Kim Clijsters was the feel-good story of the 2009 U.S. Open. A former world #1, the 26-year-old Belgian had been retired for 2 years, during which time she had married and borne a child, when she surprised the tennis world by announcing her return in the summer of 2009. Entering the tournament as an unranked wildcard, Clijsters defeated Denmark’s Caroline Wozniacki in straight sets to become the first unseeded player ever to win the U.S. Open and the first mother to win a grand slam event in 30 years.

The match that made the headlines, however, was not the final. It was Clijsters’s semifinal contest against the #2 seed, Serena Williams. Straight off her victory at Wimbledon, Williams had powered through the women’s draw at the Open without losing a set; with the third-round defeat of #1 seed Darina Safina, she was the odds-on favorite to win her third grand slam tournament of the year. Instead, Williams lost the first set 4-6 and found herself serving to Clijsters at 5-6 in the second. Down 15-30, Williams’s first serve to the ad court was wide. On her second serve, the line judge called Williams for a foot fault, putting her down double-match point. At this, Williams exploded, walking over to the judge several times, gesticulating with her racket in an ominous manner, shouting, and threatening to do things with the ball that the lineswoman was bound to find unwelcome. Because Williams had already committed a code violation earlier in the match for racket abuse, this second code violation called forth a mandatory one-point penalty. That single point gave the match to Clijsters.

Williams has few defenders. Her outburst was further penalized with a $10,000 fine that, after many commentators bemoaned its inadequacy, was raised to $82,500 and supplemented with a two-year probation. But without condoning or excusing Williams’s
response to the foot fault call, I’m interested in a different question: whether the call should have been made at all. CBS color commentator and former tennis great John McEnroe thought not. As he remarked at the time: “you can’t call that there.” His point was not that the call was factually mistaken,¹ but rather that, even assuming arguendo that it was factually supportable, it was an inappropriate call to make at that point in the match: the lineswoman should have cut Williams a little slack. Many observers agreed. As another former tour professional put it, a foot fault “is something you just don’t call—not at that juncture of the match.”²

The McEnrovian position—that at least some rules of some sports should be enforced less strictly toward the end of close matches—is an endorsement of what might be termed “temporal variance.” It is highly controversial. Indeed, some people find it simply incredible that a call conceded to be correct at one time could be thought improper at another. As one letter writer to the New York Times objected: “To suggest that an official not call a penalty just because it happens during a critical point in a contest would be considered absurd in any sport. Tennis should be no exception.”³ On this view, which possibly resonates with a common understanding of what it means to follow “the rule of law,” rules of sports should be enforced with resolute temporal invariance.

Now, perhaps McEnroe was wrong about the Williams foot fault. But the premise of the letter propounding the competing view—that participants and fans of any other sport would reject temporal variance decisively—is demonstrably false. Indeed, one letter appearing in Sports Illustrated objected to the disparity of attention focused on Williams as compared to U.S. Open officials, precisely on the grounds that “[r]eferees for the NFL, NHL and NBA have generally agreed that in the final moments, games should be won or lost by the players and not the officials.”⁴ I am unsure just how general this supposed agreement is. But I’d warrant that most fans of professional basketball would affirm that contact that would constitute a foul through most of the game is frequently not called during the critical last few possessions of a

¹ The rule governing foot faults provides that, “During the service motion, the server shall not . . . touch the baseline or the court with either foot.” International Tennis Federation, Rule of Tennis 18.c. See also USTA Comment 18.3: “A player commits a foot fault if after the player’s feet are at rest but before the player strikes the ball, either foot touches . . . the court, including the baseline.”
close contest. Moreover, most fans I have spoken with believe this is not only how it is, but how it ought to be. In any event, precious few of those who disagree would contend that the status quo is absurd. So an insistence on rigid temporal invariance requires argument not just assertion.

Yet advocates of temporal variance ought not to be too smug either. For while the negative import of temporal variance is clear—namely, the denial of categorical temporal invariance—its positive import is anything but. Surely those who believe that the foot fault ought not to have been called against Serena Williams in her match against Kim Clijsters mean implicitly to invoke a principle broader than “don’t call foot faults in the twelfth game of the second set of semi-final matches in grand slam tournaments.” But how much broader? Is the governing principle that all rules of all sports should be enforced less rigorously toward the end of contests? Presumably not. Few proponents of temporal variance, I’d wager, would contend that pitchers should be awarded an extra inch or so around the plate in the ninth inning, or that a last-second touchdown pass should be called good if the receiver was only a little bit out of bounds. So even if categorical temporal invariance is too rigid, the contours and bases of optimal temporal variance remain to be argued for. That is the task of this paper.

2. THE GREATER AMBITION

Jurisprudences have long drawn on games and sports for illumination. 

Just what games and sports are, and whether the latter is a proper subclass of the former, are questions that I do not explore in this essay. Briefly, the Wittgensteinian teaching that games cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions was challenged some decades ago in a short, little-noticed book—Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia (1978)—that has recently won praise from such philosophers as Thomas Hurka and Simon Blackburn. I am skeptical that Suits’s effort succeeds. Be that as it may, I think John Tassioulas clearly right, as against Hurka and Suits, in insisting that not all sports are games. See Hurka & Tassioulas, Games and the Good, 80 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc’y Supp. Proceedings 217 (2006).
investigation into the insights that formal sports and municipal legal systems might offer up for students of the other.\footnote{Indeed, most legal writing on sports that does not pertain to sports law is intended more to entertain than to edify, the best known example of the genre being \textit{Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule}, 123 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1474 (1975).}

The lack of sustained jurisprudential attention to games and, especially, sports should surprise, for sports leagues do, rather plainly, constitute distinct legal systems. This should be apparent on the surface things—at least to non-Americans. While the American sports scene is dominated by three home-grown team sports—baseball, football, and basketball—all of which are governed by official “rule books,” the most popular global team sports like soccer, cricket, and rugby (both league and union) are all formally governed by “laws,” not “rules.” But the law-ness of sports systems is not merely superficial, for they exhibit such essential institutional features as legislatures, adjudicators, and the union of primary and secondary rules. We might reasonably have expected a discipline of “sports and law” to have arisen as a region of study belonging either to comparative law or to special jurisprudence.

To be sure, philosophy has spawned a subfield denominated philosophy of sport, actively represented by at least two societies (the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, and the British Philosophy of Sport Association) that publish two specialty journals (\textit{Journal of the Philosophy of Sport}, and \textit{Sport, Ethics, and Philosophy}). But the integrity of this discipline is unclear—one resource proclaims, apparently proudly, that it draws on aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of education, philosophy of law, philosophy of mind, philosophy of rules, philosophy of science, and social and political philosophy\footnote{\url{http://www.heacademy.ac.uk/assets/hlst/documents/resources/philosophy_ethics_sport.pdf}.}—inviting a reasonable worry that philosophy of sport might be about as coherent a field as “the law of the horse.”\footnote{See Frank H. Easterbrook, \textit{Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse}, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 207.} Moreover, even insofar as philosophy of sport encompasses the philosophy of law and “the philosophy of rules,” it has not apparently drawn interest from scholars actively engaged in legal philosophy.

I think that is unfortunate. Legal theorists, after all, might be thought to be the experts in the problematics of rule-governed social institutions. The grander ambition of this paper, accordingly, is to help spur the growth of sports and law, or of the philosophy of sports and law,
as fields worthy of somewhat more concerted theoretical attention. We might even say that this paper does double duty as a manifesto of sorts—not for slack, but for an enlarged program of jurisprudential inquiry.

Because this goal must strike some readers, and not only the more sports-phobic, as quixotic, perhaps I should note just some of the ways in which, as formal rule-governed practices, sports and law often pursue similar goals and confront many of the same challenges. For example, each domain must decide: to what extent to guide conduct by “formal” written norms as opposed to “informal” social norms, and, if the former, by rules or by standards; when to delegate discretion to the adjudicators (judges, juries, referees), and how best to constrain it; how to respond to the problem of epistemic uncertainty; whether to provide a right of appeal from unfavorable decisions and, if so, how to structure appellate review; how to conceptualize, deter, and sanction “cheating”; how to identify and rectify the gaps that inevitably arise between “the law in the books” and “the law in action”; when to tolerate ties and how to resolve them when they should not be tolerated; how to analyze and craft optimal sanctions; and so on, and so forth.

Finally, it’s not just that (municipal) legal systems and sports systems confront similar challenges. There are reasons to believe that jurisprudential attention to the sporting domain is particularly likely to contribute to our understanding of the phenomena and dynamics shared in common. First, because the rules and practices of sports have long been viewed as unworthy of serious philosophical and theoretical investigation, even low-hanging fruit has yet to be harvested. Second, as we will see, sports supply a vast range of examples for the generation of hypotheses and against which to test our theories. And third, our judgments and intuitions about certain practices—such as, to take the present topic, the propriety of context-variant enforcement of rules—are less likely in the sports courts than in the courts of law to be colored or tainted by possibly distracting substantive value commitments and preferences.
3. PRELIMINARIES AND OVERVIEW

My broader ambition notwithstanding, our narrow subject remains whether, and under what circumstances, rules of sports should be enforced with greater laxity toward the end of close contests. Before tackling that question, a few caveats.

