Volume 9 Number 4

Fall 2000

Feature

Poland
     Arista M. Cirtautas

Contrary to initial expectations, negotiations between Warsaw and Brussels over Poland’s entry into the EU have not been limited to the technical dimensions of the acquis, institutional parities, and economic criteria for competitiveness and fiscal sobriety. Instead, the negotiations and the public debates on both sides have taken on a highly charged character pervaded by intense rhetoric and extensive fears. For example, while it was once commonly understood that Poland’s membership in the EU would be the first major step in fulfilling the Union’s objective of "promoting an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe," Poland’s leaders now find themselves forced to defend their country’s "European-ness" and "EU readiness" by emphasizing their country’s contributions to European civilization. Thus, Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, the former foreign minister, Bronislaw Geremek, and President Aleksander Kwasniewski have all made continuous reference to Poland’s Solidarity movement, and to the fact that, in Buzek’s words, "Poland’s declaration on behalf of European unity was made twenty years ago, when the Solidarity movement was created, [the] movement [aimed] at restoring Poland’s place in civilization, where human rights and freedoms are fully respected." Ironically, while such praise of Solidarity has lost its appeal in domestic Polish politics, the movement’s name and legacy have been deployed repeatedly on the European stage as a symbolic challenge to growing tendencies in Western Europe to downgrade Poland’s membership in favor of the West’s own parochial solidarities.

Most importantly in this context, Germany, under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, has clearly reoriented its commitments inward, away from EU enlargement toward the pursuit of policies designed to enhance German solidarity. This means an emphasis on combating unemployment and fears of immigration, including the immigration that is expected to result from Poland’s entry into the EU. Since the collapse of communism, the German public has been preoccupied with a possible loss of living standards associated with increased immigration from Eastern Europe. Even the prospect of Polish workers legally seeking employment in Germany is viewed through a prism of anxieties over crime rates, unemployment, and a loss of national identity. In addition, German nationalists have raised the question of Polish restitution to the Germans who were forced to leave what is now Polish territory in the aftermath of World War Two. The Polish government, for its part, has put forward restitution claims against Germany for the forced labor Poles were subjected to under the Nazi regime. The past, in short, has cast a painful shadow over enlargement, leading one German journalist to conclude that, unless these problems are solved, Poland may not even be able to gain admission to the EU (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 2, 2000, p. 9).

Not surprisingly, German public opinion is heavily against EU enlargement. Only 20 percent of the population regards enlargement as a priority, while two-thirds oppose it. Against this backdrop, the controversial suggestion made by the EU commissioner in charge of enlargement, Guenther Verheugen—that national referenda should be held on enlargement (in Germany, as well, where the Constitution currently bans referenda)—was particularly telling. Not only did a highly placed EU representative, who happens to be German, cast doubt on official EU objectives, by underscoring his concern for German national interests, he also connected the EU’s problems of democratic accountability (the so-called "democratic deficit") with the enlargement process, thus bringing the tension between broadening and deepening into stark relief. According to Verheugen, enlargement should proceed openly, not "behind people’s backs," as was the case with the introduction of the single currency. Moreover, Verheugen’s suggestion seemed to put first the need to enhance representational solidarity between the EU and its current constituency, namely Western Europeans, even if this occurs at the expense of enlargement—the selling of which Verheugen considers "dirty work" (The Economist, September 9, 2000).

Even Germany’s own EU Commissioner Michaele Schreyer seems to concur that selling Poland’s membership to the German public will be a difficult and somehow unclean business. In a recent interview, she opposed an EU organizational reform that would rotate Commission representation (to accommodate a larger number of member states), in part because she could not imagine what sort of "discussions" would take place should Germany relinquish its commission seat to Poland (Frankfurter Rundschau, October 20, 2000). In response to Verheugen’s tacit support for deepening and to the fear that the enlargement negotiations with Poland and the rest of the first-tier applicants will fall victim to both an indifferent or hostile public and uninspired Western leadership, Timothy Garton Ash, Michael Mertes, Jacques Rupnik, and Alexander Smolar addressed an open letter to Europe’s leaders challenging them to be as serious about enlargement as "they have always been about the euro. A weak euro may be a blessing in disguise. A weak Europe is an unmitigated curse. But who among our leaders will take up this challenge?" (The Independent, September 22, 2000, p. 4).

