Volume 11 Numbers 1/2

Winter/Spring 2002

Special Reports

Divorce by Mutual Consent
Stojan Cerovic

In mid-March in Belgrade, an agreement was signed on the future state to be called "Serbia and Montenegro." The name "Yugoslavia" has finally become history, inciting mixed emotions from the Yugo-nostalgists, so called, who are still numerous throughout the former state. Some felt relief, since they believed that a federal state consisting only of Serbia and Montenegro did not truly deserve to call itself Yugoslavia. Others mourned the loss of that name as if the last ray of any hope-that the former state would be restored-had been extinguished.

The agreement was made with the mediation of the high representative of the European Union, Javier Solana, who also undersigned it on behalf of the EU. Although we are meant to believe that the agreement ended the yearlong crisis between Belgrade and Podgorica, from the initial reactions to the agreement, it is obvious that only Solana is genuinely pleased. The state crisis will continue, and the agreement, envisaged as temporary, might never be implemented.

In essence, what Solana achieved in his negotiations with Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic and Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica, as the main rivals, goes no further than a legalization of the situation as Solana found it. The only problem is that what he came upon was the empty shell of a federation, one which had already collapsed in actuality. Within this shell, the two republics have functioned as economically independent for some years, with occasional conflicts (over customs, for example) and open quarrels among the political elite. The agreement failed to satisfy both Kostunica, who strove for a functional federation, and Djukanovic, who wanted and still wants an independent Montenegro that could enter into some kind of alliance with Serbia. A compromise was actually impossible, which is why, according to the agreement, in three years both Serbia and Montenegro can reexamine how the state is functioning and decide whether they wish to remain in it. The assumption is that, by then, it will become clear whether the dominant process is tending toward reintegration or disintegration.

Why does Montenegro want to leave?

The previous crisis between Serbia and Montenegro was, to a great degree, the legacy of Milosevic's regime. The two-member federation, formed in 1992 after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, rested on the political and ideological relationship of the ruling parties in each republic. It lasted until 1997, when Djukanovic, at that time acting prime minister of Montenegro, made use of an electoral crisis and massive opposition demonstrations in Serbia to distance himself openly from Milosevic, referring to him as an obsolete politician. Djukanovic announced his intention to modernize Montenegro, open up toward Europe, and commence extensive reforms. He did not want Montenegro to share the fate of Milosevic's Serbia, internationally isolated, subjected to economic sanctions, and in conflict with the world.

The break with Belgrade caused a division with in the Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). Djukanovic managed to maintain a slim majority, while the minority joined the opposition under a new name, the Socialist People's Party (SPP). At that moment, neither Djukanovic nor the opposition loyal to Milosevic questioned the joint state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), although Milosevic's propaganda machine started accusing DPS of separatism. At the end of the '90s, the idea of an independent Montenegro was still a decidedly minority notion. Djukanovic moved cautiously in that direction and gradually prepared public opinion, but he always won elections on a platform of modernizing the joint state.

Belgrade sent threatening messages and increased the pressure on Djukanovic, which reached its most intense point during the NATO air strikes when it seemed as though a military coup in Montenegro was hanging in the air. Djukanovic found himself in an almost impossible situation since, as Milosevic's adversary, he had practically placed himself on NATO's side. However, Montenegro itself was a victim of the air strikes, and it was incredibly difficult to explain those theoretically friendly bombs to its citizens. Still, partially owing to Djukanovic's skillful maneuvers, and possibly with the West's preventive diplomacy, the Yugoslav Army never even tried to topple the Montenegrin government.

Still, the army was perceived as a danger for Montenegro even after NATO's intervention, and Djukanovic and his propaganda consciously nurtured fear of the army, increasing the animosity toward Belgrade. That tactic was part of the "creeping secession" strategy, but, to a greater extent, it was aimed at Western sponsors. The image was that of a small, freedom-loving, pro-European republic, threatened both by aggressive Serbian nationalism and by Milosevic's old-fashioned communism, that desperately needed any kind of Western aid. In the last few years, Montenegro has received Western, primarily US, aid that is by far the highest per capita in the region.

