COMMENTS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, NEW YORK, OREGON, PENNSYLVANIA, RHODE ISLAND, VERMONT, WASHINGTON, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 24, 2018

By Electronic Submission to www.regulations.gov

Hon. Ryan K. Zinke, Secretary
U.S. Department of the Interior
1849 C Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240

Hon. Wilbur Ross, Secretary
U.S. Department of Commerce
1401 Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230

Re: Comments on Proposed Rules entitled:


Dear Secretaries Zinke and Ross:

would wreak havoc on one of our nation’s most successful conservation laws and harm the States’ vital interests in species protection.

Among other troubling defects, the Proposed Rules would unlawfully allow the Services to weave economic cost considerations into, and discount scientific information throughout, their decision making; ignore grave threats to species’ survival like climate change; reduce the number and extent of critical habitat designations for listed species; restrict the circumstances under which federal agencies must engage in interagency consultations and dramatically narrow the scope of such consultations; and leave threatened species unprotected from harm while the FWS works through its ever-present backlog of rulemaking obligations. Rather than promote the regulatory efficiency the agencies purportedly seek, the Proposed Rules, if finalized, would achieve precisely the opposite, burying the Services in paperwork, increasing the backlog of outstanding listing and designation decisions, and inviting litigation. The Proposed Rules also violate the plain language of the Act, its legislative history, and its overarching precautionary approach and, further, are arbitrary and capricious, lacking any reasoned basis. What is more, the Services altogether have failed to study the devastating environmental effects of the Proposed Rules, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).

We urge the Services to withdraw these misguided proposals and instead fulfill their longstanding statutory obligation to conserve the precious biological resources of our States and nation, the value of which “is, quite literally, incalculable.” *Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill*, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 (1978).

**INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Congress enacted the ESA nearly forty-five years ago in a bipartisan effort “to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” *Id.* at 184; *see* 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a). As President Nixon explained in signing the Act, “[n]othing is more priceless and more worthy of preservation than the rich array of animal life with which our country has been blessed.” The ESA accordingly enshrines a national policy of “institutionalized caution” in recognition of the “overriding need to devote whatever effort and resources [are] necessary to avoid further diminution of national and worldwide wildlife resources.” *Hill*, 437 U.S. at 177, 194 (internal quotation omitted). That pervasive goal “is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute.” *Id.* at 184.

The Act achieves its salutary purpose through multiple vital programs, each of which is undermined by the Proposed Rules. Section 4—the “cornerstone of effective implementation of the [ESA],” *S. Rep. No. 97-418*, at 10 (1982)—provides for the listing of both endangered and threatened species based solely on the best scientific and commercial data about threats to the species, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1). Section 9 in turn prohibits “take” (e.g., killing, injuring, or harming) of listed endangered fish and wildlife species, and section 4(d) authorizes extension of that prohibition to listed threatened species to ensure their conservation in line with

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the Act’s overarching precautionary approach. *Id.* §§ 1533(d), 1538(a)(1)(G), (a)(2)(E). Section 4 of the Act also ensures the survival and recovery of listed species by requiring the Services, concurrently with species listing, to designate habitat essential to their conservation, termed critical habitat. *Id.* §§ 1532(5)(A), 1533(a)(3). Finally, section 7 reflects “an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered species,” elevating concern for species protection “over the ‘primary missions’ of federal agencies.” *Hill*, 437 U.S. at 185. Accordingly, section 7 mandates that all federal agencies, in consultation with the Services, must “insure” that any actions they authorize, fund, or carry out are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species or adversely affect critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).³

The three Proposed Rules—admittedly developed to further a deregulatory agenda⁴—would fundamentally undercut these programs while purporting merely to increase clarity and encourage efficiency and transparency.

**First, the Listing Rule** violates the ESA’s express requirements for listing of endangered and threatened species and designating critical habitat without any cogent rationale for upending its longstanding listing and critical habitat designation processes. *See infra* Section II.A., pp.10-23. The proposal unlawfully and arbitrarily:

- injects economic considerations and quantitative thresholds into the Act’s science-driven, species-focused analyses;
- limits the circumstances under which species can be listed as threatened;
- eliminates consideration of species’ recovery in the delisting process;
- expands the Act’s expressly and purposefully narrow exemptions for designation of critical habitat; and
- limits the circumstances under which unoccupied critical habitat would be designated, particularly where climate change poses a threat to species habitat.

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³ *See also* 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b)-(c), 1532(3) (directing all federal agencies to conserve endangered and threatened species and to utilize their authorities in furtherance of Act’s species-protective purposes).

Second, the Interagency Consultation Rule would upend the ESA’s section 7 federal agency consultation process in violation of the plain language and purpose of the Act and without any reasoned basis. See infra Section II.B., pp.23-34. Among other unlawful changes, the Services’ proposals would:

- limit the circumstances under which a federal agency action would be deemed to destroy or adversely modify designated critical habitat;
- limit the scope and extent of the analysis of the effects of a federal agency action;
- include several significant new exemptions from the consultation requirement;
- limit the instances where changed circumstances would require re-initiation of consultation on a federal agency action;
- Limit federal action agencies’ duty to insure mitigation of the adverse effects of their proposals and give federal action agencies the ability to make biological determinations that the Services are required to make; and
- allow for broad-based “programmatic” and “expedited” consultations that give short shrift to site-specific and in-depth analysis of a proposed federal agency action.

Third, the 4(d) Rule proposes to remove, going forward, the “blanket” extension to threatened species of all protections afforded to endangered plants and animals under the ESA, a radical departure from the longstanding, conservation-based agency policy and practice of providing default section 9 protections to all newly listed threatened plant and animal species. See infra Section II.C., pp.34-37.

- FWS’s new proposal is contrary to the ESA’s conservation purpose and precautionary approach because it inevitably would leave threatened species without protections necessary to promote recovery, either temporarily or permanently, and increase the risk that they will become endangered.
- The agency provides no sound reason for this abrupt policy change, which would strain already overburdened agency resources and generate litigation.

Finally, the Services have violated NEPA by altogether failing to assess the environmental impacts of the Proposed Rules or to circulate such analyses for public review and comment. See infra Section III., pp.37-40. Each of the Proposed Rules is without question a major federal action, each will significantly affect the human environment by eviscerating the ESA’s important species protections, and none qualifies for the limited, largely procedural categorical exclusions from NEPA compliance available to the Services. The Services must now properly analyze the Proposed Rules’ dire environmental consequences, and prepare an Environmental Impact Statement to enable meaningful public comment and ensure fully informed decision making in compliance with NEPA.
I. The States Are Uniquely Positioned To Demand that the Services Faithfully Implement the Endangered Species Act.

The States are uniquely qualified to evaluate, and demand withdrawal of, the Services’ proposals to weaken the ESA: States have significant interests in the conservation of their natural heritage; States and their residents suffer when species conservation measures are curtailed and their biological diversity is threatened and in turn have benefitted from successful implementation of the Act; and States seeking to protect their natural resources would need to devote significant resources and institutional capacity to make up for the Services’ failures to properly implement the Act, if the Proposed Rules are finalized.

First, States have a concrete interest in preventing harm to their natural resources, both in general and under the ESA in particular. States are harmed in their *parens patriae* capacity when their residents suffer due to environmental degradation. See *Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico*, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982); *Maryland v. Louisiana*, 451 U.S. 725, 737-38 (1981). And, as the Supreme Court has recognized, States are entitled to special solicitude in seeking to remedy environmental harms. See *Massachusetts v. Environmental Prot. Agency*, 549 U.S. 497, 519-22 (2007). These interests are particularly robust in the context of the ESA, which conserves the invaluable natural heritage within States’ borders. Indeed, in many States, wildlife resources are held in trust by the States for the benefit of the people of the State.5 Accordingly, the Act specifically directs the Services to “cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the States” in implementing the Act and also gives States a special seat at the table in ensuring faithful and fully informed implementation of the Act’s species-conservation mandates. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a).6 The States thus have an important voice in preventing and remedying harm to endangered and threatened species and their habitat.

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5 See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, *The Public Trust in Wildlife*, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1488-93 App. A (2013) (summarizing state wildlife trust law); *Geer v. Connecticut*, 161 U.S. 519, 527-29 (1896), overruled on other grounds by *Hughes v. Oklahoma*, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); see also, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 711.7(a), 1802 (State of California holds its fish and wildlife resources in trust for people of State); WASH. REV. CODE 77.75.070 (“Wildlife resources are managed in trust by the respective states for the benefit of all residents and visitors.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4081(a)(1) (“[T]he fish and wildlife of Vermont are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the citizens of Vermont and shall not be reduced to private ownership. The State of Vermont, in its sovereign capacity as a trustee for the citizens of the State, shall have ownership, jurisdiction, and control of all the fish and wildlife of Vermont.”).

6 See also, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(5) (encouraging State species conservation); id. § 1533(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)(ii) (accounting for State efforts); id. §§ 1533(b)(5), 1536(a)(2) (State consultation requirements for critical habitat designation); id. § 1533(b)(7) (notice of emergency regulations to States where species believed to occur); id. § 1533(g) (monitoring of recovered species in cooperation with State); id. § 1533(i) (heightened justification required where regulations inconsistent with State agency’s comments or petition); id. § 1536(e) (each affected State must be represented on Endangered Species Committee established during consultation exemption procedure); id. § 1535 (requiring Services to cooperate with States); id. § 1536(g) (State governors included in exemption application process); id. § 1537a(e)(2) (States to participate in implementation of the Western Convention); id. § 1540(e)(1) (Services may use State agency resources to enforce ESA).
Second, and relatedly, any efforts to weaken implementation of the ESA would put at risk the States’ irreplaceable natural heritage and harm the States and their residents in numerous ways. The ESA recognizes that endangered and threatened “species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.” Id. § 1531(a)(3). Reducing our wealth of wild species would damage each of these values and “diminish[] a natural resource that could otherwise be used for present and future commercial purposes.” National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053-53 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also San Luis & Delta–Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011). And although the harms that would result from the loss of biological diversity are enormous, the nation cannot fully apprehend their scope because of the “unknown uses that endangered species might have and . . . the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain of life on this planet.” Hill, 437 U.S. at 178-79 (emphases in original).7

Over the last four decades, the States have seen significant benefits8 and steps toward recovery of at-risk species from the Services’ implementation of the ESA, including the recovery and delisting of our national bird, the bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus). Among other examples, populations of the Atlantic Coast piping plover (Charadrius melodus), which is listed as a threatened species along most of the East Coast, have more than doubled in the last twenty years thanks to FWS’s conservation planning, federal enforcement, and cooperative efforts between federal, state, and local partners pursuant to the ESA.9 Recovery efforts have been particularly successful in Massachusetts, where the East Coast’s largest piping plover breeding population has rebounded from fewer than 150 pairs in 1990, to about 642 pairs in 2016,10 increasing 500 percent since the species was listed in 1986.11 Despite these gains, however, piping plovers’ continued recovery is threatened by habitat loss from sea level rise caused by climate change.12

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7 See also National Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-53.
8 Species recovery also benefits biodiversity in entire ecosystems. See generally William J. Ripple & Robert L. Beschta, Trophic cascades in Yellowstone: The first 15 years after wolf reintroduction, 145 Biological Conservation, 205, 206 (2012) (reintroduction of gray wolves to Yellowstone National Park restored a trophic cascade, resulting in rebounded plant growth, greater forage opportunities for several species, and increased beaver and bison populations), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2011.11.005; Madhu Rao & Trond Larsen, Ecological Consequences of Extinction, 3 LESSONS IN CONSERVATION 25, 27-28 (2010) (studies demonstrate that species extinctions are likely to have far-reaching consequences, including cascading extinctions of other species and disruptions of ecosystem function), available at https://www.amnh.org/content/download/141367/2285419/file/LinC3_EcolCon.pdf.
11 See Piping Plover, supra note 9.
The California condor (*Gymnogyps californianus*), the largest land bird in North America, has been listed as “endangered” since the Act’s inception and was on the brink of extinction in 1982 with just twenty-three known individuals. By 1987, all remaining wild condors had been placed into a captive breeding program. Recovery efforts led by FWS, California state agencies, and other partners have increased the population to 463 birds as of 2017 and successfully reintroduced captive-bred condors to the wild. These efforts are now in their final phase, with a focus on creating self-sustaining populations and managing continued threats to the species, such as lead ammunition, trash, and habitat loss.  

