Volume 8 Number 3

Summer 1999

Feature: The inevitability of a nationalist reaction

Eastern Europe After Kosovo
     The Impact of the Crisis on Russian Politics
     Pavel Kandel

A bitter humor characterizes the Russian public's attitude toward NATO's military operations in Yugoslavia. The saying, We didn't even notice that Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright had joined the Communist Party became very popular among those who considered themselves democrats. America's and NATO's conduct in Kosovo corroborated so precisely, if unintentionally, the current propaganda slogans of Russia's national communists that it would have been impossible to make them a finer gift in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections. Not a single voice in the country proved willing to defend the military action. At the various conferences held in Russia since the air strikes began, one conclusion was drawn: Thank God that Russia is not the only country being run by idiots. Significantly, even the leaders of the extremely pro-West party, Just Cause (Pravoe Delo), headed by Yegor Gaidar, condemned NATO operations and actually hastened to dispatch a widely publicized, if abortive, mediation mission to Belgrade and several Western capitals. Gaidar's anti-NATO posture accurately illustrates the prevailing mood in Russia during the intervention, to which even the supposed agents of Western influence were not immune. The counterproductivity of NATO's rash venture was so obvious that the laurels of the peacemaker seemed like ripe fruit waiting to be plucked.

The wide consensus, here, needs stressing. The Kremlin, Russian political elites of all stripes, and the general public, regardless of political sympathies, reacted with extreme hostility to NATO's military operations. In Washington and Brussels, the violence of the Russian response seems to have been as unexpected as Milosevic's surprisingly long resistance to the bombing. In both cases, NATO's prognosis was based on shortsighted and mistaken assumptions, stemming from an exaggerated belief in the West's untouchable superiority and an imprudent itch to exploit the weaknesses of others. In the past, Milosevic had yielded at the last moment to the dictates of force majeure. The West's overconfident and poorly informed diplomats and strategists falsely assumed that, after the first air strikes, he would simply cave in, even though swift capitulation would have spelled political suicide.

Before the bombs began to fall, Russian diplomacy accepted the measures for putting pressure on Belgrade laid out in UN Security Council resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203. Western power brokers apparently assumed that Moscow's need for debt relief would compel it to accept NATO's actions. Most of them downplayed a possible negative reaction from the Kremlin as something intended only for domestic political consumption. And indeed, the Russian authorities had neither the desire nor the capacity to quarrel with their Western partners over Kosovo. They demonstrated a patent willingness to work constructively for the settlement of the Serbian-Albanian conflict. But no one in Russia was prepared to accept the utter disregard of Russia's opinions on the matter and the West's cynical abuse of the country's humiliating financial dependence. NATO's new strategic conception, as illustrated in the bombing of Yugoslavia, suggested that nondefensive military operations outside the territory of the bloc, without UN Security Council sanction (and that means, without consulting Russia), could become a new norm in international affairs. Under such conditions, Belgrade's resistance to NATO was naturally interpreted in Moscow as an unavoidable occasion for a last ditch defense of Russia's independence and influence in foreign affairs. The West still has not come to grips with the effect of events in Yugoslavia on Russia's domestic politics. Hostility to NATO by Boris Yeltsin's moribund administration does not pose a serious problem; but the alliance has been extremely foolish in underestimating the way its actions are bound to shape the foreign-policy agenda of any Yeltsin successor. Meanwhile, the course of Russian diplomacy during the war confirmed the Kremlin's reluctance to confront the West and, at the same time, revealed that its capacity for compromise, too, was finally exhausted.

Boris Yeltsins three nos (Russia would not be drawn into war, would not supply arms to Yugoslavia, and would not pursue seriously Yugoslavia's admittance into the Russian-Belarusian alliance) clarified one set of limits to the Russian stance. But during the intervention, the full range of Russia's possible responses to the Western challenge remained obscure, depending as it did on the situation in Yugoslavia and the domestic maneuvers of Czar Boris and his entourage, as well as on the more general political conditions in Russia. The day after pronouncing his mollifying nos, Yeltsin himself, seeking to derail the start of impeachment proceedings in the Duma, spoke to Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev about a possible retargeting of Russian rockets at Western capitals and gave strong verbal support to a triple alliance of Russia, Belarus, and Yugoslavia, suggesting yet again that for him nothing was inconceivable or impossible. And the fact is, in Russia today, as in 1991 and 1993, anything is possible.