First, I mean this “should” in a legal, not a moral, sense. We have noted the possibility that the lineswoman should have called a foot fault on Serena Williams just so long as she genuinely believed that Williams’s foot touched or went over the baseline before she hit the ball. Those who think otherwise could reach the contrary conclusion via varied routes. One possibility is to go outside the legal system. A proponent of this approach would agree that the rules of tennis concerning foot faults should be crafted and understood to be temporally invariant, but argue that “moral” or “all-things-considered” reasons dictated that the lineswoman should have refused to enforce the rule nonetheless. In directing our attention to the legal should, I mean to put that possibility aside. I am interested in the question of when the legal regime (here, the legal regime that makes up tennis) should itself provide for temporally variant enforcement of foot faults.

Second, I reject the conventionalist answer to this question. Some people think that what I claim to be a puzzle of genuine legal-philosophical interest is no puzzle at all. They say that the answer is that it all depends on the “norms,” “customs,” or “conventions” of the sport in question—a matter about which they may cheerfully admit to have no expert knowledge. But this won’t do. For we are seeking not simply a report of existing practices, but an account of what the practices should be. If, for example, it is the custom in some sport to afford competitors greater slack in certain game situations, the proponents of that custom should believe that it is backed by good reasons, and should hope to grasp what those good reasons are.

This is not to say that sport-specific norms and customs are irrelevant. Golf has a very different internal morality or ethos than does baseball. It might well be that these differences properly bear on optimal practices regarding temporal variance. All I mean is that we ought not to assume that the existing practices concerning temporal variance are conclusive regarding
what those practices should be, all things considered, even taking due account of relevant sport-specific features.

Third, when investigating the legal should, I intend at this early stage of the analysis to be agnostic among the variety of ways that an affirmative answer could be operationalized. Here, for instance, are five ways that temporal variance for foot faults could be realized: (1) the rules should be drafted expressly to specify the contexts in which touching the line or court does not constitute a foot fault; (2) the rules should be drafted expressly to specify the contexts in which touching the line or court, while an infraction, is unenforceable; (3) the rules should be drafted in a manner that does not expressly rule out context-variance, and should be interpreted and enforced in a context-variant manner; (4) the rules should be drafted and interpreted to confer discretion on the linesperson or umpire to adjudge infractions in a context-variant manner; or (5) the rules should be drafted and interpreted in a manner that denies context-variance to adjudicating the fact of infraction, but confers discretion on the linesperson or umpire whether to enforce the prescribed penalty for the infraction. I am not at the outset distinguishing among these (or other) routes to temporal variance. Rather, the question of whether foot faults should be enforced in a temporally variant manner is essentially whether any one of these (or other roughly similar) propositions is true. I interpret temporal invariance to be committed to the proposition that none is true. If we conclude in favor of temporal variance, we can then explore whether the arguments in favor of temporal variance also bias in favor of one or another ways to implement it. Put slightly differently, assuming arguendo that foot fault penalties should be enforced with temporal variance (and therefore that Williams should not have been penalized), I am not presently focused on which agent of the tennis system—the gamewrights, the line judge, the chair umpire, etc.—should have done differently than they, she, or he did.

Fourth, my analysis is pro tanto, not conclusive. Figuring out whether a practice of temporal variance is optimal for any given sport, all things considered, is devilishly hard—too many considerations enter the scene, implicating too many contestable empirical and evaluative premises. But perhaps we should content ourselves with a more modest ambition. Perhaps it is enough, at least at this early stage, to try merely to figure out whether “sense can
be made” of such a practice. Instead of trying to furnish a conclusive argument about just what the optimal practices should be, I will consider my efforts a success to the extent this essay explains how temporal variance could sensibly be—what can plausibly be said for it.

So much for preliminaries. Here is a short overview of the remainder of this essay.

Section 4 begins, not with tennis, but with other sports in which it has been alleged that a practice of temporal-variance is more secure—sports like football, hockey, and basketball most particularly. In each, whistles for minor physical contact toward the end of tight contests predictably elicit a cry from the stands: “Let ‘em play!” Though the plea is familiar, its rationale is not obvious. To be sure, the tighter the rules are enforced, the less physical contact there will be. And reasonable fans and participants may reasonably disagree about the level of physicality that makes the sport in question the best it can be. But however we—or the respective leagues—may answer that question, it is not self-evident why the optimal degree of laxity should be any different in crunch time during an NBA game, or throughout the NHL playoffs, than at any other time. It is not obvious, in other words, what can be said for “letting them play” at this particular time different in character or force from what can be said generally for “letting them play.”

No, it is not obvious. Still, this is a good place to start. I’m skeptical that many tennis fans could assert with confidence that tennis officials allow players to get away with a little more foot faulting toward the end of close matches than earlier. Maybe they do, but foot faults just aren’t called enough at any time to permit those without intimate knowledge of the sport to be sure what the patterns of enforcement are. Things are different with basketball. That basketball referees respect some measure of temporal variance seems clear enough to many hoops fans. Just maybe that’s because the case for temporal variance in basketball is unusually clear. If we can explain and justify slack in the calling of basketball fouls, we might be

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9 In the first round of the current NCAA basketball tournament, a referee called a lane violation against a player for New Mexico State with 18.6 seconds remaining and the Aggies down to Michigan State 69-67. The call gave the Spartans another free throw, which they made for a 3-point lead that they didn’t relinquish. Most commentators were withering in their criticism of the call. “You can’t have that be a deciding call in a close NCAA tournament game,” protested one. “That’s a horrendous, horrendous call,” objected another. “Lane violations happen on a majority of free throws and are almost never whistled. To call one with 18 seconds left in a two-point NCAA tournament game is unconscionable.”

in stronger position to assess whether temporal variance makes sense in tennis too.

Unfortunately, the analysis that I end up offering in support of temporal variance in basketball and football very possibly does not apply to foot faults. Section 5 explains why and proposes an alternative analysis that can help explain temporal variance in that context too. Section 6 is a short conclusion.

4. “LET ‘EM PLAY”: TEMPORAL VARIANCE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOULS

4.1 Of epistemic variance and substantive variance

I’m with those who believe that fouls are frequently called less strictly at the end of close games than otherwise. Even if true, this is hard to establish to the skeptical, for if this is the rule it is an example of “the rule in action,” not “the rule in the books.” Those portions of the official NBA rules that define and proscribe personal fouls do not provide that the kind or amount of contact required to constitute a foul varies according to contest-contextual features.

The most general statement of personal fouls provides that: “A player shall not hold, push, charge into, impede the progress of an opponent by extending a hand, forearm, leg or knee.” More particularly, “[c]ontact initiated by the defensive player guarding a player with the ball is not legal,” although “incidental contact with the hand against an offensive player shall be ignored if it does not affect the player’s speed, quickness, balance and/or rhythm.”

Contrast this formal invariance with the NBA’s remarkable varying standard of proof. As a comment on the administration and application of the rules directs: “there are times during a game where ‘degrees of certainty’ are necessary to determine a foul during physical contact. This practice may be necessary throughout the game with a higher degree implemented during impact times when the intensity is risen, especially nearing the end of a game.” Notice, then, that the formal rules that specify what constitutes a foul are context-invariant, but the standards of proof that determine whether a particular action will be adjudged to be of the forbidden type are context-variant.

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10 Rule 12B, Section I.
An example might help make the contrast clearer. Suppose Referee is very confident that a defensive player, say the Spurs’ Tony Parker, makes incidental contact with his hand against an offensive player, say the Miami Heat’s Dwyane Wade. But Referee is very uncertain whether that contact affected Wade’s speed, quickness, balance or rhythm. The “degree of certainty” rule seems to dictate something like the following: if Referee believes that it is only modestly more likely than not that Parker’s contact affected Wade’s speed, (1) he should call a foul through most of the game; and (2) he should not call a foul with the game tied in the last minute. In contrast, as far as the formal rules provide, were Referee fairly confident that Parker’s contact did affect Wade’s speed (by slowing him), but only to a slight degree, then he should enforce the foul no matter when it occurred. One way to think about our task is as an attempt to figure out what could be said for bringing greater symmetry to the rules—for allowing the referee the same discretion in determining how much contact (or how much impedence) constitutes a foul at different points during the game as he is granted in determining how confident he must be that the forbidden amount of contact was committed.

One answer invokes essentially aesthetic considerations: the referee’s whistle disrupts play, thereby reducing spectators’ enjoyment of the action. To be sure, disruption of play almost always incurs an aesthetic cost. But inasmuch as dramatic tension builds during crunch time, disruption of play during this time is especially costly.

There is something to this justification for temporal variance. It would seem to apply, though, only when play would continue uninterrupted but for the calling of a foul. However in some sports that arguably respect temporal variance play stops either way. It appears to me, for example, that football officials are often a little more reluctant to call defensive pass interference during crunch time even though an incompletion stops play just as surely as does a penalty flag. Because an aesthetic or dramatic preference that play not be disrupted would

12 And not only to me. Here is Sports Illustrated’s lead NFL columnist, Peter King, explaining his naming Browns cornerback Hank Poteat “goat of the week”:

with Cleveland holding a 37-31 lead and no time left on the clock in the fourth quarter, Detroit quarterback Stafford let fly with a rainbow to the end zone and Poteat tackled Calvin Johnson with the ball in the air. If Poteat had jostled Johnson, there’s little chance a flag would have been thrown. But a full-scale body slam to the ground ... That has to be called. Pass interference. With the extra play, Detroit threw a touchdown pass to win it. On the goat scale, Poteat’s play ranks about as high as you can go.
seem not to explain or justify temporal variance in the calling of fouls and the enforcement of penalties across the board, it might not provide the whole story even in basketball. So without denying that appreciation for dramatic excitement can help explain why officials should give the competitors somewhat greater slack during moments of high drama, it behooves us to explore the possibility of an alternative account too.

