Volume 9 Number 4

Fall 2000

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Macedonia - The Macedonian government continues to be plagued by its poor economic record and accusations of corruption and incompetence. In an environment of increasing political tension and bickering, September’s local government elections —marked by fraud and violence—only added to the sense of instability. Irregularities and the inability of candidates to win majorities required as many as four rounds of voting in some districts. This exacerbated the tension within the ruling coalition, and the government’s very survival was thrown into question. The local balloting came on the heels of the presidential elections in November 1999. In the presidential race, Boris Trajkovski, who was chosen to represent the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (IMRO–DPMNU)—the dominant party in the governing coalition—won 53 percent of the vote. In that election, the opposition had alleged widespread fraud, mainly in districts dominated by ethnic Albanians. In fact, Trajkovski does indeed seem to owe his victory to overwhelming support from the Albanian minority. (See Macedonia Update, EECR, Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2000.) Ethnic Albanians constitute 23 percent of the population in Macedonia. IMRO–DPMNU is joined in the government by Vasil Tupurkovski’s Democratic Alternative (DA) and Arben Xhaferri’s Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). Claims that the government pandered to the Albanian minority were bolstered by the government’s decision, in July, to allow ethnic minorities to open private universities. This decision legitimized the Albanian-language university—now the first officially recognized, higher-education institute with instruction in a language other than Macedonian—founded in Tetovo in 1995, which will now focus on teacher training, business management, and public administration.

Macedonia’s second instance of multiparty local elections were held on September 10. IMRO –DPMNU and DA ran together as the Coalition for Changes (CC), along with DPA, which was affiliated with the ruling camp. On the other side, the opposition united in the coalition For Macedonia Together (FMT), consisting of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDAM), the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM), and the League for Democracy (LD). Also in the running, and in the opposition, was the other party representing the Albanian minority—the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), led by Ymer Ymeri. The OSCE does not ordinarily monitor local elections; however, because of the charges of irregularities in the presidential election, it deployed 17 experts and 130 short-term observers to oversee the balloting. Local nongovernmental organizations added another 1,500 monitors, and the parties had their own observers as well.

In the period leading up to the vote, the opposition, spearheaded by SDAM, repeatedly pressed for early parliamentary elections, which, in the normal cycle, would be held in 2002. The opposition claimed that the country’s dire economic situation called for a new general election. Economic conditions in Macedonia are unquestionably grave. Unemployment is approximately 35 percent, per capita GDP is just $1,700, and the inflation rate has jumped from 1 percent in 1998 to 10 percent in 1999. More than half of the unemployed are young and have never had a job. For most, living conditions have declined since the country became independent. When the government came to power in 1998, it pledged to decrease the number of those living in poverty by 3 percent, increase production by 25 percent, and increase wages annually by 2 percent. It has not fulfilled any of these promises. In the days before the election, Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski agreed that if, in these local elections, the opposition parties’ margin of victory over the ruling coalition exceeded 10 percent, then the coalition would agree to early parliamentary elections—that is, some time before 2002. Given the pressure and circumstances, the local elections were essentially a plebiscite on the government. Even in this heightened atmosphere, few could have projected how the events would unfold.

The first round, on September 10, featured fraud and violence. Approximately 60 percent of the country’s 1.6 million eligible voters turned out to vote in 123 municipalities for mayors and local councillors. Violence erupted in several towns dominated by ethnic Albanians between supporters of the opposition PDP and DPA of the ruling coalition. The worst incidents occurred in Debar, where voting had to be canceled because of general mayhem, destruction of ballot boxes, and intimidation of electoral officials. Observers also reported widespread fraud, including stuffed ballot boxes, family voting and proxy voting, the presence of unauthorized people at polling stations, and the failure to check voter identification. In all, eight people were injured, mainly PDP activists, and one murder was reported from in Kondovo, a small village near Skopje. Unofficial results reported that 51 mayors were elected, 23 from the opposition FMT (including Skopje) and 16 from the coalition of ruling parties, the CC.

A second round was set for September 24, with runoffs in 54 districts, and repeated voting in 27 districts because of violence or irregularities. This round also saw its own considerable share of disturbance and fraud. The OSCE reported "serious security incidents," although it noted that the violence did not reach the levels of the first round. But ballot stuffing, destruction of ballot boxes, intimidation, stolen voter lists, group voting, and proxy voting were still to be observed.

In addition, the OSCE criticized the electoral law, adopted in 1996 to regulate the local ballot, for not clearly spelling out electoral regulations. For example, the law did not specify whether a relative or absolute majority was needed to win in the second round. One provision stated that candidates must open a bank account 45 days before the election, while another established the deadline for candidates to register as just 30 days before the election. In addition, the OSCE stated that the tasks of the Supreme Electoral Commission (SEC) and those of the municipal electoral commissions (MECs) were vague and that the central body gave little direction or instruction to the lower ones. The OSCE added that the "SEC decided only after protracted arguments to issue a nonbinding verbal recommendation that counting procedures from the Law on Parliamentary Elections should be applied in the municipal elections." In addition, funding was a problem, since no money was included in the central budget to conduct local elections. Help came just days before the election, when on September 5, the Ministry of Finance announced that it would cover the MECs’ expenditures. On September 11, the ministry allocated 19 million denars ($280,000) to 117 of the 123 municipalities. But, by the second round, very few municipalities had actually received any funds.

Third and fourth runoffs were held, and, finally, after six weeks of repeated runoffs, the electoral commission released the final results. The opposition FMT had won 37 percent; the ruling CC, 23 percent; DPA, 14 percent; and PDP, 6 percent. Another 10 percent was shared by several smaller parties.

The prime minister, however, did not make good on his promise to call early elections. In fact, in the weeks after the elections, it seemed that the viability of the coalition was threatened not so much by the opposition as by internal dissension. Intense feuding between IMRO–DPMNU and their largest partner in the coalition, DA, continued, leading to DA’s withdrawal from the government on November 24. Deputy Premier Tupurkovski, DA’s leader, announcing that his party would join the opposition, accused the government of failing "to respond to the democratization process, to implement reforms, and to promote the economy." Georgievski promptly dismissed five DA ministers—Turpurkovski and those holding the foreign affairs, education, ecology, and economy portfolios. He also fired the managers of ten state-owned companies who were DA members.

Georgievski and his party now scrambled to find other partners to hold on to their majority. On November 30, IMRO–DPMNU was joined by deputies from the opposition LDP (which was promised the position of parliamentary speaker in return), some independent deputies, and four rebellious DA members. On December 1, Georgievski’s new lineup was approved by 66 votes in the 120-member parliament. The new coalition has eked out the majority it needs, and it seems that, for now at least, early elections will not take place. SDAM’s leaders allowed that the new government would "not last long," admitting that the prime minister simply postponed by a few months the government’s collapse.

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