Unfortunately, such visionary leadership is unlikely to be found at the EU level, where the need to protect the solidarity of Brussels’s elaborate bureaucratic culture from the disruptive impact of new members is only growing stronger. Consequently, training programs have been established to initiate East European elites into the practices of the EU bureaucracy. Extensive testing is foreseen for the new personnel to be appointed after entry. But such measures have not allayed EU fears that Poland’s Slavic culture is just too disorderly and undisciplined, too unsophisticated and, interestingly, too American, to be tamed. Hence the specter of a Trojan horse has been raised, in which Poland, as a member state, would provide an entry point for American (and Ukrainian) interests, thus diluting the Union’s ability to pursue its collective interests even as it undermines the unique bureaucratic culture whose particular magic allows the EU to function in spite of the diversity of languages and nationalities. (The Trojan-horse metaphor was, I believe, first used by the Polish weekly Wprost in the summer of 2000. When Geremek was asked at the annual Copernicus Lecture, at the University of Michigan, in September 2000, whether Poland really was a Trojan horse for the United States, he replied unapologetically that it would be a Trojan horse for Ukraine as well.)

Such apprehensions are reciprocal. Poland’s farmers and nationalists fear the EU as a Trojan horse that could permit Germans and others to buy up the national patrimony. According to Polish officials, an atmosphere of "unnecessary mistrust" pervades Polish-EU negotiations, while "proof positive" of the EU’s lack of good faith toward Poland is to be found in the fact that the second-tier applicant countries have "covered as much ground in six months of negotiations as Poland did in two years" (Financial Times, October 24, 2000). The extent to which Poland might bring non-European commitments with it into the EU, along with "uncivilized" orientations (for example, a lack of support for supranational deepening), in addition to its obvious need for substantial economic assistance, is clearly perceived as a threat to existing solidarities.

Not surprisingly, then, given the problems that the Polish candidacy poses for the EU, Poland may not be included in the first wave of admissions now scheduled to take place before 2004, even though the Polish government has made substantial progress toward meeting established entry requirements. Consequently, in spite of an expected positive assessment of Poland in the EU’s annual report on candidate countries (political criteria for membership are deemed to have been met, while economic criteria are extremely close to being met), Malta, Slovenia, Estonia, and Hungary are now considered the front-runners for early entry (The Financial Times, October 11, 2000, p. 1). The Polish government, moreover, is increasingly concerned that the longer the country’s entry is delayed, the more likely it is that the EU, and especially Germany, will lose interest in further expansion, shunting the remaining candidates into a drawn-out holding pattern. To preclude Poland’s slide into an indefinitely extended EU candidacy, the open letter by Timothy Garton Ash and the others has urged that the "first round must include Poland, the most difficult but also the most important country in the leading group of applicants."

In short, the emotional, zero-sum debates surrounding Poland’s candidacy represent a considerable departure from the usual bureaucratic, legal, and technical discourse of the West European political establishment. This change in rhetoric is perhaps the most vivid indication of what is at stake, substantively, in the enlargement process—not only for Poland but for the EU as well. For both sides, the stability of liberal democracy and a sustained economic development are clearly the overriding goals of enlargement. For the EU, however internal security is also at stake.

Unlike previous enlargements, this is the first to include the justice and home-affairs acquis, which now cover asylum, control over external borders, migration, organized crime, terrorism, drugs, as well as police, customs, and judicial cooperation. Most importantly, the acquis also includes the Schengen agreement on the dismantling of border checks between member states. Under these conditions of heightened interdependence, extending membership to Poland is not just a question of extending rights and practices, it is also a question of Poland fulfilling crucial obligations. According to the EU’s own documents, enlargement is conditional not just on the completion of legal and technical matters but also on existing members becoming convinced that the new members will adhere to the "bond of trust between member states, that they will all follow the same rules, with the result that they do not need borders or controls between them" (Catherine Day, Director, DG for Enlargement, Enlargement and Civil Society 1999 Conference Proceeding, Brussels, October 1999, p. 31).