The alternative account that I’ll offer has two core components. First, expanding on the wisdom at the heart of the saying “no harm, no foul,” I argue that, insofar as penalties are designed to serve a compensatory or restitutionary function, we have reason not to impose them when they would work substantial overcompensation. Second, starting from the straightforward idea that the competitive cost imposed by any given outcome-affecting contest event—e.g., a score, an infraction of the rules that confers a competitive benefit on the rule-breaker, a penalty imposed by an official in response to an infraction, etc.—is not constant, but context-variant, I draw attention to one contextual factor of particular significance: time (or functional equivalents). In particular, I argue that the competitive impact of an event occurring during a close contest varies in inverse proportion to the distance remaining to the contest’s completion. If these two claims are correct, then it follows that a penalty of nominally constant magnitude that it is optimal to impose early in a contest may become suboptimal to impose later in that same contest.

4.2 On the Saying, “No harm, no foul”

Take a step back and consider the familiar saying “no harm, no foul.” (NHNF) We hear it, and use it, frequently. But what, exactly, does it mean?

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13 Many sports (e.g., basketball, football, hockey, soccer) are timed. In such sports, distance to contest completion is temporal. Unclocked sports (e.g., baseball, tennis, golf, volleyball) use mechanisms other than the passage of time to determine when a contest ends. In them, distance to completion must be measured in other units—in baseball, the units are outs that a team may incur or must secure; in tennis and volleyball, they are games that one must win or may lose; in golf, the units are holes. So these other means of measuring progress toward contest completion—outs, games, holes, etc.—are what I mean by “functional equivalents” of time. For simplicity of exposition, I will speak about time and temporality but with the understanding that I mean to invoke its functional equivalents when the context requires.
I’m not the first to ask this question. “Curious” posed it a few years ago on Yahoo Answers, eliciting this “best” response: “No one was hurt, nothing is wrong.” Or, as another reply offered: “it means that if noone [was] hurt in what you were doing, then what you have done is justified.”

Another website, “UsingEnglish.com,” elaborates: “There's no problem when no harm or damage is done, such as the time my sister-in-law stole the name we'd chosen for a boy and we both ended up having girls.”

This is bad ethics. Take the case of the thieving sister-in-law. Admittedly, I’m not entirely certain what is involved in stealing a name: despite what a surprising number of parents (perhaps teenage mothers especially) appear to believe, one can give a child a name already in use. Still, the scenario as I imagine it goes like this. One pregnant woman learns of the name that her pregnant sister (or sister-in-law) intends to give her baby, if it is a boy, and forms the intention to give it to her own baby, if a son, knowing that doing so would make the name no longer attractive, or significantly less attractive, to the couple who first had the idea—that is, who had the idea before she did. To be sure, that both women bore girls softens the sting of the betrayal. But the notion that the sister-in-law did nothing wrong, that “there’s no problem” with her conduct, seems plainly mistaken. We are told, after all, that she “stole” something (a name). That would seem to be wrongful if true. That the wrong proved harmless is fortunate, but not an erasure of the wrong itself.

The answers proposed by the Yahoo responders, though admirably concise, are even further off base. One can run afoul of standards of rightful or permissible behavior even without causing harm, which is why almost nobody thinks criminal punishment for unsuccessful complete attempts is unjust or morally impermissible (assuming that criminal punishment is not generally unjust or impermissible). So if “no harm, no foul” has any sensible meaning, we still haven’t identified just what it is.

True story: some evenings ago my wife and I returned home to find our house empty, but the front door unlocked. Our kids’ babysitter had taken them to the park and had forgotten

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16 Recall from *Freakonomics* the remarkable statistic that nearly 30 percent of black girls born each year in California are given a name that is given to no other California baby born that year. Steven D. Levitt & Stephen J. Dubner, *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything* 184 (2005).
to lock up. My wife remarked upon it when he returned. “Gosh,” he said embarrassment.
“You’re right. I just forgot. I’m really sorry.” “Well, it’s okay,” she assured him. “No harm, no foul.”

That, I think, is a sound usage. But my wife wasn’t saying that our babysitter’s lapse was
“justified,” nor was she denying that he had, in fact, done something wrong—an unintentional
wrong to be sure, but a wrong nonetheless. At least in my wife’s deployment of the phrase,
“no harm, no foul” is a performative—namely, an acceptance of an apology. Thus does another
web dictionary define the phrase: “no problem, it's cool. Usually used in response to
someone's apology to indicate acceptance.”

Insofar as this is correct, it has an important implication for our question. To see why,
we should distinguish two things that are often conflated: accepting an apology and
demurring to it.

Sometimes we are causally responsible for bad states of affairs even when not to blame.
Take this common example: D is driving down a residential street at an appropriate rate of
speed and with utmost care. C, a young child, darts out from behind a parked car into the path
of D’s minivan. With no time to react, D drives into C, killing him. D has a relationship to the
event that P, a pedestrian down the block, lacks: D caused the death of a child. And yet, on
these facts, he is not to blame. It is tragic all around—tragic for C, for C’s family, and for D
himself—yet, for all that, a quintessentially blameless accident. Of course, though, D’s
blamelessness doesn’t let him entirely off the hook. Bernard Williams contends that D ought to
experience agent-regret. At a minimum, he has a duty to express remorse: “I’m so terribly
sorry.”

It seems to me that C’s family, if they understand the relevant basic facts, ought to, let
us say, “let D off the hook.” But there are different ways to do so. (Sadly, in this case, “no
harm, no foul” is not among them.) Imagine this choice: “Thank you, we accept your apology.”
If you’re D, you might think this not quite apt. You might feel, whether or not you choose to
voice it, that by “I’m sorry” you didn’t mean “I apologize.” You felt deep regret for the outcome
and remorse for your causal role, but were not intending to own a wrong for which you are

called upon to apologize. The better response of C’s family would have been to acknowledge that fact. “It wasn’t your fault” would have been more apt than “We accept your apology.”

The point of this sad little story is that accepting an apology is not the only alternative to rejecting it. Rather, there are at least three responses one can make to an apology: rejection, acceptance, or demurrer. This third option is to say that the apologizer has done nothing for which the need to apologize arises. The second option is less indulgent, for it avows precisely what the third denies: that the actor has done something for which he should apologize. So insofar as “no harm, no foul” serves to accept an apology, then its force or upshot is not to deny the commission of a foul, but to affirm it.

This understanding of the saying comports with its original usage. Longtime Lakers announcer Chick Hearn coined the expression in the 1960s to express the idea that referees should not call minor fouls that do not interfere with the flow of play. The definition of the adage offered by Wiktionary is consistent with both Hearn and my wife: “Encapsulation of the idea that although technically a breach of some code or law may have occurred there is no need for punishment . . . or retribution if no actual damage occurred.” It offers an example: “He parked in my space but as I was away at the time: no harm, no foul.” In contexts such as these, “no harm, no foul” is a slight misnomer. The underlying idea would be rendered more accurately, if less gracefully, as no harm, no penalty, notwithstanding foul. Call this reformulation NHNP.

4.3 The puzzle of “no harm, no penalty.”

Now we encounter a modest puzzle. Some norms and rules can be violated only by the causing of harm or injury, whereas other rules can be violated by proscribed conduct all alone, regardless of whether that conduct causes any further bad state of affairs. As a very rough generalization (albeit one subject to many exceptions), the law of torts (largely designed to...

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18 I think that matters here are complicated. It might be that D does have a duty to apologize, as P of course would not, but that C’s family has a duty to affirm, in response to the apology, that D had no such duty. Morality and etiquette are tightly intertwined here, for while our fundamental obligation is to respect and express respect for other persons, we often have no better way to satisfy that obligation than to conform to the complex social rituals designed to pattern respectful behavior.

19 Omitted by the ellipses is the word “apology.” I think that Wiktionary is wrong about that. In paradigmatic cases where no harm, no foul reasoning applies, there is a need for an apology, though the apology should be accepted. That is why it was my wife, not our babysitter, who uttered “no harm, no foul,” and why she did so after he had apologized.
ensure compensation for injury) requires harm for the commission of a foul, the criminal law (principally designed to deter commission of serious wrongs and to inflict retribution for blameworthy wrongdoing) does not. Sports rules are similarly varied: some are defined such that their commission requires a proscribed result, most aren’t. Examples appear in the margin.20

“No harm, no foul” is often invoked to urge that a penalty not be imposed even when the relevant rules provide that harm is not required for the foul or for the consequent penalty, which is what Chick Hearn meant to express and why Wiktionary has things right in emphasizing that, frequently, the adage is offered in response to “a breach of some code or law.” The puzzle, then, is this: given that rulemakers know how to draft rules so that their violation does or does not require harm, why would the non-realization of harm be thought to warrant non-imposition of a penalty even in cases where the rule does not require harm?

Allow me to belabor the question. If in a particular case no penalty should be imposed because no harm was caused notwithstanding that the conduct violated a rule that is not defined in terms of causing of harm, then why doesn’t the reason for not imposing the penalty

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20 One sport that resolutely embraces the principle “foul, regardless of harm” is basketball: the victim of a shooting foul goes to the charity stripe even if his shot had gone in. Golf is similar. For example, a player is disqualified for signing a scorecard that reports a lower score for any hole than actually taken. (Rule 6-6.c.) Imagine the player who scores a 3 on hole 12 and a 4 on hole 13, but who accidentally switches the scores when recording them. The final recorded score is correct, but the player is nonetheless disqualified.

