and individual meanings a further and yet more concrete elaboration of social ones. Within this picture, it is easy to see what banishment and slavery have in common, and what distinguishes them from other government deprivations as attacks on the offender’s moral worth. Banishment and slavery each address the offender in a comprehensive capacity, as a citizen in the one case and a person in the other, and they each assert the desirability of erasing or eradicating her at the respective levels of abstraction. In doing so, both banishment and slavery proclaim the offender to be worthless or worse.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{35}\) *Ideal* both in the normative sense, of signifying an aspiration, and in the descriptive Weberian sense, of marking an ideal type.

\(^{36}\) For a characterization of banishment (expatriation) along similar lines see Justice Brennan’s statement, in *Furman v. Georgia*, 408 U.S. at 273-274, that this form of punishment “necessarily involves a denial by society of the individual's existence as a member of the human community.” And see generally, Cf., Alexander Aleinikoff, *Theories of Loss of Citizenship*, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1471-1503, 1494-98 (1986). There is of course a widely discussed question of whether globalization has eroded this conception of citizenship, and, correlatively, the extent to which
I have so far made the point in the idiom of value, but the same point can be made in the language of rights, providing a further link to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Not only do both banishment and slavery strip offenders of their rights, but, to use an expression used by Chief Justice Warren in regard to banishment, they also strip them of their “right to have rights.”

This expression, originally introduced by Hannah Arendt, is meant to draw attention to an aspect of banishment, and correlatively, of slavery, that is supposedly decisive in explaining why these penalties violate the Eighth Amendment. But though suggestive, the expression is obscure. What is this putative “second order” right Arendt and Warren invoke? And what difference does denying it make compared to simply withdrawing the offender’s “first order” rights? Warren himself does not elaborate, but Arendt’s position, though less than crystal clear, offers enough of a clue, which can be applied to Warren’s use of this expression as well.

Arendt introduces the “right to have rights” mostly in connection with revocation of citizenship and the plight of the stateless, but the gist of her position, especially as it bears on our present concerns, can be best conveyed in terms of our discussion of the hypothetical “lucky” slave. I maintained that being treated humanely by an owner would not morally rectify the enslavement.

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37 Trop v. Dulles, at 102; see also Perez v. Brownell, 356 US 44, 64.
38 In Hannah Arendt, “The rights of man: what are they?,” Modern Rev. 3(1): 24-36 (1949), and The Origins of Totalitarianism, (1948, 1976), ch. 9, at 296 and 298.
40 Arendt too discusses slavery in this context (The Origins of Totalitarianism, supra, at 297), but this is not her main concern.
Why? If the slave’s level of welfare and range of choices were to match those of some non-slaves, where does the infamy lie? It is natural to answer this question by pointing out that the non-slave’s advantages, such as they are, are grounded in some rights, whereas the slave’s are not. But in considering this difference, we must tread carefully. A likely construal of this difference would highlight its practical side: the slave’s options appear precarious since they can be withdrawn at any time at the master’s whim, whereas those of the non-slave are secure. This, however, need not be the case. We can imagine a master whose firm, perhaps obsessive character makes it all but impossible for her to depart from her relatively benign attitude toward her slaves, whereas a regime of rights may be feebly enforced and the rights easily infringed. Evidently, rights have a significance that goes beyond the practical advantages and protections they are designed to provide. What rights have in common, as rights, and independently of their content, is the recognition of their possessor as a right-holder and so as a denizen of the normative domain. Correspondingly, by stripping slaves of rights, slavery goes beyond affecting their life-conditions; it also seeks to annihilate their status as persons, and repudiate any moral value that attaches to them. This explains why two patterns of welfare, the slave’s and the non-slave’s, may be identical and yet have a fundamentally different moral significance. However, the explanation seems to rest on the presence or absence of the totality of one’s “first order” rights; but why posit an additional meta-right “to have rights” as Arendt and Warren do? Isn’t such a putative right redundant and idle?

One way to see the motivation for this extra step is by simply noting the multiplicity of first order rights. Each such right supposedly represents some weighty concern (otherwise it would not have been granted in the first place), and so withdrawing it must be supported by an equally weighty reason. Such a reason may indeed exist, and so lead to the withdrawal of each one of a
person’s rights. But although a piecemeal process of eliminating a person’s rights may eventually result in abrogating all of them, this process does not quite add up to denying the right-holder’s normative standing. The gap between withdrawing rights in the aggregate, and withdrawing a single meta-right can be seen when we imagine what a process of piecemeal withdrawal of specific rights would look like. There are two possibilities, and neither is the equivalent of withdrawing a single meta-right. One possibility is that cancelling rights piecemeal would be understood as moving their holder on a sliding scale of “relative” or pro tanto enslavement. But slavery is a binary, yes-or-no, concept; one cannot be partially enslaved. The alternative option is that enslavement occurs only when the last right is sequentially removed, and so no rights remain. But this implies the absurdity that whether one is a slave (or, in the case of banishment, is still a citizen) depends on whether one retains a single right, no matter how trivial. To get to the special affront signified by abrogating someone’s rights (by banishment or enslavement), it appears that the rights must be abrogated in their totality, in one fell swoop, as it were. But as long as we conceive of rights as discrete, each representing a different interest or concern, abrogating them all would appear to be an entirely arbitrary act. For an act of repealing all one’s rights to make sense, these rights must be unified in some manner; they must form a coherent totality or be anchored in one, so that this common denominator or basis would form the target at which the aggregate withdrawal of all one’s “first order” rights could coherently aim.

