Volume 8 Number 3

Summer 1999

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Poland - The Screening Law, which came into force on August 2, 1997, has had its first impact. The law stipulated the creation of a screening court to verify statements made by high-level public officials concerning their cooperation with the communist secret services. It also established the office of a public-interest spokesperson who, acting essentially as a procurator, can refer statements considered dubious to the Screening Court. (See Poland Update, EECR, Vol. 6, No. 4, Fall 1997; Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1998; and Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1998.) Boguslaw Nizienski was appointed the public-interest spokesman, on October 16, 1998, and he began analyzing the declarations of those who had admitted to collaboration. Having verified the first batch of declarations, Judge Nizienski ordered their publication in the Official Gazette (Dziennik Ustaw), as provided for by law. The list was published on March 2, and it included the names of various judges, procurators, and defense lawyers. To the shock of many observers, the justice minister, Hanna Suchocka (Freedom Union [FU]), reacted swiftly, demoting two district procurators who had acknowledged their collaboration. At the same time, she recommended that the presidents of courts dismiss those judges whose names had been published. Suchocka's actions surprised a good many people, as neither dismissal nor demotion is mandatory under the Screening Law.

According to the law, an admission of guilt does not trigger further consequences, such as the loss of one's position. But Suchocka declared that she had lost confidence in her subordinates, who admitted to collaboration, and thus she had no choice but to demote them. Wlodzimierz Olszewski, president of the National Council of the Judiciary, countered that any decision to dismiss a judge should be taken only on an individual basis and only after scrutinizing the evidence. The lists of those who admitted collaboration also included the names of two high-ranking officials from the president's office (they kept their jobs). Deputy economics minister Janusz Kaczurba, who also confessed to collaborating with the secret services, resigned on March 23.

Nizienski then began to consider the declarations of those who claimed they had not collaborated. If Nizienski doubted the validity of a statement, he would turn it over to the Screening Court, which would then determine the statement's truthfulness. But a serious legal controversy soon arose. In order to assess the honesty of the declarations, judges would need materials from the Office of State Security. But judges on the Screening Court had not been cleared for viewing documents containing state secrets. Eventually, the parliamentarians approved an interpretation of the law according to which the screening judges, charged with determining the validity of declarations, were also granted the right to inspect confidential materials.

A great commotion arose following a declaration, on April 12, by the political board of Electoral Action Solidarity (the board is EAS's most important body, on which sit both party chair Marian Krzaklewski and Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek). The resolution recommended that any EAS member whose declaration was not accepted and sent to the Screening Court for further examination should resign immediately, without waiting for the court's decision. The declaration was widely interpreted as an admission that high-ranking EAS members had submitted false declarations.

The atmosphere around the lustration process grew even more tense when the parliamentary deputy, Tomasz Karwowski (of the Confederation for Independent Poland Homeland [CIPÐH]), publicly accused Prime Minister Buzek of collaboration. According to Karwowski, Buzek had provided the communist-era secret services with a great deal of information on the Solidarity underground in the 1980s. Buzek responded by asking Judge Nizienski to examine his declaration first. Nizienski agreed and announced, on May 5, that he had found no grounds for requesting the court to examine the prime minister's declaration. But Karwowski was undeterred and filed an appeal with the Screening Court. (The law contains a controversial clause according to which members of parliament who question the validity of another person's statement can request the spokesperson to re-review the statement.) At the same time, Karwowski and his allies launched a public campaign against the prime minister, continually hurling extreme accusations at him. Growing weary of politicians continually exploiting collaboration accusations in order to attack rivals, on May 19, most newspapers and broadcasters announced a boycott of Karwowski's so-called revelations. The court is still reviewing his appeal.

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On March 5, in compliance with the agreement between the ruling coalition and the Polish Peasant Party (PPP), the Sejm passed an amendment to the law governing the Institute of National Remembrance. Established by a 1998 law, the institute is an archive of the files of the pre-1989 secret services. Last winter, PPP had demanded certain alterations to the law in exchange for its support in overturning a presidential veto of the legislation that created the institute. (See Poland Update, EECR, Vol. 8, Nos. 1/2, Winter/ Spring 1999.) Under the amended law, the term of the institute's president was shortened from seven to five years, and he will be elected by a three-fifths majority of parliament. At the same time, the term of the institute's board members was reduced from nine to seven years; nine of its members will be appointed by the Sejm and two by the National Council of the Judiciary. PPP had insisted on these changes to give itself a voice in electing the institute's president and board. Although still opposed to the law, President Kwasniewski stated that it had been amended to such a degree that he was willing to sign it. The law was signed into effect, but the Sejm has yet to name a president.