In football, in contrast, most infractions incur penalties regardless of whether the infraction affected the play. For example, when a long run from scrimmage (or a long return of a punt or kickoff) is called back because of a hold or an illegal block by the offense (or the receiving team), it is not uncommon for the announcer to observe, in commiseration with the penalized team, that the infraction was particularly unfortunate because it occurred at a place on the field where the player held or blocked could not possibly have had an impact on the play. The rule for pass interference is different: “Contact that would normally be considered pass interference [is not pass interference if] the pass is clearly uncatchable by the involved players.” (Rule 8, section 2, article 5(c).)

In soccer, the offsides rule is much like the uncatchable rule in football: a player who is in an “offside position” does not commit an “offence” if he is not “involved in active play” by interfering with the play or with an opponent, or by “gaining an advantage by being in that position.” (Law 11.) But what about the player who simulates an injury with the intent of deceiving the referee? This is an offence for which a yellow card must be awarded regardless of whether the player has successfully deceived anyone. (Law 12, Decision 5.) In table soccer (aka foosball), “spinning the rods is illegal” (Rule 13) but “spinning of a rod which does not advance and/or strike the ball does not constitute an illegal spin.” (Rule 13.2)

Most of the sports rules that make harm matter actually take the form NHNF, not NHNP. For present purposes, this difference is not material. The present point is that rule makers know how to specify that harm is a necessary condition either for a finding of violation or for the imposition of a penalty. Therefore, their failure to avail themselves of either option suggests that a given rule of conduct can be violated, and its violation penalized, even in the absence of a harmful consequence.
serve as well as a reason for reframing the rule to require harm-causation in all cases? Put another way, is there an argument for not imposing a penalty on the commission of a foul in a particular case because, in that case, the foul caused no harm that allows for the possibility that the penalty should be imposed in other cases just because of the foul and without regard for whether harm was caused? The plausibility of “no harm, no penalty, notwithstanding foul” depends on explaining how this no-harm-causing act-token of a proscribed act-type differs from other no-harm-causing act-tokens of that same proscribed act-type.

Briefly and quite generally, I think the answer (or part of it) is this. Were a penalty imposed solely for compensatory or restitutionary purposes then we would have no reason to enforce it when particular fouls end up being costless. Furthermore, we have affirmative reasons not to enforce it. Among other things, such penalties disrupt the flow of the contest and they handicap a competitor who has imposed no cost on his opponent. But of course penalties usually serve other functions too—most importantly, deterrence. This is why penalties authorized for violations of act-types that are proscribed because of their tendency to cause harm are usually sensibly enforced even in response to tokens of those act-types that happen not to cause any harm.

_Usually_, but not necessarily always. On this account, non-enforcement might be warranted if, for context-specific reasons, enforcement of a penalty in a particular case would be unusually costly to the rule-breaker (or to other interests), or if non-enforcement of the penalty on this occasion would weaken the deterrent force of the rule to an unusually small degree.

Let’s recap. We started by asking what “no harm, no foul” means. We considered and rejected one oft-suggested answer: that an action is necessarily justified or not wrong if it fails to produce harm. Instead, I proposed that it is often used to accept an apology in circumstances when somebody did do something wrong but, happily, nothing bad came of it. We saw that this usage gives the lie to the expression because it means not that no foul has occurred but that no bad consequences should be imposed even though a foul did occur. And we saw that this formulation is curious. Because rules are sometimes crafted to make occurrence of harm a necessary condition for the foul and for any prescribed consequences, when a rule is crafted
otherwise, the apparent implication is that any prescribed penalty should attach regardless of whether harm has occurred. Such a practice, despite a possible whiff of unfairness, can be easily defended on the ground that imposing penalty regardless of harm improves deterrence of risky conduct in the future. Finally, we said that it might make sense to refrain from imposing a penalty even of such rules if, in a given case, no harm has occurred and either enforcement of a penalty in a particular case would be unusually costly to the rule-breaker (or to other interests), or if non-enforcement of the penalty on this occasion would weaken the deterrent force of the rule to an unusually small degree.

If this is right, then it should be apparent what more we need to explain and justify temporal variance in the enforcement of sports penalties. We need to establish that, at crunch time, penalizing harmless fouls would be unusual in one of the respects just mentioned. Before exploring whether that might be so, we should examine one small wrinkle. We have translated “no harm, no foul” into “no harm, no penalty, notwithstanding foul.” But what if the conduct doesn’t cause no harm? What if it causes some harm, but very little?

4.4 From “no harm, no penalty” to “little harm, no penalty”—or not?

If prescribed penalties should sometimes not be enforced against the violator of a rule that is itself defined without regard to harm, when and because that particular violation caused no harm, does it also follow that there will be some occasions (albeit fewer) in which the penalty should not be enforced because the particular rule violation caused only minor harm? That is, if we are forced to choose one of two suboptimal alternatives—either (a) leaving a minor injury entirely uncompensated and thus allowing a rule-breaker to enjoy the benefits of his violation, or (b) substantially overcompensating the victim and thus shifting a cost upon the rule-breaker substantially in excess of the cost he would otherwise be allowed to impose on this victim—ought a sensible system ever to allow the injury to go unremedied?

One might think not. It is tempting to suppose that, as much as we might prefer perfect restitution, if the only options available to us are overpenalizing a rule-breaker or undercompensating his victim, justice or fairness demands that we always select the former. We might say that, by violating the rule, an actor has “assumed the risk” that he’d be subject to a disproportionate excessive penalty, or that he forfeited his claim against a disproportionate
penalty. Notions like guilt, fault, and innocence are surely relevant to our choice between suboptimal alternatives. The question is whether they are always decisive.

The short answer is that they aren’t. But because I expect this contention will not prove controversial with this audience (think, for example, of the inaptly named “harmless error doctrine” which serves not to identify truly harmless errors but to protect against windfall remedies), given space constraints I will leave it as an undefended assertion. Just as no harm, no foul (NHNF) is frequently more accurately rendered as no harm, no penalty (NHNP), NHNP entails as well little harm, no penalty (LHNP).

The cogency of LHNP in sports can be illustrated with a hypothetical. Suppose that proscribed physical contact in basketball were penalized, if at all, by the awarding of 20 free throws to the victimized team. And suppose that a player on Team A engaged in minor and incidental (but proscribed) physical contact against some player on Team B, not engaged in the act of shooting. We should wish not to impose this penalty for this infraction because we want the outcome of the contest to depend upon the competing teams’ relative excellence in executing the particular athletic virtues that the sport is designed to showcase and reward, and a sanction of this magnitude would make the outcome too dependent on the less important (though not unimportant) ability to refrain from any bodily contact. (This is not claim that this latter excellence is something that, in the nature of things, no sport could wish most to valorize; I am claiming only that, in the sport of basketball as we know it, this particular excellence does not rank so highly among the excellences that we wish to feature and reward.)

4.5 On the saying “It cost us the game.”

In week six of the 2009 NFL season, the undefeated Minnesota Vikings hosted the 3-2 Baltimore Ravens in what turned out to be a thriller. Up by 17 with ten minutes to go, the Vikings looked like they were on their way to a blowout. But second-year QB Joe Flacco led the Ravens to three quick touchdowns to take a 31-30 lead with under four minutes remaining. The ageless Brett Favre responded, driving the Vikings to a go-ahead field goal just inside the

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21 Admittedly this is fanciful. But there can be many reasons, having to do with natural facts about the world or with system-specific interests, why the range of penalty options available to us will be extremely limited. Two illustrations: The NFL used to authorize two levels of penalty (5 yards and 15 yards) for the act of grabbing the face mask of an opponent, depending upon the severity of the infraction; it recently eliminated the 5-yard penalty. The sentences available for voluntary manslaughter in California are 3, 6, or 11 years. Cal. Penal Code 193(a).
two-minute mark. At the end of regulation, Ravens kicker Steven Hauschka missed wide on a 44-yard field goal attempt that would have given the Ravens the victory. Not surprisingly, many fans bemoaned that the miss “cost us the game.” But Ravens running back Ray Rice, whose 194 yards from scrimmage were wasted in the loss, demurred: “We didn’t lose that game because of Hauschka’s miss. If we start fast and put points on the board, our defense starts fast, I think the game is a totally different outcome.”

This is a common routine across team sports. After some late-game mishap leads to a loss—a dropped pass or blown coverage, a pair of missed free throws, a base-running error, or a referee’s bad call—a large number of fans are sure to complain that the mistake “cost us the game.” Other fans, players or coaches, will disagree. No, they’ll protest, that play didn’t cost us the game. Had we played better in other facets of the game—had we been able to convert on earlier trips into the red zone, or had we left fewer men on base, or had we capitalized on our power plays—we wouldn’t have been in that situation in the first place.

The second assertion is surely right. Contrary to the adage, defeat has as many fathers as does victory. It can fairly be said about any number of plays that, had it gone differently, the loss would have been a win. But what about the first part of the protest? Does it follow from the fact that many players and coaches share responsibility for the loss that the particular poor play or bad decision did not cost the team the game? Was Ray Rice right that the Ravens “didn’t lose that game because of Hauschka’s miss”?

Perhaps it depends on what we mean by “because of.” Had Hauschka not missed, he would have made it. (This assumes, of course, that the closest possible world to the actual is one in which the field goal is still attempted.) And had he made it, the Ravens would have won, 33-31. So Hauschka’s miss was a but-for cause of the Ravens’ loss: but for the miss, they would not have lost; they would have won. In this fairly straightforward sense, the Ravens did lose because of Hauschka’s miss. But—and this is very likely what Rice really meant—the Ravens didn’t lose only because of Hauschka’s miss. There were many but-for causes of their loss.

