

## DOVETAILING INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Draft

March, 31, 2004

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### Summary:

This paper is a draft. It is part of an on-going book-length project on Power and Justice in International Relations. Bringing together international law and international relations, the project reflects on the legality and legitimacy of the international system.

The main assumption of the argument made in the following pages is that there is no reason to believe that the search for international security and the search for international solidarity are antithetical. In fact, dovetailing security and solidarity is probably the best way to establish a (just) international order.

The paper looks into three sets of changes that are required at minimum for improving the dovetailing of international solidarity and security: changes in US foreign policy; stressing the democratic dimension of multilateralism as a system of legitimacy and empowerment; and improving the relations among international actors, including the UN.

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The rights of all are not secured when the rights of each are not protected. The violation of one's rights is an invitation to challenge the social arrangement which leads to this state of affairs, with the instability and insecurity that ensue. Being on the lookout becomes the common fate, for the powerless and the powerful. This shows that security and solidarity, far from being at odds with one another, work hand in hand. While security may be needed to engineer the delivery of solidarity, solidarity helps greatly to ensure security. All share and benefit from the tranquility of mind that solidarity provides. Taking solidarity seriously is therefore not a simple question of morality, of doing the right thing. It is also one of the best ways to guarantee security.

Historically, it is the lack of solidarity, of communal feelings beyond borders that has made the international realm particularly conflicting and dangerous. More often than not, international security has been pursued, not through inclusive values and practices based on reciprocity, but *via* the need to have the upper hand on one's neighbor. Disregard, suspicion and, ultimately, fear have ruled to a large extent.

September 11 and its aftermath are the latest illustration of this state of mind. Now the pressure is on to keep security apart from solidarity, to achieve security regardless of, if not against solidarity. Compared to the tentative yet significant push for international solidarity displayed in the 1990s, this is a set back. Judging by the polarization that it generates around the world, it is quite unlikely that this will help bring about an international order in which security and solidarity would be intertwined.

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How then can international solidarity be enhanced by highlighting its ability to embed international security in a legitimate way? This is what is at stake here. At minimum it requires answering two questions: what are the adjustments necessary in American foreign policy to make it contribute extensively to the establishment of a just international order? And what is required from international mechanisms and actors to make advancing a progressive international agenda a greater possibility?

### **I – US Foreign policy and the possibility of multilateralism**

It would be wrong to believe that the United States is the only international actor that truly matters. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War, its power and role are unparalleled, to the point that at the international level most things begin and finish with America. In the 1990s the United States ranked the United Nations and peace operations relatively low on its list of priorities. Yet America's attitude was one of the key factors accounting for the ways in which the UN and peace operations evolved. Since the arrival of Bush Administration to the White House in 2001, the situation has reached new extremes. With the help of September 11, the conservative administration has been able to radically modify the international agenda. Such imbalance and its effects on international life are all the more problematic when several characteristics of US foreign policy are now, arguably, endangering America's contribution to the possibility of a better world order. Thus a number of amendments ought to be envisioned.

➤ *The future of multilateralism and the need to change US foreign policy*

America, on the basis of its sheer power, would be able to project its influence internationally. But maintaining this influence would be difficult. From a material point of view, as the Iraqi case shows, the United States would have trouble handling on its own the troop deployments and the financial demands associated with long-term commitments, especially in areas of conflict. From a diplomatic standpoint, the legitimacy of America's foreign policy, if not the nature of its political system as a whole, would be destined to be increasingly questioned.

The United Nations would be equally in difficulty. Without the critical support of the United States, it would run the risk of becoming a rather secondary political entity. In the process, its overall relevance and legitimacy would be in jeopardy.

As for world order, a divorce between America and the United Nations would increase global instability. Since most countries favor a multilateral approach, resentment towards the United States would grow. Moreover, as the rest of the world, including the Europeans, is neither willing nor able to take up the task of collective security on its own (without America), the mission of preserving international security could end up facing two opposite but equally challenging predicaments: too much concentration or too much diffusion of power. In the first case, the United States alone would be more or less in charge of global security, with the various dangers associated with it. In addition to the impossibility for America to adopt a unilateral approach towards the deployment of

troops, as we have seen above, these dangers could include unbridled American power and it being the global scapegoat for whatever could go wrong. In the second case, left to the good will of local actors, international order could largely remain unattended.

