At first glance, the results of the Czech parliamentary elections, held June 14-15, seem to indicate a shift to the left. The biggest winner was the unreformed Communist Party (CP) with 18 percent of the popular vote-a 6 percent gain over its performance in the last elections in 1998. When translated into mandates, the Communist gains were even more impressive. While each of the other parliamentary parties lost a few seats in comparison to 1998, the Communists won 17 more seats in the parliament's lower chamber (see table at right). In 1998, the victorious Czech Social Democratic Party (CSDP) and the Communists, together, did not have a majority of seats; now they have 111 seats in the 200-seat parliament.

In reality, this shift to the left, something of an optical illusion, means very little. First, the CSDP, like all the other parties represented in parliament, is unwilling to cooperate with the CP on the government level. More important, the supposed leftist identity of the CP is questionable. The Czech Communist Party is a strange blend of extreme-left and extreme-right ideas. In fact, it is simply an extremist party that uses some leftist ideas to lure voters who do not see the CSDP as being socialist enough. Otherwise, the party is strongly nationalistic, Euroskeptic, and xenophobic. In the last four years, it has been able to attract many voters who had previously supported the extreme-right Republicans.

Political apathy and cynicism
Still, the CP's success cannot be explained entirely by its ability to attract fringe voters. It has also become a protest party that benefits from voters' intense dissatisfaction with the performance of all the parties represented in the parliament. In the last four years, opinion polls have repeatedly shown that as many as 70 percent of Czechs are unhappy with politics as practiced by mainstream democratic politicians.

One reason for this disappointment was the so-called opposition agreement of 1998, according to which Vaclav Klaus's Civic Democratic Party (CDP) agreed to support the minority government of CSDP in exchange for high-level parliamentary positions as well as promises to work jointly on constitutional amendments and electoral-law changes that would be advantageous to those two parties. Many Czechs saw the agreement as a cynical power-sharing deal. Numerous center-right voters were also unhappy about the fact CDP chairman Vaclav Klaus had mobilized against a "leftist danger" during the electoral campaign only to ally himself with the CSDP after the elections.

While before the 1998 elections the rhetoric of Czech politicians was strongly ideological, in the 2002 campaigns the parties lost not only their ideological edge but ignored important ideas in their campaigns as well. The electoral campaigns of individual parties were populist, devoid of any real issues, and their leaders repeatedly declared they were prepared to form coalitions with any other democratic party, regardless of the compatibility or incompatibility of party programs. The opposition agreement helped to transform Czech politics into a mere technology of power. Politicians were basically telling the voters: "You cast your vote in our favor, we will do with it what we want."

One of the most popular billboards before the elections said: "Vote either for the CSDP or for the CDP, it does not matter. We will find a way to work together anyway." Actually, the billboard was not entirely accurate; it should have also mentioned the opposition Christian Democrats and the Freedom Union, allied under the rubric Coalition, which were also unwilling to tell the public whether they preferred to work with the CDP or the CSDP.

The Communists
Not surprisingly, many voters decided to punish the democratic parties. Some voters did so by casting their votes for the CP; many more did not bother to vote at all. The voter turnout, 58 percent, was the lowest since the fall of communism in 1989. This, too, benefited the Communists, who have by far the most-disciplined voters. The fact that the unreformed Communist Party continues to exist and is able to play an important role is peculiar to the Czech Republic in postcommunist Central Europe. Explanations begin with events going back to 1968, when the Soviet-led invasion crushed the Prague Spring reforms. The Communist Party was subsequently turned into a neo-Stalinist monolith, in which no reforms were possible until the fall of Communism. While the Hungarian and the Polish communist parties were able to liberalize in the 1980s and, eventually, to make a smooth transition into social-democratic groupings, the Czechoslovak Communist Party shrank but remained intact. The CSDP was thus created as a formation totally separate from the Communists.

Although politicians repeatedly discussed the possibility of banning the unreformed Communists, the political will was lacking. The CP, therefore, remained part of the political spectrum, attracting many people who had been connected with the Communists in the so-called normalization era (1970-89). Since no democratic party would form a coalition with the Communists, the CP has not participated in any government since 1989 and so could not be associated with any of the many scandals, financial and otherwise, that the government parties were tainted with over the years. As a result, it is seen by an increasing number of young people, who do not remember the communist regime, as a "clean" party. The CP's profile has allowed it to attract a wide variety of constituencies: unemployed people from economically depressed regions, old people afraid of reforms, workers afraid of European integration and globalization, nationalists afraid of a "German threat," young antiglobalization protesters, and people who want to punish the establishment.

The Civic Democrats
In the 2002 electoral campaign, the Communists were greatly helped by Vaclav Klaus's nationalist campaign that focused on the Benes decrees, under which some three million Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II. Klaus repeatedly warned against alleged plans by Austria and Germany to use the Czech Republic's admission into the EU to press for large-scale revisions of postwar territorial and property arrangements. Although the EU has repeatedly said the Benes decrees and the Czech Republic's prospective membership in the EU are two separate issues, Klaus yoked them together by demanding that the EU provide guarantees that the Benes decrees are untouchable. Klaus was, of course, trying to stir nationalist sentiments to win a few more electoral points. He focused not only on the Benes decrees but, like the Communists, explored anti-immigration feelings and other populist issues.

