Volume 8 Number 3

Summer 1999

Feature: Yugoslav federalism under siege

Eastern Europe After Kosovo
     Montenegro Survives the War
     Srdjan Darmanovic

From the beginning of the armed clashes in Kosovo, in February 1998, the crisis had a strongly regional character, as neighboring Albania and Macedonia were thrown directly into jeopardy. It also had the potential to draw in or endanger NATO's southern wing Greece and Turkey. All of these countries are sovereign states, but still, the risks from the Kosovo crisis were significant and have, in various ways, threatened their national security.

But if the sovereign states of the region have been endangered by the Kosovo crisis, one can imagine Montenegro's predicament. The risks for Montenegro arose not only because it is a republic within a federal state that was being bombed but also because of the situation that had existed previously and separately from the Kosovo crisis, namely, the political conflict between Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Belgrade and the prodemocratic government in Podgorica. Given a complex situation, it is still possible to highlight a few critical aspects of the Kosovo crisis, as seen from the Montenegrin perspective: the military aspect, that is, the consequences of NATO's intervention in Montenegro; the political aspect, and the related issue of internal security in the federal republic during the war; and the fate of Montenegro following the NATO intervention.

Paradoxically, the war's direct military effect on Montenegro was almost nominal. Thanks in part to the government's earlier anti-Milosevic policies, Montenegro remained largely untouched by NATO's actions. From the outset of the bombing, on March 24, the air strikes on Montenegro were secondary and selective, and-apart from a few tragic deaths in a little town in the north-without major consequences for the republic. There was no doubt that NATO intended to spare the Montenegrin territory. It was, in a sense, a demonstration of the advantages a state can obtain, even if it is a part of a larger state involved in a war, under the conditions of a supermodern war-if it respects the 'rules of the game' of the international community and its fundamental values. The government's open-door policy for all refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo also benefited Montenegro's cause. At one point, the number of refugees in Montenegro amounted to 15 percent of the population. All in all, while Kosovo and the whole of Serbia were exposed to destructive NATO air strikes, resulting in massive human and material losses, Montenegro experienced a roughly normal state of affairs, or at least a situation far more normal than is typical of war.

A much more significant and potentially more destabilizing effect of the Kosovo crisis on Monte-negro has been the impact on relations between the main political powers. The reason lies in the fact that Montenegro is a divided society. Rokan's theory of 'split societies' applies well to Montenegro. The division of Montenegro's social corpus is clearly expressed in the political arena. Although the sources and motives of the separation are different, politics in Montenegro is split into two blocs: pro- and anti-Milosevic. The prodemocratic, anti-Milosevic bloc, personified by President Milo Djukanovic, makes up the ruling coalition known as To Live Better. (The coalition consists of three parties-the Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS], the People's Party [PP], and the Social Democratic Party [SDP]. DPS is the strongest member of the coalition.) On the other side, the main pro-Milosevic power in Montenegro is the Socialist People's Party (SPP), led by the former Montenegrin president and now the current federal prime minister, Momir Bulatovic. In 1997, SPP was formed from a pro-Milosevic faction of DPS. It was founded by and depends on Milosevic and his regime. Bulatovic was abruptly designated the federal prime minister, in May 1998, during an electoral campaign in Montenegro. His nomination was unconstitutional, as Milosevic and his allies did not allow the Montenegrin parliament to elect deputies to the federal parliament, and they were, therefore, shut out of the vote on Bulatovic's candidacy. Since then, the Montenegrin government has refused to recognize the legality of the federal parliament or the federal government. These two political groups are diametrically opposed on all significant issues.

This sharp political divide leaves Montenegro with an unstable democratic system. SPP represents an illegal or, at best, a semilegal opposition. Relying on Milosevic and the federal government, SPP is patently willing to resort to violence to dislodge the current Montenegrin government. (Following Djukanovic's victory in the presidential election in October 1997, and on the day before his inauguration ceremony, SPP organized a protest that led to an attack on a government building. Riots lasted into the night before the police, 40 of whom were injured, finally managed to restore order.) Many informed observers assumed that President Milosevic would call out the federal army and SPP to attack his opponents in Montenegro and retake, by force, what he had lost through elections. Knowing the opponent they faced, Djukanovic and the government have since beefed up Montenegrin police forces significantly and thus have managed to keep the federal army at bay. The government has been engaged in some serious crisis management, operating under the shadow of NATO air strikes and the threat of a military move by Milosevic, all at the same time. Despite constant pressure on civilian authorities by the federal army, the Montenegrin government has resisted temptations to confront the military.

Some other factors may have contributed to Montenegro's stability so far. NATO's warnings that an attack on Montenegro would mean an escalation of military action against Serbia may have played a stabilizing role. It is also possible that Milosevic had neither the time nor strength to fight on two fronts. Further, the army and SPP might have concluded that a strike in Montenegro was too risky and would prove fruitless. The widespread reluctance of the Montenegrin population to take part in any fighting was also significant.

With the end of the bombing campaign, Montenegro now faces certain inevitable issues directly connected with the country's democratic transition and consolidation. Most everything hinges on how the following questions are answered. If Slobodan Milosevic remains in power, how can the prodemocratic and pro-Western Montenegrin government coexist with a state led by an authoritarian regime ruled by a person indicted for war crimes? If Milosevic stays in power and the daily tensions between his regime and the Montenegrin government persist, how can efficient security guarantees for Montenegro be ensured, and how can Milosevic be prevented from initiating a new and serious internal crisis? How can one neutralize the political role of the federal army in Montenegro? And, how is it possible for Montenegro, as the significantly smaller republic in a federal state, to have equal political status with Serbia? Given the destruction wrought by the air strikes, what are the chances for successful economic and democratic reform in a federal republic with one of its members in ruins?

The crucial question, of course, is Montenegro's status vis-ˆ-vis Serbia. Leaders from the ruling coalition have already suggested that this question cannot for now be answered. It is difficult to predict whether some will push for substantive constitutional revision of the federal republic or cast their lot for full independence. The issue, to be sure, cannot be resolved simply through a decision by the ruling coalition to hold a referendum. Apart from the situation within the country, Montenegro's status will depend largely on international arrangements for the stabilization of the Balkans and southeastern Europe, as well as on developments in Serbia itself.

For Montenegro, the Kosovo crisis was the most trying of all the postcommunist Yugoslav wars. That Montenegro, despite the many risks it ran, remained almost undamaged was nothing short of miraculous. Montenegro experienced no significant casualties or destruction, nor was its prodemocratic government undermined or removed. On the other hand, the Kosovo crisis, NATO's intervention, the conduct of the federal army in Montenegro during the bombing, the destruction of Serbia, and the weakening of Milosevic's regime have brought other questions to the forefront for Montenegro, questions that are likely to prove more difficult and complex than was the bombing itself.

***

Srdjan Darmanovic is assistant professor of law at the University of Montenegro and the director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights, both in Podgorica. He was a regular political analyst and columnist in the now-defunct independent daily, Nasa Borba (Belgrade), and still writes for the independent weekly Monitor (Podgorica). From 1992 to 1996, he was a member of the federal parliament of Yugoslavia in the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro as well as vice president of the party.

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