Against this background, five changes appear to be necessary in the US foreign policy: finding a better balance between national and international interests; coming to terms with the foreign policy implications of American democratic values; exercising leadership within multilateral constraints; overcoming the parochial characteristics of the United States' foreign policy; and facilitating the learning ability of the American foreign policy elite regarding the changes required.

• *Aiming for a better balance between the US national interest and the international interest* – Calling for a better balance between national and international interests is not to imply that the United States' foreign policy has so far ignored the importance of this balance and has not tried to attain it. The US contribution to the establishment and development of multilateralism and the United Nations has been the product of trying to achieve such balance. But, somehow, the American belief that the United States is the best thing that has ever happened to the world and all that truly counts has grown over the years.<sup>2</sup> In the process, the American establishment has increasingly become accustomed to viewing other countries' national interests as hardly legitimate compared to those of

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<sup>2</sup> This belief is expressed as well as fueled by contradictory and yet complementary feelings, in which a sense of superiority and entitlement, of insecurity if not paranoia, of self-involvement and righteousness goes hand in hand with liberal patriotism and nationalism. It amounts to making national interest the obsessive benchmark of American foreign policy.

the United States. Consequently, it has also come to regard the international interest, particularly embodied in multilateralism, as of no great concern.

The goal here is not to advocate a U-turn in American foreign policy, in the context of which the international interest would become the primary factor. It is neither possible nor desirable. However, changes have to be introduced to mitigate the self-centered character of the United States' power projection. It is especially the sole superpower status of America that renders necessary the achievement of a better balance between national and international interests. US preponderance makes it indeed more difficult to have a foreign policy conducted first and foremost in the name of American national interest. Unlike the rather inconsequential international impact of a country of secondary importance, the overwhelming international influence of the sole superpower is certain to tremendously affect other nations.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the primary attention given to national interest by US foreign policy creates an imbalance that tends to empty multilateralism of its meaning and effectiveness. This endangers the interests of all states, including those of the United States.

The sheer amount of power that America enjoys induces it to consider that not only can it get away with adopting an *à la carte* approach to the international interest (following or disregarding the multilateral path at will), but that in doing so it is also maximizing its gains. This calculation is misled. The United States, in its own way, is as much in need of

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<sup>3</sup> The building of alliances among nations of secondary importance can change this state of affairs and give them noteworthy international power. This is namely what happened in the 1960s and 1970s, when developing countries formed coalitions within the United Nations, largely leading the United States to desert the world organization until the late 1980s.

multilateralism, of taking into account international interest, as other powers. Arguably, as a superpower, it is even more in need of multilateralism. A discretionary conception and use of the multilateral mechanisms and obligations leads the United States to deprive itself of one of the main instruments at its disposal to achieve what should be its principal goal: to generate a consensus based upon and around its preponderance. It deprives America of the possibility of making its preponderance part of a system of international justice, and therefore of making itself be seen as just. It deprives the United States of having a foreign policy seen as being part, expression and tool of international legitimacy.

- *Taking seriously the constraint of democratic values on US foreign policy* – Democratic values are an extremely effective tool for establishing a contemporary form of international legitimacy. Taking into consideration the fact that they are based upon a sense of universality/universalization and of sameness among people, and have the betterment of the as one of their main goals, they are highly inspirational. By aiming to place individuals and countries on an equal footing, they provide the substance and the procedures for imagining and implementing a structured international order in which the various actors involved could find their place. Nevertheless, for these values not to be a tool of political and cultural expansion and imperialism, for them not to trigger violence from people feeling alienated and deceived by them, they need to be taken seriously. This presupposes fulfilling the conditions of inclusiveness, plurality and mobility at their heart.

At the multilateral level, this requires institutionalizing a web of political power that has to be identifiable, strong and open. For these reasons, and although living up to democratic expectations is at the international level an enterprise even more demanding than at the national level, the United States has to come to terms with the political and policy implications, with the responsibilities brought about by now being not only the sole superpower standing, but also a democratic superpower.

A systematic unilateral American approach to international affairs or more of a self-serving (*à la carte*) multilateralism generalize one-sided attitudes. In the process, it is not only the validity claim of the structure of the international system that runs the risk of being undermined. It is also the democratic values and ideas at its foundation which are endangered. Hence the necessity to ensure that calling upon democratic values in the international setting is not a disguise for universalizing an undemocratic hegemony.