Originally a liberal party, the CDP has, since 1998, gradually moved toward a mix of conservative, nationalist, and populist ideas. Klaus himself has become increasingly hostile to the project of European integration. The gradual intensification of Klaus's anti-EU rhetoric has posed a serious problem for the Civic Democrats, as its voters represent the most pro-EU segment of the Czech electorate. Knowing this, Klaus has tried to perform a difficult balancing act. On the one hand, he continued to assure his voters that there is no alternative to the Czech Republic's becoming a member of the EU; on the other hand, he would never forget to tick off a long list of the EU's real or alleged problems. In the electoral campaign, he finally declared that unless his demands are met, he will campaign against membership. He knows, of course, that the EU cannot provide any guarantees on an issue that is, by nature, legal and not political.

As the election results show, most of those voters whom Klaus frightened with his Benes-decree scare cast their votes for the CP, which is a genuine strong-arm party with a long history of fighting the "Sudeten German threat." By turning openly against the EU, Klaus also managed to scare away many of his traditional voters. They were forced to decide whether they preferred Klaus or the European Union. Klaus then sealed his electoral defeat by trying to undermine the Social Democrats by mobilizing against socialism yet again. But it was the CDP, of course, that had kept the socialist government in power for four years with the help of the cynical power-sharing "opposition agreement." Klaus's appeals simply reminded many voters that he had mobilized against the CSDP before the elections in 1998, only to ally himself with Milos Zeman, the CSDP head, after the election.

European vs. anti-European forces
In the end, the elections produced a very fragile majority of pro-EU forces. The CSDP and Coalition, uniting the Christian Democrats and the Freedom Union, have between them 101 votes in the 200-seat parliament. The anti-EU forces represented by the CDP and the CP are not only openly Euroskeptic but now openly support policies for which Austrian populist leader Jörg Haider was vilified, from all corners of Europe, for advocating. Haider's participation in the Austrian government and electoral successes of extreme-right parties in other European countries have since "legitimized" some of those stances.

The clearly pro-EU forces will be in a difficult position. Klaus and the Communists can continue to explore the Benes-decree controversy and to keep insisting that the EU may not be able to protect the Czechs from Germany's and Austria's pressure to revise the decrees. Opinion polls show that anti-EU propaganda has already significantly reduced the level of support for EU membership. Only some 45 percent of Czechs actively support membership, while 30 percent are undecided and 25 percent are against. On the other hand, it is clear that a government led by the Social Democrats will not only push to complete negotiations with the EU but will actively campaign in favor of membership. If those policies are effective a majority of Czechs are likely to vote in support of membership.

CSDP dilemmas
The electoral results do not amount to a huge victory for the left, as it is often claimed. The Communists will not play a role in shaping government policies. Most policies, as practiced by the CSDP government in the last four years, are not likely to change significantly. The government will put the emphasis on building what the CSDP calls "a modern social-welfare state." It will also continue luring foreign investors with a number of investment incentives and is likely to maintain the Czech Republic's current position as the country with the highest foreign direct investment in the region. The government will, however, need to reduce its appetite for deficit spending. The fact that it will not be granted carte blanche again by virtue of an opposition agreement and will have to find compromises between its own views and those of the center-right parties should help. The new prime minister, Vladimir Spidla, who replaced Zeman as chairman of the CSDP last year, is much less prone than Zeman to getting embroiled in power-sharing deals and pursuing nontransparent projects that raise questions about possible corruption.

CDP dilemmas
Following its electoral defeat, the CDP faces serious problems. First, over the years it has become a one-man party. Its entire election campaign was centered on Klaus. The CDP's defeat is thus Klaus's defeat, but the party does not have anyone who can replace Klaus. Second, by embracing some issues that are generally advocated by extremist parties, the CDP has lost a number of moderate, pro-EU voters. To regain those votes, the party would have to move back toward the political center. That, however, will not be easy unless Klaus "reinvents" himself again or is replaced by someone else. Klaus's continued presence at the helm of his party most likely means a further movement toward anti-EU attitudes. That may drive away even the party's most loyal supporters. Klaus himself may follow two main strategies now. First, he may try to solve CDP's leadership problem by attempting to run for president when the Czech Republic holds its presidential elections next February.

However, because the recent parliamentary election results significantly decreased his chances of being elected by parliament (which under the current law chooses the president), Klaus may stop opposing the idea of direct election of the president, and his party may support a constitutional amendment that would make the popular vote possible. Klaus is a charismatic but also a polarizing figure, and even massive support from his friends in show business may not be enough to get him elected and to succeed Vaclav Havel. In fact, following the recent elections, the presidential odds of Senate chairman Petr Pithart or Ombudsman Otakar Motejl are greater than those of Klaus.

Second, Klaus may simply bet everything on the anti-EU strategy. If he winds up in the opposition, he may dispense with the pretense about there being "no alternative" to the EU and campaign openly against membership before the accession referendum next year. Should he be able to persuade a majority of Czechs to vote against membership, the pro-EU government would have to step down and Klaus could return with a significantly strengthened mandate as well as a less schizophrenic agenda than he used in the electoral campaign.