Unfortunately, the very obligations that Poland must undertake to demonstrate trustworthiness, and so preserve the EU’s collective internal security, may very well undermine Poland’s own socioeconomic development and democratic stability. Two areas in particular—border controls and labor mobility—highlight the impact that EU candidacy and eventual membership will have on Poland.

Border controls
The security of Poland’s eastern borders has become of serious concern to the EU. Not only has EU money (more than $50 million this year alone) and technical assistance been provided to shore up Poland’s ability to control its borders. In addition, the EU hopes to station German patrols along the Union’s new eastern front. According to Brandenburg’s minister for justice and European affairs, up to 10,000 German border guards are available for a possible "Schengen border control" in Poland. The fact that such an unprecedented breach of national sovereignty, even by the EU’s supranational standards, is being considered, is an indication of the EU’s vital interest in border security. Even Leszek Balcerowicz, an unwavering advocate of European integration, has pointed to the unfairness of the EU’s stance in this regard: while demanding that Poland seal its eastern border immediately, the EU still refuses to give Poland a concrete entry date for admission (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 23, 2000).

Although Poland has managed to resist the outright militarization of its borders with Ukraine and Belarus, Polish customs officers have begun to police the border in keeping with EU expectations. German-trained, "masked, machine-gun-wielding Polish border brigades" have successfully tightened restrictions, often using force and intimidation in the process; but in doing so they have also curtailed the vibrant "bazaar economy" that had sprung up in the border regions (Newsweek International, September 18, 2000, p. 18). As a result, economists estimate that 140,000 jobs will be lost on the Polish side in a region that can ill afford such a reduction. It is also estimated that petty border trade accounts for as much of 29 percent of Poland’s exports (in 1996–97, for example). Since Polish export capacity is already weaker than that of Hungary or the Czech Republic, the loss of this border trade and expected competition from the EU after membership could result in a substantial trade imbalance (as much as $4 billion in the first five years) as imports increase over exports.

In the long run, admittedly, Poland is expected to benefit economically from increased trade with the EU. The long run, however, may prove too late for Poland’s eastern provinces, the poorest regions in the country. These communities might well suffer permanent damage as small-scale economic entrepreneurship is increasingly limited, not just by the EU’s border restrictions but by its quality controls as well; even domestic producers must increasingly conform to the EU’s standards. These are decisive disadvantages; the limited educational background and limited skills in these regions will further prevent people from taking advantage of new opportunities. Small-business loans administered by the European Bank for Recovery and Development, for example, require prohibitively complex documentation.

Poland has one of the highest percentages of functionally illiterate adults in Europe. Thus, a substantial investment in human capital will be necessary to help disadvantaged regions cope with the end of the bazaar economy. That EU funds, structural and other, will help compensate for the adverse effects of membership is the clear hope. Current predictions are that Poland will receive EU funding on a scale that it can effectively absorb and administer—approximately 4 percent of its annual GDP (The Economist, September 9, 2000). Subtracting the probable costs of joining (an estimated 1.5 percent of annual GDP for the first five years), leaves a gain of 2.5 percent. This is not an inconsiderable sum. But its distribution will be contingent on Poland’s ability to manage the funds according to EU standards. There is no guarantee that this will be the case: EU assistance funds have already been withdrawn from Poland on grounds of ineffective management. In this context, the EU’s growing concern with corruption and incompetence in Polish public administration is also of particular importance. If levels of corruption are deemed too high, decreases in funding are probable.