- *The United States and international democratic leadership* – Balancing the national and international interests better and welcoming the foreign policy implications of being a democratic superpower does not imply that America should give up its position of leadership and become a regular actor, if only for the reason that multilateralism does not work without leadership. Without leadership the variety of points of view inhabiting multilateralism are likely to cancel each other and become a paralyzing factor. Representation without ability to take action is no solution. Multilateralism requires that a country, or a group of countries, point the direction for others to coalesce around a

position. From this perspective, taking the multilateral contract seriously mainly signifies for the United States to use its leverage while keeping in mind three imperatives.

First, international cooperation is not a one-way street. It cannot be called upon by the hegemon when viewed as useful, and disregarded when considered as a source of inconvenience. Multilateral obligations have to be upheld by all parties, and especially by the most powerful of them. Second, leadership in the context of multilateralism builds upon the consent of other countries. Although multilateralism does not exclude resorting to coercion and force in certain circumstances, it establishes the search for consent as the most celebrated way to regulate the international system. Recognizing this point is all the more necessary for American leadership considering that contemporary international life increasingly relies upon a negotiated course of action. Third, taking multilateralism seriously from an international leadership point of view not using exclusively its conciliatory and conflict resolution powers exclusively as bargaining chips and opportunities to advance its interests. At best, as envisioned in the most inclusive and democratic understanding of multilateral philosophy, this makes for the promotion, in the midst of compatible differences, of a relatively open, i.e. fair, access to public goods (particularly in connection with key international rights, be they political, economic and social rights) the overarching goal.

- *The internationalization of American foreign policy* – The internationalization of American foreign policy calls for its elites to revisit their traditional positions on the role

of the US in the world, and on the world itself. It calls for both Democrats and Republicans to change their attitudes to a certain extent.

Although willing to recognize intellectually the new complexities (the possibilities and constraints) of the post-Cold War era, Democrats tend to have difficulty coming up with a grand strategy and a road map able to factor in these new complexities.<sup>4</sup> In addition, they are often short of displaying the moral and political discipline and of investing the moral and political capital that are needed at home to make the case for a more internationalist American foreign policy and deliver it on the ground.<sup>5</sup> The tentative foreign policy of the Clinton administration in connection with the international interventions of the 1990s regarding humanitarian crises, in Bosnia and Rwanda in particular, illustrated this point. The Democrat administration was eager to have people think that it was doing its best to end the humanitarian crises. On the other hand, it was unwilling to put itself on the line by taking decisive action and extending a strong sense of international solidarity at the peak of the conflicts.

For Republicans, a narrow conception of American national interest is a constant. This was the case throughout the 1990s and it applies even more so since the early 2000s with the new Bush administration and its neo-conservative elements. This frame of mind has its virtues. It makes the deliberation and decision-making processes, and action, easier.

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<sup>4</sup> On the challenge represented by the conceptualization and implementation of a strategy at the international system level in the post-Cold War era, for the United States and other global actors, including the United Nations, see Charles A. Kupchan, "Empires and Geopolitical Competition" (pp. 39-52), and Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "The Impact of Globalization on Strategy" (pp. 83-95), in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), *Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).

There is minimal hesitation and agonizing over which ends to pursue. Debates focus on the means to achieve agreed upon ends. Assessing what is right in a world of moral clarity is more straightforward than in a world of nuances. However the self-centered and confrontational tone associated with this approach tends to fuel the “war of the gods”, the radicalization of positions and fundamentalism all around.

- *American foreign policy and the ability to change* – Whether or not the United States’ foreign policy elite will be able to change its points of view is far from sure. Any chance of changing depends in particular upon two factors, one international and one domestic.

The international factor resides in the capacity of American friends and allies to send a message to the United States. More than its enemies, it is its friends and allies who can convey to the United States the need for change, both for its own sake and for the sake of international order.

As for the internal factor, it involves enlightened American political leaders. The emergence of these changes could take place through a less self-centered training of policy-makers in the areas of international affairs. In this regard, the fact that the academic field of international relations in American universities is largely inhabited today an intellectual ideology based upon the projection of the US view of the world does not help.