One could say, somewhat cynically, that Djukanovic's anti-Milosevic policies were Monte-negro's greatest export. The smaller republic was treated as the most serious opposition to the Milosevic regime, and, thanks to Western aid, it could even provoke Serbia's jealousy and present itself to Belgrade as a successful model and proof that cooperation with the West pays off. Many believed that Podgorica could play an important role in organizing and assisting the Serbian democratic opposition, which, in turn, along with the independent media in Belgrade, unreservedly backed Djukanovic against the Montenegrin opposition that was supporting Milosevic.

Until the October revolution and change of government in Belgrade, Montenegro's official position was that it would wait for democratic changes in Serbia and then reorganize the state and establish it in a democratic manner. This was also the stance accepted by the majority of the public as well as the international community-the latter especially keen to avoid further divisions and fragmentization in the Balkans. However, by the time Milosevic's regime was toppled, the two republics were practically independent states. True, the citizens used the same passports, and there was a joint army, but there was also customs control on the border between the republics. Montenegro had completely stopped using the Yugoslav dinar and was already using the German mark as its currency.

Still, it was expected that the reintegration process would begin immediately, especially since Djukanovic had close political and personal relations with many of the leaders of the new Serbian democratic government. It seemed that there was no serious reason for conflict, that there was no need for Montenegro to fear pressure and dominance from Belgrade, and also that the international community would strongly support reintegration. However, the opposite occurred. Djukanovic suddenly started using a separatist vocabulary, demanding that Montenegro be given its own seat in the UN. He said that Kostunica had inherited Milosevic's Greater Serbian aspirations with regard to Montenegro, that it was impossible to achieve equality between the two federal units when one was twenty times smaller, that FRY no longer existed in any case, and that a union of separate states would be the ideal solution.

The idea of calling a referendum on independence in Montenegro was becoming increasingly popular; it was even a campaign promise of Djukanovic's DPS, as well as of the radically proindependent Liberal Alliance and the Social Democratic Party. But in the parliamentary elections in May 2001, the coalition of these three parties-known as Victory Belongs to Montenegro-won only a very slim majority over the opposition bloc Together for Yugoslavia. It was a disappointing result, and it became clear that an independence referendum, in all likelihood, would not achieve a sufficiently convincing majority. If those who opposed independence simply boycotted the referendum, overall participation would fall below 50 percent.

But the supporters of an independent Montenegro did not abandon their campaign. Instead, they simply stepped up their activities and started looking for arguments from history and in ethnic differences. Such arguments had played a decisive role in the former Yugoslavia's disintegration; still, Montenegro had remained with Serbia, in part, because these historic-ethnic reasons were mostly negligible with regard to it. To be more precise, Montenegro had existed only as a separate state (internationally recognized at the Berlin congress in 1878, like Serbia) until 1918 when it joined Serbia and then the newly formed Kingdom of Yugoslavia. There is, therefore, a certain, somewhat modest historic and objective basis for autonomous existence, and it is this upon which Podgorica greatly insists today.

The ethnic differences are more difficult to see since the same language is used in both Serbia and Montenegro, with slight differences of dialect, and both populations are Orthodox Christians. According to the latest census from 1991, in Montenegro, 62 percent were Montenegrin, 14.6 percent Muslim (now called Bosniac), 6.6 percent Albanian, and only 9.3 percent Serbian. However, the differences between Serbs and Montenegrins were always rather fluid. Many Montenegrins also consider themselves Serbian, as though talking of a wider family circle, while many others will say that clear differences to exist between the two. Sometimes, even the closest relatives will have different opinions on this. Independence advocates are now trying to emphasize the differences with Serbia as much as possible; this policy has brought about the creation of the alternative Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the rediscovery of new Montenegrin ethnic roots (to be called Dukljani), which puts into dispute any ethnic kinship with Serbs. The language, hitherto always called "Serbian," is now called "Montenegrin" by those who strive to emphasize its uniqueness.

