Volume 9 Numbers 1/2

Winter/Spring 2000

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Yugoslavia - After his defeat in Kosovo at the hands of NATO, President Slobodan Milosevic has been struggling to stabilize and consolidate his grip on power. His targets have included judges and the independent media.

During its last session in 1999, on December 21, the Serbian parliament removed a Supreme Court judge, a Constitutional Court judge, and another judge on a lower municipal court from their positions. All three were known for having criticized the govern-ment's frequent abuse of the legal order. Ostensibly, the judges were dismissed for violating Art. 100 of the Constitution, which bars judges from performing any other public or political function. Constitutional Court justice Slobodan Vucetic was purportedly sacked because of his membership in a group of independent economists known as G17. (See Yugoslavia Update, EECR, Vol. 8, No. 4, Fall 1999.) Supreme Court justice Zoran Ivosevic and Bozidar Prelevic, a judge in a Belgrade municipal court, were removed supposedly because of their membership in the Association of Judges. The three judges may indeed have violated this constitutional provision. But this was the first time the provision had even been applied. For instance, Milosevic himself seems to have violated a similar provision (Art. 86) when he was both president of Serbia and leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) between 1991 to 1997. Moreover, it does not appear that Justice Vucetic was legally dismissed. Article 101 of the Constitution holds that Constitutional Court judges cannot be removed unless they retire, request dismissal, or are found guilty on criminal charges.

Members of the media were also targeted. During the war with NATO, the various Serbian media oper-ated under the strict censorship of the Ministry of Information, presided over by Aleksandar Vucic, the 32-year-old vice president of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRP). The government did not ease its controls after the strikes were over but continued its harsh crackdown based on the Law on Public Information, which was adopted by parliament on October 20, 1998. (See Serbia Update, EECR, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1998.) For example, on January 21, Ivan Markovic, the federal minister of telecommunications, lodged criminal charges against TV Studio B, Radio B92, TV Pancevo, and the Montenegrin dailies Vijesti and Pobjeda. The war of rhetoric has also continued. On November 25, Mirjana Markovic, the head of the United Yugoslav Left (UYL) and Milosevic's wife, stated that the Serbian media "needed decontamina-tion." She repeated her belief that NATO was still at war with Yugoslavia, albeit via nonmilitary means, and claimed that NATO was "using independent media to conquer Yugoslavia." Perhaps the most strident attack came from Vojislav Seselj, vice prime minister and SRP president, who lashed out at journalists at a February 10 press conference, promising that he would liquidate the independent media, which he labeled "treacherous." In an interview on December 31, Milosevic hailed the Law on Public Information, while claiming that it was not applied frequently enough.

It has, to the contrary, been used quite often. The law has been invoked 58 times since it was enacted. By the end of 1998, the total amount of the fines for violating this law (paid principally by the independent media) reached $670,000. Accumulated fines in 1999 added up to $1.3 million. Media outlets have been most often accused of violating Art. 69, which concerns libel. Not surprisingly, most of the statements deemed libelous by the government were criticisms of govern-ment officials and their work. According to both the Serbian Constitution (Art. 48) and the Yugoslav Constitution (Art. 44), such repressive actions by the government are unconstitutional. Article 44 of the federal Constitution reads: "Citizens shall have the right publicly to criticize the work of government and other agencies and organizations and officials. . . . Citizens may not be called to account or bear any other conse-quences for opinions expressed in the course of public criticism. . . ." Only one newspaper, Vranjanske Novine, has been fined for violating Art. 67 of the law, which criminalizes any attempt to overthrow the country's constitutional order or to provoke national hatred.

Media outlets have also faced other kinds of harassment and intimidation. On January 17, the trans-mission equipment of TV Studio B, under the control of Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM), was stolen. The director of TV Studio B, Dragan Kojadinovic, accused the government of organizing the theft in an attempt to reduce the station's influence (after the equipment loss, Studio B now reaches two million fewer viewers). Another attack at Studio B occurred on March 6, when men in police uniforms raided its transmission center, severely beating two employees, and tearing out transmitter cables. As a result, Studio B and Radio B92 temporarily went off the air. The very same day, the federal government fined Studio B 11 million dinars ($280,000) for not paying in a timely fashion for the use of a government-allocated frequency. A local court announced that another libel suit of $40,000 had been filed by a military officer.