The smallest rabbit in North America, the pygmy rabbit (*Brachylagus idahoensis*), was listed as an endangered species under Washington State law in 1993 and by 2001 was considered nearly extinct, with an estimated population of fewer than 50 individuals. In 2003, FWS also listed a distinct population segment of the species known as the Columbia Basin pygmy rabbit as an endangered species under the Federal ESA. Since that time, the species has begun to recover in Washington as a result of a cooperative effort by FWS, the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, researchers, and other state agencies. Thousands of rabbits have been reintroduced on state and private land, with promising evidence of a growing population. Recovery would not be possible without the mutually supporting protections of state and federal law.

The shortnose sturgeon (*Acipenser brevirostrum*) is an anadromous fish found in rivers, estuaries, and coastal waters along the Atlantic Coast of North America. Overfishing, river damming, and water pollution greatly reduced its numbers, and the shortnose sturgeon was listed as endangered in 1967. However, fishing prohibitions and habitat protection efforts led by NMFS and New York have allowed the shortnose sturgeon population to increase in New York’s Hudson River from about 12,669 in 1979 to more than 60,000 today.

The Delmarva fox squirrel, found primarily in Maryland and included on the original list of federally endangered species, has successfully recovered and was delisted by FWS in December 2015. At the time it was listed, the Delmarva fox squirrel had been limited to just 10 percent of its historic range due to forest clearing and overhunting and was found almost exclusively in three Maryland counties. Through concerted conservation efforts triggered by the ESA, the species’ range now encompasses ten counties in three States—Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia—and, with an estimated population of 17,000-20,000, the species is no longer at risk.

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risk of extinction.\textsuperscript{17} These are but a few of the many examples of successful, robust, and cooperative implementation of the ESA by the Services and State partners, success stories that likely would not be possible under the Proposed Rules.

Third, the States have institutional and proprietary interests in the Services’ full compliance with the Act’s plain language and overriding conservation purpose, because States would have to attempt to fill the regulatory and enforcement void left by the Services’ failure to adequately protect the nation’s irreplaceable biological resources. Many States have laws and regulations that protect species within their borders to the same extent or greater than the federal ESA.\textsuperscript{18} In such circumstances, the Services and the States take account of each other’s efforts to conserve rare species and often work cooperatively to share the responsibility and workload required for their protection.\textsuperscript{19}

If the Services finalize the Proposed Rules and thus weaken federal species protections, the responsibility for, and burden of, protecting imperiled species and habitats within State borders would fall primarily on the States. This would detract from State efforts and resources to carry out their more protective programs and impose significantly increased costs and burdens on the States. For example, under the proposed 4(d) Rule, species newly listed as threatened under both State and federal law would be subject to a “take” prohibition only under State law. \textit{See, e.g.,} MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 131A, § 2; CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2080, 2085. In such circumstances, the States would have to shoulder the costs of conservation while FWS clears its


\textsuperscript{18} \textit{See} 16 U.S.C. § 1535; \textit{see, e.g.,} MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 131A, §§ 1-7; 321 CODE MASS. REGS. §§ 10.00 \textit{et seq.} (creating three classifications of protected species, “Endangered,” “Threatened,” and “Special Concern,” and currently listing 427 species, including 401 species not listed under the federal ESA); California Endangered Species Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2050 \textit{et seq.}; California Natural Communities Conservation Planning Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800 \textit{et seq.}; REV. CODE WASH. 77.12.020 (authorizing the classification of wildlife as “protected” or “endangered”); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 220-610-110 (creating the protected subcategories of “sensitive” and “threatened,” and establishing procedures for listing); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5401 \textit{et seq.} (protecting endangered and threatened species and critical habitat, and currently listing 52 animal species, 44 of which are not listed under the federal ESA, and 163 plant species, 160 of which are not listed under the federal ESA); Maryland Endangered Species of Fish Conservation Act, MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 4-2A-01 \textit{et seq.} (providing authority for listing and protection of fish species “[i]n addition to the species deemed to be endangered or threatened pursuant to the Endangered Species Act”); Maryland Nongame and Endangered Species Act, MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 10-2A-01 \textit{et seq.} (providing authority for listing and protection of species of wildlife and plant “[i]n addition to the species deemed to be endangered or threatened pursuant to the Endangered Species Act”).

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{See} 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)(ii). Under Washington State rules, for example, federal listing initiates state listing and development of a recovery plan. Consequently, federal and state protections operate synergistically, and the reduction of federal protections for threatened species will render state recovery plans less effective. \textit{See} WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 220-610-110 (3.2); \textit{see also} VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5402(c)(2), 5402a(c)(2) (requiring that for listing or delisting species or designating critical habitat Agency of Natural Resources “notify and consult with appropriate officials in Canada, appropriate state and federal agencies, [and] other states having a common interest in the species,” among others).
backlog and irons out the details of a species-specific rule (if it ever even does so), or else risk irreversible damage to the threatened species in the meantime. *See Air Alliance Hous. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency*, No. 17-1155, slip op. at 18-19 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 2018) (“Monetary expenditures to mitigate and recover from harms that could have been prevented absent the [federal rule] are precisely the kind of ‘pocketbook’ injury that is incurred by the state itself.” (citing *Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.*, 458 U.S. at 602)). And, importantly, despite these resource-intensive efforts, the States would not be able to wholly fill the regulatory gap created by abrogation of the blanket 4(d) Rule and other proposed changes because some states with significant biodiversity do not adequately protect endangered or threatened species under state law. In such cases, federal regulation is the only defense for resident at-risk species.

For all these reasons, the States have a special perspective on implementation of the ESA that demands the Services’ attention here.

II. The Proposed Rules Violate the Text and Purpose of the Endangered Species Act and Lack Any Reasoned Basis.

The Proposed Rules violate several bedrock principles of administrative law. While agencies often have discretion to carry out statutory mandates, they may not regulate in a manner that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “in excess of statutory . . . authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). First, agencies altogether lack authority to adopt regulations that are “manifestly contrary to the statute.” *Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council*, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); *Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtyys. for a Great Or.*, 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995). Second, in promulgating a regulation “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quotation and citation omitted). Agency regulation is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “relie[s] on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider” or “entirely fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the problem.” *Id.* Finally, in promulgating regulations agencies must afford the public notice of the specific—not vaguely stated—regulatory changes and their reasoned basis to provide the public a meaningful opportunity for comment. *Home Box Office, Inc. v. Federal Commc’ns Comm’n*, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

These core principles apply equally to an agency’s decision to change existing policy. *Federal Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations*, 556 U.S. 502, 513-15 (2009). While an

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agency need not show that a new rule is “better” than the rule it replaced, it still must demonstrate that “it is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.” Id. at 515 (emphases omitted). Further, an agency must “provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate” when “its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy.” Id. Any “unexplained inconsistency” between a rule and its repeal is “a reason for holding an [agency’s] interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change.” National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005).

The Proposed Rules fail each of these requirements for lawful agency action and therefore must be withdrawn. The Listing Rule, Interagency Cooperation Rule, and 4(d) Rule violate the ESA’s text, structure, and purpose, and exceed the scope of the Agencies’ authority and discretion under the Act. In addition, the Services have failed to provide a reasoned justification for the proposed changes, relied on factors Congress did not intend for them to consider, or entirely overlooked important issues at the heart of their species-protection duties under the Act. The Services further have evaded their notice obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act by posing vague questions in the Federal Register notices about possible additional and damaging changes to the regulations without specific proposed regulatory text or explanation for the proposed changes. We address each rule and its legal flaws in turn below.

   Docket ID No. FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006

   i. Addition of Economic Impacts to Listing Analyses.

   The Listing Rule proposes to remove the listing regulation’s current restriction, embodied in section 4 of the ESA, that species listing, reclassification, and delisting decisions must be made “without reference to possible economic or other impacts of such determination.” 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(b); see 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,194-95, 35,200. In removing that limitation, the Services aim to inject consideration of economic impacts into the species threshold listing, delisting, and reclassification determinations in clear violation of the Act’s express terms and without any reasoned explanation.

   First, the Services’ economic-cost proposal violates the ESA’s express terms, legislative intent, and case law. The ESA could not be clearer on this point: species listing decisions must be made “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available” about the status of the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).23 Whereas the ESA authorizes consideration of economic impacts in determining what areas to designate as critical habitat, id. § 1533(b)(2), it expressly requires that all listing decisions center exclusively on the biological threats to the species, such as habitat destruction, disease, and predation, without regard to the economic effects of listing, id. § 1533(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).

23 The reference to “commercial data” in the statute’s listing provisions is intended to allow the Services to consider data about trading of species and is “not intended, in any way, to authorize the use of economic considerations in the process of listing a species.” H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 20 (1982).
Legislative history and case law confirm that the term “solely” was meant to preclude economic analysis at the listing stage. “The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” *Hill*, 437 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added). As numerous courts have recognized, Congress added the term “solely” to section 4’s listing provisions in 1982 to emphasize that listing determinations were to be made “solely upon biological criteria and to prevent non-biological considerations from affecting such decisions.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 19 (1982); *see also* at 20. This amendment was intended to “improve[] and expedite[]” the listing process and to divert “the balancing between science and economics” to “the [critical habitat] exemption process.” *Id.* at 12.

The Services’ proposed elimination of the prohibition on referencing economic impacts thus is plainly unlawful and manifestly contrary to the statute, undermining Congress’s goal of improving and expediting the listing process. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C); *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843; *Motor Vehicle Mfrs.*, 463 U.S. at 43. The proposal does not merely “more closely align [the regulation] with the statutory language,” as the Services claim. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,194. Although the Services contend that biological considerations will continue to be the basis for listing decisions, they themselves acknowledge that they may under their new proposal, actually “reference[] economic, or other, impacts”—a factor Congress expressly provided they *not* consider—in their listing decisions. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,194; *see also* id. at 35,195. It is difficult to believe that the Services and commenters will not *consider* economic impact information even as the Services generate and “reference[]” it during the listing stage. *Id.* at 35,194 (emphasis added). And it is unclear what purpose it could serve for the Services to spend time and resources generating economic impact information if they were not going to consider the data.

In any event, that proposed process of compiling and presenting cost-benefit analyses itself runs counter to Congress’s intent to “improv[e] and expedit[e]” the listing process, *even if* the Services counterintuitively intend to ignore it. H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 12 (1982); S. Rep. No. 97-418, at 4 (1982). The Services nowhere even acknowledge, let alone justify, the added burden, backlog, and delay these economic impact analyses will create for the Services, thus “fail[ing] to consider an important aspect of the problem.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs.*, 463 U.S. at 43. Nor do the Services explain what “circumstances” would warrant “reference[ing]” economic

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26 *See also* S. Rep. No. 97-418, at 4 (1982) (1982 amendments “would ensure that . . . economic analysis . . . will not delay or affect decisions on listing”); *id.* at 11.
27 *See* U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-304, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: INFORMATION ON ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DEADLINE SUITS, pp.5-18 (Feb. 2017) (hereinafter “GAO Listing Deadline Litigation Report”) (reporting that 141 lawsuits involving 1,441 species were filed from fiscal year 2005 through 2015 alleging that FWS and NMFS failed to take actions within deadlines mandated by ESA section 4, largely on petitions to list species), *available at* https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683058.pdf; *see also In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig.-MDL No. 2165*, 704 F.3d 972, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (describing backlog of listing decisions).
impacts or how they plan to quantify the potential costs and benefits of listing decisions, a particularly challenging task where they lack the requisite resources and expertise to do so and where, as discussed above, “[t]he value of [species and our] genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable.” Hill, 437 U.S. at 178-79 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973)); cf. id. at 187-88 (“Quite obviously, it would be difficult for a court to balance the loss of a sum certain—even $100 million—against a congressionally declared ‘incalculable’ value, even assuming we had the power to engage in such a weighing process, which we emphatically do not.”).

