Volume 11 Numbers 1/2

Winter/Spring 2002

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Yugoslavia - March 14 marked the end of Yugoslavia as we have known it. After protracted negotiations, in a deal brokered and pushed by the EU and its High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, Serbia and Montenegro signed a document-called the "Agreement on Principles of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro within the Framework of a Union of States"-outlining the structure and institutions of a new joint state. The new state will no longer be called Yugoslavia and is referred to in the agreement as "Serbia and Montenegro."

Tiny Montenegro, with a population of just 700,000, had begun its move toward independence during the Milosevic reign as part of its opposition to his draconian rule. At that time, the country started to boycott federal institutions, use the German mark as official currency, and reform its economic system independently of Serbia. After Milosevic's ouster, the country continued to push for independence, and the current government-led by Milo Djukanovic's Victory Belongs to Montenegro coalition-had campaigned on an independence plank, promising to hold a referendum on the republic's status this spring. The new agreement, Solana stated, was "an important step forward for the stability of the region and for the stability of Europe." Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic stated that he hoped the two states would be rewarded for agreeing to the EU's request-that they remain united in some way-with a speedier integration into the Union.

Talks on Yugoslavia's future were mired in stalemate until Solana stepped in just after the new year began. The EU wanted to reach a deal that would preserve some sort of federal relationship, fearing that independence for Montenegro would lead the Kosovar Albanians to push for their independence as well. On February 10, Solana put a draft compromise on the table that the two sides used as a basis for negotiations during the next six weeks. The final document, which Djindjic stated "recognized the status quo," stipulates a unicameral parliament, a president elected by parliament, and a council of ministers with prerogatives in the areas of foreign affairs, defense, international and internal economic relations, and minority and human rights. The duties of the ministries will be worked out later. There will be a single court, with an equal number of judges from both states, that will have "constitutional and administrative judicial functions and concerns itself with the standardization of judicial practices." The armies of Serbia and Montenegro will be commanded by the Supreme Defense Council. By June, the respective parliaments must draft a Constitutional Charter. After it has been adopted, the new parliament will be constituted and the president elected. Representation in international bodies will rotate, with separate representation in international financial institutions.

The agreement did not specify the terms of the economic relationship between the two countries, a major sticking point during the negotiations. Montenegro had pressed for separate tax, customs, and monetary systems, stating that joining Serbia on any of these would be backpedaling for Montenegro. The text states that "the achieved level of economic reform in the member states is the starting point for the structuring of reciprocal economic relations. The member states are responsible for the unimpeded functioning of the common market, including the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. The surmounting of existing differences, especially in the area of trade and customs policy, shall be ensured though harmonization of the economic systems of the member states with the economic system of the European Union."

Most importantly, there will be a three-year moratorium on any independence referendum. After this period, the document states, the "member states have the right to initiate a procedure to change the statehood status or to leave the union of states." If Montenegro leaves the union, international documents applying to Yugoslavia, especially UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which ended the Kosovo war, will apply only to Serbia. Some observers had worried that the agreement would negate all documents that dealt with Yugoslavia, soon to be nonexistent. The referendum moratorium could bring the collapse of the Montenegrin government, which has a minority in parliament and governs only with the support of the radically proindependence Liberal Alliance. The repercussions of the agreement in Podgorica remain to be seen; in early April, Montenegro's Socialist People's Party threatened a vote of no confidence in the government and called for early parliamentary and presidential elections. On April 9, the agreement was approved in both parliaments, prompting the Social Democratic Party in Montenegro to resign from the government; it held four ministerial posts.

While the agreement resolved the squabbling between Serbia and Montenegro, politics in Belgrade continue to be dominated by squabbling between Djindjic, leader of the Democratic Party (DP), and federal president Vojislav Kostunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DePS). Although the two parties ran together in the coalition-the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)-that threw Milosevic out of office in the fall of 2000, DePS and DP, which are the largest parties in the coalition, now often find themselves on opposite sides of parliament's floor. Kostunica's party stormed out of the Serbian government this summer, and, although it no longer holds any portfolios, it is still a formal member of the governing DOS coalition. Nonetheless, the party sometimes votes against the government on important legislation, often blocking a quorum or otherwise stalling parliament's work. The bickering between the two sides has monopolized politics in the last months, coloring every political debate and making the adoption of serious reform difficult. For the time being, the coalition-and the government-have held together, and early elections do not seem to be on the immediate horizon.

In recent months, controversy has erupted around the new labor law, long regarded as one of the most important reform projects, along with the privatization law adopted in June and the tax laws adopted in April 2001. The law's most disputed point was Art. 101 establishing when management will be allowed to lay off workers. Many stated that the previous law had made it basically impossible for management to fire workers; opponents of the new law argued that this article gave management too much power over its employees, calling for the restriction of these powers. According to the law, employers are also no longer required to sign collective agreements with unions as the work relationship may be regulated by a collective agreement, work rules, or a contract.