On March 2, by government order, the state publishing house Borba formally took over Vecernje Novosti, a newspaper long under Milosevic's control, which had recently begun to criticize his policies. The takeover was carried out under the pretext that the 1998 ownership transfer of Vecernje Novosti had been illegal.

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Realizing that Milosevic does not intend to relax his grip on power, the fragmented Serbian opposition continues trying to coordinate its strategy and prepare for the upcoming local and federal elections. Results have been mixed. Public protests, which filled the streets during the fall, were silently terminated toward the end of December due to lack of popular support, but then began again in large force in April. The oppo-sition roundtable talks, which began on September 30, broke down on December 1, when the SRM spokesman informed the public that they were a "waste of time." After a series of unsuccessful efforts to discuss the issue of new parliamentary elections with the ruling coalition (that is, SPS, SRP, and UYL), SRM leader Vuk Draskovic called on the opposition to design a new strategy. Fourteen leaders of opposition parties attended a meeting on January 14 and drew up two declarations. The first, calling for preterm parliamentary elections in April 2000, was addressed to Milosevic. This was rejected by the regime the next day, leading the opposition to threaten mass protests. The second, which called for strict compliance with UN Resolution 1244 regulating the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and the lifting of air-traffic and fuel sanctions, was addressed to the EU, the US, Russia, and China.

The international community also tried to promote unity among the squabbling opposition parties. In fact, the EU and US sought to bring opposition leaders closer together by establishing a commission that consisted of opposition and international forces. The first informal meeting was held in Berlin on December 17. The opposition had hoped that the Western states would lift the economic sanctions at the meeting. This did not happen-although some EU diplomats supported the idea-and the meeting was considered a failure by most. At the commission's second meeting, on January 19, the EU apparently agreed to lift "some sanc-tions," without detailing which ones.

As winter drew to a close, however, the opposi-tion appeared closer to drawing up a single, unified list of candidates for local elections. The public also reasserted itself, and, on April 14, an estimated 100,000 people attended a rally in Belgrade's central square to demand early parliamentary elections. The demonstra-tion was led by approximately 20 opposition leaders representing a variety of parties and organizations. The Milosevic regime tried, somewhat unsuccessfully, to entice people to stay at home rather than attend the rally-during the demonstration, several recent, popular American movies were shown on television.

Meanwhile, Milosevic's propaganda machine ground on. Right after the NATO air strikes, Milosevic initiated a campaign known as Obnova I Razvoj (Building and Renewal), with the purpose of rebuilding the bridges, railroads, factories, and structures destroyed by NATO bombs. The pro-Milosevic media presented the campaign as another example of the president's extraor-dinary strength. The reconstruction, however, had a hefty price tag. Since no funds have flowed to Serbia since the NATO strikes, Milosevic's financial team printed the money to pay for the reconstruction. According to Serbian economic experts, the amount of Yugoslav dinars in circulation increased from 15 billion to 15.3 billion in November and then went up to 17 billion in February, causing a spike in the inflation rate, which went as high as 10 percent by the end of November. (The official figure of 2.5 percent was not considered credible.) Moreover, the campaign's results also fell far short of its goal. According to a report made by G17, the total amount of damage and loss inflicted on the Serbian economy by the war amounted to $805.4 million, but the amount devoted to recon-struction totaled $50 million.

The main goal of the government's economic policy between October 1999 and February 2000 consisted of an attempt to control the prices of basic foodstuffs. On November 27, the government issued a decree requiring all retailers to request government clearance when setting prices on basic goods. At the same time, the government kept the prices of products such as milk, bread, cooking oil, sugar, and meat under strict control. The low price of these products ensured social peace. The policy, however, created a disincentive for producers, as it soon became unprofitable to sell goods at such low prices. Producers gradually withdrew basic foodstuffs from the shops to sell them on the black market for 50 percent more than the official price. Hence, in grocery stores, September was a month without milk and meat; in October, November, and December, sugar and cooking oil were scarce; in February, bread was in short supply.