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<sup>5</sup> There is obviously a strong relationship between the difficulty in reaching and conveying intellectual clarity, and that of adopting a decisive moral and political course regarding the new international landscape.

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By keeping in mind the considerations above, the US could be able to balance the intoxicating temptation of power with the moral rewards of principled international rule. It could display a global foreign policy commensurate to its nature, role and responsibilities as a democratic superpower. It could balance power and democracy. To be sure, conceiving, designing and implementing a grand strategy along traditional security lines is simpler. Relating to reality from the sole point of view of the United States' national interest dispenses with the normative and policy headaches of leading and bringing together international plurality. But the search for international order and justice of which the United States is now largely the depositary and guarantor does not really make this a sound option in the long run.

## **II – Norms and actors of multilateralism, and the quest for international solidarity**

Adjustments envisioned to enhance international solidarity and its positive effects on international order cannot come only from America. They also have to take place in regard to the understanding of multilateralism and of the role that actors (in addition to the United States) play in it. This calls for promoting the dynamics of legitimacy and empowerment included in which is multilateralism, and encouraging the United Nations and member states, in particular, to follow through with the demands associated with it. Upon this condition lies their ability to help engineering just order and just change at the international level.

➤ *Multilateralism and the dynamics of legitimacy and empowerment*

The more challenging it is for the UN and multilateralism to address international crises, the more the following questions come to the forefront:

- How to balance *status quo* and change?
- Where to draw the line between what can be brought on the UN and multilateral agendas, and what has to be left out?
- How much the UN and multilateralism should be firm or flexible in the interpretation and implementation of their values and goals, so that they do not betray them?

Answering these questions is not easy, if only because the responses given to them are likely to engage the credibility of the UN and multilateralism as well as the future shape of international order. To unpack and underline the importance of the dynamics of legitimacy and empowerment inhabiting multilateralism helps solving the riddle. It helps identifying what is the right thing to do in the midst of plurality, of competing demands, and unfolding changes. Without eliminating them, it certainly helps to become more aware of and to minimize the trade-offs associated with choosing a course over others.

- *Multilateralism as a system of legitimacy and empowerment* – Multilateralism is about envisioning and implementing a system of international legitimacy and empowerment. It

is about defining the rules of the game for an international life aiming towards socialization. It refers to the coordination of relations and cooperation among states on the basis of generalized principles. The key international principles of collective security: sovereign equality of states; non-intervention in the affairs of other states; good faith; self-determination of peoples; prohibition of the threat or use of force; peaceful settlement of disputes; respect for human rights; and international cooperation, are a version of these generalized principles.<sup>6</sup>

In the various areas of application of multilateralism (including collective security, international trade and environment), generalized principles define what is internationally commendable and what is condemnable. They also express the value-ideals that significant actors (i.e. states and increasingly non-state actors) consider to be indispensable elements of the quest for a workable and justice-oriented international system, as well as avenues for their integration and participation in it. Generalized also try to regulate states' interactions in a consensual fashion that favors consistency and therefore predictability in the relations. In doing so, they pursue the overall coherence of the multilateral framework and the system of international legitimacy that it attempts to establish.

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<sup>6</sup> For a detailed analysis of each of these international principles, see Antonio Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, reed.), pp. 129-157. Also, on the non-exhaustive character of this list and the status of international principles, see Michel Virally, *Le droit international en devenir. Essais écrits au fil des ans* (Geneva, Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), pp. 206-212. More broadly, refer to Jean-Marc Coicaud, "International Organizations, the Evolution of International Politics, and Legitimacy", in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen (eds.) *The Legitimacy of International Organizations* (Tokyo-Paris-New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), pp. 536-545.

International, or generalized, principles, ultimately heading for nothing else than for the establishment of a rule of law at the international level, also seek the coordination and cooperation among states in order to secure and enhance the empowerment of each of them. This is one of the key conditions upon which states are willing to enter into collective coordination and cooperation, and to be constrained by it, including the loss of part of their autonomy of decision-making and action. The trust associated with long term cooperation makes the pursuit of self-interest not exclusive but inclusive. The inclusiveness associated with and epitomized by long term cooperation trust has systemic and temporal dimensions.

