Volume 7 Number 3

Summer 1998

Constitution Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Romania
     Over the course of the last several months, the efforts of the prime minister, Radu Vasile (Christian Democratic–National Peasant Party [CD–NPP]), to manage the recurring conflicts among members of his cabinet were more or less successful. At the same time, disagreements among the coalition partners in the Parlamentul (Parliament) continued to mount, and, as a result, the passage of much-needed legislation has grown increasingly difficult.

     One of the coalition members, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), was especially hurt by lack of coordination within the ruling coalition. The important Ordinance 36/1997, which expanded the rights of ethnic minorities, has not been ratified by the Parliament. (See Romania Update, EECR, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1998). Another ordinance, 22/1997, which allowed the use of minority languages in local administrative bodies, was invalidated by the Constitutional Court, on April 19. This latter ordinance, which was passed last year as only an “emergency ordinance,” was deemed improper by the justices, because the government had failed to show that an emergency existed. (According to Art. 114 of the Constitution, “in exceptional cases, the Government may adopt emergency orders, which shall come into force only after their submission to Parliament for approval.”) The Court held that the ordinance’s subject matter should have been regulated by means of ordinary legislation. After the Court’s decision, the Camara Deputatilor (Chamber of Deputies, or lower house) could have recast the ordinance as a law. The Chamber, however, left it off its agenda, and thus the use of minority languages in local administrative bodies remains without legal guarantee. Subsequently, Alexander Sassu, Minister for Parliament, announced that in September the cabinet will prepare draft legislation that will accommodate all important DAHR demands. Given the sluggishness of legislative work in the Parliament, however, the chances the law will be passed any time soon seem slim.

     Unsurprisingly, the controversy surrounding the establishment of a Hungarian-language university in Transylvania remained unresolved. While DAHR leaders insist that such an institution is necessary, politicians, such as Petre Roman, leader of the Social Democratic Union (SDU) and Senatul (Senate, or upper house) chairman, and Ion Diaconescu, leader of CD–NPP, seem to support the view that the demands for multilingual education can be accommodated within the existing universities, and that the establishment of a new institution would thus be redundant. Minister of Education Andrei Marga, former president of the Babes Bolyai University of Cluj, also opposes the establishment of a purely Hungarian university. Under these circumstances, the chances that such will be established are doubtful. A Hungarian-language university was created in 1945, under law 407/1945 as Bolyai University, but was closed down by Ceausescu in 1959 and merged with the Romanian-language Babes University.

     Obviously unhappy with the slow work of the legislature, Vasile asked deputies to convene for an extraordinary session in July in order to pass several bills drafted by the government. During that session, however, Parliament managed to pass only one significant measure, the establishment of the Board of the Romanian Television (BRT), and even this vote was marred by various, prolonged controversies. The law grants seats to each parliamentary club, including the club of the minorities (which is composed of Armenian, Greek, Ukranian, and Roma representatives). DAHR has a seat on the board as a parliamentary party. The scandal began when Roman claimed that DAHR’s seat should also be considered the seat belonging to the minorities’ club, even though DAHR is not included in the club. Roman went further, to claim that SDU should get the seat that would have gone to the ethnic minorities. The row prompted several other minority organizations to complain that they were not awarded seats, and they subsequently filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court. In addition, the press exposed Alexandru Mironov—one of the candidates considered by Parliament—as a former Securitate collaborator. Reacting to the news, two other prospective nominees announced their refusal to sit on the board if Mironov were elected. Undeterred, the deputies voted to install Mironov as a member of the board, but subsequent efforts to elect a president of the board proved futile, and it remains to be seen if and when the new institution will become functional.

     Debates surrounding the board took up so much time that work on other legislative projects was virtually suspended. Thus deputies did not address Council of Europe demands that the Penal Code be amended to decriminalize consensual sex between homosexuals, and other acts loosely defined as an “offense to state authorities.” The passage of a number of important laws related to economic reform—including laws on local finances, on public property, on concessions, and amendments to the Privatization Law—were likewise postponed. The intercoalition squabbling over seats on the BRT again exposed the weaknesses of the coalition and its inability to pass fundamental legislation.

     Meanwhile, various scandals involving former Securitate collaborators and informers continued to erupt. Adrian Vilau, head of parliament’s Commission for Foreign Secret Service Control, was forced to resign when the press threatened to publish documents implicating him as a former Securitate informer. Prime Minister Vasile, in turn, asked for Minister of Health Francisc Baranyi’s (DAHR) resignation, when it became clear that he too had been recruited by the Securitate in 1961. The daily newspaper Ziua then published nationalist leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s written pledge of cooperation with the Securitate. Tudor denied that he had ever had contacts with the secret service (which he has praised for its “patriotic zeal”), even though he is known as its staunch defender.