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23 [http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/gamecenter/recap/NFL_20091018_BAL@MIN](http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/gamecenter/recap/NFL_20091018_BAL@MIN).
So if it is true that Hauschka’s miss was a but-for cause of the loss, but wasn’t the only such cause, why focus on it? I think that Rice and others who say similar things are urging that we really ought not to. That we focus on it only because it is more salient to us, perhaps because we know how things would have turned out had he done otherwise, whereas, although there are many other but-for causes, we forget about them, or don’t know which they were. Rice is claiming that Hauschka didn’t cause any more damage than did any other Raven who missed a play in that contest.

That is the question to investigate. More precisely, I’m interested in the more general question that this particular question exemplifies. The general question is whether the costliness of detrimental contest events varies depending on time of contest. And here’s a way to focus the question in a pretty clean way. Suppose two missed 44-yard FGs—the first with time expiring in the first quarter, the second with time expiring in the fourth, both with the kicking team down 10-9. Are the two misses equally costly, or was one more costly than the other? And if one was the more costly, which?

The more common intuition, I venture, is that the later miss is more costly than the earlier one. But many colleagues with whom I have spoken answer that the two are equally costly. I will argue that the latter is more costly than the former. And, therefore, that there is a straightforward sense in which Hauschka’s miss was especially costly precisely because of when it occurred. It’s not just a matter of drama and atmospherics. Instead, events do in fact have greater impact on the outcome of a game—good things contribute more to victory, and bad things are more costly—when they occur later in close contests. If that argument succeeds, we’ll have the final piece of the explanation for slack in the calling of basketball fouls and similar infractions.

4.6 “Crunch time” and the varying magnitude of outcome-affecting events

How ought we to think about the costliness of outcome-affecting events? I propose that the competitive costs or benefits of any game action, \( x \), can be conceptualized in terms of the action’s impact on a given competitor’s probability of victory. The probability of victory ranges from 0 to 1. So the competitive cost or benefit of an action, \( x \), ranges from -1 to +1. Let us represent the impact of an action, \( x \), on competitor A’s probability of victory by \( \phi_{[A]} \). Now, let
In-m stand for a token of infraction-type n committed by competitor m, and let Pn-m stand for a token of penalty-type n imposed on competitor m. Thus: \( \phi_{\text{In-A}(B)} \) is the impact of a given infraction by A on B’s probability of victory, and \( \phi_{\text{Pn-A}(A)} \) is the impact on A’s probability of victory of being assessed some given penalty. Lastly, because penalties for fouls in sports including basketball, football, and hockey are designed to deter, they must be (by and large) over-compensatory. So \( |\phi_{\text{Pn-A}(A)}| > |\phi_{\text{In-A}(B)}| \).

It should be apparent on little reflection that both \( \phi_{\text{In-A}(B)} \) and \( \phi_{\text{Pn-A}(A)} \) are context-variant to at least some extent. For example, they vary depending on the score differential at the time of the event: each is greater when the score is tied than when either team enjoys an insurmountable lead. The claim I want to add is that, holding all else constant, they are also temporally variant. This is for the simple reason that, holding closeness of contest constant, scores and missed scoring opportunities have greater impact on the outcome of the game the closer they occur toward the game’s end.

Here’s an illustration: Suppose that the Lakers are called for a shooting foul on a missed basket by the Celtics in the first 20 seconds of a scoreless scheduled 48-minute game. Suppose that the shot missed the basket and backboard and sailed out of bounds. Absent the enforcement of a penalty, the Lakers would have been awarded the basketball and the score would have remained 0-0. Assuming that the teams were evenly matched and playing at a neutral site, the Lakers’ probability of victory absent a penalty would have been, let us suppose, .5. The awarding of two free throws to the Celtics as a penalty for the Lakers’ foul has an expected value of 1.5 points. The Lakers’ probability of victory when down 1.5 with 47:40 remaining is, let us imagine, .495. The cost of the penalty to the Lakers is -0.05, a small cost indeed. Now assume the same facts, except that the foul is called and penalty assessed with time expiring and the Lakers ahead by 1 point. The Lakers’ probability of victory absent the penalty would be exactly 1.0: the game would have ended at that moment with the Lakers enjoying a razor-thin lead. The probability, post-penalty, that the Lakers will win is the

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24 They don’t always work that way which is why basketball teams intentionally foul when behind late in games: stopping the clock is more important than not giving up points.

25 The closeness of a contest is a function, inter alia, of the score differential and the distance remaining to contest completion. (See supra n.13.) For a constant score differential of n (>0), the contest is closer at t1 than at t10. What I mean to keep constant is closeness of contest not score differential.
probability that the Celtics will miss both free throws (.06) + the probability that the Celtics will hit only one of the two free throws and then lose in overtime (.38*.5), or 0.25. The cost of the penalty to the Lakers under these circumstances is a whopping -0.75.26

In short, the expected outcome-affecting magnitude of an outcome-affecting event is greater toward the end of a contest than at its start, holding closeness of contest constant, because there are fewer opportunities for the impact of that event to be countered.27 Another way to think about the point is this: the less time remaining in the contest, the greater the impact of each unit change in score on “closeness of contest,” and thus the greater the expected effect on outcome of each unit change in probability of a score.28 “Crunch time” just is that period when everything matters more.

26 Here’s another illustration, moving from basketball to football. The Cowboys are beating the Giants 21-20 with 1:00 remaining in the fourth quarter and the Giants facing fourth and ten from their own 40. Giants QB Eli Manning throws the ball 40 yards downfield, where a Cowboys’ cornerback interferes modestly with the Giants’ receiver. Even absent any interference, it would have been a very difficult catch—say, a .3 probability. The modest physical contact made a reception yet more difficult, but still possible—say, a .2 probability. Either way, had the receiver caught the ball, the reception would have taken him out of bounds at the Cowboys’ 10-yard line. In the event, the pass falls incomplete. On these assumptions—stylized but not fanciful—the interference imposed a cost of -0.1 likelihood of reception. A reception at this field position and time, let us say, would have given the Giants a 96% probability of victory. An incompletion gives possession to the Cowboys, and thus leaves the Giants with a mere 1% probability of victory.

Should the foul be called and the penalty—awarding the Giants possession and a first down at the spot of the infraction—enforced? Many informed observers would say no, that during “crunch time,” the referees should give the players a little more latitude for physical contact. See supra note 12. Without fully resolving whether, on balance, this is so, the analysis to this point at least makes sense of why it might be. The contest-outcome cost of this defensive pass interference on the Giants (φ_{Pn-C}(G)) is -0.095. The context-outcome cost of the penalty on the Cowboys (φ_{Pn-C}(C)) is -0.95. When a penalty would have such a large expected impact on the game outcome and when the unpunished infraction would not have an impact of roughly similar magnitude, we might think that the game goes better—it is fairer and more satisfying—by letting the play on the field stand.

27 Of course, things are not quite so simple, and some dynamics might cut in just the opposite direction. In particular, insofar as early scores might have especially pronounced effects on strategy and psychology, one might predict that, holding closeness of contest constant, points scored earlier in contests are likely to have a greater impact on outcome than points scored later. The effect of early scores on game progression is ultimately an empirical question and likely to vary substantially across different sports. Nonetheless, I suspect that the effects of early scores are less regular then this surmise suggests. Sometimes the team that goes down early will become demoralized, other times it will become refocused; sometimes the team that goes up will play with greater confidence, other times it will become complacent or sloppy. But if you’re losing, you simply can’t prevail unless you score more than your opponent in the time remaining. And the less time that remains the harder that it is to do.

28 Peter King recognized that events gain in significance in inverse proportion to time remaining when analyzing Bill Belichick’s much-discussed decision to go for it on fourth and 2 from his own 28 with 2:08 remaining, up 34-28 against Indianapolis in week 10 of the 2009 season. The Patriots didn’t get the first down, the Colts took over on downs and scored the winning TD with 13 seconds remaining. King is critical of the decision, urging that New England should have punted instead. His criticism was misguided. (See, for a powerful defense of Belichick’s
It is true that $\phi_{\text{In-A}(B)}$ and $\phi_{\text{Pn-A}(A)}$ both increase in crunch time, and that the ratio between the two probably remains constant. But the absolute magnitude of the difference between the two increases. And because $\phi_{\text{Pn-A}(A)}$ may substantially exceed $\phi_{\text{In-A}(B)}$, the change in the outcome-affecting difference between allowing the infraction to go unrectified and imposing a penalty might well justify heeding the call to “let ‘em play”—certainly in cases of NHNP, and very possibly in cases of LHNP too.

4.7 An objection: risk damage and the lost chance doctrine in tort law.

The argument for temporal variance in the enforcement of fouls depends on the following four propositions, among others:

1. at $t_1$, before an infraction, competitor B “has” or “faces” some probability, $P_1$, of victory;
2. at $t_2$, as a result of an infraction by competitor A, B faces probability $P_2$ of victory;
3. $P_1 - P_2 = R$, $R > 0$; and
4. the reduction in probability of victory, $R$, is a compensable injury or harm to B.