The systemic dimension of multilateral empowerment can be encapsulated as follows: the minimization of losses that multilateral cooperation implies for most states is all the more attractive that it brings about a collective or common good and elevates it into a system. The temporal dimension of multilateral empowerment resides in the ability of states to project into the future. The giving of a future and the various possibilities of investment and return on investment that this entails, counting the opportunities associated with some sense of community and collective future, are not the least of the dividends that multilateral empowerment generates. In this perspective, multilateral cooperation is at the same time what brings states together and the good that is exchanged.

- *From multilateral rights and obligations to democratic rights and obligations* – Multilateralism as a system of legitimacy and empowerment takes place through an intertwining of rights and obligations, themselves based upon international/generalized

principles. Rights and obligations of multilateral legitimacy and empowerment concern crucial but rather elementary requirements of existence and coexistence of states. Or at least that was the case until the Bush administration put forward its pre-emptive policy.

Up to the Bush administration, the enforcement of rights and obligations of multilateral legitimacy and empowerment was rather straightforward. It was about restraint: following the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, the objective was not to infringe upon other states' prerogatives. Or the enforcement of rights and obligations was reactive: It took place when a violation had to be redressed. The overall goal was to engineer or preserve basic global security. Now of course things are different. By lowering the threshold of threat, the doctrine of pre-emption championed by the current White House introduces an active dimension. Moreover, it is an active dimension which, in principle, is more or less permanent: the pervasive nature of terrorism (the danger that pre-emption *à la* Bush is meant to counter) calls for being on the lookout and ready to intervene on a constant basis.

Multilateralism does not stop at being a system of international legitimacy and empowerment. It is also a system of democratic legitimacy and empowerment. The rights and obligations deriving from the international principles dealing with human rights, i.e. self-determination and especially respect for human rights, account for this state of affairs. They amount to the emergence of the individual on the international scene. Focusing on what should be at minimum the quality of life of individuals within

countries, the democratic rights and obligations have been complex and intrusive, and as such controversial, from the start. Agreeing and even more so enforcing the respect for human rights in a world marked by diversity of cultures, regimes and levels of development has proved to be difficult. The discussions which marked the 1990s regarding the extent and limits of the international rights and obligations that international democratic principles trigger showed also that they clash with a *status quo* oriented conception of multilateralism. They showcased how challenging it is to find common ground on whether the obligation of the international community to intervene to stop to massive human rights violations is a duty (an unequivocal injunction endorsed by law), a responsibility (based on moral awareness, normative imperative and political considerations) or none of the above.

- *Multilateral democratic legitimacy: possibilities and constraints* – The main possibility emerging from the democratic legitimacy dimension of multilateralism and its development is that humanitarian intervention becomes an option. Multilateral democratic legitimacy alters the hierarchy that once clearly favored state-centrism and made the basic requirements of existence and co-existence of nation-states the sole pillar of international socialization.

From previously being quasi-absolute rights, not to be questioned, the rights of nation-states connected with the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states become conditional. They tend to partly depend upon the capacity of states to fulfill their duties and responsibilities towards human rights. For countries

with poor human rights track records, sovereignty is prone not to be anymore a shield behind which to hide. For instance, the military intervention in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 may have been illegal (it lacked a proper endorsement from the Security Council), but the authoritarian character of Milosevic's regime and the denial of basic individual rights to people from Kosovo did much to build the perception of its legitimacy.

The fact that the democratic legitimacy dimension of multilateralism makes room for getting involved in the internal affairs of a country in the name of human rights does not amount to a war-machine against troubled countries. The conditionality of rights of nation-states introduces as well constraints over the countries most likely to intervene, the developed, powerful and democratically minded nations. Designed to provide protections and guarantees for countries at the low and receiving end of the international distribution of power, the constraints are namely at work in regards to the qualification of crises and the ways to handle them. The reality of the violation has to be proven to justify encroachment on sovereignty, let alone use of force. As for the ways in which to take action, they have to be as much as possible in line with multilateral requirements.

In the present institutional arrangement of multilateralism, this calls upon the Security Council to approve, to give legality and legitimacy to the international involvement in a country in crisis, and to outline the modalities of intervention. The modalities of intervention have to be proportionate to the crisis situations, with force being the last resort and to be called upon and used only with precaution. Needless to say, the constraints that multilateralism imposes upon the intervening powers in human rights

crisis situations also apply in the field of global security. Here too both the evidence and the procedure of decision-making must satisfy the requirements. Moreover, as long as basic security is not truly under threat, there is no good reason to override sovereignty.