Second, the Services do not, and cannot, offer any reasoned basis for their economic-impact proposal. The Services may not lawfully resort to their stated goal of informing the public about the potential costs and benefits of implementation in order to comply with Congress’s unspecified “support for informing the public as to the impacts of regulations in subsequent amendments to statutes and executive orders.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,195. Whatever the content of those vaguely referenced authorities, they do not authorize the Services to evade the ESA’s specific prohibition on the inclusion of economic impacts in listing determinations. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A); cf. Am. Bicycle Ass’n v. United States, 895 F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1990) (general grant of authority does not override “specific and unequivocal” proscription). In fact, as the Services themselves acknowledge, 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,194, Congress originally added the term “solely” to the ESA out of concern that those same types of authorities, like the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Paperwork Reduction Act, potentially could be used to introduce economic and other factors into listing determinations under the Act. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-835, at 20 (1982) (explaining that “economic analysis requirements of Executive Order 12,291, and such statutes as the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act, will not apply to any phase of the listing process” (emphasis added)). For these reasons, too, the Services’ attempt to analogize listing determinations to the entirely distinct standard-setting processes under the federal Clean Air Act is simply inapt. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,194-95. Because the Services’ economic-impact proposal is thus both unlawful and unjustified, it should be withdrawn.

ii. Redefinition of Foreseeable Future.

The Listing Rule’s second proposed change would narrow the definition of “threatened species” under the ESA, which includes a species “likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). The proposal, if adopted, would for the first time embed quantitative probability into the term “foreseeable future,” providing that the term would “extend[] only so far into the future as the Services can reasonably determine that the conditions potentially posing a danger of extinction . . . are probable.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,195, 35,201 (emphasis added). This approach would allow the Services in listing decisions to “explain the extent to which they can reasonably determine that both the future threats and the species’ responses to those threats are probable” and to “tak[e] into account considerations such as the species’ life-history characteristics, threat-projection timeframes, and environmental variability” in that analysis. Id. at 35,195 (emphasis added). These proposed changes are not only contrary to the statutory language of the ESA, but they also improperly constrain the Services’ consideration of future threats to a species’ continued existence, including threats related to climate change, without any reasoned basis.
First, the Services’ injection of these “probability” and “variability” criteria into the threatened species analysis violates the text and purposes of the ESA. The ESA requires the Services to make its listing determinations “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available . . . after conducting a review of the status of the species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A), based on threats to the species, id. § 1533(a)(1). As the Services admit, this analysis must be done on a case-by-case basis and is “uniquely related to the particular species, the relevant threats, and the data available.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,195 (citing In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litig., 709 F.3d 1, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). After that assessment, if the Services find it likely that a species will “become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” they must list that species as threatened. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20); see id. § 1533(b)(1)(B)(ii).

In enacting the ESA, Congress did not define “foreseeable future” or prescribe standards regarding the “likelihood” that a species would become endangered and thus require the Act’s protection. The proposed rule’s use of the word “probable,” however, raises the specter that the Services may only consider threats that have a fifty percent or greater chance of occurring during a particular time period. It is difficult to imagine—and the Services have failed to explain—how they would reliably quantify the percentage likelihood of threats to species. And, even if quantification were possible, it would be unlawful and arbitrary to discount severe threats that may be, say, 40% likely but would be extremely dangerous. Such an approach also would be inappropriate for species that may be facing severe or multiple threats that may have a lower chance of occurring or for which the likelihood cannot be precisely calculated and is contrary to the Services’ longstanding precautionary approach. Cf. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,102-03 (Sept. 21, 1983) (FWS guidelines for reclassification from threatened to endangered status based on magnitude and immediacy of threats). Simply put, the Services’ new, ultra vires requirements inject criteria for quantification and certainty that are not required by the Act and will most likely limit listing decisions, even where potential threats could be devastating. It is thus contrary to section 4 of the ESA, the overriding conservation purposes of the ESA, and the policy of “institutionalized caution” embedded in the Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); Hill, 437 U.S. at 194.

Courts also have held that the ESA does not mandate that the Services base their decisions “on ironclad evidence when it determines that a species is likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future; it simply requires the agency to consider the best and most reliable scientific and commercial data and to identify the limits of that data when making a listing determination.” Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 681 (9th Cir. 2016). In Pritzker, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld NMFS’s decision to list the Pacific bearded seal (Erignathus barbatus nauticus) as a threatened species based on its determination, using several climate models, that the loss of sea ice over shallow waters in the Arctic would leave the species endangered by the year 2095. Id. at 674. The Court specifically rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the climate models “cannot reliably predict the degree of global warming beyond 2050 or the effect of that warming on a subregion, such as the Arctic.” Id. at 679. “The fact that climate projections for 2050 through 2100 may be volatile,” the Court explained, “does not deprive those

28 See also Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2016); San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 602 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Polar Bear Litig., 709 F.3d at 16.
projections of value in the rulemaking process” where the Services have used a reasonable methodology for addressing that volatility and explained its shortcomings. Id. at 680. Under the Services’ proposed redefinition here, however, rather than making a reasoned determination based on the best scientific and commercial data available such as climate modeling, NMFS would have been required to show that “the future threats and the species’ responses to those threats are probable,” e.g., more likely than not—a standard contrary to the precautionary Act and case law. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,201.

Thus, perhaps most problematically, the Services’ proposed definition would give the Services carte blanche to ignore “an important aspect of the problem” of species extinction: the significant threats posed by climate change. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. As noted above, in addition to its new ultra vires probability requirement, the Services, using code words for climate change, also direct that the foreseeable future analysis now should “account for any relevant environmental variability, such as hydrological cycles or oceanographic cycles, which may affect the reliability of projections” and “consider the timeframes applicable to the relevant threats and to the species’ likely responses to those threats in view of its life-history characteristics.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,195.

These new “probability” and “variability” criteria may have the perverse effect of enabling the Services to discount the potentially devastating effects of climate change. The fact that climate change is occurring and will have impacts on habitat is more than “probable;” it is certain. But the precise impact that climate change might have on particular areas at particular times may be uncertain as there might be several varying, perfectly plausible projections of effects that climate change might have on a particular habitat that could predict somewhat different impacts at different times. It may be that none of those specific projections reaches the fifty percent “probability” threshold because of uncertainty due to environmental variability, but each threat must nonetheless be considered in assessing the “likelihood” that a species will become endangered. Indeed, as the previous Director of FWS recently testified before Congress, the Earth’s rapidly changing climate is one of the principal emerging threats to species nationwide—variability notwithstanding.29 Scientific research confirms that climate change already is, and over the next several decades will increasingly become, a driver of species decline and biodiversity loss.30 And the severity of this threat is already apparent to State

30 See, e.g., Céline Bellard, et al., Impacts of Climate Change on the Future of Biodiversity, 15 ECOLOGY LETTERS 365, 375 (2012) (most climate change impact models “indicate alarming consequences for biodiversity, with the worst-case scenarios leading to extinction rates that would qualify as the sixth mass extinction in the history of the earth”); available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01736.x; Paul Leadley et al., Biodiversity Scenarios: Projections of 21st Century Change in Biodiversity and Associated Ecosystem Services, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY TECHNICAL SERIES No. 50 (2010); see also U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 9 Animals That are Feeling the Impacts of Climate Change (Nov. 16, 2015) (climate
agencies studying climate impacts on biodiversity and species conservation and planning for endangered and threatened species conservation.

Thus, even in the face of evolving threats, the Services must still consider and act on the best available science in evaluating threats to a species. See Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1072 (9th Cir. 2018) (FWS must explain why uncertainty of climate change favors not listing the arctic grayling given evidence of warming water temperatures and decreasing water flow); Greater Yellowstone Coal. Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011) (“It is not enough for the [FWS] to simply invoke ‘scientific uncertainty’ to justify its action.”). But far from considering, as it must, the threat of climate change, the Services under their proposed redefinition could arbitrarily cite climate change as a justification to avoid species protections altogether. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43.

What is more, the Services again fail to provide any reasoned explanation for this significant change. They attempt to justify the proposal solely by reference to a 2009 opinion from the Department of the Interior’s Office of the Solicitor (“2009 Guidance”), which they claim is “well-founded” and “has been widely applied by both Services.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,195. But the 2009 Guidance does not even contain the word “probable.” See generally 2009 Guidance. It simply recognizes the unremarkable proposition that the Services have discretion to make listing determinations based on “the facts applicable to the species being considered,” provides direction to base such determinations on “reliable” predictions that are “sufficient to provide a reasonable degree of confidence in the prediction, in light of the conservation purposes of the Act,” and acknowledges that “[s]ince the foreseeable future is uniquely related to population, status, trends, and threats for each species and since species often face multiple threats, the Secretary is likely to find varying degrees of foreseeability with respect to the various threats.” Id. at 13. None of this guidance affords the Services discretion to ignore reasonably foreseeable threats to species based solely on uncertainty. To the contrary, and consistent with the case law, the 2009 Guidance recognizes that the Services must sometimes make listing decisions extrapolating from limited data, always mindful of the conservation purposes of the


32 See, e.g., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN FOR PIPING PLOVER, supra note 12, at 2-10 to 2-11 (continued recovery threatened by habitat loss from sea level rise caused by climate change).

The Listing Rule’s proposed requirement that such threats be “probable” would unlawfully and arbitrarily foreclose that approach and should be withdrawn.

iii. **Elimination of Recovery from Delisting.**

The Listing Rule’s third major proposed change would modify the language in 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) to provide that, when determining whether to delist species, the Services must apply the same five factors for listing species under ESA section 4(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c), eliminating current regulatory language that refers to species recovery as key basis for delisting, 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,196, 35,201; see 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d)(2). Again, the Services’ proposed changes are contrary to the Act and its legislative history and are arbitrary and capricious.

First, the proposed delisting changes violate the ESA and its intent. The Act plainly states that its species conservation measures are intended to “bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this [Act] are no longer necessary.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). In other words, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, “the ESA was enacted not merely to forestall the extinction of species (i.e., promote a species survival), but to allow a species to recover to the point where it may be delisted.” *Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv.*, 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, the ESA specifically requires the Services to develop and implement recovery plans “for the conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to this section, unless [they] find[] that such a plan will not promote the conservation of the species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1). Among other things, those plans must include “to the maximum extent practicable . . . objective, measurable criteria which, when met, would result in a determination, in accordance with the provisions of this section, that the species be removed from the list.” *Id.* § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii) (emphases added).

The ESA’s legislative history confirms its clear focus on species recovery. Congress added these procedures in 1988 to prioritize this important goal of the ESA and to remedy the Services’ failures to prepare adequate recovery plans for listed species. *See S. Rep. No. 100-240*, at 4, 9 (1987). The amendments were intended to ensure that each recovery plan “contain[s] objective, measurable criteria for removal of a species from the Act’s lists and timeframes and cost estimates for intermediate steps toward that goal [to] . . . provide a means by which to judge the progress being made toward recovery.” *Id.* at 9. The Act and its legislative history thus make plain that recovery must be the paramount concern in delisting decisions.

Elimination of recovery considerations in the delisting process would fail to ensure that listed species have become secure members of their ecosystems prior to removing the Act’s protections. In particular, the proposed factors in ESA section 4(a)(1) do not discuss recovery and would not necessarily result in a determination whether threats to the species have been eliminated or controlled, or whether the population size is stable and trending in a positive direction. *See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(4)(a)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c). Consequently, the Services’ proposal could result in the premature delisting of species that are not yet likely to recover, in direct violation of the conservation purposes of the Act.*
Furthermore, the Services have failed to provide any reasoned explanation for this proposed change, which departs significantly from its longstanding practice. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 515. Even if recovery plans prepared under section 4(f) are not “binding” on the Services or do not require the Services to find that “all of the recovery plan criteria had been met before it could delist” a species, the Services cannot justify disregarding species recovery in the delisting process altogether. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,196 (emphasis added). In fact, even in the case referenced by the Services, Friends of the Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012), FWS did consider recovery in its delisting decision for the West Virginia northern flying squirrel. See id. at 431 (discussing the Service’s analysis of the recovery plan for the species and its consideration of data provided pursuant to the plan); 73 Fed. Reg. 50,226 (Aug. 26, 2008) (delisting “due to recovery”); 71 Fed. Reg. 75,924 (Dec. 19, 2006) (same). Consequently, proposal to eliminate species recovery as a factor in delisting decisions should be withdrawn, and the Services should retain the current regulatory language in 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d)(2) regarding species recovery in the delisting process.

iv. Expanding the Limited “Not Prudent” Exception to Critical Habitat Designation.

