Volume 9 Numbers 1/2

Winter/Spring 2000

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Belarus - The political impasse in Belarus wors-ened this past winter. President Alexander Lukashenka continued to rule by decrees that were subsequently rubber-stamped by the National Assembly (Nacyianalny Skhod). The OSCE-sponsored talks between the government and opposition never really got off the ground. In fact, having ignored the OSCE's recommendations and Belarus's pledges to the organization, on February 11 Lukashenka signed into law the new electoral code that was supposed to have been the principal focus of talks with the opposition (more on this below). Parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 2000.

Meanwhile, the government has undergone several cosmetic changes. On February 18, a new prime minister, Uladzimir Jarmoshyn, the mayor of Minsk, was appointed, replacing the 65-year-old Siarhej Linh, now retired. The change is believed to have no significant implications, either for economic or political developments.

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The most-significant political changes came in the field of Belarusian-Russian integration, which took a major step forward, on December 8, when Boris Yeltsin and Alexander Lukashenka signed the Treaty on the Formation of the Union State and a second document outlining a program to make the treaty a reality. In December, both the Russian and Belarusian parlia-ments ratified the agreement, which envisages-by 2005-a single currency, harmonized legislation, and uniform policy for tax, customs, borders, and defense, as well as shared securities markets. According to the treaty, however, the two states will preserve their sovereignties and national identities, remaining sepa-rate entities at the UN and other international bodies. However, should it be presumed necessary, the two nations can combine their diplomatic missions abroad and be represented as one. The new union will be governed by a supreme state council, comprising the two countries' heads of state, prime ministers, and parliamentary speakers, and a union parliament, consisting of a union chamber (with 36 members from each national parliament) and a chamber of representa-tives (elected by direct vote, with 28 Belarusians and 76 Russians). The union will also feature a council of ministers, a union court, and a union auditing chamber.

The opposition organized a series of street protests, declaring the treaty nonbinding because Lukashenka and his parliament had lost domestic and international legitimacy. In its statement, the US State Department stressed that it had no objection to the integration of European states so long as it was mutu-ally beneficial, voluntary, and did not interfere with wider transatlantic integration. In order to be voluntary, however, integration must be the result of a democratic process, which the treaty was not.

In general, constitutional experts have played down the treaty's significance, pointing to its ambiguous character and the failure of five similar agreements signed between 1995 and 1999. Indeed, the signing of this latest treaty was delayed several times, and the text underwent numerous changes. Lukashenka was not pleased with the final version, and declared that he and Yeltsin would soon sign a new treaty, this time on the union's actual structure not just on its formation. But Yeltsin's sudden resignation, on December 31, and the emergence of Vladimir Putin, first as acting, and now as president of Russia changed the character of Moscow-Minsk relations. Lukashenka's attempts to play a role in the Russian political arena were dealt a heavy blow.

The integration process has not entirely stopped but has continued in a manner and in areas that primarily reflect Moscow's interests. A joint Russia-Belarus mili-tary group has been formed, and the new Russian defense doctrine-endorsed by Lukashenka-antici-pates the use of Russian nuclear arms in the case of a threat to Belarus. As far as monetary union, the Russian central bank unequivocally stated that any future joint currency could be issued only under its auspices and that Belarus would have no issuance rights. In February, Minsk was denied the millions of rubles in credits from Russia it had hoped to receive.

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In the absence of reforms and with meager foreign investment, the economy remains in deep crisis. In February, the average monthly wage was around $30; foreign trade fell by 20 percent in 1999; a currency devaluation by a factor of 1000 had no positive effect on inflation. In its Index of Economic Freedom for 2000, the American Heritage Foundation listed Belarus as 145 out of the 161 nations surveyed and placed it in the category of "repressed."

Neither the legislature nor the Constitutional Court plays any significant, independent role. The prac-tical work of drafting laws and decrees has shifted to the National Legislative Center, which was created by and is under the auspices of the presidential administration. (See Belarus Update, EECR, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1998.) Director Ihar Andreyeu reported that, in 1999, the center's experts drafted 26 bills and oversaw the drafting of another 364. In the future, all bills are to be drafted exclusively by the center. Among the laws that have been prepared under the president are administrative and electoral codes and a law on the National Assembly.

It had been hoped that the draft of the new elec-toral code would be the main ground for compromise and reconciliation between Lukashenka and the opposi-tion during OSCE-sponsored talks. On November 16, 1999, at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, Lukashenka invited observers from member countries to witness the elections in Belarus, which are, he asserted, "free, fair, and meet modern requirements." On February 11, however, he signed into law the new code, without taking into account the proposals of the opposition or the OSCE monitoring mission in Minsk. This code covers elections to local soviets, parliament, the post of president, as well as referenda. Several discriminatory measures-such as a ban on running for office by those who have been fined by a court, limitations on appealing electoral decisions, and the like-were eliminated. The turnout threshold for the second round of parliamentary elections was lowered from 50 to 25 percent.

Nevertheless, the OSCE-proposed mixed propor-tional- majoritarian system was rejected in favor of the old majoritarian one. The law also fails to guarantee the opposition free and equal access to the state media. According to the OSCE, the code gives the executive full control over the various electoral commissions, and the limitations it imposes on campaigning violate freedom of speech and the right to self-expression.

The opposition, however, insists that a more important constitutional issue should be resolved before there is any further discussion of the electoral code, namely, that of the parliament's powers. Constitutional changes in 1996 did away with the separation of powers and stripped the parliament of any meaningful role. Free access to the mass media is another major concern that has not been properly addressed.

In January and February, three European parlia-mentary bodies-the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament-held hearings on Belarus. Their represen-tatives visited Minsk in March and held talks with the opposition and the president. The delegation insisted on continuing the dialogue and warned that future parliamentary elections might not be recognized by the international community. Lukashenka dismissed the criticism and declared that there was no further role for the OSCE monitoring group in Minsk.

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