*Multilateral guidelines of action* – Member states, whatever their power level, cannot ignore altogether these guidelines, the extent and limits of actions that they design. Basic security and human rights are the minimum that people want, whoever and wherever they are. And if they are willing and eager to have the international community help these demands to be respected, in particular when local governments have a hand in their systematic violation, it is provided that the international intervention does not turn to the advantage of the intervening powers. In the end, people want to be as much as possible the masters of their own destiny and not the captives of a foreign rule.

The debates of the 1990s concerning humanitarian interventions and those of 2003 regarding the war against Iraq serve as a case in point. In the 1990s, in the developing and non-western world, where most of the international interventions took place, it was not so much humanitarian interventions *per se* that were a source of concern. It was the fear that Western powers (primarily the United States) could use them to extend their influence. Rather than international solidarity itself, it was its hijacking for non-international solidarity purposes which was the problem. In 2003, America's insistence on going to war in spite of the dubious existence of weapons of mass destruction triggered much suspicion. In the aftermath of the war, although few mourned the end of

Saddam Hussein's rule, many remained wary that the United States sees Iraq's interest as a distant second compared to its own.

*Consistency is not a luxury* – Consistency in the interpretation and implementation of the multilateral rights and obligations is essential for multilateralism to be able to ground its validity claim, and play an international socializing function. Systematic inconsistency makes a mockery of multilateral constraint all together. The consistency requirement entails for state-actors to move away from their tendency to have it both ways, i.e. from their tendency to maximize as much as possible multilateral benefits and minimize multilateral constraints, to focus on the multilateral aspects which suit them and disregard those which are costly. The temptation of having it both ways is especially strong for countries at the top of the hierarchies (considering their might), as well as for the ones at the lower end of the international distribution of power (their unprivileged situation can induce them to feel entitled to rights apart from responsibilities and duties). When it prevails, the sense of reciprocity at the core of multilateralism runs the risk of disappearing and, with it, multilateralism itself.

Avoiding *à la carte* multilateralism also calls for consistency at the normative level. It calls for rejecting a double standard attitude in the interpretation and implementation of the rights and obligations of the norms of multilateralism. Here the consistency requirement boils down to the fact that when there is inconsistency or selectivity in interpretation and implementation, it must be justified, i.e. motivated by factors which are as little as possible disconnected or foreign from the reasons and guidelines offered by

multilateral rights and obligations.<sup>7</sup> For example, it is consistent, and consequently acceptable, to take action vis-à-vis country X to defend human rights and not to do so vis-à-vis country Y if the contrast is grounded in a difference of gravity of the situations, with one satisfying the threshold justifying taking action and the other not satisfying it. But the inconsistency is not justified if two similar situations generate different responses due to external considerations –for example political, cultural, geo-strategic considerations.

Ultimately, the extent and limits to which powerful and democratically minded nations are consistent with and abide by multilateralism, including its democratic dimension, in the conduct of their foreign policy outline the extent and limits of their claim to be the models, depositories and key instruments of the system of legitimacy and empowerment that multilateralism seeks to provide. Their attitude becomes an indication of the extent to which the world should or should not believe in and embrace multilateralism.

➤ *International actors and the enhancement of international solidarity*

Finally, what are the minimum adjustments required from international actors, especially the United Nations and member states (in addition to America), to enhance international solidarity and its positive effect on international security?

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<sup>7</sup> On this issue, see the requirement of consistency at the heart of the relationship between the second principle of justice (the difference principle) and the first principle of justice (basic equal liberties) in John Rawls's theory of justice, John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness. A Restatement* (edited by Erin Kelly), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 42-43, and 61-64.

• *Improving the United Nations' role in support of international solidarity* – There are in particular two changes that could help the United Nations to strengthen its support to international solidarity. The first one is for the UN to be less of a headquarters organization and more of a global organization. There is a better political and institutional balance to be found between the demands of the politics of headquarters (in the Security Council and the UN Secretariat) and the necessity to reach out to needs coming from the ground. Second, the United Nations has to become more an institution of and for the people than an institution of and for the states. Growing attention given to the democratic dimension of international politics calls for this change. This makes enhancing the accountability and representation levels of the UN all the more necessary. How can this happen? Two possible improvements come to mind. One concerns the international civil service, and the other the political arm of the UN, the Security Council.