The Listing Rule also proposes to expand the circumstances “in which the Services may find it is not prudent to designate critical habitat” for listed species, and thus elect not to do so, by replacing the existing two narrow circumstances in which designation would not be prudent with a non-exhaustive list of five such situations. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,196, 35,201. The Services’ proposal would dramatically expand an expressly and intentionally narrow exception to the Act’s important critical habitat designation requirements in violation of the Act and its purpose, and without any reasoned basis. It, too, should be withdrawn.

First, the Services’ proposal to expand the so-called “not prudent exception” is contrary to the ESA, Congress’s clear intent, and case law. The Act requires that the Services, when listing a species as threatened or endangered, also designate “to the maximum extent prudent and determinable” the habitat that “is then considered to be critical,” 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added), i.e., “essential to the conservation of the species,” id. § 1532(5)(A). Recognizing that “the greatest [threat to species] [is] destruction of natural habitats,” Hill, 437 U.S. at 179, Congress intended that such designations be made concurrently with listing determinations, except in “rare circumstances” when designation “would not be beneficial to the species,” H.R. Rep. No. 95–1625 at 17 (1978). Consistent with the Act’s plain text and history, courts, in turn, have construed the “not prudent” exception as a “narrow statutory exception” to the general rule that critical habitat must be designated for imperiled species. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997).

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34 See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1).
35 H.R. Rep. No. 95–1625 at 17 (1978) (“The committee intends that in most situations the Secretary will, in fact, designate critical habitat at the same time that a species is listed as either endangered or threatened. It is only in rare circumstances where the specification of critical habitat concurrently with the listing would not be beneficial to the species.”).
36 See also Conservation Council for Hawai’i v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1283 (D. Haw. 1998) (rejecting FWS’s rationales for not designating critical habit for 245 listed plant species and noting that critical habitat should be designated “in all but rare cases”).
In line with that authority, the Services’ current regulations list only two situations in which a critical habitat designation is not prudent: where identifying critical habitat would risk harm to the species or where such designation would not benefit the species because, for example, habitat destruction is not a threat to the species. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1). And courts have interpreted those two exceptions narrowly, rejecting unsubstantiated attempts to avoid designation. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (condemning Services’ practice of “invert[ing] [Congressional] intent, rendering critical habitat designation the exception and not the rule”); Natural Res. Def. Council, 113 F.3d at 1126. The Services’ Listing Rule would undermine the ESA’s critical habitat scheme and its court-confirmed purpose, creating a laundry list of new extra-statutory “not prudent” exceptions and paving the way for the Services to avoid designating critical habitat, as detailed below.

Second, the Services’ unlawful new exceptions are each arbitrary and capricious, lacking any reasoned basis. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. Most problematically, exception (v) broadly authorizes invocation of the “not prudent” exception if “the Secretary otherwise determines that designation of critical habitat would not be prudent.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35, 201; see also id. at 35,197. The exception is an overbroad and vague “catchall” that would give unfettered discretion to the Services to evade the Act’s core critical habitat requirements—an authority not contemplated by the ESA. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. The Services nowhere explain this proposed, substantial expansion of the exception, which would swallow the rule that the “not prudent” determinations should be extremely rare.37

Exception (ii) arbitrarily expands the “not prudent” exception to cover circumstances in which “threats to the species habitat stem solely from causes that cannot be addressed through management actions resulting from [section 7] consultations.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35, 201; see also id. at 35,197. This exception apparently aims directly at precluding critical habitat designations based on threats to a species from climate change—a “cause” that cannot be “addressed” solely through the management actions of the Services and the jurisdictions in which critical habitat lies, but rather requires concerted action at the local, state, federal, and international level. The proposal arbitrarily assumes, with virtually no explanation, that the value of a critical habitat designation depends on whether management actions identified through interagency consultations can address threats to a species’ habitat. Id. at 35,197. But the ESA simply does not require that effective consultation actions be available for critical habitats to be designated; it separately requires both critical habitat designation and consultation. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(3)(A), 1536; cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, 113 F.3d at 1126 (rejecting Services’ rationale that designating critical habitat would not be prudent because the bulk of the species’ habitat was located on private lands).

Additionally, there are significant substantive and procedural benefits that result from the designation of critical habitat outside of the consultation requirements, including educating the public and state and local governments about the importance of certain areas to listed species, assisting in species recovery planning efforts, identifying areas where agency consultation will be required, and “establish[ing] a uniform protection plan prior to consultation.” Conservation

37 Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (agency must provide “good reasons” for policy change); National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 981 (“unexplained inconsistency” is basis for invalidation).
Council for Hawai’i v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Haw. 1998).\(^{38}\) Indeed, the Services themselves acknowledge as much. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,197. In light of these myriad benefits of critical habitat outside of the section 7 requirements, far from justifying an exception to critical habitat designations as the Services appear to claim, id., the threat of climate change casts in stark relief the importance of such designations to ensure robust understanding of and protections for the many species it threatens.

Exception (iii) allows areas within the United States to be excluded from critical habitat designations if they would provide “no more than negligible conservation value” to species “occurring primarily outside” the United States. Id. at 35,201; see also id. at 35,197. The Services fail to explain what they mean by “negligible conservation value” or how they would determine whether a species “occur[s] primarily” elsewhere, injecting more vague and subjective loopholes into the designation analysis and depriving the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 35 (notice must “disclose in detail the thinking that has animated the form of a proposed rule and the data upon which that rule is based,” to afford meaningful opportunity for comment). Further, the exception fails to appreciate that a designation within the United States could still be beneficial and protect habitat that is important for the species’ survival and recovery, particularly for migratory species.

The Services cannot save their ultra vires proposal based on their stated intention to “reduce the burden of regulation” or their passing assurance that “not-prudent determinations would continue to be rare.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,197. The Listing Rule on its face adds several new and extremely broad exceptions to the ESA’s critical habitat mandate and, in practice, would give the Services carte blanche to forego critical habitat designation, particularly where climate change threatens species’ habitat. Accordingly, the Listing Rule’s proposed exceptions must be abandoned.

v. Restricting Unoccupied Critical Habitat Designation.

The Listing Rule also proposes to “clarify” when areas not yet occupied by the endangered or threatened species (“unoccupied areas”) are “essential for the conservation of the species” and thus warrant designation as critical habitat. Id. at 35,198, 35,201. The proposal is not a mere clarification; it torpedoes the ESA’s critical habitat designation process by arbitrarily demoting unoccupied habitat without regard to the effects of climate change, delaying the time at which occupied areas are identified, and creating a laundry list of arbitrary new factors the Services can invoke to evade critical habitat designation, including at the behest of private landowners. Id. Like the other proposals, it must be withdrawn.

Prioritizing, and Delaying Determinations of, Occupied Critical Habitat. The proposed rule would restrict designation of unoccupied critical habitat by requiring the Services first to evaluate whether currently occupied areas are inadequate for species conservation—without explaining how the Services would make that determination—using occupation at the time of critical habitat designation (and not the listing decision) as the point of reference. Id. at 35,198, 35,201. As an initial matter, as the Services themselves recently concluded, there is no basis in

\(^{38}\) See also 81 Fed. Reg. 7,414, 7,414-15 (Feb. 11, 2016) (Services’ own statement describing “several ways” that critical habitat “can contribute to the conservation of listed species”).
the statute or legislative history for the Services to evaluate occupied areas before considering unoccupied areas.\textsuperscript{39} The ESA expressly requires the Services to consider \textit{both} occupied and unoccupied habitat in designating critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). By arbitrarily elevating occupied critical habitat to the preferred and default designation option, this proposal would discount the importance of previously occupied habitat to species recovery. If a species has reached the point of becoming endangered or threatened, it is quite likely that it no longer occupies habitat that it once occupied. Indeed, the Act’s critical habitat provisions are intended to address that reality. \textit{See Hill}, 437 U.S. at 179. It thus would flout the Act’s recovery purpose to look first at the narrowed range of habitat currently occupied by the species rather than areas within its historical range.

What is more, this proposal too would permit the Services to avoid addressing the effects of climate change, allowing the Services to ignore unoccupied areas that could provide important habitat in a changing climate. We are already seeing an unprecedented migration of plant and animal species into new areas as a result of climate change.\textsuperscript{40} As the Services recently explained, “[a]s the effects of global climate change continue to influence distribution and migration patterns of species, the ability to designate areas that a species has not historically occupied is expected to become increasingly important” to ensure connectivity between habitats and protect movement corridors and emerging habitat for species experiencing range shifts in latitude or altitude. 81 Fed. Reg. at 7,435; \textit{see also} 83 Fed. Reg. 42,362, 42,365 (Aug. 21, 2018) (designating unoccupied critical habitat for three plant species to allow for expansion of the species’ range and the reintroduction of individuals into areas where the species historically occurred, and to provide areas for recovery); \textit{cf.} Conservation Council for Hawai’i, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. The Services’ proposal does not at all contend with this important consideration. \textit{See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.}, 463 U.S. at 43.

\textsuperscript{39} 81 Fed. Reg. at 7,426-27 (emphasizing that “there is no suggestion in the legislative history that the Services were expected to exhaust occupied habitat before considering whether any unoccupied areas may be essential” and “no specific language in the Act that requires the Services to first prove that the inclusion of all occupied areas in a designation are insufficient to conserve the species before considering unoccupied areas”).

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{See} Céline Bellard, \textit{et al.}, \textit{Impacts of Climate Change on the Future of Biodiversity}, supra note 30, at 367 (“[R]ange shifts have . . . been observed [for] more than 1,000 species.”); Robert A. Robinson, \textit{et al.}, \textit{Travelling Through a Warming World: Climate Change and Migratory Species}, 7 ENDANGERED SPECIES RESEARCH 87, 95 (2009) (migrating species are responding to climate change by altering their ranges and “it will be important to protect areas that may be used in the future,” at the edge or beyond current ranges); Thomas T. Moore, \textit{Climate Change and Animal Migration}, 41 ENVTL. L. 393, 405 (2011) (climate change may cause migration corridors and destinations to shift out of protected areas). Among imperiled marine species with migration affected by climate change, the critically endangered North Atlantic right whale (\textit{Eubalaena glacialis}) has been foraging farther north because of changed zooplankton distributions due to warming in the Gulf of Maine and, in winter, spending more time in Mid-Atlantic waters and less time in calving grounds off the southeastern U.S. coast. \textit{See} Sean A. Hayes, \textit{et al.}, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM NMS NE-247, NORTH ATLANTIC RIGHT WHALES – EVALUATING THEIR RECOVERY CHALLENGES IN 2018 (2018) (citing multiple studies). With fewer than 450 North Atlantic right whales left in existence, unmitigated climate impacts could drive the species to extinction.
Finally, the requirement that occupied habitat be assessed at the time of critical habitat designation conflicts with the ESA’s directive that the Services designate critical habitats “to the maximum extent prudent and determinable . . . concurrently with making a [listing] determination.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). In other words, the ESA makes clear that habitat assessments should occur at time of listing. But the Services often do not designate critical habitat on time, at the time of listing.41 Thus, by prioritizing occupied habitat and assessing occupation at the most likely later point of critical habitat designation, the Services will likely designate even less habitat where species populations have already dwindled in the intervening time, again arbitrarily omitting previously occupied habitat for imperiled species. To comport with the ESA’s approach of “institutionalized caution,” the Services must instead base designations on data from both the time of listing and critical habitat designation, considering both occupied and unoccupied areas concurrently. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 194.