Immediately after the draft was forwarded to parliament in early October, the two largest trade unions took to the streets, on October 16, and threatened a countrywide strike. In response, the Serbian government withdrew the draft, incorporated a few amendments put forward by the unions, and resubmitted it to parliament at the end of November. Article 101, however, remained essentially unchanged. In one of the first votes on the law, the tension between DP and DePS was aggravated when parliamentary speaker Dragan Marsicanin, speaking at the behest of his party (DePS), alleged irregular voting procedures-namely that a DP deputy, Borislav Novakovic, was not actually present at the vote but that other DP members had voted for him with his card in favor of the law. DP responded immediately, demanding Marsicanin's dismissal, and accused Kostunica's DePS of conspiring with the opposition to obstruct passage of the labor law. On December 5, DOS submitted to parliament a measure to remove Marsicanin. The vote failed several times due to the lack of a quorum. Finally, faced with a no-confidence vote, Marsicanin resigned. The ensuing days saw heightened political squabbling. DePS threatened no-confidence votes, demanded that Marsicanin be reinstated, and raised the possibility of calling early elections. Djindjic threatened, in turn, to strip DePS deputies of their mandates for not abiding by the coalition agreement-for voting with the opposition. Natasa Micic, a young deputy from Civic Alliance, was voted in as the new parliamentary speaker. Nonetheless, DePS withdrew its opposition to the labor law, which was adopted in mid-December.

The strife between the two parties continued throughout the winter months, and one of the issues that came up was cooperation with The Hague Tribunal. Milosevic, currently sitting in the dock in the Netherlands, was extradited in the summer by a government decree, despite the fact that the federal Constitutional Court had suspended all extradition proceedings pending its decision on the decree's constitutionality. At that time, Kostunica came out against the extradition-or at least the government's use of a decree to facilitate it. (See Yugoslavia Update, EECR, Vol. 10, Nos. 2/3, Spring/Summer 2001.) On November 6, the decree was ruled unconstitutional. (See Yugoslavia Update, EECR, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 2001.) Although Milosevic's extradition alleviated the intense pressure on Belgrade from the international community, the Serbian government has been reminded that Milosevic was just one of many wanted by The Hague. In recent months the tribunal has been putting pressure on the government to find indicted war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic as well as deliver the others named in the Milosevic indictment. (SFOR conducted-unsuccessfully-raids in February and March to find Karadzic in the Republika Srpska.) In early December, DePS came forward with a draft law on tribunal cooperation and requested that parliament vote on it in an urgent procedure. Djindjic stated that the DePS draft does not, in fact, facilitate cooperation but rather "offers tricks to avoid it."

Djindjic, instead, prefers à la carte extradition based on the discretionary power created by the decree of June 28. He has criticized the Milosevic proceedings, arguing that they are making it more difficult for him at home to press for more extraditions, alleging that the trial is only exacerbating anti-Hague sentiments in Belgrade. Yet Djindjic, as he himself sometimes states, is dragging his feet on extraditing any more indictees in order to press the international community for more financial aid. He has complained that of the $1.3 billion promised to Serbia (agreed to only after Milosevic's extradition), the country has only received $500 million. Debate on creating a legal framework for extraditions continued, and, in March, DOS met with the ruling coalition in Montenegro (both republics would have to agree on a draft since the law should be a joint one) to try and hammer out a compromise. According to reports, the meetings could accomplish little because of continued political jockeying over matters of who was to attend and who would chair the meeting. On March 6, B92 reported that one DOS member complained that "party politics was getting in the way of lawmaking. . . . 'Drafting the law is not the problem, there's a political problem.' " That group was soon disbanded. Finally, in early April, a compromise draft that was hurriedly thrown together was adopted by the federal parliament's upper house on April 10. On that day, however, the lower house adjourned without voting on the legislation. At the same time, the federal government announced that there would be no extraditions until late April, at the earliest.

The struggle between Djindjic and Kostunica abates from time to time. For example, on January 14, Djindjic announced a government reshuffle that would give three ministries and a deputy-minister post to DePS. Nothing came of the announcement, which was not taken particularly seriously by any of the parties. Any temporary rapprochement between the parties broke on January 29 when the forces supportive of Djindjic in the federal parliament did not elect Marsicanin, who had just resigned as speaker, to the post of federal finance minister (this was not part of a reshuffle but was rather to replace the minister who had resigned in the wake of a string of bank closings-see below). The crisis soon exploded again when Alija Delimustafic, a former interior minister in the Bosnian government in the early 1990s and currently wanted by Interpol, entered Yugoslavia by means of falsified documents and was arrested. The advisers of Kostunica and Djindjic immediately started accusing each other of having ties with Delimustafic. Although the scandal had little actual consequences, it only served to inflame the ugly mudslinging between the two politicians.