– Strengthening the international civil service could help the United Nations to support better international solidarity. International civil service, as well as national civil service, should not be so comfortable that people enlisted in it end up considering their role (serving people) as a nuisance and an obstacle to their tranquility. Nor should it be so volatile that people end up being too busy securing their own jobs and careers to attend truly to the problems and people that they are supposed to look after. It should be a balance between too much security (which invites complacency) and too much insecurity (which generates agitated paralysis).

After decades of cushy security, the UN civil service is growing increasingly unstable. Arguably, the institutional and professional flexibility that is partly sought after in the process does not compensate the pathologies resulting from this state of affairs. Associated with the endemic shortcomings of personnel in light of the broad mandates assigned, this leads to a work style that, at best, is no more than damage control. Like national bureaucracies, international bureaucracies are now under pressure to do more with less. But there is only so much that can be done with less. Beyond a certain threshold, it is the reality and meaningfulness of the task and of the means provided to perform it that are in question.

– The changes required from the Security Council concern the political side of the United Nations. Far from moving back to a traditional understanding and handling of international politics and crises, the Council should continue to favor the internationalist dimension that it developed in the 1990s. This entails for its permanent members to focus further on the responsibilities that their status brings upon them. The excess of power that they enjoy through the Council is only legitimate as long as it generates a proportional sense of international responsibility. When the rule of law is taken seriously, more power, rather than implying more rights and entitlements, signifies more duties. The ability to abide by this constraint is fundamental for the legitimacy of the Security Council, but also for that of the United Nations as a whole.

• *States as member states of the global community* – Member states have a critical role to play in the enhancement of international solidarity. Three types of change appear equally

needed. They are the democratization of states, the perfection of relations among states and other international actors, and the improvement of the role played by member states other than the United States

– From the democratization of states, one can hope to have member states overcoming more than it is the case today their Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde syndrome, their dual identity problem, with one side leading them to conform to multilateral requirements and imperatives, and the other encouraging them to try to evade them as much as possible.<sup>8</sup> If multilateralism is a key tool to engineer a “general will” at the global level, this can only happen if each state sees the overall benefit of transcending particular interests. Democratization, with its focus on public good, can help to achieve this universalization of interests. Upon this condition rests the possibility of countries to come together and reap the benefits of collective and long-term cooperation. Upon this condition rests as well the possibility for the UN to gain the advantage over other international actors, such as regional organizations and non-governmental organizations in the continuous competition in which it gets increasingly locked into.

– It has been the trend in recent years to give more responsibilities to regional organizations in the handling of collective security and humanitarian crises. The role played by NATO in the Balkans and in Afghanistan is a showcase. The operational

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<sup>8</sup> In Victor Fleming’s cinematographic adaptation of Robert Louis Stevenson’s novel *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1941), Spencer Tracy is Dr. Jekyll during the day, a medical doctor who enjoys a good reputation in his hometown and daily activities, and Mr. Hyde during the night, a reckless criminal. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali must have liked the film and received some inspiration from it. When posted in New York, he would describe the essence and attitude of member states as Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: two personalities –one good and one bad– in one body, two world visions in one entity.

limitations of the United Nations accounted for much of this tendency. This trend could, however, run the risk of creating problems. The polemics surrounding the ways in which the NATO bombing campaign was launched in the case of Kosovo have led to see these problems mainly in the light of whether or not the United Nations' authorization is required for regional organizations to take action. Behind this question, to which it is appropriate to answer "yes", lies nevertheless a more critical issue: what will happen to areas of conflict that fall outside of the range of action of efficient regional organisations and do not represent a strategic interest for major powers? What will happen in Africa, in particular, where big powers are reluctant to help and where the regional and sub-regional organisations are weak? Is the United Nations going to be led to explicitly endorse a *laissez-faire* policy? And if so, what will become of international solidarity, let alone of global security?