Definition of Unoccupied Critical Habitat. Second, the Services dramatically redefine and substantially narrow when unoccupied areas will be considered “essential for the conservation of the species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). Specifically, the proposed rule would create a two-factor test that would allow designation of unoccupied critical habitat only if (1) the currently occupied area, as discussed above, is (a) “inadequate to ensure the conservation of the species” or (b) “result[s] in less-efficient conservation of the species,” and (2) “there is a reasonable likelihood that the [unoccupied] area will contribute to the conservation of the species” as determined through three new “area-specific factors.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,198, 35,201. To be sure, habitat should not be designated as critical unless it has some likelihood of contributing to the conservation of the species. But this proposal’s sweeping two-step test would veer far beyond that threshold. Rather than promote “flexibility,” id. at 35,198, it would upend the regulatory scheme and give the Services virtually unlimited discretion to refuse to designate unoccupied critical habitat based on almost any conceivable non-biological rationale, contrary to the conservation purpose of the Act in general and its critical habitat provisions in particular and to the great detriment of imperiled species.

The first step requires the Services to assess whether occupied areas are providing adequate and efficient conservation for the species. Id. at 35,198. Broadly speaking, as discussed above, there is no basis in the Act or in the legislative history for the Services to elevate occupied critical habitat as the default designation option. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). Further, even if the Act allowed the Services to consider occupied areas before making an unoccupied critical habitat designation, the first step of this two-part test does not provide clear guidance for how occupied areas should be assessed. For instance, the Services state that “efficient conservation” “refers to situations where the conservation is effective, societal conflicts are minimized, and resources expended are commensurate with the benefit to the species.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,198 (emphases added). But the Services fail to explain what the term “societal conflicts” means, and the proposal is therefore fatally vague, precluding meaningful opportunity for comment. See Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Thus unexplained, the term “societal conflicts” also is overly broad, extending well beyond the economic impacts the ESA permits the Services to consider. 16

41 See, e.g., Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1268 (“We are troubled by the Service’s apparent practice of routinely delaying critical habitat designation until forced to act by court order.”).
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). Additionally, the alluded to “resource expenditure” analysis gives the Services unlawfully broad discretion to determine that the benefits of a critical habitat designation may not be worth the cost, with virtually no guidance. The proposal thus would significantly limit the circumstances under which the Services would designate an unoccupied critical habitat, contrary to the Act’s equal concern for both occupied and unoccupied areas and the ESA’s overarching species-recovery goals. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A).

The second step of the Listing Rule’s two-part test—requiring a “reasonable likelihood that the [unoccupied] area will contribute to the conservation of the species”—is likewise unsupported by law and arbitrary. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,198. The proposal adds three area-specific factors for the Services to consider when making a “reasonable likelihood” determination, two of which are plainly contrary to the ESA: (a) “whether the area is currently or is likely to become usable habitat for the species,” and (b) whether any “federal agency actions are likely to be proposed with respect to the area” (i.e., whether interagency consultation will be triggered). Id.

The first area-specific factor—whether unoccupied area is usable given the “current state of the area,” the “extent to which extensive restoration would be needed,” and whether this restoration is “likely” by current landowners or managers, id.—arbitrarily bases critical habitat designations on landowner whim in violation of the ESA and its purposes and ignores the many benefits of critical habitat designations, see Conservation Council for Hawai‘i, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. Critical habitat designations must be based on the “best scientific data available” and are not subject to a private-landowner exception. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).

To be sure, the States recognize that the designation of private land as critical habitat can raise difficult issues. But this proposal is antithetical to the ESA’s biological focus and conservation purpose. It would allow “private landowners [to] trump the Service’s scientific determination that unoccupied habitat is essential for the conservation of a species so long as they declare that they are not currently willing to modify habitat to make it habitable and that they will not be willing to make modifications in the foreseeable future.” Markle Interest, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452, 470 (5th Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that ESA authorizes “private landowner exemption from unoccupied critical-habitat designations”), cert. granted, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 138 S. Ct. 924 (2018). Moreover, the suggestion that landowners can prevent critical habit designation simply by expressing hostility to the idea would diminish, rather than promote, landowner cooperation and participation in recovery efforts. We encourage the Services instead to identify ways to create incentives for landowners to participate in conservation and recovery.

The second area-specific factor—whether an unoccupied area will trigger interagency consultation, 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,198—arbitrarily and without explanation assumes that consultation is a prerequisite to the conservation value of species’ habitat. Without any basis in the statute or fact, the Services claim that “the likelihood that an area will contribute to conservation is, in most cases, greater for public lands and lands for which . . . federal actions can be reasonably anticipated than for other types of land,” admitting their intent largely to

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42 In addition, it is unclear whether the Services also intend to consider “societal conflicts” in evaluating whether occupied habitat is “essential to the conservation of the species” under 16 U.S.C. 1532(5)(A)(i). The Services should clarify that they do not intend to do so.
confine consultation to federal lands. *Id.* As discussed above, in Section II.A.iv., however, the Services’ assumption is inconsistent with the mandate of the ESA, which does not require that effective consultation actions be available for an area of critical habitat to be designated, again unlawfully putting the consultation cart before the critical habitat designation horse. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(3)(A), 1536. And it ignores the fact that there are a variety of reasons—like educating the public, planning species recovery, and identifying areas for consultation in the future—why an area should still be considered essential to the conservation of species and why designation of that critical habitat could further species’ conservation, even if that land were not slated for a federal action that would prompt interagency consultation. For all the above reasons, the Services should withdraw the proposed Listing Rule.


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The Services’ proposed amendments to the Interagency Cooperation Regulations implementing section 7 of the ESA would make numerous significant, and in some cases sweeping, changes to the definitions and requirements of those regulations. In summary, these proposed changes are designed to: (a) limit the circumstances under which a federal agency action would be deemed to destroy or adversely modify critical habitat; (b) limit analysis of the type and extent of effects of a federal agency action; (c) create significant new exemptions from the consultation requirement; (d) limit re-initiation of consultation on federal land and resource management plans; (e) allow federal action agencies to conduct biological analyses that should be conducted by the Services; (f) allow federal action agencies to adopt mitigation measures as part of the project description without committing to implementation of these measures; and (g) allow for broad-based “programmatic” and “expedited” consultations that give short shrift to site-specific and in-depth analysis of a proposed federal agency action. Collectively, these proposed changes would severely limit: the circumstances requiring consultation; the scope of consultations, including the effects analyzed and the reasonable and prudent alternatives considered and mitigation measures required; and the number of “jeopardy” and “adverse modification” findings. As such, these proposed rules fail to “insure” that federal actions will not jeopardize listed species or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat, or that reasonable and prudent alternatives and mitigation measures will be required for such actions, as required by section 7.

The proposed revisions are contrary to the plain language and purpose of section 7, the conservation purpose of and precautionary approach undergirding the ESA, and the controlling case law. The Services therefore lack the authority to adopt these changes. In addition, the Services have failed to articulate a reasoned basis for the proposed changes, many of which—contrary to the Services’ repeated assertions—constitute major, unexplained departures from the Services’ decades-long practice. The proposals thus are also arbitrary and capricious.

i. **Revised Definitions.**

“**Destruction or Adverse Modification**” of Critical Habitat. The proposed revisions would alter the definition of “destruction or adverse modification” in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, one of the triggers for consultation under ESA section 7(a)(2), to require the destruction or adverse modification of the critical habitat “as a whole.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,179-80, 35,191. The
The Services also fail to explain or justify this proposed rule change. In particular, they fail to explain the deletion of the existing language stating that destruction or adverse modification occurs when an action alters “the physical or biological features essential to the

43 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1532(3); see also, e.g., Alaska v. Lubchenco, 723 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013); Center for Native Ecosys. v. Cable, 509 F.3d 1310, 1322 (10th Cir. 2007).

44 See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2009); National Wildlife Fed’n v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 930, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2008); Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1093 (“Pacific Coast II”) (9th Cir. 2005); Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Pacific Coast I”).

45 Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (agency must provide “good reasons” for policy change); National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 981 (“unexplained inconsistency” is basis for invalidation of regulation or policy).
conservation of a species or that preclude or significantly delay development of such features.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02; see 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,179-80, 35,191. In 2016, the Services determined that addition of this text was necessary to ensure that federal agency actions do not destroy or adversely modify critical habitat essential for a species’ recovery. 81 Fed. Reg. 7,214, 7,216-17 (Feb. 11, 2016); see also id. at 7,219-20. In an about-face, the Services now state that this language is being deleted because it purportedly has caused controversy and confusion and is unnecessary, but the Services do not explain why or how. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,181. Nor do the Services explain how the new “streamline[d] and simplif[ied]” text will remedy that confusion or provide adequate guidance for when an action will destroy or adversely modify critical habitat. Id. Rather, the Services implausibly assure the public that they will continue to determine how alterations to critical habitat could affect species recovery. Id. But this assurance is refuted by the proposals’ changes to the definition of adverse modification, and the Service’s other, contradictory statements that the revisions will reduce the circumstances under which a federal action will be deemed to adversely modify critical habitat. Id.

“Effects of the Action.” The Services also propose significantly to alter the existing definition of “effects of the action” in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, limiting both the type and extent of effects of a proposed federal agency action that must be considered during the consultation process. The proposal would restrict evaluation of an action’s effects during the consultation process, requiring that the proposed action be considered a “but for” cause of the effects or activities and that the effects or activities be “reasonably certain to occur” to be considered in evaluating the potential impacts of a federal agency action. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,183, 35,191. Under the proposal, to be considered “reasonably certain to occur,” an activity must not be speculative, based on: (a) consideration of “past relevant experiences,” (b) “[a]ny existing relevant plans,” and (c) “[a]ny remaining economic, administrative, and legal requirements necessary for the activity to go forward.” Id. at 35,193. The proposed rules apply this concept of “reasonable certainty” to all effects of the proposed action, including direct and interrelated or interdependent effects, whereas previously the “reasonable certainty” standard applied only to indirect and cumulative effects of the proposed action. Id. at 35,183-84, 35,189.

These changes are inconsistent with the ESA and applicable case law. Section 7(a)(2) is “[t]he heart of the ESA,” Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 495 (9th Cir. 2011), requiring federal agencies to “insure” that their actions are not likely to jeopardize listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of their habitat, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Section 7(b) requires action agencies to consult with the Services if any part of a proposed action “may affect any listed species or critical habitat.” Western Watersheds Project, 632 F.3d at 495. The “may affect” trigger for consultation is a “relatively low threshold[,]” allowing an agency to “avoid the consultation requirement only if it determines that its action will have ‘no effect’ on a listed species or critical habitat.” Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012). For agency actions that “may affect” listed species or critical habitat, the Services must evaluate, in a comprehensive biological opinion, the effects of all aspects of that action, including short-term and long-term effects, and site-specific and cumulative effects, when combined with the adverse effects on the species and habitat that are already included as part of the environmental baseline.46 The scope of that evaluation in a

46 See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 878 F.3d 725, 737-38 (9th Cir. 2017); Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628 F.3d 513, 521-24 (9th Cir. 2010); Miccosukee Tribe, 566
biological opinion directly affects the determination of whether the action is likely to cause jeopardy or adverse modification of critical habitat, and whether “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the action will be required, as well as the type and extent of “reasonable and prudent measures” that will be required to mitigate the adverse effects of the action. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A), (b)(4); see Wild Fish Conservancy, 628 F.3d at 522 (“The delineation of the scope of an action can have a determinative effect on the ability of a biological opinion fully to describe the impact of the action on the viability of the threatened species . . .”).

Contrary to these statutory requirements, the proposed changes to the definition of “effects of the action” would arbitrarily limit the scope of the section 7 analysis to effects for which the federal agency action was a “but for” cause and those that are deemed “reasonably certain to occur” based on a variety of non-biological factors. For example, the numerous non-biological “reasonable certainty” factors and limitations in new section 402.17 would allow arbitrary exclusion of certain effects—that are admittedly caused by the proposed action—from the section 7 effects analysis, based on almost any conceivable rationale. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,189. In addition, these changes would allow federal action agencies and the Services to narrowly define the scope of the proposed action and its effects and to conduct a piecemeal, limited evaluation of the action’s adverse effects on listed species and critical habitat, thus ignoring many of the action’s true impacts, contrary to the ESA and governing case law.