This argument is analogous to the argument in support of the “lost chance” doctrine in tort law, which provides that negligent conduct (action or omission) by some party that increases the probability that some person will experience some uncontroversial injury (usually, death, bodily injury, sickness, etc.) is itself a compensable injury. The argument for recovery runs like this:

1. at $t_1$, individual B “has” or “faces” some probability, $P_1$, of some specified bodily injury;
2. at $t_2$, as a result of negligent conduct by A, B faces some other probability, $P_2$, of that same bodily injury;
3. $P_2 - P_1 = R$, $R > 0$; and

But in the course of his analysis, he makes an astute observation. Acknowledging that Belichick had made a similar call earlier in the season that had worked out well, King notes a critical difference: “Against Atlanta in Week 3, there was a play something like this. New England had fourth-and-one at its 24 late in the third quarter, up 16-10. Sammy Morris ran for two yards, first down, and the Patriots went on to kick a field goal on the drive. But that was one yard, not two, and even if it had failed and the Falcons got the ball and scored, the Patriots would have had an entire quarter to rectify things.” (my italics).

4. the increase in probability of injury, R, is an injury or harm to B.

Although the lost chance doctrine is recognized in the United States and Canada and has been supported by many tort scholars, Britain and several other scholars—Stephen Perry most influentially—reject it.\(^{29}\) If Perry’s arguments against lost chance in tort law are correct, and if the sports case is not distinguishable, then my argument fails. So ultimately I must establish either that Perry’s argument is not entirely correct or that it is distinguishable, or both. Given the complexity of Perry’s arguments, their somewhat changing shape, the difficulty of some of the underlying issues, and the length of this paper, I cannot attempt a comprehensive evaluation here. This is just a sketch of the issues and some possible routes forward; it is inescapably preliminary and telegraphic.

The tort literature contains various arguments against recovery for lost chances, or what are better termed augmented probabilities of harm. All start from the idea that if augmented probability of harm is a harm in its own right—that is, a harm apart from such uncontroversial harms as the fear and anxiety the plaintiff might experience in contemplation of future harm, the costs the plaintiff might incur for medical monitoring, the life opportunities the plaintiff might forgo to reduce the danger of realizing the augmented risk, etc.—it must be an increase in objective probability of outcome harm, not an increase in probabilities variously described as subjective, epistemic, or Bayesian. From that point of departure, at least three distinct arguments can be discerned.

The first argument denies that there exist objective probabilities with respect to singular events or propositions at least with respect to events governed by deterministic causal processes. The dominant account of objective probability, frequentism, defines the probability of an outcome as the limit of its relative frequency in a long series of events or, put otherwise, as the ratio of the times that outcome occurs to the times it might have occurred. Because any

individual event falls within indefinitely many reference classes, objective probabilities cannot uniquely extend from the reference classes to the individual event itself. As the leading theorist of frequentism, Richard von Mises, announced eighty years ago, an objective probability for singular events is “utter nonsense.” Let’s call this the “no objective singular probabilities” thesis.

The second argument may grant (at least arguendo) that objective probabilities can apply to singular propositions, but maintains: (a) that, given determinism, an individual’s probability of suffering some harm in the future is always 0 or 1; (b) that an event cannot be harmful if it does not change the pre-existing objective probability of harm from 0 to 1; and (c) that, when some event does change the pre-event probability of harm from 0 to 1, that event causes actual unproblematic harm, leaving “[no] room for the idea that risk constitutes a separate form of harm.”\(^\text{30}\) Call this the “merger argument”: an event augments the objective probability of outcome harm only when it causes that harm (by changing the probability of outcome harm from 0 to 1). But in that case the risk damage merges into the outcome harm itself.

The third argument grants that objective probabilities can apply to singular events and that such probabilities can lie between 0 and 1, and can change, but denies that any such increase in an objective probability of unproblematic harm (i.e., of a setback to “core interests”) is itself a compensable harm (setback to core interests) for purposes of tort law. Call this the “not a welfare harm” argument.\(^\text{31}\)

This last argument is no threat to my analysis for temporal variance for it depends entirely upon claims about human welfare or well-being and about the proper function of tort law. There is no inconsistency in maintaining that an augmented objective probability of physical injury or illness is not itself the sort of setback to interests that tort law should treat as a compensable injury while allowing that a diminished objective probability of victory is a setback to interests that competitive sports may be concerned to compensate. So insofar as

\(^{30}\) Perry 2007 at 196.

\(^{31}\) See, e.g., Perry 2007, at 201-04; Perry 2003, at 1304-08; Adler.
Perry and others rely upon the “not a welfare harm” argument, the argument against the lost chance doctrine and my argument for temporal variance are easily distinguished.

The merger argument might prove harder to distinguish, but it is a bad argument because (on deterministic assumptions) the pre-event objective probability of outcome harm already takes fully into account the subsequent occurrence of the event in question (like a negligent misdiagnosis), thus making the pre-event and post-event probabilities of outcome harm the same. Put another way, if determinism is true, then any event that might seem to change an objective probability from 0 to 1 (like young Hotson’s fall from the tree) was itself determined and thus fully accounted for in the pre-event objective probability of post-event harm.

That leaves only the first argument as an obstacle to my argument. Unfortunately, that is probably the dominant philosophical argument against the lost chance doctrine. I believe I am left with two avenues of escape.

First and more ambitiously, I am tempted to challenge the categorical denial of objective singular probabilities. I confess that, with Claire Finkelstein,\(^{32}\) I am influenced by pre-theoretical intuitions that I find hard to shake: the ubiquity, utility and apparent meaningfulness of objective singular probability (OSP) judgments are too great to be easily dismissed. But we can say a little more to sustain hope that the search for OSP is not a fool’s errand. First, some theorists who have rejected OSP might have been too quick to reduce objective probabilities to relative frequency accounts of probability, paying insufficient attention to the possibility that alternative accounts of objective probability might be workable. In particular, they have overlooked “propensity” accounts of objective probability, a term initially coined by Karl Popper for his own theory but now routinely applied to the family of objective, non-frequency accounts.

Now, it is true that propensity accounts are disfavored by philosophers of probability. But—and this is an additional reason for hope—the reasons for the rejection may be more dependent on those philosophers’ particular scientific aspirations than legal commentators who credit that rejection might appreciate. Consider in this vein Donald Gillies’s observation

\(^{32}\) Finkelstein, at 997-98.
that, “while there is nothing wrong with developing a metaphysical theory of propensities,” his “own aim is to develop a . . . theory of probability which can be used to provide an interpretation of the probabilities which appear in such natural sciences as physics and biology.” To satisfy that ambition, he explained, “probability assignments should be testable by empirical data, and this makes it desirable that they should be associated with repeatable conditions”—a desideratum that standard propensity theories cannot satisfy. 33 Gillies’s concern might justify the rejection of propensity-based OSP by science, but it does not license the conclusion that OSPs are false.

The second avenue of escape is to argue that my analysis does not truly depend upon objective probabilities, but can make do with epistemic probabilities. Consider the discussion in section 4.6 that assumed that a team had some objective probability of victory less than 1 and greater than 0. If that is not so—if the objective probability was unchanging at either 0 or 1—it would still be true that the epistemic probabilities range between 0 and 1. Accounts of epistemic probabilities vary regarding the extent to which they would impose constraints on actual subjective probability estimates. On a radically subjectivist version, the epistemic probability that the Lakers will beat the Celtics might be .5 for you, .58 for a professional gambler, and .25 for a shamrock-eyed Celtics fan, and that is that. Most versions of epistemic probability, however, incorporate standards of evidence and reasonable inference that provide resources for critically assessing actual subjective probabilities as good or bad, or, at a minimum, better or worse. If there are intersubjectively valid epistemic probabilities, and if infractions and penalties change those probabilities in the ways 4.6 discusses, that is probably all that the argument of this section requires.

5. TWO KINDS OF FAULTS, MANY KINDS OF RULES

At first blush, we might suppose that the analysis of section 4 applies, mutatis mutandis, to foot faults in tennis and therefore that McEnroe’s position is vindicated: tennis officials should call foot faults less strictly at crunch time. The penalty for foot faults should not have been imposed on Serena Williams even assuming that her foot did touch or slightly cross the

33 Donald Gillies, Philosophical Theories of Probability 128 (2000).
baseline. But such a conclusion would be premature. It could be that foot faults in tennis differ from fouls and similar infractions in basketball, football and comparable sports in ways that make a difference.

5.1 From the hardwood to the diamond.

I claimed in Section 1 that the case for temporal variance is made difficult by clear cases for invariance. My example was strikes in baseball. Nobody, I supposed, would think that umpires should cut pitchers a little more slack toward the end of a close game. But was I too quick? The famed Harvard zoologist-cum-Yankees fan Stephen Jay Gould would have us believe so. Here’s his account of Don Larsen’s perfect game in the 1956 World Series—to this day, the only perfect game or no-hitter in postseason play—penned on the death of the home plate umpire that day, Babe Pinelli:

Babe Pinelli was the umpire in baseball’s unique episode of perfection when it mattered most. October 8, 1956. A perfect game in the World Series—and, coincidentally, Pinelli’s last official game as arbiter. What a consummate swan song. Twenty-seven Dodgers up; twenty-seven Bums down... [T]he agent was a competent, but otherwise undistinguished pitcher, Don Larsen.

The dramatic end was all Pinelli’s, and controversial ever since. Dale Mitchell, pinch hitting for Sal Maglio, was the twenty-seventh batter. With a count of 1 and 2, Larsen delivered one high and outside—close, but surely not, by its technical definition, a strike. Mitchell let the pitch go by, but Pinelli didn’t hesitate. Up went the right arm for called strike three. Out went Yogi Berra from behind the plate, nearly tackling Larsen in a frontal jump of joy. “Outside by a foot,” groused Mitchell later. He exaggerated—for it was outside by only a few inches—but he was right. Babe Pinelli, however, was more right. A batter may not take a close pitch with so much on the line. Context matters. Truth is a circumstance, not a spot.