Labor mobility
The EU can assist in other ways, of course. The broader EU labor market may provide employment for Poles negatively affected by EU policies. Opinion polls in Poland show that the unemployed strongly favor membership and that, in general, 35 percent of those polled would like to seek employment opportunities in the EU after membership. No doubt, many of these potential entrants into the European labor market are part of the new "demographic wave" of some two million Poles seeking employment in the coming years. This wave has awoken considerable concern in Austria and Germany, where neither the public nor the government have much confidence in the Polish economy’s ability to absorb so many job seekers. Consequently, even though German research shows that the actual number of immigrants from new East European member states would be much smaller than expected and that Germany needs at least 200,000 immigrants annually over the next decade to maintain the size of its current workforce, fears of a crush of Polish workers has prompted the EU to seek restrictions on Polish labor mobility even after entry into the Union. Although these negotiations are ongoing and the final outcome is unclear, the extent to which the EU is willing to hold in abeyance a central tenet of the single market (freedom of movement) and a fundamental right of EU citizenship (the right to seek work anywhere within the territory of the Union) reflects the Union’s overriding interest in internal security.

Immigration from Eastern Europe is increasingly associated with crime and corruption in Western Europe. As a direct consequence, Poland is being asked to accept a second-class membership status. Here again, the socioeconomic cost of Polish acquiescence is considerable, especially for the rural population. Since it is generally accepted that EU agricultural subsidies will not be extended fully to Polish agricultural producers, a painful restructuring of this sector is imminent. Given that 38 percent of the population lives in the countryside and that agriculture accounts for 27 percent of Poland’s labor force (while accounting for only 6.4 percent of GDP), many of these farmers and farm workers will soon be looking for new employment.

If the Western labor markets remain restricted and if the local housing shortage (which prevents labor mobility in Poland) remains acute, Poles in depressed rural regions will have few options but to fall back on, or continue with, subsistence-level farming. If farm lands are indeed bought up by foreigners or more prosperous Poles, the number of homeless unemployed will increase. Again, the extent to which the EU will provide adequate funds to assist in both restructuring agriculture and facilitating the expansion of the Polish labor market is unclear. Past EU policies have actually worsened the current condition of Polish agriculture by "mercilessly battering Poland’s farmers in the marketplace" with the EU’s own heavily subsidized exports (Newsweek International, November 29, 1999, p. 44). A recent agreement regarding initial EU assistance for agricultural restructuring is being cofinanced by Poland. If cofinancing becomes a condition of aid, the Polish government will have to walk a difficult line between the need to underwrite social-assistance and economic-restructuring programs and the need to maintain the budgetary discipline required by the EU. Against this background, Balcerowicz’s recent plea that "a little solidarity from the EU would go a long way" is especially poignant (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 24, 2000).

EU membership will have a profound effect on the economy’s complex pattern of formal, informal, commercial, agricultural, and barter sectors. The barter sector, the agricultural sector, and the realm of small-scale entrepreneurship in particular will be at a disadvantage, thereby increasing socioeconomic and regional disparities in Polish society. Naturally, those social groups better situated regionally and with a better knowledge of Western "codes of behavior" and higher levels of education will continue to benefit from integration. At the same time, the most disadvantaged will now be joined by increasing numbers of those who had been coping well enough in the last ten years, but whose survival strategies are inadequate to the new conditions. While current socioeconomic disparities appear tolerable, it is not certain whether Polish society can absorb or accept the deteriorating conditions of these potential new casualties of EU membership.

Overall, the hope in Poland is that joining the EU will help contain socioeconomic divisions and disparities, rather than reinforcing them. In this context, EU membership is not just a vehicle to integrate Poland into Europe. It is also seen by some as a vehicle to promote domestic regional and social integration. Given the unlikelihood of such an outcome, at least in the short to medium term, the question becomes how Poles will respond politically to the potential loss of livelihood and to the deepening of social divisions caused, directly or indirectly, by the EU. One obvious response is a decrease in the popularity of EU accession. Poland was once the East European country most in favor of membership. But now only 30 percent of those polled definitely support membership and only 59 percent would vote in favor of it, down from 80 percent approval in 1996 (CBOS Survey, July 2000).