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The alleged assassination attempt on SRM leader Vuk Draskovic last fall has now been overshadowed by the murder of Zeljko Raznatovic (known as Arkan), who was shot on January 15. A longtime Milosevic crony and the alleged architect of Serbia's ethnic cleansing of Bosnia, Arkan had been indicted by The Hague Tribunal. Between January 19 and 23, the Serbian police arrested three men suspected of having committed the murder, two of whom had formerly worked for the police. Nevertheless, the speculation that the murder was ordered by Milosevic or someone close to his family does not appear well founded. The murder was more likely related to some murky business dealings. Another murder attracted the public's attention only three weeks after Arkan's death. Pavle Bulatovic, a Montenegrin who was the federal defense minister, was killed on February 7 by an unidentified gunman in a restaurant owned by a Belgrade soccer club. To date, no substantial information has been released regarding possible motives or culprits.

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As 1999 drew to a close, Montenegro continued to strain at its Yugoslav leash. Seeking to shake off some of the federal legal framework, the Montenegrin government promulgated in October a new law on citizenship and a new law on amnesty in November. In addition, the government adopted the so-called two-currency system, which introduced the German mark as an official currency in Montenegro, parallel to the Yugoslav dinar. (For more on Montenegro's proposal for increased autonomy, see Yugoslavia Update, EECR, Vol. 8, No. 4, Fall 1999.)

This last step was a calculated and defiant reac-tion to Belgrade's refusal to respond to Podgorica's quest for greater independence within the federation. But it was also spurred by the steady decline in the dinar's value-a result of the Yugoslav government's decision to print more and more money. In an initial reaction to the adoption of the mark, domestic Montenegrin producers increased the prices of goods by as much as 30 percent. After the first wave of salaries and pensions was paid out in marks, however, prices stabilized. While monthly salaries and pensions are quite low (the average monthly salary in Montenegro is about $90), they are, nonetheless, higher than Serbian salaries (at approximately $35 a month).

Just as the introduction of the mark represented a step out from under the federal economic and financial umbrella, so the new laws on citizenship and amnesty are further attempts to extricate Montenegro from the federation's constitutional framework. The Law on Citizenship creates a Montenegrin citizenship distinct from Yugoslav or Serb citizenship and stipulates that only individuals with ten years of residency in Montenegro qualify. This applies not only to foreign nationals but to Serbs as well. The law is designed to prevent any major changes in Montenegro's ethnic and demographic makeup; it seeks to bar Serbs from gaining Montenegrin citizenship and thus voting in elections or in a possible future referendum on Montenegro's independence. (The new law also forbids individuals from voting in both Serbian and Montenegrin elections.) These fears may have some legitimacy. The opposition Socialist People's Party (SPP)-ardent Milosevic supporters who oppose any increased independence for Montenegro-recently argued that the sizable number of Serbian residents who are of Montenegrin origin would be eligible to vote in any future Montenegrin elections or referendum.

The Law on Amnesty, which also constitutes a move away from Yugoslavia, is a direct consequence of NATO's recent military campaign. During the war in Kosovo, numerous Montenegrins refused conscription or otherwise evaded being drafted into the federal army. Approximately 17,000 individuals were charged with treason by military prosecutors and are currently awaiting trials in military courts. In response, the Montenegrin parliament passed an amnesty law that would clear draft dodgers of any criminal responsibility. It is unclear, however, how the Montenegrin government can enforce this measure against federal military and judicial authori-ties. Some leading politicians have declared that, at the very least, the Montenegrin police can refuse to carry out arrest orders issued by military courts.

Despite these tentative steps toward greater autonomy, Montenegro is still a long way from inde-pendence. President Milo Djukanovic's constant diplomatic activity has not succeeded in building inter-national support for a referendum on independence. The Western allies have given three reasons for their disapproval of a referendum: the desire to avoid regional conflict that would require NATO reengage-ment; the fear that Montenegro's withdrawal from the federation could further complicate the situation in Kosovo; and, lastly, the hope that Montenegro might play a role in pressing for political change in Serbia. Podgorica has apparently agreed to comply with the international community's wishes and has moderated its tone toward Belgrade.