... Truth is inflexible. Truth is inviolable. By long and recognized custom, by any concept of justice, Dale Mitchell had to swing at anything close. It was a strike—a strike high and outside. Babe Pinelli, umpiring his last game, ended with his finest, his most perceptive, his most truthful moment. Babe Pinelli, arbiter of history, walked into the locker room and cried.34

34 Stephen Jay Gould, Op-Ed, The Strike That was Low and Outside, NY Times, Nov. 10, 1984. Gould’s piece was mistitled. Video of the play makes clear, as the body of the essay suggests, that if the pitch wasn’t the right height, it was too high, not too low.
Is Gould right that Pinelli should have called that non-strike a strike? Is this a case for temporal variance? I cannot do justice to Gould’s remarkable essay in this space, so two brief points. First, whereas the case for temporal variance I have sketched depends entirely on an assessment of the costs and benefits to the competitors, Gould rightly draws attention, in addition, to the impact that calls and no-calls can have on others—fans at the time and even, we might say, posterity. Second, and nonetheless, if informal polling of students and colleagues provides reliable guidance, Gould is in a very small minority. Most people think that strikes and balls are not appropriate candidates for temporal variance even here, in what we might reasonably suppose is the best-case scenario for it.

The analysis provided above suggests why: the case just advanced for temporal variance depends on the fact that the competitive cost of the sanction imposed for an infraction is itself temporally variant and can become, at game’s end, very much greater than the competitive benefit accruing from the infraction. Yet the very question of whether the competitive cost of the sanction for an infraction is too large seems ill-posed in the case of balls and strikes. Every pitch is either a ball or a strike. The logical consequence of its being outside the strike zone is that it is a ball. While we can sensibly ask whether the strike zone is too small (or large) or whether the number of balls that constitutes a walk is too great (or too small), it seems nonsense to ask whether a pitch’s being a ball is too high a price for its having narrowly missed the strike zone: that the pitch was a ball is just what it means for its not having been a strike.

Things are different with the infractions we have considered in basketball and football. Of them, we can sensibly ask both whether some type of contact ought to be proscribed (thus denominated as a “foul”), and, in addition, whether, if so, the penalty attached to commission of the foul—two free throws, say, or ten yards—is too great (or too small).

More generally, because the case for temporal variance with regard to fouls relies upon NHNP and LHNP, and not NHNF, it can apply only when the consequence of a ruling is, conceptually, a penalty. But not all undesired consequences that attach to nonconformity with the dictates of a rule are penalties, as Hart explained when introducing the idea of power-conferring rules—rules that (somewhat simplified) provide that “if you wish to do this, this is
the way to do it.” Some might say, he observed, that power-conferring rules are just like duty-imposing rules backed by sanctions, where the sanction for noncompliance is “nullity” or “invalidity.” But that would be “absurd,” he explained, for we can distinguish clearly the rule prohibiting certain behaviour from the provision for penalties to be exacted if the rule is broken, and suppose the first to exist without the latter. We can, in a sense, subtract the sanction and still leave an intelligible standard of behaviour which it is designed to maintain. But we cannot logically make such a distinction between the rule requiring compliance with certain conditions, e.g., attestation for a valid will, and the so-called sanction of ‘nullity’. In this case, if failure to comply with this essential condition did not entail nullity, the rule itself could not be intelligibly said to exist . . . . The provision for nullity is part of this type of rule itself in a way which punishment attached to a rule imposing duties is not. If failure to get the ball between the posts did not mean the ‘nullity’ of not scoring, the scoring rules could not be said to exist.  

In short, and contra Gould, balls and strikes are not proper candidates for temporal variance because (1) temporal variance depends upon the widening of a gap of a sort between infraction and the penalty it incurs, but (2) there is no such gap between nonconformity with a power-conferring rule and the consequences that attach, and (3) the rules governing balls and strikes are power-conferring rules (or something of a sufficiently close type).  

5.2 Two kinds of faults

If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the question whether temporal variance would have been appropriate in the Williams-Clijsters match might depend, to a significant degree, on how we conceptualize the rule governing foot faults—as a duty-imposing rule or as a power-conferring one (subject to the qualification in the preceding footnote). If the rules command that the server not step on or past the baseline, on pain of the serve being declared a nullity, then the reasoning that supports temporal variance in the calling of fouls would be available, providing a possible basis for temporal variance in the calling of foot faults too. If, instead, the rules confer upon the server two opportunities (lets aside) to put the ball in play, and specify

36 Id. at 34-35.
37 The parenthetical is intended to signal that I am not wholly committed to this particular typology of rules. Perhaps, for example, the roughly analogous distinction between regulative and constitutive rules might provide the more useful analytical framework. I am open to other possibilities as well.
that the only valid way to put the ball in play includes that one not step on or past the baseline, then the analysis proffered in section 4 would not apply, and we would have, thus far, no basis for temporal variance.

Which is the better conceptualization of the relevant tennis rules is, I think, more open to argument than one might suppose. I am unaware of any simple consideration that unequivocally rules out one interpretation or conclusively confirms the other.

Start with the text of the relevant rules. Rule 18, recall, is written in deontic terms, providing inter alia, that “during the service motion, the server shall not . . . touch the baseline or the court with either foot.” Furthermore, Rule 19(a)—by providing that “the service is a fault if the server breaks rules 16, 17, or 18”—reinforces the idea that the server has a duty not to step on the line, for, strictly speaking, one does not “break” a power-conferring rule by failing to comply with its dictates. However, we should not place too much weight on constructions that are unlikely to have received much conscious thought by the drafters. After all, rule 17—a second rule that rule 19 contemplates being broken—employs similar deontic language in providing that “the serve shall pass over the net and hit the service court diagonally opposite.”38 Yet no tennis player would think himself under a duty to hit the diagonally opposite service court. To the contrary, all players and fans understand that the server is empowered to put the ball into play by serving into the correct space. Because the plain function of rule 17 is to confer a power, not to impose a duty, we must characterize it as a power-conferring rule, the somewhat infelicitous language notwithstanding. We ought not then invest much faith in the ordinary meaning of the text of rule 18 either.

More significant, I think, is the fact that the sanction (so to speak) for a foot fault is nullity.39 I am not certain that this fact alone demands a conclusion that the rule is power-conferring. For example, were contracts formed under duress void rather than voidable, we

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38 I am taking this locution, in which the subject is the served ball, to be equivalent to either of the following, in which the subject is the server: “the server shall serve the ball to pass over the net . . .” or “the server shall cause the serve to pass over the net . . .”

39 That is not the only consequence, for a service fault is also one-half the way toward a point for one’s opponent. I’m going to ignore this complication on the ground that the McEnroonian claim was that the serve should have been allowed, not that the line judge or the chair umpire should have called a let. In fact, though, I think it possible that the optimal result in the Williams-Clijsters match would have been for the umpire to have overruled the line judge and declared a let (but only had Williams politely petitioned). The analysis in Section 4 might well support that outcome.
might nonetheless resist the conclusion that only considerations of power are in play, determining instead that contract law does impose a duty not to subject one’s contracting partner to duress. Or consider traveling in basketball. The consequence for traveling—termination of possession—seems equivalent to nullity or invalidity. Yet I think it arguable that players are subject to a duty not to walk with the ball; the prohibition on traveling might not be merely a part of the power-conferring rules that set forth the exclusive permissible means of advancing the ball.

The last two paragraphs leave things disconcertingly unsettled. Nonetheless, even if a (putative) sanction’s being a nullity is not a conclusive indication that the rule in question is power-conferring, that is surely a relevant and weighty consideration. Pending further argument, then, I will accept that provisional conclusion: the tennis rules that validate a serve only if (among other things) the server stays behind the baseline are power-conferring (or constitutive), not duty-imposing (or regulative). Lest we get too focused on labels and the perhaps imperfect taxonomic schemes that underlie them, perhaps we should just say that foot faults in tennis are more like balls in baseball than like fouls in basketball or infractions in football.

Even if this is right, the implication for temporal variance remains uncertain. Although there are more ways to fault in tennis than the casual fan might realize, the two types of fault just mentioned—those that arise from not striking the served ball into the designated service court, and those that arise from stepping on or over the baseline—are surely the most common. The latter are formally designated “foot faults”; let’s dub the latter “zone faults.” I have already asserted that the rules governing zone faults are power-conferring. Moreover, I assume that they, like balls and strikes in baseball, are not subject to temporal variance. If Babe Pinelli should not have punched Dale Mitchell out on Larsen’s 1-2 pitch, then a fortiori a line judge should call any serve that’s long or wide a service fault regardless of game context.

Recall that Rule 19(a) specifically mentions, in addition to rules 17 and 18, rule 16. That rule provides that the server “shall stand at rest with both feet behind the baseline” before starting the service motion, and must “hit the ball with the racket before the ball hits the ground.” Subsections (b) through (d) of Rule 19 also make it a fault if the server misses the tossed ball when trying to hit it, or if the served ball touches a permanent fixture or either the server or the server’s partner.
If foot faults are also governed by power-conferring rules, and if the analysis to this point is correct, then we should expect foot faults, just like zone faults, to be immune from temporal variance. But widespread intuitions are more equivocal. I have not run across anybody who is tempted by temporal variance for zone faults. And yet we have already seen that some—John McEnroe, for example—believe that foot faults should be enforced with temporal variance. Just as revealingly, many more feel that the temporal variance of foot faults is, at the least, more plausible, less obviously mistaken. The fact that even those who resist temporal variance for foot faults do not feel about foot faults quite as they do about zone faults requires explanation even if we end up concluding that, all things considered, foot faults should be enforced with temporal invariance. That fact is inexplicable if the argument for temporal variance depends upon the consequence being a penalty, and if faults aren’t penalties.