Increasing public awareness of stiff membership requirements has clearly shaken the public’s confidence in the positive benefits of EU accession. If this trend continues, Poles might reject entering the EU in the referendum required to approve membership. Assuming, however, that the number of those who would vote for joining does not decrease further and that the major political parties remain committed to European integration, membership is likely to be approved on the Polish side—even if unenthusiastically. After membership, two scenarios are possible: a dramatic rise in populism, as resistance to European integration is mobilized; or a less visible but nonetheless significant decline in the quality of political representation, as EU membership erodes the capacity of both ordinary Poles and the Polish political elites to participate effectively in the public realm constituted by the EU.

A populist response?
The appearance on the political scene of Andrzej Lepper, a so-called populist firebrand capitalizing on the rural population’s fears, has raised concerns over a hostile backlash against the EU. Lepper’s movement, Samo Obrona (Self-Defense), has promised to protect Poland’s "political and economic sovereignty." Although the movement’s tactics, which include French-style highway barricades, are not widely supported, public anxiety over the loss of economic independence is growing. CBOS, for example, reports that a "relatively small but noticeable group of respondents (4 percent) regard a loss of economic independence as the greatest threat to national sovereignty" (June 2000). The Catholic nativist movement associated with Radio Maria, a Catholic radio station, has also sought to channel simmering fear and frustration—which has many causes—into a popular rejection of all things Western, including the EU.

To date, Radio Maria’s followers have been limited to older rural inhabitants. Such populist movements may now be able to gain ground in the general population. For example, in the voivod elections of October 1998, the major parties (Electoral Action Solidary [EAS] and Democratic Left Alliance [DLA]) received only 26.8 percent of the vote, which leaves the preferences of the remaining 73.2 percent open to question. As Lena Kolarska-Bobinska concludes, the "shape of the Polish political scene is not foreclosed once and forever. The second stage of transformation can also bring serious changes in the political sphere" (quoted in George Blazyca, "Polish Socioeconomic Development in the 1990s and Scenarios for EU Accession," Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 5, p. 821). On the other hand, the Polish public also seems relatively realistic about the potential costs of EU membership, expecting higher levels of unemployment, the disruption of rural lifestyles, and the Polish government’s inability to protect Polish interests. Even the hierarchy of the Catholic Church is, for the most part, positively inclined toward EU membership. This realism or resignation, combined with the political marginalization of nationalist and populist groups, reduces the potential for a broadly based backlash against European integration.

Decreasing political representation
Although the rise of a politically destabilizing populism seems unlikely, the gradual disenfranchisement of Polish citizens is quite possible. EU membership will certainly safeguard formal civil liberties, political rights, and general human rights. But the capacity of ordinary citizens to act in politically meaningful ways in pursuit of their own interests will be further undermined by the conditions of EU membership. Most obviously, the decline in living standards will have a negative impact on the capacity of many Poles, outside preexisting trade unions or professional associations, to promote their interests.

Moreover, effective political participation will increasingly require mobilization on three tiers: the local/regional, the national, and at the EU level. Although Polish citizens have established relatively strong activist networks locally, it will be difficult given limited financing and experience, to move beyond this first tier. In addition, the feeling of autonomy on which civic activism is based may also be lost, even at the local level, as disadvantaged citizens increasingly become dependent clients of bureaucracies distributing and administering EU adjustment funds. Unease is already growing in Poland about the EU’s highly rigid and overly bureaucratized nature.

The quality of Polish officials, at both the local and national levels, could be jeopardized as well. If the most-able civil servants are dispatched to Brussels to fulfill the Polish personnel quota, a dearth of qualified state administrators might result. A majority of Polish citizens already believes that their national government serves, at best, only the interests of a minority. If their confidence in the accessibility of local government is shaken (currently, 39 percent feel that individual citizens can and do influence local affairs) after Poland becomes a member state, the EU will have exported its own democratic deficit, as it were, and exacerbated popular dissatisfaction with democracy inside Poland (CBOS, June 2000).