The government's more cautious stance has also been dictated by a lack of clear public support. According to an opinion poll conducted last December, 36 percent support independence, 33.5 percent support strong federal ties with Serbia (or some form of unitary state), and 22.5 percent support the government's proposal from last year, that is, a redefinition of the federation into a kind of confederacy. Because a sizable portion of the population still supports some form of federal arrangement, many fear that Milosevic could use his Montenegrin supporters and the federal army troops stationed in Montenegro to provoke a conflict.

These fears gained credibility on December 10, 1999, when a dispute erupted at the Podgorica airport. Apparently, both federal and Montenegrin army forces claimed ownership of a certain building. As the dispute dragged on, the federal army responded by massing troops at the airport, temporarily shutting it down. After flexing their might, the federal forces withdrew. But, on March 2, federal army special forces again appeared at the Podgorica airport, apparently to send a signal to President Djukanovic, who was flying back that day from Germany, after having secured a 40 million mark loan. Djukanovic landed at a different airport to avoid a confrontation.

Two days later, on March 4, Serbian authorities blocked traffic at a border point between the two republics, halting the flow of goods. Such blockages had been common since early September, when the Serbian government reimposed an earlier blockade on basic foodstuffs and other goods transported into Montenegro. On November 20, about 100 trucks carrying food bought by Montenegrin food retailers reportedly had been stopped by the Serbian police on the border in Kolovrat. The blockade was lifted and reimposed in December and January, and, on February 3, following a decree by the Serbian Ministry of Agriculture, the border was closed completely, if temporarily. According to stories circulating in the press, the ministry imposed the blockade because of ostensible food shortages in Serbia. Needless to say, the blockade has no legal basis.

Scare tactics aside, it is unclear how Belgrade might react to a referendum on Montenegro's indepen-dence. Although Milosevic stated in an interview in Politika, on December 31, that the republic could secede from Yugoslavia if it wanted to, Serbian ministers and political figures have routinely indicated that Serbia would prevent independence by force. The information war continues, too. On February 16, the federal govern-ment set up a new television station in Montenegro. The federal minister of information, Goran Matic, explained that the station aims to inform Montenegrins better about Yugoslav politics.

In other spheres, the federal powers have proven rather less solicitous. On February 15, Dragoljub Ojdanic, former chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav Army, was named the new federal defense minister, in place of the recently assassinated Pavle Bulatovic, who was from Montenegro. This appoint- ment aggravated the imbalance within the federation because Ojdanic is from Serbia, and so Montenegro lost another ministerial post in the federal government.

In mid-December, Milutin Srdic, also from Serbia, was named president of the federal Constitutional Court. Claiming that it was their turn to fill the position, Montenegrin judges protested, and threatened to with-draw from the Court altogether. They also pointed to the overrepresentation of Serbians on many federal bodies. Indeed, recent appointments have almost invari-ably gone to Serbians loyal to the Milosevic regime. By the end of 1999, the governor of the federal national bank, the head of the federal Supreme Court, and the chief of staff of the Yugoslav military were not only all from Serbia but were above all allies of Milosevic and his Socialist Party of Serbia.

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Tensions have recently arisen within the Montenegrin ruling coalition itself. The proindependence Social Democratic Party (SDP) announced it may withdraw from the coalition if the government does not hold a referendum on Montenegro's status in the near future. Although SDP will probably not follow through on these threats, differences among the coalition partners on such key issues as the republic's status could desta-bilize the government.

A smaller crisis occurred when the Liberal Union (LU)-although not a member of the coalition at the state level-withdrew its representatives from governing coalitions at the municipal level in Podgorica and Herceg-Novi. As a result, new elections will have to be held in these two cities. The elections will have significant symbolic importance. Podgorica is the capital and the largest city in Montenegro, and home to a quarter of the total electorate. Herzeg-Novi is the stronghold of the pro-Milosevic SPP. Thus, the local balloting in these two cities will serve as a preview to this fall's federal elections.

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A Quarterly Published by New York University Law School and Central European University