With an authoritarian regime, when a leader departs from the scene, a deep political crisis ensues. And in the present circumstances, one may anticipate, in addition, catastrophic socioeconomic conditions, a collapse of voter confidence, and discontent among the elite, all of which testify to this regimeÕs demise even before the Yeltsin presidency formally expires. Under these conditions, a foreign-policy humiliation on a question of principle, affecting not illusory Balkan interests but rather Russia's vestigial clout in world politics, would be what is called an impermissible luxury, for both the departing president and the nation. If Western politicians could have foreseen the distant consequences of their own actions, they might have come to the surmise that the war against Yugoslavia will end not with negotiations in Belgrade but in the Russian presidential election in the year 2000. When trying to calculate the negative side effects of the war, one cannot exclude an anti-Western sea change in Russian public opinion and a drastic turnabout in the Russian elite's way of thinking. Yet West Europeans and Americans remain as numb to such developments, now, as they were to Russia's possible reaction when NATO began to drop bombs on the Balkans.

Clinging to familiar myths about Russia (that Russian society suffers from an empire complex, a proclivity for Orthodoxy- Slav solidarity, and a phobia of the West) some Western politicians, it is true, anticipated an even more severe reaction from the country than occurred. Such myths reflect the prejudices shared by Western commentators and Russia's own so-called Westernizers. Empirical studies refute this diagnosis and present a much more complex picture. While dry statistics may be difficult to assimilate, recent opinion polls can help dispel some common misconceptions.

Particularly telling is a poll conducted by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (ACSPO), in February 1999, before the bombing began. Of those polled, 38.7 percent supported resolving the Kosovo conflict in concert with the Western powers; 30.7 percent supported a particular policy of their own; and 30.6 percent found it difficult to say. Only 4.1 percent responded very positively to Russian participation in an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo; 20.1 percent, somewhat positively; 26 percent, somewhat negatively; 32.7 percent, extremely negatively; and 17.1 percent found it difficult to say (Monitoring Public Opinion, Economic and Social Changes 2 [1999], p. 76). Although these results most clearly testify to the public's lack of concern for the problem, they did not confirm the expectation that Russians generally long to become a superpower once again or to reassert their traditional imperial interests.

Additional survey questions revealed that neither anti-Westernism nor an inclination toward ethnic nationalism nor a desire for an imperial foreign policy is predominant in the popular imagination. At the same time, Russians definitely distrust NATO and its brisk expansion into post-Soviet space. The responses to a question about the proposal to join an alliance of former Soviet republics were as follows: 3 percent of respondents felt absolutely positive about the prospect; 9.7 percent, somewhat positive; 27.2 percent, indifferent; 25 percent, somewhat negative; 17.2 percent, absolutely negative; and 17.9 percent found it difficult to say. According to the poll, 9.9 percent felt that Russia's interests would be best served by joining NATO; 22.6 percent favored a modification of Russia's collaboration with NATO; 19 percent supported the creation of a defensive alliance distinct from NATO; 24.7 percent preferred nonalignment with any military alliance; and 23.8 percent found it difficult to say. Furthermore, 17.2 percent considered the use of military force to resolve foreign-policy problems permissible; 68.3 percent, thought it impermissible; and 14.6 percent found it difficult to say. The responses to the question of whether it would be acceptable to use military force against Chechnya is highly significant: 11.4 percent of respondents answered affirmatively; 64.6 percent, negatively; 11 percent favored launching missile strikes on rebel bases only; 6.7 percent supported conducting ground operations with special divisions; and 6.3 percent found it difficult to say.