These “reasonable certainty” factors also would give the Services leeway to ignore agency actions’ contributions to climate change and resulting effects. As discussed supra in Section II.A.ii., it is certain that climate change will increasingly affect species conservation even though the precise extent of the impact may at times be difficult to predict with certainty. Thus, the proposed regulations, like the biological opinion invalidated in National Wildlife Federation, amount “to little more than an analytical slight [sic] of hand” that will enable federal action agencies and the Services to “manipulat[e] the variables to achieve a ‘no jeopardy’ finding.” 524 F.3d at 933. Indeed, the proposal not only would enable such manipulation, but also would officially sanction it and render it common practice, contrary to the statutory commands of section 7. Moreover, the proposed “reasonable certainty” factors run counter to the ESA’s requirement that the Services must use the “best available science” in conducting consultations. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The Services must make decisions based on the best scientific information available at the time the decision is made rather than defer analysis or decisions simply because either the information or outcome is not “reasonably certain.” See Conner, 848 F.2d at 1453-54.

In addition, the Services have failed to adequately explain or justify these proposed changes. Once again, the Services provide only the empty excuse that these changes are intended to simplify the definition, “increase consistency and avoid confusion and speculation,” and codify the existing practice in conducting section 7 consultations. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,183. But the Services do not identify any inconsistency or confusion that needs to be resolved or explain how the proposed changes would resolve those problems. In fact, the proposed changes

F.3d at 1270; National Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 928-30, 934-35; Pacific Coast II, 426 F.3d at 1090-95; Pacific Coast I, 265 F.3d at 1036-38; Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1988).
are likely to lead to increased confusion, inconsistency, and uncertainty as to what effects can and cannot be considered during consultation.

Furthermore, the assertion that the “reasonable certainty” standard already was part of its existing practice in conducting section 7 consultations is plainly incorrect. See 83 Fed. Reg. 35,183-84 (citing 80 Fed. Reg. 26,832, 26,837 (May 15, 2015)). The cited discussion from the 2015 rule change does not pertain to the scope of analysis of the effects of a proposed federal action in a biological opinion. Rather, the discussion applies only to the determination whether incidental take is “reasonably certain to occur” and must be accounted for in an incidental-take statement accompanying the biological opinion under section 7(b)(4). See 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,836-37. In sum, rather than resolving uncertainty or codifying current practice, the proposed changes would severely limit the effects of federal action considered in the section 7 consultation process, contrary to the plain language and purposes of section 7 and the ESA as a whole.

“Environmental Baseline.” The Services next propose to separate out the concept of the “environmental baseline” currently embedded in the definition of “effects of the action” into a separate definition in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. While the Services are not now proposing any specific change to the “environmental baseline” concept, they request comment on possibly revising the definition of “environmental baseline” to mean “the state of the world absent the action under review,” including “the past, present[,] and ongoing impacts of all past and ongoing Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action area . . . .” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,184 (emphasis added). As discussed below, this suggested change raises the concern that the Services or federal action agencies will subsume ongoing actions or conditions into the baseline, thereby failing to account for the full extent of impacts of those actions and artificially inflating the baseline, thus inappropriately minimizing an action’s adverse impacts on listed species and critical habitat, once again contrary to section 7.

The courts have made clear that section 7 of the ESA applies to federal agency actions over which an agency has discretionary involvement or control. National Assn. of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 667-68 (2007). The courts have expressly held that “agency action” must be construed broadly and includes ongoing federal agency actions or actions over which the agency otherwise has discretionary involvement or control. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “it is clear Congress foresaw that § 7 would, on occasion, require agencies to alter ongoing projects in order to fulfill the goals of the Act.” Hill, 437 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added).

Courts also have expressly held that where there is a federal agency action that meets the section 7 consultation trigger, the Services cannot minimize the effects of that action by subsuming an ongoing federal agency action within the environmental baseline. For example, in National Wildlife Federation, NMFS incorporated ongoing impacts of dam operation into the environmental baseline in a biological opinion on the ground that ongoing operations were “non-

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47 See, e.g., Cottonwood Env'tl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1086-88 (9th Cir. 2015); Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1020; Wild Fish Conservancy, 628 F.3d at 521-22, 524; Turtle Island Restoration Network v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2003); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998); Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1994); Conner, 848 F.2d at 1453.
discretionary.” 524 F.3d at 928-33. The court invalidated the biological opinion, holding that the ESA does not permit agencies to “ignore potential jeopardy risks by labeling parts of an action non-discretionary.” Id. at 928. Accordingly, NMFS may not sweep “so-called ‘nondiscretionary’ operations into the environmental baseline, thereby excluding them from the requisite ESA jeopardy analysis.” Id. at 929; accord San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Auth., 747 F.3d at 639-40. The D.C. Circuit recently followed suit, holding that the FWS “acted arbitrarily in establishing the environmental baseline without considering the degradation to the environment caused by” the ongoing operation of a hydropower project. American Rivers v. FERC, 895 F.3d 32, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

Against this weight of authority, the Services attempt to cite as support for their potential change “complexities” that they claim have arisen in consultations on ongoing agency actions, such as: “if an ongoing action is changed, is the incremental change in the ongoing action the only focus of the consultation or is the entire action or some other subset reviewed,” and “is the effects analysis different if the ongoing action has never been the subject of consultation as compared to if there is a current biological opinion for the ongoing action,” among other questions. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,184. As discussed above, however, these questions have already been answered by controlling case law: the “effects of the action” include all effects of an ongoing federal agency action over which the agency has discretionary involvement or control—regardless of whether consultation was previously conducted on the action—added to the effects on the species and habitat already occurring as part of the environmental baseline but which are not in any way caused by the federal agency action, including its ongoing effects. In sum, the Services’ proposed incorporation of ongoing federal agency actions into the “environmental baseline” runs afoul of established law.

ii. Exemptions from the Consultation Requirement.

Although not included in the proposed rules, the Services seek comment on revising 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 to eliminate the consultation requirement when the Federal agency does not anticipate take, and the action either: (1) will not affect listed species or critical habitat; (2) will have effects that are “manifested through global processes” and cannot be reliably predicted or measured, or would have “an extremely small and insignificant” or “remote” impact on species or critical habitat; or (3) will have impacts that “are either wholly beneficial or are not capable of being measured or detected in a manner that permits meaningful evaluation.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,185. The Services again state that the purpose of this new suite of “no-consultation” criteria is “to increase efficiency in implementing section 7(a)(2) consultations,” claiming that “such actions are far removed from any potential for jeopardy or destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat . . . .” Id. The Services also seek comment on whether the scope of consultation under section 7(a)(2) should be limited solely to the “activities, areas, and effects within the jurisdictional control and responsibility of the regulatory agency.” Id.

48 See also Turtle Island Restoration Network, 878 F.3d at 737-38 (“[B]aseline conditions must be factored into the jeopardy analysis, cumulatively with the entirety of agency actions. The relevant inquiry is therefore whether the ‘action effects, when added to the underlying baseline conditions,’ are such that they would cause jeopardy.”); Wild Fish Conservancy, 628 F.3d at 522-29 (FWS required to analyze the effects of ongoing operation of a fish hatchery on the endangered bull trout, and had not adequately justified analyzing the ongoing action for only a five-year period).
The foregoing proposals are patently inconsistent with the ESA for multiple reasons. First, they would significantly limit the circumstances under which a federal agency would be required to consult with the Services on a proposed federal action, contrary to the plain language and intent of section 7. As already discussed, the “may affect” standard in section 7(b) establishes a “low threshold” for the consultation requirement and requires the Services to examine and account for all aspects of the federal agency action, including beneficial effects and effects that cannot be predicted with certainty. Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1027 (citing California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, “[a]n agency may avoid the consultation requirement only if it determines that its action will have ‘no effect’ on a listed species or critical habitat.” Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1027 (emphasis added).

The Services have no authority to create by regulation new exemptions from federal agencies’ mandatory duties under section 7. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173, 188 (section 7 “admits of no exception”); Conner, 848 F.2d at 1455 (“Appellants ask us, in essence, to carve out a judicial exception to ESA’s clear mandate that a comprehensive biological opinion . . . be completed before initiation of the agency action . . . . We reject this invitation to amend the ESA. That is the role of Congress, not the courts.”). What is more, in proposing to exempt from consultation proposed actions that will have effects “manifested through global processes,” the Services again arbitrarily attempt to create a “climate change” exception to yet another bedrock program of the ESA, in this case when federal agencies are contributing to the problem. But, as already discussed, see supra Section II.A.ii., iv., and v., where climate change is a threat, it is even more important that the ESA’s species protections be fully implemented and enforced to ensure species recovery and conservation.

Second, the Services cannot adequately justify or explain this proposed reversal of their longstanding interpretation of section 7. In promulgating the current version of the section 7 regulations in 1986, the Services explained that “[a]ny possible effect, whether beneficial, benign, adverse[,] or of an undetermined character,” triggers the section 7 consultation requirement. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,949 (June 3, 1986). The Services then stated that this “threshold for formal consultation must be set sufficiently low to allow Federal agencies to satisfy their duty to ‘insure’ that their actions do not jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat as required under section 7. Id. (emphasis added). The Services’ fail to explain how their new proposal could possibly achieve that fundamental objective.

Third, the Services do not have authority to limit consultations solely to effects within the jurisdiction and authority of the federal action agency. See Native Ecosys. Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (agency must consider all areas that actually would be affected by proposed action and may not arbitrarily restrict its selection of “action area” to be considered). Rather, as discussed, section 7 requires federal agencies to initiate consultation on any federal agency action over which they have discretionary involvement or control, and to broadly examine all effects of that action. National Ass’n of Homebuilders, 551 U.S. at 668-69; 49 See also Conner, 848 F.2d at 1453-55 (having “incomplete information about post-leasing activities does not excuse the failure to comply with the statutory requirement of a comprehensive biological opinion using the best information available.”); accord Wild Fish Conservancy, 628 F.3d at 525.
The Services’ proposal thus would put federal agencies in the untenable position of either violating their section 7 obligations or demanding that the Services engage in consultation beyond that contemplated by their *ultra vires* regulations.

Finally, as discussed in connection with the proposed changes to 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) below, section 7 requires the Services to make independent biological determinations, based on their scientific and technical expertise, regarding the effects of proposed federal agency actions. *See Cal. ex rel. Lockyer*, 575 F.3d at 1018. However, the proposed revisions to 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 do not contain any requirement for federal agencies to obtain the Service’s written concurrence in federal agency determinations of “no effect,” “beneficial effect,” “insignificant effect,” or “immeasurable effect.” In sum, because the Services’ new “no consultation” criteria thus constitute an unlawful, arbitrary, and wholly unexplained reversal of their longstanding policy that is contrary to the ESA, they must be withdrawn. *Fox*, 556 U.S. at 515.

**iii. Weakening of Mitigation Requirements.**

The Services propose to add language to the end of the formal consultation provisions in 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) stating that “[m]easures included in the proposed action or a reasonable and prudent alternative that are intended to avoid, minimize, or offset the effects of an action are considered like other portions of the action and do not require any additional demonstration of specific binding plans or a clear, definite commitment of resources.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,187, 35,192. The Services admit that these proposed changes are designed to repudiate the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *National Wildlife Federation*, 524 F.3d 917, asserting that “[t]his judicially created standard is not required by the Act or the existing regulations.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,187. The Services claim that, rather, they must simply “assume that the [proposed federal] action will be implemented as proposed,” and that they are not required “to independently evaluate whether the proposed measures to avoid, minimize, or offset adverse effects will be implemented.” *Id.*

This proposed revision would contradict established case law, which clearly requires that federal agency mitigation commitments be incorporated into the proposed action and be binding and enforceable. 50 This requirement is necessary to ensure that the federal action agency satisfies its duties under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. If the federal action agency does not ensure that proposed mitigation measures included within the project description will be implemented, then the Services’ jeopardy and adverse modification findings and accompanying “reasonable and prudent alternatives” will be based on a project description that may or may not be accurate, making section 7 essentially aspirational. Whether mitigation measures will in fact be implemented also will affect the level of likely incidental take for purposes of the section 7 incidental take statement and its accompanying “reasonable and prudent measures.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). Finally, enforceability of mitigation is important to establish measurable triggers for re-initiation of consultation and to ensure federal agency compliance with the terms and conditions of incidental take statements and other provisions of biological opinions. *See Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 698 F.3d 1101, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2012).