Though this explains the motivation for introducing a singular, unifying term of the kind suggested by Arendt and espoused by Warren, the expression they use feels ad hoc and obscure; we don’t have a clear notion of where this putative right comes from or what it comes down to. As I have already mentioned, Arendt does point out a way out of this quandary by equating “the right to have rights” to a concern for human dignity. We can retain the gist of her position by
tying it to our preceding discussion. As I have argued, citizen (in connection with banishment), and person (in connection with slavery), each designate at their respective levels of abstraction a human being, connoting the normative valence associated with humanity. And this valence of “humanity,” its moral worth, is what undergirds all human rights. In short, by “a right to have rights,” Arendt, and subsequently Warren, allude to dignity by another, and less perspicuous, name.41 The same line of reasoning, which discredits punishment by banishment and slavery, applies to the death penalty as well. Like these other penalties, the death penalty addresses the offender in a comprehensive manner, as an individual in this case, emphatically conveying the desirability of destroying him. This amounts in all three cases to a denial of a human being’s worth.42

One final argumentative goal remains to be met. It concerns Justice Frankfurter’s earlier mentioned complaint, that abolishing punishment by banishment (and, one might add, by slavery) while upholding the death penalty, renders American “constitutional dialectic … empty of reason.”43 Disagreements among judges, as among philosophers, are of course common, but for the most part, opponents can see each other’s point. So there is something startling about the way Frankfurter dismisses the opposing view. However, the interest in his observation goes beyond the etiquette or the politics of judicial style, and reaches to the merits of the issue at hand. Frankfurter blames the vacuity of “constitutional dialectic” in this case on the judgment that

41 Cf., “‘dignity’ is the name Europe gives for the quality in virtue of which human beings have rights.” Kleinfeld, note 31 supra, at 1004. But especially since the American Supreme Court interprets the Eighth Amendment in terms of human dignity, I don’t quite see the appeal of containing this idea along geographic lines. Arendt herself is skeptical regarding the prospects of grounding human rights in “abstract” universal humanity, and at any rate, her take on dignity is different from the one I outline here. But this is not the place to get any further into these issues. 42 The points raised here echo themes eloquently expressed in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Furman v. Georgia, note 14 above, 290-29. 43 See text at note 7 above.
“loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death.”⁴⁴ Such a judgment would indeed be odd, and incorporating it into one’s constitutional stance, strikingly incongruous. I have argued, however, that no such judgment need underlie abolishing banishment (and slavery) while retaining the death penalty. As we have seen, Frankfurter’s observation implicitly draws on a view of the Eighth Amendment according to which all penalties must be ranked on a unitary scale of severity. But outlawing banishment and slavery (as well as other aspects of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence I have mentioned) is not well explained by such a scale. I have advocated instead transposing the assessment of these penalties from the register of welfare or experience to the register of meaning. In this register, the moral equivalence between the death penalty on the one hand and banishment and slavery on the other, becomes less visible, and the inconsistency between upholding the one while invalidating the others easier to miss.

The three penalties we consider – slavery, banishment, and death – all share the same morally decisive failing: they proclaim the offender’s worthlessness by, respectively, deeming the obliteration of the offender as a person, a citizen, and an individual, to be a desirable thing. This is their shared invidious meaning. But there is a difference nonetheless. Citizenship and personhood are entirely constituted by meanings and norms; they do not designate natural phenomena. Correspondingly, banishment and slavery, the respective negations of citizenship and personhood, manifestly operate on the same plane. And so these penalties’ invidious meaning is particularly salient. Not so in the case of capital punishment. Somewhat paradoxically perhaps, it is because death is such an immense and yet naturally common deprivation, a total termination of all experience and welfare, that applying to it the experiential scale of assessment seems particularly compelling, eclipsing the dimension of meanings, values,

⁴⁴ Ibid.
and rights. To talk about death as a matter of ceasing to be a site of meanings, or to be deemed lacking in value, or be forever stripped of all rights, sounds like a euphemism. When death is compared to banishment and slavery in the dimension of harshness, retaining the first while prohibiting the two others is indeed not just incongruous but absurd. Not so when we compare them in the dimension of meaning. The inconsistency remains blatant, but is not equally conspicuous; its persistence does not attest to a complete “emptiness of reason”; only to ordinary myopia, and perhaps some bad faith.