An earlier poll conducted by ACSPO, in November 1998, confirms this (to some Westerners) surprising absence both of nationalist sentiment and of anti-Americanism among ordinary Russians. Data on attitudes toward various nationalitiesÑfor example, Jews, Chechens, and AmericansÑare also worth citing here. The responses were particularly revealing, especially given the long-standing tradition of anti- Semitism in Russia, the understandable reaction to terrorist acts and the seizure of hostages by Chechen rebels, and, most recently, anger in Russia over the US bombing of Yugoslavia. The information culled from this survey spectacularly fails to support the prevailing stereotypes. The question was: How do you react to members of the following groups:Attitude toward: Jews With liking: with interest: 5.8%Calmly, as toward any other: without particular feelings: 81.2%With irritation with enmity: 9.8%With mistrust with fear: 3.2%
*
Attitude toward: ChechensWith liking: with interest: 2.1%Calmly, as toward any other: without particular feelings: 47.6%With irritation with enmity: 29%With mistrust with fear: 21.3%*Attitude toward: AmericansWith liking: with interest: 12.8%Calmly, as toward any other: without particular feelings: 75%With irritation with enmity: 6.7%With mistrust with fear: 5.5%

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Although it is not entirely appropriate to compare feelings toward individuals with attitudes toward a country, it is still worth stressing that Russians are more kindly disposed toward Americans than Americans are toward Russians. According to a Gallup poll conducted from March to May, in 1999, 46 percent of Americans polled expressed a positive attitude toward Russia; and 49 percent, a negative attitude. There was no substantial difference of opinions between Republicans and Democrats or liberals and conservatives (The Pulse of the Planet, America [March 21, 1999], p. 5). Strikingly, even in Russia, the results of polls on foreign-policy problems attest to comparatively minor differences (rarely exceeding 10 percent) in the positions of those who voted for Yeltsin and those who voted for Gennady Zuganov. Thus, consensus on international political issues (customary in the US and now increasingly common in Russia) has deep roots in the popular consciousness.

Pacifist isolationism characterizes Russian thinking far more than either imperialist militarism or great-power nationalism. Indeed, outrage at the West's own imperialism is precisely what explains the radical change in public opinion after the bombing of Yugoslavia began. More than 80 percent of those polled held a sharply negative view of NATO's activities. Ninety percent condemned the commencement of bombing without the UN Security Council's approval. But the numbers testify less to war fever than to fear of war. Thus, 59 percent of the respondents favored Russia's pursuit of an end to the conflict by peaceful means; 26 percent, for providing humanitarian aid; and only 9 percent, for giving military assistance to Yugoslavia (Itogi [April 6, 1999], pp. 24Ð 25). But the respondents did feel increasingly endangered. Thus, the number of those supporting RussiaÕs union with other countries in a military-political bloc grew to 50 percent, although only an insignificant 4 percent named Yugoslavia as a candidate for such a union (Izvestiia [April 24, 1999], p. 1).

Data gathered by another sociological institute is no less significant. Opinions on who the guilty parties were in the crisis and the development of the Balkan conflict broke down as follows: 46.3 percent blamed NATO and the US; 16.7 percent, the Milosevic regime; and 12.8 percent, the Kosovar Albanians. In this survey, 74 percent favored assisting Yugoslavia, while 16.8 percent were opposed. But 2.8 percent favored entering the war on Yugoslavia's side; 7.3 percent thought Russia should be an outside observer; 26.2 percent believed it necessary to exert influence on Milosevic to obtain a peace treaty; and 57.2 percent thought it optimal to mold world public opinion, using RussiaÕs influence in the UN Security Council and other international organizations (Kommersant [March 31, 1999], p. 2).

Not surprisingly, Russians were of the opinion that the actions taken by the US and NATO were just as wrong as those of Russia itself in the extremely painful Chechnya crisis, which displays some parallels to events in Kosovo. The results of the survey published in Kommersant are sensational and, at first sight, paradoxical: the Russian public, precisely because it has embraced democratic values, now firmly rejects the anti-Yugoslavian military campaign waged by the democratic West. Such a reaction could be considered grounds for optimism about the future of democracy in Russia. But Russia's failure to prevent the bombing will lead many to conclude that a pacifist foreign policy is doomed to failure, provoking a search for other and perhaps more-aggressive solutions.