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50 *See Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 698 F.3d 1101, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012); *Rock Creek All. v. FWS*, 663 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 2011); *National Wildlife Fed’n*, 524 F.3d at 935-36; *Selkirk Conservation All. v. Forsgren*, 336 F.3d 944, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2003).
iv. Diminishing the Service’s Role in Consultation.

The Services also propose to create a new consultation procedure in 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) that would allow the Services to adopt, as their own biological opinions, all or part of a federal action agency’s biological analyses that are submitted upon its initiation of formal consultation. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,187-88, 35,192. The Services state that the purpose of this alternative process “is to bring the information and expertise of both the Federal agency and the Service (and any applicant) into the resulting initiation package to facilitate a more efficient and effective consultation process.” Id. at 35,188. These provisions are inappropriate and unlawful because only the Services, and not the federal action agency, have the requisite biological expertise, and the Services are statutorily required to perform the biological analysis of the effects of the action. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). As the courts have repeatedly stated, “[t]he purpose of the consultation procedure is to allow either [NMFS] or the FWS to determine whether the federal action is likely to jeopardize the survival of a protected species or result in the destruction of its critical habitat, and if so, to identify reasonable and prudent alternatives that will avoid the action’s unfavorable impacts.” Turtle Island Restoration Network, 340 F.3d at 974 (emphasis added).51 Contrary to that purpose, the proposed revisions would enable the Services merely to “rubber stamp” an action agency’s analysis as its own, without applying their expertise and performing the required independent, science-based analysis.52


“Programmatic Consultations.” The proposal also would add a new definition of “programmatic consultation” to 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 to provide for “a consultation addressing an agency’s multiple actions on a program, region or other basis,” including but not limited to: (1) “[m]ultiple, similar frequently occurring or routine actions expected to be implemented in particular geographic areas,” and (2) “[a] proposed program, plan, policy, or regulation providing a framework for future actions.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,191-92; see also id. at 35,184-85

Although programmatic consultation may be appropriate in some cases, the proposed changes would authorize such consultations in circumstances where it is not appropriate. For example, when used for multiple different projects occurring in the same region, the site-specific impacts of individual proposed federal agency actions on listed species and critical habitat would not be separately addressed or adequately considered. But section 7 requires that consultations on large-scale and programmatic actions may not ignore or minimize the site-specific and short-term effects of these actions, see, e.g., Pacific Coast II, 426 F.3d at 1091-95; Pacific Coast I, 265

51 See also Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 847 F.3d 1075, 1084 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Consultation allows agencies to draw on the expertise of wildlife agencies.”); Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1020 (“[T]he purpose of consultation is to obtain the expert opinion of wildlife agencies . . . .”).

52 The proposal to allow the Services to adopt their own existing analysis in a permit issued pursuant to ESA section 10(a) could satisfy the Services’ obligation under section 7, but only to the extent these prior analyses are relevant to the scope of section 7 consultation. For example, where the analysis in a 10(a) permit does not address the effect on a listed species, critical habitat, or listed plants that may be present in a permit area, it must be supplemented during consultation to fully assess those impacts as required by section 7.
F.3d at 1035-38, and programmatic biological opinions are permissible only when the analysis is “supplemented by later project-specific environmental analysis,” *Gifford Pinchot Task Force*, 378 F.3d at 1068.

The Services also inappropriately state that programmatic consultation can be used in an informal consultation. It is difficult to conceive how a programmatic consultation analyzing the effects of multiple projects over a large area or a single large project occurring on a broad geographic scale could ever possibly meet the “not likely to adversely affect” requirement for informal consultation. *See* 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a). As with other proposals, this proposed change ignores the significant direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of federal agency actions and the Services’ and federal agencies’ statutory duties to comprehensively analyze those effects.53

**“Expedited Consultations.”** The proposed revisions further would add a new 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(l) authorizing “expedited consultations” as an “optional formal consultation process that a Federal agency and the Service may enter into upon mutual agreement.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,192-93; *see also id.* at 35,188. According to the Services, the determination whether expedited consultation is appropriate will be based on “the nature, size[, and] scope of the action or its anticipated effects on listed species or critical habitat and other relevant factors.” *Id.* at 35,193.

This expedited consultation procedure has many of the same flaws as excessive reliance on programmatic consultation. The proposed language affords the Services unduly broad discretion and does not ensure that expedited consultations will sufficiently and comprehensively evaluate the effects of federal actions, contrary to the requirements of section 7. The proposal also is vague and open-ended in identifying what actions may be subject to expedited consultation and offers no criteria or process to guide expedited consultation. The Services instead broadly state that “[t]his consultation process is proposed to provide an efficient means to complete formal consultation on projects ranging from those that have a minimal impact, to those projects with a potentially broad range of effects that are known and predictable, but that are unlikely to cause jeopardy or destruction or adverse modification.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,188 (emphasis added). The Services provide no justification for their assumption that such projects are “unlikely to cause jeopardy or adverse modification” and also provide only one example of an action that might be subject to expedited consultation—conservation actions designed primarily to benefit the species—ignoring the fact that federal restoration and recovery actions already are subject to a streamlined consultation process.54

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53 The problems with this proposal are compounded by the Services’ statement that federal agencies and applicants can “propose measures to avoid, minimize, and/or offset effects to listed species and/or designated critical habitat as part of their proposed action” on a broad, programmatic scale. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,184-85. But as discussed above, under the proposed amendments to 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8), these proposals would not need to be enforceable, thereby exponentially increasing the risks to listed species and critical habitat if such measures are not implemented and cannot be enforced on a programmatic level.

Importantly, the Services admit that “expedited consultations are a new process and likely [will] involve proposed actions that would otherwise go through the regular formal consultation process and require an incidental take statement.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,188 (emphasis added). In other words, expedited consultations would, under the Services’ new proposal, be available for actions that are “likely to adversely affect” listed species or designated critical habitat and reasonably likely to result in incidental take. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13(a), 402.14(a); 80 Fed. Reg. 26,832 (May 11, 2015). Thus, the Services’ statement that actions subject to the new expedited consultation procedure will be “unlikely to cause jeopardy or destruction or adverse modification” is plainly insupportable and contradicted by their own statements. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,188. Moreover, the Services’ statements, and the vague criteria for when expedited consultation is appropriate, raise the suspicion that expedited consultation will become the norm rather than the exception, undermining the rigor and completeness of the normal consultation process.

In sum, the expedited consultation procedure allows for an end-run around some of the most important and fundamental requirements of the ESA: to comprehensively analyze and mitigate the effects of federal agency actions on listed species and their critical habitat. And whether a particular action is subject to the expedited consultation procedure will be based solely on an arbitrary determination by the Services and the federal action agency following no ascertainable criteria, without any public review and oversight. The unlawful and arbitrary proposal should be abandoned.


The Services propose to add new 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b), eliminating the requirement to reinitiate consultation on an approved Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) or U.S. Forest Service (“Forest Service”) land and resource management plan (“management plan”) upon the listing of a new species or designation of new critical habitat in the plan area, “provided that any authorized actions that may affect the newly listed species or designated critical habitat will be addressed through a separate action-specific consultation.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,193; see also id. at 35,188-89. The Services claim that “[r]equiring reinitiation on these completed plans based on newly listed species or critical habitat often results in impractical and disruptive burdens,” and “results in little benefit to the newly listed species or critical habitat . . . .” Id. at 35,189.

This proposed change would drive a large hole in existing reinitiation requirements, directly contrary to the case law rejecting this very concept. In Pacific Rivers Council, 30 F.3d at 1053, the Ninth Circuit expressly held that management plans “have an ongoing and long-lasting effect even after adoption . . . and represent ongoing agency action.” The Court expressly rejected the Forest Service’s argument, identical to the Services’ contention in support of the proposed rule change here, that it was not required to reinitiate consultation on a management plan when a new species was listed in the plan area. Id. at 1055. Similarly, the Forest Service was required to reinitiate consultation on a management plan where the FWS subsequently had revised a previous critical habitat designation to include National Forest land. Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr., 789 F.3d at 1086-88 (“[R]equiring reinitiation in these circumstances comports with the ESA’s statutory command that agencies consult to ensure the ‘continued existence’ of
listed species.” (emphasis in original). The court held that the “new [critical habitat] protections triggered new obligations” and the Forest Service could not “evade its obligations by relying on an analysis it completed before the protections were put in place.” Id. at 1088.

Moreover, as previously discussed, other cases likewise make clear that, in general, section 7 consultation is required for any action over which the federal agency retains discretionary involvement or control to protect listed species and habitat. Turtle Island Restoration Network, 340 F.3d at 974; see National Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 926-29 (obligation to consider effects of ongoing operations of dam, where Congress specified broad goals, but agency retained significant discretion as to how to achieve those goals). The Services do not and cannot contend that the BLM and the Forest Service do not retain sufficient discretionary involvement, authority, or control over federal management plans to institute additional protections for species and habitat upon a new listing or critical habitat designation. Consequently, the Services’ explanation of the rationale for this proposed change is contrary to law.

The Services also claim that reinitiation of consultation on federal management plans “does little to further” the overall goals of the ESA, but fail to explain why or provide any detail. In addition, the Services erroneously allege—without any justification—that management plans have “no immediate on-the-ground effects” and that consultation need only be conducted on individual federal agency actions proceeding under these plans. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,189. This assertion is directly contrary to case law and common sense and ignores the widespread and cumulative effects of these broad-based federal agency actions. Management plans contain substantive criteria governing the nature and extent of permissible land uses and impacts to species and habitat on a large scale, on a programmatic and ongoing basis. See Pacific Rivers Council, 30 F.3d at 1051-53, 1055 (management plans “have an ongoing and long-lasting effect even after adoption” and set forth criteria for timber harvesting, grazing, road building, and other activities on federal lands); Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 2007) (approving of the statement in Pacific Rivers Council that management plans “may have ‘an ongoing and long-lasting effect’ on the forest”). Failing to revisit them when new imperiled species and their habitat are identified would render those plans outdated and risk species’ recovery or survival.

In sum, this proposal fails to meet the Services’ or federal action agencies’ section 7 obligations and is also arbitrary and capricious because the Services have failed to offer any reasonable justification for the exemption.

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The 4(d) Rule proposes to remove, going forward, the “blanket” extension to threatened species of all protections afforded to endangered plants and animals under the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)-(2); 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,175, 35,177-78. The proposed rule abandons FWS’s longstanding policy and practice of providing default protections to all newly listed threatened species, subject only to exceptions carved out by special rule as necessary on a species-by-
species basis. Instead, FWS intends to issue species-specific rules only as it deems necessary to protect threatened species, and specifically preserves its discretion to delay promulgation of those protections for an indefinite period, “at any time after the final listing or reclassification determination.” Id. at 35,175. The proposal is a dramatic departure from current FWS practice and contrary to the ESA’s conservation purpose and precautionary policy approach because it inevitably will leave threatened species without protections necessary to promote recovery and survival, instead increasing the threat that they will become endangered. FWS provide no sound reason for this abrupt policy change, which would strain already overburdened agency resources and lead to litigation challenges.

First, the proposal contravenes the ESA’s policy of “institutionalized caution” because it inevitably will result in FWS neglecting to provide adequate protections to threatened species. Hill, 437 U.S. at 178, 194. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the ESA’s core purpose is “to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” Id. at 184. Given the agency’s history of listing backlogs and its increasingly limited budget, FWS does not have the capacity or resources to promulgate species-specific 4(d) rules at the outset for individual threatened species at the level that would be necessary to match the protection that is currently in place with the blanket 4(d) rule. Instead, it is highly likely that the FWS will rarely promulgate special rules extending the take prohibition or other protections to newly listed or reclassified threatened species. And even where species-specific rules are adopted, as FWS appears to anticipate, there will likely be a significant delay during which no protections would be in place. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,175.

Without interim protections, newly listed or reclassified threatened species would face significant risk of harm, and parties that put threatened species in danger would be free from consequences and undeterred. Either circumstance thus would upend the precautionary approach enshrined in the ESA, which the FWS has implemented for decades by instituting default protections for threatened species to keep them from sliding toward endangerment and extinction.