Even established political elites, parties, and civic associations in Poland are going to find it difficult to navigate all the relevant levels of representation. As Kuehnhardt, et. al., have pointed out, "the ability to enter the European Union is not identical to the ability to function within the European Union. Whereas the former requires fulfilling the formal criteria of the acquis communautaire and the Copenhagen conditions, the latter requires a mental, in other words, a spiritual, programmatic, and strategic development within Polish social groups, political parties, and governmental institutions" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 29, 2000, p. 11). In many ways, EU membership presupposes well-organized interest groups, NGOs, and political parties, in addition to well-trained civil servants, all capable of negotiating and sustaining credible commitments and effective policy positions. Accordingly, Phillipe Schmitter argues that the EU is best understood not as a supranational government in the making but as a process of negotiation and compromise among a plurality of polities and deliberative networks ("The Future of Democracy: Could it be a Matter of Scale?" Social Research 66, no. 3). From this perspective, the EU resembles less a democratic form of federal governance than a feudal court society comprising notables and estates, where tough-minded strategic bargaining is cloaked in elaborate conventions of civilité.

To date, Polish officials negotiating with the EU have not been particularly successful in navigating this court society writ large. For all the problems on the Western side, the EAS coalition government has not always formulated clear and consistent positions vis-a-vis Brussels. A general lack of detailed information about the costs and benefits of European integration, as well as frequent replacements of the Polish minister in charge of EU negotiations, have only compounded the problems.

Although Polish elites will no doubt adjust rapidly to life in the EU, there is a danger that, once membership is achieved, the current consensus in favor of entry will give way to increasingly polarized debates within the Polish political establishment over what exactly was won or lost in the negotiating process. Just as the roundtable negotiations of the past have become a focal point for recriminations and conspiracy theories, so, too, could the EU negotiations become a flashpoint for political polarization. An "all or nothing" division could emerge between those who maintain that EU membership is as necessary as breathing, as Geremek once alleged, and those who believe that vital Polish national interests were betrayed. In such a heavily polarized climate, social concerns are not generally considered legitimate points of departure for public debate and policymaking but are instead politicized and even demonized as "special interests" motivating rival political camps. Fragmentation of the elite along these lines would deprive Polish citizens of strong representation within EU structures, where support for particular national preoccupations depends on effective and coherent leadership, sophisticated lobbying, and a nonpartisan commitment to all of the country’s constituencies.

If conflicts among various elites emerge after Poland’s entry into the EU, the Union itself will have contributed substantially to this outcome. By pursuing its own interests with single-minded intensity, the EU has conducted the enlargement negotiations in an "all or nothing," or rather "take it or leave it," atmosphere, giving the current Polish elites few options and very limited room for maneuver. Consequently, Polish negotiators will be vulnerable in the future to the charge that they conceded too much. Ironically, whenever Polish negotiators have attempted to maneuver within the EU’s narrow parameters in order to promote Polish interests more forcefully, they have been accused of arrogance—clearly, a no-win situation.

Finally, it remains to be seen to what degree the negotiation process and the conditions of membership end up promoting long-term political vulnerabilities and durable socioeconomic inequalities inside Poland. In the short run, in any case, Poland will probably not be able to partake fully of the progressive social policies and protectionist economic policies that were pursued so successfully in Western Europe. As is well known, existing member states have effectively reduced disparities in income and quality of life across regions and classes and have been able to shield themselves economically from the more destabilizing consequences of globalization. Unfortunately, in the case of Poland and Eastern Europe, the EU may end up acting more like an agent of globalization than as a protective buffer. Indeed, if current trends continue, Poland itself is likely to function as a buffer for the EU—a second-class buffer state safeguarding the (Western) European Union’s external borders and enhancing its internal security.

Arista M. Cirtautas is currently an assistant professor of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia and is the author of The Polish Solidarity Movement: Revolution, Democracy and Natural Rights (Routledge, 1997).

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