Russia's political elite reacted in a similar fashion after the decision to expand NATO membership to the east. For elites, the alliance's aggression against Yugoslavia, which turned a local, ethnopolitical conflict into an event of momentous global significance, was the last straw. Russia's failure to prevent or stop the war in the Balkans meant, in essence, a diplomatic default an admission that Russia's foreign policy was utterly bankrupt, essentially a sham. NATO's new strategic conception suggested that the Yugoslavian affair was not just an exception but a new precedent. NATO expounded its intention to continue expansion, including expansion into post-Soviet space, at its fiftieth-anniversary celebration, in Washington, DC, stoking fears that future targets of the alliance' peacemaking could be Russia' close neighbors and Russia itself. The West formulated its expansionist intentions as a mere statement of the naked facts of the new international system, in which not the UN but NATO, led by the US, will force itself upon others as the dominant international decision maker and, at the same time, as the instrument of the new European and world order. This new world government will be defined by power, not by international law. In a monopolar world under American leadership, and in a NATO-centric Europe prepared to elbow its way into post-Soviet space, Russia is apparently assigned the role of helpful assistant to the alliance but denuded of any veto power. The Western political class apparently sees a future that has no place for Russia as an independent and significant actor in international politics, and especially not as an imminent threat or a direct challenge.

Of course, various political groups inside Russia had their own reasons for condemning NATO' operations against Yugoslavia. Thus, for the national com- munists, the air strikes were a vivid confirmation of long-held anti-American and anti-Western conceptions. For the liberal free-market advocates, keeping NATOÕs actions at armÕs length was essential for political survival. For the centrists, who profess both foreign-policy realism and anti-NATO conviction, opposition to all attempts to draw Russia into war seemed an effective approach for reeling in supporters from both the right and the left. But, in general, Russia has witnessed a serious upheaval of its political landscape and a noticeable hardening of anti-Western and anti-American sentiments.

Diverse political forces naturally coalesced around different possible Russian responses to the Balkan crisis. National communists urged that aid be provided to Yugoslavia and argued for its immediate admittance into the Russian-Belarusian alliance. Reformist democratic circles generally limited themselves to opposing, as if from inertia, any attempt to lure Russia into the conflict. The center was dominated by those vacillating between the urge to exploit NATO' predicament and weaken the alliance and the desire to find a political solution to the crisis, making it possible for NATO to save face, as it were. The latter tendency prevailed, setting the Russian diplomatic course as well.

NATO' decision to triumph at any price spelled out its willingness to pay the cost of an uncooperative Russia. Without clearly realizing what it was doing, the West made a strategic substitution in the hills of Kosovo. Seeking to gain a piece of Yugoslavia, it lost the whole of Russia. Russia will either surrender to the national communists or be plunged into a Weimar scenario, becoming a state hell-bent on nationalistic regeneration, obsessed with revanchism.

What will be the face of post-Yeltsin Russian foreign policy? Future foreign policy will presumably react to the previous regime' foreign-policy shortcomings and humiliations and to the problems it left unresolved. It is only logical to assume that Russia will be forced to respond to the challenges and threats of a new era. It is also obvious that Russian foreign policy will be shaped by the character of its domestic political problems and by the current balance of forces within the country. Finally, Russia's economic needs will play a role. The first three factors despite their differences'all point in the same direction: a foreign policy based on opposition to the West. This is the inevitable, and even rational, outcome. And there is no alternative. We can expect to see, therefore, a repudiation of self-restraint in foreign policy, a proliferation in the resort to the use of arms, and an open and ill-defined game of destabilizing international relations. Russia' economic needs will probably limit the scope of such a foreign policy. Yet a situation in which meager and ineffective economic assistance from the West is the reward Russia receives for the loss of its independence in foreign policy will do little to encourage restraint.

For the sake of analysis, it is important to distinguish three different processes, even though they all point in the same direction: the collapse of Yeltsin's regime and the inevitable resultant changes in Russian foreign policy; the possible election of a national-communist regime, with its obvious consequences for domestic politics; and the rise of anti-Western sentiments in Russia's foreign policy as the only feasible answer to the crudely anti-Russian policy of the Western powers. In practice, the interweaving of each of these processes mutually reinforces and accelerates the others. The world and Russia will be very lucky if responsible and reasonable political forces (capable of segregating these tendencies and containing Russia's responses to the West's incautious challenges within sensible bounds) prevail. If moderation takes hold, then, perhaps, we can speak of the next Russian miracle. But in the year 2000, when the debate on who lost Russia and when is raging in America and Europe, the answer will be at hand.

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Pavel Kandel is the chairman of the Department of Ethnopolitical Conflict Studies at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences. This article was written in May.

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