Such exaggerations usually have an opposite effect as well. According to polls, the number of advocates of independence for Montenegro has not increased in recent months; in fact, the proponents might even be losing support. That is partially a consequence of the drop in the popularity of Djukanovic and the ruling elite, both of whom were accused, recently, of being involved in cigarette black-market activities, corruption, and crime. At the same time, international aid to Montenegro has drastically decreased, and it is becoming increasingly more difficult to buy social peace.

Why doesn't Montenegro want to leave?

Relations with Serbia have divided Montenegro-into two approximately equal parts-for almost one hundred years. It is not only a question of current policies, reforms, or the relationship with the West, although it is true that, among those who oppose independence, one finds the greatest number of conservative traditionalists who, until recently, ardently supported Slobodan Milosevic. And today, it would be the parties within this bloc that very decisively oppose the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to The Hague Tribunal. However, the relationship with Serbia is, above all, an issue of identity and the sense of belonging.

A good half of all Montenegrins find it difficult to imagine total separation from Serbia, if only because that determination has been and still is passed down as tradition in most families. These are decisions that the great-grandfathers made, and, in Montenegro, that is respected in most cases. On top of that, almost everyone in Montenegro has some close ties to Serbia, via their closest cousins, friends, business activities, or property. Many also seek education and hospital treatment in Belgrade. One should not forget that Montenegro only has 650,000 citizens; many realize that this number is insufficient to enable the country to survive independently.

The question of security is also anything but insignificant. At this moment, none of its neighbors directly threaten or endanger Montenegro's borders, but the events in Kosovo and the rebellion of Albanians in Macedonia definitely have caused concern. In the eastern parts of small Montenegro, Albanians are the majority, and their numbers are still growing. They are basically loyal to the state, and Podgorica's policies are tolerant toward minorities, but no one can say with any certainty what the future holds. In any case, Montenegro's Albanians are, without exception, in favor of an independent Montenegro. The same goes for Bosniacs who fear the Serbs becoming a majority and believe that their minority position is better or more secure in a smaller rather than larger state. Thus, a certain suspicion is felt by Montenegrins of Slav-Orthodox descent that all minorities, as a rule, would opt for an independent Montenegro. Reflecting on how the former Yugoslavia fell apart, by way of ethnic conflicts and secession, it would be odd if Montenegrins did not fear that minorities would express their own territorial demands, especially since both the Albanians and the Bosniacs border their original countries, both of which have larger territories and a greater number of citizens than Montenegro.

An independent Montenegro would have to support its own army, although many separatists in Podgorica argue that because of membership in the EU and even NATO, it will not need an army, since these organizations will guarantee state security. The Montenegrin economy, which is in a chronically lamentable state, and its neglected tourist industry would have to support the diplomatic, education, and health services, and this prospect certainly does not hold out the promise of a higher standard of living. Many Montenegrins would still be oriented toward Serbia in terms of business even after secession, but the customs duties and various taxes would definitely increase operating costs. Health and education services in Belgrade would be more expensive for the Montenegrins if they were treated as foreign citizens.

Of those opposed to secession, one should also include the tens or hundreds of thousands of Montenegrins who live in Serbia, many of whom declare themselves Serbian, and whose number cannot be determined, even approximately. Almost without exception, they want to preserve a joint state; many have influence over their cousins and friends in Montenegro, and they have also demanded the right to vote in case of a referendum on independence.