In the next section, accordingly, I develop an alternative rationale for temporal variance in the enforcement of rules—one that does not apply only to duty-imposing rules.

5.3 Two more kinds of rules

The distinction between duty-imposing and power-conferring rules is one of function. Another, more common, way to categorize rules—it might be clearer to speak now of “norms”—is on the basis of form. This is the division between rules and standards. True, the rule/standard distinction describes something closer to poles on a continuum than to binary possibilities, and any given complex norm can consist of more rule-like and more standard-like pieces cobbled together. Still, the basic difference between the two is fairly well settled: rules turn upon factual predicates that are sharper-edged, whereas standards require those who apply them to exercise evaluative judgment. Also well accepted are the considerations that recommend proceeding with one form or the other. To a first approximation: standards better reflect the genuine justifications that underlie the norm, while rules, because they are quicker and easier to apply, promote second-order considerations in cheap, predictable, stable,

41 I earlier noted the possibility that temporal variance is warranted by aesthetic considerations: when energy, intensity and drama have risen, we don’t want delays and we want things to be resolved by excellence, not errors or miscues. While conceding that there is something to this analysis, I contended that it’s not the whole story. Contemplation of foot faults and zone faults bolsters that suggestion. We prefer the match to end with a winner than with an unforced error (including a service fault), but we are much less tempted to temporal variance for zone faults and other unforced errors than for foot faults.
uniform, and non-corrupt decision-making. As Fred Schauer summarized: “the choice of rule-based decision-making ordinarily entails disabling wise and sensitive decision-makers from making the best decisions in order to disable incompetent or simply wicked decision-makers from making wrong decisions.”

The formal norms that govern foot faults and zone faults alike are rules strictly speaking, not standards. And there are good reasons for this. I will argue in this section, however, that the rule-ness of these two faults rests on different considerations, and that this difference can help explain why temporal variance might be appropriate for foot faults but not for zone faults.

Consider zone faults first: Why are they governed by rule, not by standard? The short answer, I think, is that serving the ball into a predefined space is one of the central athletic challenges that the sport of tennis is intended to present and reward. Indeed, it is how tennis instantiates one of the most commonly tested skills across all of sports: target-hitting. And horseshoes and curling notwithstanding, precision is generally part of the nature of targeting—for pitchers, field-goal kickers, basketball players, no less than for archers and riflemen. To be sure, there is rarely anything essential about the target dimensions. But while the target’s contours may be arbitrary, the demand that the competitor hit the target, as it were, and not merely come close, is not arbitrary, for the rule is designed to test and reward that particular class of physical excellences involving accuracy and precision in limb-eye coordination. The rules of tennis require that, for a serve to be valid, the ball must land within the defined service court because that is part of the nature of the athletic challenge.

The rule that validates a serve only if the ball is struck before the server’s feet touch or cross the service line might be of just the same sort: it might be designed to test and reward a certain excellence in full bodily control. That could be, but I rather suspect that it’s not. And

42 Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and Life (1991).
43 Consider some spectacular display of ball-handling artistry in which a soccer player dribbles the ball from deep in his own end up the pitch, deking and dodging defenders all the way until, 30 yards from the goal, he blasts a frozen rope through a tiny window between two defenders that just catches the inner edge of the right goal post and ricochets across the goal mouth before skittering out of bounds. Fans of soccer but not of either team might well wish that the shot had scored, to reward the player for his dazzling skill. Yet nobody would argue that a goal should be counted. While we might have made the goal a touch larger—indeed, while we might have good reasons for thinking that, all things considered, slightly enlarging the goal would improve the sport—we understand that the challenge is to put the ball into the goal, and not to get it “close enough.”
while I can’t prove this to the skeptical, it is relevant, I think, that the sport is so unconcerned to prescribe serving mechanics as even to permit underhand service. Crucially, that does not mean that the rule governing foot faults is misguided. Even if the precise placement of one’s feet were no part of the athletic challenge the rules are meant to present, getting the serve in would be easier, and returning it would be more difficult, if the server were nontrivially closer to the net. So to maintain the challenge and to protect against unfair advantage, there should be a norm against “unreasonable encroachments” over the line, where reasonableness *vel non* would be, as per usual, a function of a variety of considerations—whether the encroachment was intentional or accidental, frequent or atypical, marginal or substantial, etc. A norm of reasonableness is a quintessential standard. But if that’s the underlying informal norm, it doesn’t follow that the formal norm should assume the same shape. Quite the contrary. Because the factors that bear on reasonableness would be debatable in every case, considerations like predictability, certainty, and finality all forcefully favor implementing this norm by means of a rule rather than by means of a standard.44

The foregoing analysis of foot faults comports with the conventional justification for rules: norms are rulified at some cost in accuracy to serve second-order institutional objectives. But the rule-like nature of the rule governing zone faults is quite different. Zone faults are governed by rule not because of the costs that attend proceeding by standard but because the pre-codified norm is *itself* a rule. And all this suggests a possible general jurisprudential implication—namely, that we might find it useful to distinguish between two kinds of “rules” as distinguished from standards: those that are rule-like based on second-order considerations of administrability and the like, and those that are rule-like in principle or by their very nature. Call the first kind of rule a “rulified standard,” and the second kind a “true rule.” Conventional analysis of the form of norms generally assumes that norms come to us as standards, and that a variety of considerations bear on whether we should codify these standards as they are or,

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44 Even if I’m wrong in thinking that the foot fault rule of tennis serves purposes different in kind from the zone fault rule, the claim is more obviously correct of cognate sports. Volleyball, for example, recognizes three kinds of faults: if the served ball lands outside the court, if the server steps outside the service zone, or if the server takes more than 8 seconds before striking the ball. USAV Rule 12. Plainly, this last rule serves functions different than the first.
instead, rulify them. That, I am suggesting, is only part of the picture of rules. Sometimes the justification for a rule is that that’s the form in which the norm arises.

5.4 *Context-variance and rulified standards*

I have proposed that rules, as contrasted with standards, come in two subtypes—rulified standards and true rules—and that foot faults are examples of the former whereas zone faults are examples of the latter. It remains to explain what bearing this analysis, if correct, has for our question of temporal variance.

First, a rulified standard is a rule, not a standard, and we should generally apply it as such. To routinely pierce the rule and apply the underlying or animating standard would defeat the purposes served by having rulified it. Second, that we must not *routinely* pierce a rulified standard does not mean that we must never pierce it. Perhaps the critical upshot of the distinction between rulified standards and true rules is that the question of whether and under what circumstances to disregard the rule’s form in favor of the underlying considerations is at least askable for the former, but not for the latter. It is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for disregarding the ruleness of a rule that it be a rulified standard not a true rule.

Third, it is plausible to suppose that two additional requirements should be satisfied in order to go beneath the surface of a rulified standard: (1) that enforcing the rule as a rule would produce unusually high costs; and (2) that disregarding the rule’s form on this occasion would incur low costs on the dimensions, such as predictability and the like, that justified its rulification in the first place. Fourth, it is also plausible that these two additional conditions can be satisfied by foot faults in crunch time. The high cost of enforcing the rule as a rule are plain: doing so allows the foot fault to have an excessive impact on the match outcome, detracting from the participants’ satisfaction and the spectators’ enjoyment. At the same time, the costs of piercing the rule are very low precisely because the fact of the supposed nonconformity with the rule is hidden from public view. And it’s hidden from public view because the Cyclops electronic system that determines whether a ball lands within the lines is not used to judge foot faults. From the perspective of optimal game design, that might be a good thing. In general, rule makers who want to preserve the rule-enforcers’ option to sometimes apply the standard
that animates a rulified standard should arrange things so that non-compliance with the rule isn’t apparent. Transparency is not always a blessing.

Of course, even if an ideal system would have (non-expressly) authorized line judges to adjudicate crunch-time foot faults against the underlying standard of reasonableness and not in terms of the nominal rule, that does not fully determine whether Serena Williams’s step on the line should have been called. It could be that it was unreasonable or unfair all things considered—if, for example, her transgression was substantial or repeated. My sense is that it was neither, but I make no strong claims about it. I claim more strongly that Williams’s step on the line did not apparently put Clijsters at a competitive disadvantage: the ball landed squarely in the service court and was easily returnable. In sum, if I’m right that the foot fault rule is a rulified standard not a true rule, that would be a promising (though not conclusive) basis for supporting the McEnrovian intuition: the line judge should have cut Williams some slack.

6. CONCLUSION

My analysis of the puzzle of temporal variance in sports turns out to be two analyses. Temporal variance in the enforcement of penalties for infractions can be explained and justified by the fact that the over-restitutionary impact of penalties is greater as time toward contest completion diminishes. Temporal variance in the enforcement of power-conferring or constitutive rules depends upon a distinction between two types of rules (as contrasted with standards)—true rules, and rulified standards—married to the propositions that context might warrant disregarding the latter in favor of its underlying standard, and that a “technical” foot fault might comply with that standard even though it runs afoul of the implementing rule.

These arguments are tentative, only first steps toward a solution to the puzzle. But even if they do not ultimately justify temporal variance, I hope that readers will sense their potential utility for helping to resolve some problems that arise outside of sports—the lost chance doctrine in torts, the harmless error doctrine in criminal procedure, the regulation of municipal and corporate elections, the difference between genuine “jurisdictional rules” and mere claim-processing rules, or others. Insofar as they do, we have greater reason to believe that sports will repay searching jurisprudential attention.