Volume 11 Number 3

Summer 2002

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Slovakia - In advance of the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for September 20 and 21, the ruling coalition government in Slovakia, led by Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDCU), has become increasingly ineffective and unstable. In addition to the immediate damage caused to Dzurinda by a scandal in June involving a bid for railway equipment, the government is the subject of considerable disappointment for having failed to meet many of its campaign promises involving unemployment reduction, wage increases, and housing development. According to recent polls, none of the coalition members is likely to fare very well in the elections. However, the reason that such a broad coalition was formed in the first place-namely, opposition to Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS)-remains, making it likely that the impending elections will result in a similarly unwieldy and precarious coalition.

Prime Minister Dzurinda's political future was severely compromised in mid-June, when he was implicated in a scandal involving a Slovak Railways public procurement procedure. The tender committee, which was chaired by Dzurinda's brother, who is an official at Slovak Railways, was accused of accepting a bid for the purchase of locomotives that was 822 million crowns ($17.3 million) higher than that of any other competitor. These allegations were made public by the transport minister, Jozef Macejko, who belongs to Dzurinda's own party. The premier indirectly defended the committee's decision, saying the allegations were made by a group of people who were "pursuing their private interests."

On June 17, Dzurinda submitted to President Rudolf Schuster a proposal for Macejko's dismissal. Schuster delayed approving the dismissal until June 24, prompting Dzurinda to turn to the Constitutional Court for an opinion on the constitutionality of the president's deferral. The court ruled, on June 19, that it was within the president's power to take the time to investigate charges of ministerial corruption and that the Constitution imposed no time limit on the president's acting on a prime minister's request. On June 26, Ivan Miklos was appointed the new transport minister.

In response to this scandal, the opposition MDS called for a special session of parliament, on July 3, and proposed a vote of no confidence in the government of Prime Minister Dzurinda. After nine hours of debate, the motion failed, with only 52 out of the 105 MPs present voting in favor. This was well short of the 76 votes, or majority of the total 150 seats in the Narodna Rada (parliament), required to bring down the government. However, only 35 MPs voted against the motion, with 18 abstaining. The MDS and the Slovak National Party naturally voted in favor of no confidence, but numbered among the 52 votes in favor were four coalition MPs and three MPs who were formerly members of coalition. Many other members of the ruling coalition preferred to abstain from the vote, arguing that it did not make sense to dismiss the government a month before new elections. In any case, the vote amply demonstrated that the present government's support, even among its own members, is extremely low.

Among the parties of the ruling coalition, none have deteriorated as much as the two major leftist parties-the Party of the Democratic Left (PDL) and the Party of Civic Understanding (PCU). The latter suffers from organizational weakness, having been originally established in early 1998 only as a vehicle for the successful presidential candidacy of Rudolf Schuster. The former finally succumbed to a long-standing rift between its populist and proreform camps. The reform faction splintered off early this year, following the dismissal of proreform finance minister Brigita Schmognerova. Schmognerova founded a new party-the Social Democratic Alternative (SDA)-in February, and was promptly joined by Peter Weiss, a former PDL leader, and by Milan Ftacnik, the education minister and former candidate for the PDL chairmanship, in March. Ftacnik was elected to the new party's chairmanship at its founding congress in April. PDL's disintegration continued, on July 12, when Defense Minister Jozef Stank left the party to run as an independent. Even though PDL and PCU signed an agreement, on May 29, to run in September's elections on joint lists, there is a distinct possibility that none of the left or center-left parties will attain the 5 percent threshold required for parliamentary representation.

The opposition MDS, for its part, has also suffered from disunity. The party, which enjoys the greatest popularity in most recent polls, essentially coheres around the charismatic and autocratic figure of Vladimir Meciar. In July, Ivan Gasparovic, an MDS delegate who claims to adopt a more moderate stance on issues of NATO and EU membership and had been left off the MDS candidate list for September elections, split to form his own party-the Movement for Democracy (MfD). He was joined by Marta Aibekova, another MDS delegate omitted from the new candidate lists. The revised candidate lists were drawn up by Meciar himself, with no discussion, and forced through the party's nomination congress on July 7, in spite of little initial support. On July 15, Gasparovic and Aibekova were elected chairman and deputy chairman of MfD, respectively. Thus far, there have been few defectors to the new faction from MDS, although there is increasing speculation that MfD might lure away some voters who are weary of MDS's isolation.

In spite of its likely electoral success, MDS has virtually no chance of forming a government after the new elections. None of the other parties, including the popular center-right Smer (Direction), which was formed after the last election in 1998, will consider entering into coalition with it, at least so long as Meciar remains its leader. The Smer party, led by Robert Fico, is likely garner the second largest number of seats, after MDS, raising the possibility that Fico could become prime minister. In any case, the Smer party will most certainly be a large part of the new coalition. This new government is likely to be broadly united by a commitment to EU and NATO entry, which, for a long time, MDS has resolutely opposed.