56 See GAO Listing Deadline Litigation Report, supra note 27, at 5-18 (reporting that 141 lawsuits involving 1,441 species were filed from fiscal year 2005 through 2015 alleging that FWS and NMFS failed to take actions within deadlines mandated by ESA section 4, most of which involved missed deadlines to act on petitions to list species); Benjamin Jesup, Endless War or End This War? The History of Deadline Litigation Under Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act and the Multi-District Litigation Settlements, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 327, 348-51 (2013).
58 Indeed, as discussed supra in Section II.A.i., the Services’ proposed introduction of economic impact analysis into species listing decisions, if adopted and finalized, would further burden limited FWS resources.
while details of specially tailored rules are worked out. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 178, 194; Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698-99. Against this clear statutory purpose, FWS cannot fall back on its unsupported claim that the proposed change will provide “meaning to the statutory distinction between ‘endangered species’ and ‘threatened species.’” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,175. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit already has rejected arguments that the blanket rule impermissibly blurs the statutory distinction between endangered and threatened species. See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmntys. for a Greater Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Second, the 4(d) Rule is arbitrary and capricious because FWS fails to analyze important aspects of the problem and provides no reasoned justification for its proposal. As an initial matter, the 4(d) Rule lacks any acknowledgement or discussion of FWS resource constraints or the increased workload and exacerbated delay that would be associated with conducting species-by-species assessments and promulgating special rules necessary to adequately protect all newly listed threatened animals or plants in the absence of the blanket take prohibition. The agency has thus “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem”—one that will in all likelihood undermine the ESA’s mission and result in harm to imperiled species. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. And where FWS declines to promulgate or delays special rules to protect newly listed threatened species, the agency inevitably will face lawsuits challenging the inaction or delay, further burdening agency resources.

For the same reason, FWS cannot resort to its stated intent to align FWS practices with that of NMFS, which does not by default extend endangered species protections to threatened species but instead only promulgates species-specific rules for threatened species. 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,175. The agency fails to appreciate or even acknowledge that there are many reasons why FWS should employ a different rule than its sister agency. NMFS has jurisdiction over, and manages fewer than, one hundred marine species listed as threatened or endangered in the U.S. 59 By contrast, FWS manages more than 1,660 ESA-listed species in the U.S. 60 And yet the resources available to NMFS for promulgating and implementing special rules for each threatened species vastly exceed those of FWS. For example, for the fiscal year 2017, NMFS’s annual budget for managing 159 U.S. and foreign ESA-listed species was $182 million, compared to FWS’s budget of $234 million to manage more than 2,100 U.S. and foreign ESA-listed species. 61 While NMFS may have the capacity and resources to promulgate species-specific rules at the outset, FWS indisputably does not.

Nor does FWS provide any reasoned explanation or justification for abandoning the section 4(d) blanket protections with special rules carving out exceptions, a policy FWS itself

59 See Endangered Species Conservation, NOAA FISHERIES
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/endangered-species-conservation (NMFS has jurisdiction over a total of 163 ESA-listed species, 66 of which are foreign species) (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).

60 Environmental Conservation Online System, Listed Species Summary. FWS,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reportsibox-score-report (FWS has jurisdiction over a total of 2,344 ESA-listed species, 683 of which are foreign species) (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).

acknowledges not only is reasonable, but has also been effective and successful. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,175. Indeed, the 4(d) Rule notes FWS’s years of experience developing species-specific special rules under its current policy and the many benefits provided by this flexible yet protective approach. Id. The agency perversely attempts to invoke the benefits of species-specific rules to justify its wholesale elimination of the blanket take prohibition. Id. But those benefits simply have no bearing on the wisdom of abolishing protections for all newly listed species while those species-specific rules are being developed, nor do they provide a “good reason” for upending forty years of agency policy and practice. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515. The agency fails to explain how its proposal comports the ESA’s mandates and purpose and adequately protects threatened species before species-specific rules are developed. Id.

For all the above reasons, FWS should withdraw the proposed 4(d) Rule. Should the agency proceed with this illegal and ill-advised revision, however, any final rule must include a mandatory deadline, no later than 180 days following any final listing or reclassification for FWS to promulgate all necessary protections in a species-specific special rule. Without a mandatory timeframe, FWS would have unfettered discretion to promulgate species-specific rules “at any time after the final listing or reclassification determination,” 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,175, again departing from the ESA’s purpose and clear directive that FWS use its resources and authority to conserve threatened species, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), (c), 1533(d).

III. The Proposed Rules Must Be Analyzed Under NEPA.

The Services have a duty under NEPA to analyze the significant effects of the Proposed Rules, and to circulate the analysis for public review and comment. But instead of performing the required analysis, the Services merely invite public comment on whether NEPA applies. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 35,177, 35,191, 35,200. As discussed below, the Proposed Rules constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and they are not subject to a categorical exclusion. As such, the Services were required to request comments on the appropriate scope of environmental review and then prepare, and notice for public comment, an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) analyzing the Proposed Rules’ potential impacts before, or in tandem with, their publication. The Proposed Rules thus violate NEPA and must be withdrawn. At the very least, the Services must suspend rulemaking for the Proposed Rules, request NEPA scoping comments, and prepare an EIS.

A. The Services Are Required to Prepare an EIS for the Proposed Rules.

The Agencies have failed to comply with their statutory duty to publish an EIS. NEPA is the “basic national charter for protection of the environment,” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a), enacted in recognition of “the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment,” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). The fundamental purposes of the statute are to ensure that “environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before

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63 See also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A)-(B) (timeframes for FWS action on ESA listing petitions).
decisions are made and before actions are taken,” and that “public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.” *Id.* § 1500.1(b)-(c). NEPA thus requires agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of their actions before deciding whether and how to proceed. *Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 803 F.3d 31, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Agencies must prepare an EIS for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), including where “substantial questions are raised as to whether a project may cause significant environmental impacts,” *Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber*, 767 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2014).

The Services plainly violated their NEPA obligations here. As an initial matter, it is the Services’ obligation to perform the required assessment of whether an EIS is required, and they cannot shirk that duty or delegate it to the public by requesting that stakeholders commenting on the Proposed Rules explain why they do, or do not, require an EIS. In any event, there can be no doubt that the Proposed Rules constitute a “major federal action” requiring the preparation of an EIS. The Council on Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations provide, and numerous courts have confirmed, that a “major federal action” includes “new or revised agency rules [and] regulations.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a).

And it is likewise clear that the Proposed Rules will significantly affect the environment. NEPA regulations require that both the context and the intensity of an action be considered in determining whether an action may significantly affect the environment, including “[t]he degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. The presence of just “one of these factors may be sufficient to require the preparation of an EIS in appropriate circumstances.” *Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 402 F.3d 846, 865 (9th Cir. 2005).

As discussed above, the Proposed Rules, if adopted, are likely to cause numerous and profound harms to imperiled species. For example, the Proposed Rules would limit the designation of critical habitat; result in fewer listings of—and significantly less protection for—threatened species; increase the likelihood that species will be delisted; limit the scope of section 7 consultations; and limit the circumstances under which the Services impose measures to reduce the impacts of federal actions on listed species, among other adverse impacts on imperiled species and their habitat. Thus, the Services thus must prepare an EIS for the Proposed Rules.

What is more, the Services should already have done so. The NEPA regulations make clear that “[a]gencies shall integrate the NEPA process with other planning *at the earliest possible time* to insure [sic] that planning and decisions reflect environmental values, to avoid delays later in the process, and to head off potential conflicts.” 40 C.F.R § 1501.2 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has explained, an EIS “is the outward sign that environmental

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values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions. If environmental concerns are not interwoven into the fabric of agency planning, the ‘action-forcing’ characteristics of [NEPA] would be lost.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1979). Thus federal agencies must have evaluated the environmental consequences of an action when they propose to undertake a qualifying major federal action, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 & n.15 (1976), and certainly “prior to commitment to any actions which might affect the quality of the human environment,” Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (EIS must be prepared “as close as possible to the time the agency is developing . . . a proposal . . . so that preparation can be completed in time for the final statement to be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal”); 1508.23 (defining “proposal” stage at which agency “is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative means of accomplishing [its] goal”).65 “If any ‘significant’ environmental impacts might result from the proposed agency action then an EIS must be prepared before the action is taken.” Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1415.

Here, the Services should have followed NEPA’s requirements to prepare a draft EIS for the Proposed Rules well before—or at the latest, at the same time as—publishing the Proposed Rules on July 25, 2018, to weave thorough understanding of environmental consequences into the planning process. By failing to publish an EIS before the close of the comment period, the Services have unlawfully foreclosed the opportunity for the public to understand and provide important feedback on the Proposed Rules’ environmental impacts. Because the Services published the Proposed Rules in violation of NEPA, they must be withdrawn. At the very least, the Services must suspend rulemaking on the Proposed Rules, request comments on the appropriate scope of environmental review under NEPA, and prepare and circulate a comprehensive draft EIS for comment to afford the public a meaningful opportunity to participate in the Services’ development of any final rules.


The Proposed Rules are not eligible for a categorical exclusion under NEPA. Agencies may invoke a categorical exclusion only for “a category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and which have been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of [NEPA] regulations[].” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. No such circumstances are present here. FWS66 and NMFS67 have established categorical exclusions for policies and regulations of an administrative or procedural nature, none of which apply to the substantive, significant changes reflected in the

65 See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-06 (1976) (holding that, under § 102(2)(C) of NEPA, agency must have a final statement ready when it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action); Sierra Club, 803 F.3d at 37 (agencies must take a “hard look” at environmental consequences of their actions).
Proposed Rules. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit rejected a similar attempt to evade NEPA requirements in the context of National Forest planning, finding that replacement of substantive protections with a less-protective regulatory regime—as the Services are currently attempting to do with the Proposed Rules—qualifies as a major federal action that is not exempt from NEPA review. *California ex rel. Lockyer*, 575 F.3d at 1013-15.

*Even if* the Proposed Rules could otherwise qualify for coverage under the Services’ categorical exclusions (they do not), they would nonetheless present “extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect,” and thus be subject to NEPA’s full requirements in any event. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. To that end, the Services exempt from categorical exclusions any actions that, among other things: may significantly impact species listed, or proposed to be listed, under the ESA; have uncertain or potentially significant environmental effects or have unique or unknown environmental risks; violate a federal, state, local, or tribal law imposed for protection of the environment; or may have controversial environmental effects. See NOAA NEPA Handbook at 22; DOI Exclusions at 2-3. While only one of these factors need apply to the Proposed Rules to remove them from consideration for a categorical exclusion, plainly several of them do, as the Proposed Rules would have significant negative impacts on, among other things, newly listed threatened species and on all listed species’ critical habitat. Additionally, the Proposed Rules violate the ESA itself in numerous ways, as detailed above. Thus, no categorical exclusion may be applied to the Proposed Rules, and NEPA analysis is required.

For all the above reasons, the Proposed Rules violate NEPA and must be withdrawn. At the very least, the Services must suspend rulemaking and follow all NEPA requirements, including noticing and seeking public comment on the proper scope of environmental review, and preparing and circulating a draft EIS for public comment.
CONCLUSION

The Services’ proposed Rules each chip away at the ESA’s most important species protections, and together upend the ESA’s decades-long policy of “institutionalized caution” and risk significant harm to the precious species the Act serves to protect. The Listing Rule takes aim at the Services’ foundational species-listing and critical habitat designation decisions, infecting the Services’ decisions with expressly irrelevant economic impact information, and limiting the extent to which the Services can consider and respond to the most pressing threats to species extinction, like climate change. The Interagency Consultation Rule renders the Act’s core agency consultation program a sham, decreasing its frequency and diminishing its value by gutting its key definitions and substantive requirements. And the 4(d) Rule, with no sound explanation, altogether eliminates the take prohibition for newly listed threatened species, risking their existence while the Services work through their ever-present backlog. Given the Services’ disregard for these harms and failure to evaluate the Proposed Rules’ environmental damage, their promulgation would at once violate the ESA, the Administrative Procedure Act, and NEPA. As entities uniquely qualified to evaluate efforts to protect our nation’s natural resources, the States urge the Services to immediately abandon all three unlawful, arbitrary, and harmful Proposed Rules.

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