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The Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) has been preoccupied with its internal structure. Until recently, the alliance had been a coalition of various political and labor organizations. Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDRP) constituted the bulk of DLA; other members included the All-Polish Trade Union Agreement, the Polish Teachers' Union, and the Polish Socialist Party (PSP). DLA decided to transform itself into a uniform party and signed its founding charter on April 15. Young activists dominated the founding membership, most likely in an effort to demonstrate to the public that the party's communist roots would no longer be all that strong; rather, it would be, simply, the largest left-wing party. Nearly all the partners making up the former DLA are expected to join the new party, once SDRP is dissolved. Eager to preserve its separate status, PSP will probably be an exception. Activists from the All-Polish Trade Union Agreement will join the new DLA on an individual basis, since no trade union may formally be a part of the new, unified party.

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Political emotions are expected to heat up with the presidential election campaign set to begin soon. Although the election will not be held for 18 months, President Kwasniewski has already announced his intention to seek reelection. Lech Walesa will run as well. With no candidate standing a realistic chance of beating Kwasniewski, EAS is in serious trouble. EAS leader Marian Krzaklewski seems a natural candidate, but his defeat could undermine his leadership and make it difficult for him to lead the party in parliamentary elections. The only hope would be for FU and EAS to agree on a joint candidate. For the time being, however, the chance of that is purely speculative.

Work has begun on a new electoral law to jibe with the new territorial divisions laid out in the recent reform that substantially reorganized Poland's local-government system. EAS and DLA want to reduce the size of constituencies to include only two to three parliamentary mandates. Smaller constituencies would be better for the larger parties, giving them an advantage in parliamentary races, and would probably foster the emergence of a two-party system. In the recent elections, PPP and FU won their parliamentary seats only in the big constituencies. FU responded unsympathetically to the EAS suggestion, and the project has stalled. Like administrative reform, electoral reform has been mired in a political struggle between the various parties, each seeking to tailor the rules to maximize its own advantage in future elections.

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The protracted conflict over the crosses placed by Kazimierz Switon and his followers at the gravel pit adjacent to Auschwitz led the government to begin work on a law on the protection of significant World War II sites. (Last year, the government announced it would remove a large wooden cross placed in Auschwitz, in 1988, to mark the site of a mass given by Pope John Paul, in 1979. To protest the government's plan, Switn called on Poles to place other, smaller crosses at the site, which they did.) A draft prepared by Buzek's cabinet, on March 9, would create 100-meter-wide protection zones around nine World War II concentration camps. Holding meetings or doing business inside a zone, without the consent of the voivod where the camp is located, would be forbidden. On April 7, the Sejm passed the law, with wording that came close to the cabinet draft. FU, EAS, and the opposition DLA deputies voted in favor (251 votes), while PPP, CIPÐH, the Movement to Rebuild Poland, and Our Circle parliamentarians voted against (96); 21 deputies abstained.

A stormy debate concerning the law was held in the upper house. (According to Art. 121 of the Constitution, the Senate, within 30 days of submission of a bill, may adopt it without amendment, adopt amendments, or resolve upon its complete rejection. If, within 30 days following the submission of the bill, the Senate fails to adopt an appropriate resolution, the bill shall be considered adopted, according to the wording submitted by the Sejm.) Some senators were afraid that the law's enactment would lead to the removal of all religious symbols from the designated protection zones, including the memorial papal cross. Prime Minister Buzek and other lawyers assured the senators that only the smaller crosses would be removed. But the senators were not convinced and added an amendment requiring that religious organizations (of any denomination) could approve the placement of religious symbols in the zones. However, on May 7, the Sejm overruled that amendment. Deputies opposing the Senate's proposed amendment argued that, on the basis it provided, the consent of any marginal religious organization would suffice to sanction the placement of religious symbols in the designated zones.

On May 10, the president signed the law. Switon announced that he would occupy the gravel pit and construct a chapel on the site. But Catholic bishops categorically precluded the possibility of consecrating Switon's chapel. After the law came into force, in May, local authorities arrested Switon and removed the smaller crosses. The issue seems, for now, to have been resolved.

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