     These scandals evolved simultaneously with debates in the Senate over the the law on the Securitate files, also known as the “Ticu Dumitrescu Law.” (See Romania Update, EECR, Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 1998.) The law’s original draft had provided for the establishment of an institution similar to the German Gauck Commission to manage the former secret-service archives and ensure that citizens have access to their files. On June 25, however, the Senate voted 109–7 to pass the law with some important alterations to Dumitrescu’s original draft. The final version of the law authorizes the Secret Services to keep control of their archives, which comprise approximately 125 million files, and therefore the special commission will have to apply separately for each file. Dumitrescu (CD–NPP), who is a member of the Senate, alleges that the Securitate had 486,000 members under Ceausescu. The legislation’s passage marks a clear victory for the heirs of the Securitate—comprising the Romanian Service of Information, the Military Intelligence, and the Foreign Secret Service. The law still must be passed by the lower house. Indeed, the only setback that members of the secret-service establishment have had to endure was the decision by the Supreme Council of Defense (headed by the president) to shut down, in July, UM 02105, the special intelligence unit of the Ministry of Interior. This unit, which employed many former Securitate officers, was involved in the 1990 miners’ riots in Bucharest. Previous attempts to restructure UM 02105 were stalled by Minister of Interior Gavril Dejeu (CD-NPP), but finally he had to agree to this measure when confronted personally by Vasile.

     At present, Dejeu seems the most controversial figure in the cabinet, and his behavior apparently exacerbates tensions among the coalition partners. He has been reluctant to initiate reforms in his ministry and to restructure the prison system. In addition, he is opposed to the idea that ministry officials should be obliged to provide information to civic groups and the public at large. Recently, Dejeu hired as an adviser a former police director who was involved in the 1990 police atrocities against CD–NPP members, at the time headed by the legendary dissident, Corneliu Coposu. This act prompted several party members to demand the resignation of Dejeu, who is also a member of CD–NPP and had headed the Ministry of Interior in the previous Ciorbea government. After Ciorbea’s resignation in the spring, Dejeu led the interim government until Vasile was nominated to the premiership.

     Such squabbles obviously undermine the government’s capacity to define and implement a coherent package of economic reforms. Communication between the leaders of the coalition partners is irregular, reduced for the most part to heated exchanges on television. On the other hand, the legislative measures that have actually passed seem to create legal chaos. Taxes, such as the value-added tax, are repeatedly modified, and firms are often forced to hire a special lawyer just to keep abreast of the constant changes. Recently, parliament passed a government-sponsored bill providing financial help to small- and medium-size enterprises, but the necessary funds for starting the program have not been allocated yet. The privatization of two state banks has not begun even though foreign investors have already made their interest known. When the value of the shares of the state communications monopoly, Romtelecom, dropped, the government declared that the company’s privatization would be postponed. And the State Ownership Fund is far behind schedule in the privatization process. This is the one area where governmental inaction is particularly evident—in the restructuring of state-owned monopolies. Under pressure from MP Trita Fanita (SDU), who is also director of the state cereal-trade monopoly, the government has vowed to consider a bill that would integrate all former state farms into a single agricultural conglomerate. The bill was strongly criticized in the domestic and international press. The Economist went so far as to state that SDU is subverting attempts at reform, alleging that it has a vested interest in the continued existence of state-owned monopolies. The only bill the government managed to push through the parliament was one restructuring the national airline, TAROM.

     In the meantime, Romanian relations with the major international institutions have deteriorated. After a failed round of negotiations with the IMF, the fund announced that it will terminate its financial assistance to the state. The World Bank has also been reluctant to extend its work beyond the end of its present restructuring-assistance program, coming in March. These setbacks bode ill for the future of the Romanian economy and render the prospects of the current government uncertain.

     Over the last several months, a number of important appointments in the judicial branch have been undertaken. President Emil Constantinescu appointed his former adviser and the present attorney general, Sorin Moisescu, as president of the Supreme Court of Justice. Lucian Mihai was elected chairman of the Court; he is a well-known university professor who filed a petition with the Constitutional Court in 1996 arguing that then-president Iliescu was not eligible to run for a third term. (See Romania Update, EECR, Vol. 5, No. 4, Fall 1996.) Despite these moves, however, the ruling coalition still does not control a majority of the votes on the Constitutional Court. This is the case, even though three newly opened vacancies on the Constitutional Court were filled with judges commonly thought to be close to the ruling majority.

     Minister of Justice Valeriu Stoica (NLP), meanwhile, replaced Supreme Court judges whose terms had expired. He also pledged to introduce an Italian-style reform to the procuracy, which would ensure that, on special occasions, judges would be entrusted with prosecutorial functions. Thus Stoica hopes to overcome the passivity of the prosecutors, most of whom are widely perceived as holdovers from the previous regime. The minister has vowed to present his draft legislation to parliament by the end of the year.

     Romanian problems on the domestic scene contrast with a fairly successful foreign policy. During his eight-day visit to the US, President Constantinescu became the first Romanian president to address a joint session of the US Congress. In his speech he pointed out that, while the current ruling majority is fully committed to democracy, the influence of former communists and nationalists—without Western economic assistance—may be resurrected. During Constantinescu’s trip to the US, the government announced its intention to purchase several Bell helicopters, even though domestic financiers and IMF observers criticized the move as financially imprudent. It remains to be seen for how long the governing elite will be able to combine energetic international activities with inaction at home without undermining the trust of its Western allies.

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