This shows that the international community cannot view regional organizations as a way to discharge itself from its global responsibilities. Moreover, it is probably neither possible nor desirable that the increasingly central place that NATO is taking in the emerging relations between global and regional security becomes the model for the future. What NATO is as an institution, the capabilities that it encompasses, the ways it was used and the autonomy that it demonstrated on some occasions in the Balkans have an exceptional character. The other regional organizations do not have today the capabilities and clout to play a similar role in their respective areas. In addition, using NATO beyond the European theatre ("out of area"), as it is done today in Afghanistan, should be done in a careful manner, and not too often. Calling upon NATO to support

international involvements around the world is likely to create over time resentment in the developing non-Western world. As a result, the way to go seems the following; while continuing to count on NATO, the international community has to envision concrete measures to upgrade the operational capabilities of the UN and encourage the strengthening of regional organizations other than NATO.

– Rather than being a source of negative competition, the relationships between states and non-governmental organizations, as well as those between the United Nations and the NGOs, ought to be conceived as an asset to organize cooperation cashing in on their respective strengths and a way to obtain better results in the area of international solidarity. What states and international organizations are missing in terms of flexibility, rapidity of reaction and intervention on the ground, non-governmental organizations have; and what is out of reach for non-governmental organizations, in particular when it comes to use of force, is accessible to public institutions such as states and international organizations. Their complementary character indicates that any attempt to enhance an internationalist agenda cannot, in the end, be achieved by a logic of “either/or”. It has to try to benefit from the various strong points of international actors and to create synergies among them.

– The United Nations best serves member states when it is as independent as possible from them while trying to engage them in the pursuit of the international interest. Any alignment or perception of alignment of the UN with the specific interest of a member

state, especially a powerful member state, is destined to undermine its credibility globally and ability to work on the behalf of the international community.

From a general standpoint, especially if they accept to improve their attitude, three groups of non-American member states can help the United Nations to assert better its status at the service of the international community.

Europe can help in three ways. First, although Europeans are always eager to present themselves as the most committed to internationalist multilateral policies (in the context of the UN and beyond), in reality, this commitment is often hampered by a strong attachment to the *status quo*. Europe's insistence on negotiated solutions is at times a way of hiding its uneasiness with rapid and drastic change. This needs to be altered. Secondly, there is among Europeans a reluctance to call upon decisive means to solve a crisis. If America is too eager to use force in certain situations, Europe's shyness in doing so is a limitation that has to be addressed. The fact that the European Union is now envisioning a military force which could undertake a number of tasks, including humanitarian interventions and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management and even peacemaking, could help. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, Europe should play a more important role in bridging the United States and the rest of the world. Rather than being simply another and less militaristic (compared to America) version of the contemporary West, Europe could serve as a "middle man". It could bring to the United States the concerns of the developing countries and to the developing countries the

concerns of the America. More than it is the case today, it could help them, namely in the context of the UN, to ease the tensions that keep them apart.

Developing countries also have a card to play. This presupposes going beyond the combination of victim and entitlement mentality that they tend to adopt. Finding a satisfactory balance between defending their national rights and fulfilling their national and international responsibilities is essential to their potential contribution to a more credible United Nations.

Finally, Asian countries (above all the leading ones) have a critical role to play. The conceptual, normative, political and operational management of the international realm is still very much a transatlantic affair. The United States and Europe continue to enjoy the lion's share. If trying to realize the mandates of the United Nations is going to become a truly global matter (and not simply a Western project), Asia has to be brought to the table more than is the case today. The various ways in which it is a bridge between developing and developed countries, the West and the non-West, and the fact that it is (with Europe and America) the only other global region put it in an ideal position, if it achieves self-confidence beyond its own realm, to make a significant contribution to the management of international order.

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As long as international politics is organized along nation-state lines, national interest and national security will remain defining features of international relations. Does this mean that international solidarity and the normative and policy preferences which go with it should be relegated as an incidental aspect of international life? No.

In the end, right (including the respect for individual rights), not might alone, is the best security guarantee, nationally and internationally. And right is achieved when solidarity becomes a structuring component of social life, nationally and internationally. It is therefore not enough for international solidarity to be recognized mainly as a moral obligation. Based on the responsibilities outlined in the core values of the United Nations and multilateralism (especially their democratic core values), solidarity must be viewed as equally important as security. The limitations of the multilateral handling of the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the security bent of Bush's foreign policy in the early 2000s show how far we still are from international solidarity being an integral part of the cement and fabric of international society.

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