With the government weak and in disarray, it was unable to pass many of the proposed bills in parliament's recent legislative sessions, some of which are required for EU entry. For instance, the ruling coalition was divided over the passage of an antidiscrimination bill, to combat, in its supporters' words, discrimination based on race, language, age, religion, health, gender, and political or sexual orientation. However, the conservative Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) claimed this law would be the first step toward allowing homosexual couples to adopt children, a policy they firmly oppose. CDM deputy chairman Vladimir Palko argued that the European Union does not require Slovakia to pass such a law, because it would be based on a "resolution" passed by the European parliament and is not part of the EU acquis communautaire.

Among non-EU related bills that failed to pass was a proposed constitutional amendment (requiring the support of three-fifths of the MPs, or a minimum of 90 out of 150) that would have strengthened the rules regarding conflicts of interest for those seeking and holding public office. The bill called for mandatory asset declarations for public officials and their relatives. The current regulation, which was passed under Meciar's government in 1995, excludes spouses, children, and people sharing the households of public officials. The revision would require all of these groups to declare their assets, annually. The amendment would also have toughened existing restrictions and broadened the circle of officials obliged to comply with them, including the president, members of parliament, regional parliamentary officials, judges, heads of state companies, mayors, prosecutors, and the ombudsman. Of the 121 deputies present, 75 voted in favor, 7 against, 36 abstained, and 3 did not register for the voting. The bill was rejected not only by the opposition but also by some coalition deputies, including all of CDM's deputies, one-third of the MPs from the Hungarian Coalition Party, and also 5 MPs from the Slovak Democratic Coalition.

On May 29, the governing parties did succeed in amending the pension system. The amendment ties pensions more closely to how much a contributor earns, raises the retirement age of women, and strips politicians of the power to decide annual pension increases. However, this is only the first step toward the pension reform that had been promised by the Dzurinda government. A few days earlier, the parliament rejected a more radical bill that would have entailed the privatization of the pension system.

The May 29 amendment that did pass stipulates that people who contribute more to the pension fund because of higher earnings should receive a larger retirement benefit. The changes would allow for 30 percent of the contributions to go into a special account that will collect interest-called a "capitalization pillar"-and will continue to be administered by the state social insurance. The retirement age for women will increase gradually, from that established by the pre-1989 rules, in which women were to retire between the ages of 52 and 57, depending on the number of children they had. With this change, women will now retire at the age of 60, at the same age as men. Beginning July 1, pension increases will be indexed to increases in minimum living expenses and average wages. According to the old system, valid until the end of this year, pension increases were at the discretion of the government and parliament, thereby leaving the issue open to manipulation for electoral gain.

On May 21, the government refused to sign the European Code of Social Security. The code is a recommendation, not an obligation, for EU members and candidates. It defines norms for social security coverage and establishes minimum levels of protection for medical care, unemployment, and old-age benefits. Vice Prime Minister Ivan Miklos (SDCU) said that signing the code at that time would be irresponsible, because committing to the code would incur financial obligations Slovakia could not meet. He called for a true assessment of the costs entailed, before the government signs the code. This marked the first time that Slovakia had rejected a recommendation of the European Commission.

Joining NATO and the EU remain the highest priorities of the present government, and the only basis for its cohesion. Over the past several months, this goal has been complicated by the uncertainty generated by the prospect of the imminent elections. Many foreign officials and leaders of international organizations have expressed their concern regarding Slovakia's potential political instability. Specifically, Guenter Verheugen, the EU's commissioner in charge of enlargement, warned that Slovakia's chances of joining the EU "could be jeopardized" if the country were to be led by a government "incapable of completing preparations" for accession by 2004. He recalled that under Meciar's
rule, from 1994 to 1998, Slovakia did not even fulfill the criteria for starting negotiations. This was one of many thinly veiled warnings, issued by foreign officials, of the dire consequences of a return by Meciar to power.

By August, Slovakia had closed 27 chapters of the acquis communautaire, including, most recently, the chapters on justice and home affairs, institutions, and regional policy. The recently concluded agreements require that Slovakia bring its regulations on security, border control, visa policy, migration, techniques for combating organized crime, and money laundering into line with EU rules. They also provide that Slovakia should have 13 seats in the expanded European Parliament and one European commissioner, the same number as Denmark and Finland. Slovakia will be required to apply immediately after entry the same measures on its eastern border with Ukraine as are used on the EU's outer Schengen border. However, during a five-year transition period, Slovaks will continue to have to show passports on entering Austria and other current EU countries. Finally, in closing the regional-policy chapter, Slovakia approved a statistical map that divides the country into four geographical areas, including one for Bratislava. This map was required for the ongoing evaluation of the implementation of EU-related reforms in Slovakia.

The remaining open chapters are competition, financial and budgetary provisions, and agriculture. Of these, the last is likely to create the greatest problems. Already, there have been some points of contention in the negotiation of the agriculture chapter having to do with the lower agricultural subsidies for new member states. A study, prepared by the Slovak Academy of Science, predicted that entry into the EU would bring a significant increase in agricultural prices and could push unemployment to as high as 30 percent. Such studies are quickly exploited by populist leaders-like Robert Fico, who enjoys considerable support in recent polls-to electoral advantage.

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