Finally, those in favor of a joint state have received additional arguments from an unexpected quarter. The EU and the US, which Djukanovic regarded as his allies for years with good reason, are opposed to Montenegro's secession. Djukanovic has become a victim of his own pro-European propaganda. His adversaries, who never cared much for Europe, have started praising Western policies and are pointing out the contradictions in Djukanovic's position. And Djukanovic, who wanted to open up, cooperate, and meet all Western demands, has found himself politically isolated by the very same Western forces on which he had previously depended. His attempt to accuse the new Serbian government of Milosevic's aggressive nationalist policies has not succeeded. No one, apart from Montenegrin separatists, see Milosevic in Kostunica.

Postponed solutions

The Western position, represented by Solana, boiled down to one of looking for the quickest and cheapest compromise. But Solana had to take into account not only Podgorica and Belgrade but also the wider regional implications of the crisis. An independent Montenegro, achieved by means of a referendum of dubious democratic quality and with a minimal majority vote, could incite conflicts within Montenegro itself and cause permanent instability. Besides that, and of possibly even greater importance, it would set a dangerous precedent for the Republika Srpska, which might also insist on its independence from Bosnia. A referendum for independence, there, could easily achieve much greater support than would be the case in Montenegro.

Kosovo's Albanians could also pose their demands to proclaim independence formally, for which a referendum vote would be almost unanimous. They could also argue that, with the disappearance of FRY, UN Resolution 1244, stating that Kosovo is part of that state, is no longer valid, making the province independent. Even those Albanians who organized a separatist guerrilla movement in Macedonia would be extremely pleased if Montenegro, with the blessing of the international community, seceded from Serbia. All of this would mean that the process of redrawing borders in the Balkans was still not complete, that new maps are yet to be made, and that hope remains for various national aspirations, including possibly even those for a Greater Albania, or something similar.

If Solana's conduct during the negotiations accurately represents the West's relationship toward the Balkans and its understanding of the current situation, then one could say that the West believes that one should not have a strong stand either for or against any particular composition of the states in the region. What is most important is to avoid violence and to have everything unfold gradually and in a controlled manner. Viewed from the European side, it would definitely be preferable if the process of reintegration began in the Balkans, but it might be too soon for that.

The final solution is very original and probably temporary. Serbia and Montenegro will continue to be one state, at least viewed from the outside; it will share a UN seat. The state will have a president who is, at the same time, also the prime minister and is elected by a unicameral federal parliament. Instead of a government, there will be a five-member Council of Ministers (defense, foreign affairs, domestic and foreign trade, and human rights) and a Court. The agreement allows for a nonexistent joint market. Montenegro will retain the euro as its currency, Serbia the dinar, and the customs and banking systems will be different, although both sides are required gradually to harmonize their economic relations. But this, as drawn, is a very lenient obligation and, in reality, does not oblige anyone.

According to the agreement, Montenegro will give up its referendum, in other words, postpone it for three years. After that, both republics will have the right to reassess how the state is functioning and decide whether they want independence. This delay almost certainly means that the current solution is, in actual fact, heading for a breakup of the existing state and that both sides will take all necessary steps to protect their own interests until then. Immediately after signing the agreement, Djukanovic tried to explain to his supporters in Montenegro, to whom he had promised a referendum on independence, that he had struck a good deal because the referendum probably would not have been successful. Thus, in this manner, by way of a lax and temporary agreement on a joint state, Montenegro could achieve full independence in an easier way, bypassing a democratic procedure.

In Serbia, as well, measures of economic separation were immediately announced, without waiting for any harmonization with Montenegro. Serbia can definitely survive the loss of the joint state much more easily than Montenegro, and it does not have much patience with the thought of establishing the complicated and uncertain structures envisioned in the agreement. The only point both sides will probably agree to-for the love of the European Union-is to slow down the breakup process, subjecting it to some kind of foreign supervision. But the new country, "Serbia and Montenegro," will most probably never exist.

Stojan Cerovic is a cofounder and columnist of the weekly magazine, VREME, in Belgrade. In 2000, he was a senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.

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