Meanwhile, debate continued on another highly politicized issue-and, again, one that saw Djindjic and Kostunica on opposite sides of the fence-that of the status of Vojvodina, the northernmost province of Serbia. Like Kosovo, Vojvodina was an autonomous region until Milosevic stripped it of this status in 1989. Unlike Kosovo, however, Vojvodina does not have a majority non-Serbian population. Of its two-million-strong population, approximately 56.8 percent are Serbian, 16.9 percent are Hungarian, with the remainder split among 24 other ethnic groups. The drive for autonomy is supported by a considerable proportion of the Serbian population, many of whom have very old ties to the region and see it as part of Central Europe rather than Serbia. Vojvodina, which accounts for 20 percent of Serbia's population, produces 40 percent of its revenue.

Among their many electoral promises, DOS had promised increased autonomy for the province. The EU also pressed Belgrade to push toward a devolution of power. Nonetheless, the government has been dragging its feet on the matter, and many in Vojvodina began to fear that it was not going to deliver on its electoral promises. The atmosphere began to heat up in the fall when the proautonomy forces in the region became increasingly exasperated with the government's lack of resolve. In early October, the regional assembly ousted one of its deputy prime ministers, Rade Marinkov, who is from Kostunica's DePS, which opposes autonomy for the province. Then, on October 10, Nenad Canak, speaker of the provincial assembly, as well as a strident voice for autonomy, stormed into Vojvodina's state television station, tore down the TV Serbia sign, and, in front of the cameras, cursed at it. Canak was upset that TV Serbia's main board had not accepted his man for the job of editor-in-chief of TV Vojvodina. On November 13, 14 political parties and NGOs from Vojvodina declared their intention to draft a new Constitution as well as hold a referendum on Vojvodina's independence.

Finally giving in to some of this pressure, on December 14, the Serbian government-with Vojvodina's executive council-tailored a draft law that grants Vojvodina prerogatives in 24 areas-culture, education, language, social policy, agriculture, and so on. (Article 80 of the Constitution gives Vojvodina's assembly the right to propose legislation. Vojvodina's status is currently regulated by Arts. 108-12 of the Serbian Constitution.) The draft was endorsed by Vojvodina's parliament on December 14 and adopted by the Serbian parliament on January 23, by the slim majority of two votes. Of the 236 deputies present, 119 voted for, 74 against, and 43 abstained. The opposition voted against the law en masse, while Kostunica's party abstained. Most of proautonomy parties were not satisfied with the law and have vowed to continue their push for substantial autonomy, especially in connection with the broadcasting system and natural resources such as oil, water, and timber. It seems, however, that they may accept the law as a stopgap measure until a new Serbian Constitution is adopted, which, they hope, will grant the region full autonomy. Proautonomy forces in Vojvodina have also announced their intention to draft a new constitution for the province.

Kostunica's DePS certainly will not offer Vojvodina the autonomy it is seeking. On January 21, the party rolled out its proposal for a new Serbian Constitution. The proposal defines Serbia as a state of citizens, putting special emphasis on the protection of human rights. Government structure is again centered around the president who is elected directly and has the power to dissolve parliament. The proposal also envisages splitting up the country into five regions, with Kosovo as a sixth. This was the third proposal for a new constitution put forward in the past six months. In August 2001, the Belgrade Center for Human Rights presented its own proposal, and Pavle Nikolic, a retired professor of constitutional law, presented his version later in the fall. While any serious parliamentary debate on a new constitution is far off, it does seem that many parties accept the need for a new basic law as inevitable, both for symbolic reasons-to usher in the post-Milosevic order-and for other purely political reasons.

The government has also been lambasted for a lack of action over media policy. The media were one of Milosevic's favorite targets, and, in 2000, his government adopted a law on public information that was used extensively to harass the newspapers and television stations. Although it promised to reform the media law, the government has done little to that end. On October 9, the government presented the seventh draft version of the new law on public information. The major innovation was the introduction of the Broadcasting Council, an independent regulatory body. Yet the government seems to be lagging in adopting the law on television and radio licenses. This problem was raised by the editor-in-chief of B92, who accused Djindjic of deliberately denying television broadcasters proper frequency regulations as a means to blackmail or harass them. More than one year after Milosevic's fall, basically all the stations that he had refused licenses are still without them, and those that received some sort of preferential treatment from the former regime-notably TV Pink and BK TV-are expanding their coverage.

Some television stations are still under pressure-either from the government or their own management. On October 3, the federal government ordered TV Pirot to stop broadcasting because it lacked a proper license. Toward the end of December, the editor-in-chief of TV Studio B forbade a journalist from broadcasting a report on tobacco smuggling that involves Djindjic. As a result of the general lack of press freedom, the Serbian government was chided by the Council of Europe, which stated, on January 30, that the adoption of legislation on public information and broadcasting is a prerequisite for Yugoslavia's membership in the Council of Europe.

On November 16, the Yugoslav National Bank cancelled Astra Bank's license, leaving the bank's owners, the Karic brothers, without their flagship institution. The brothers are possibly the biggest profiteers from the Milosevic era. The federal agency for bankruptcy and bank liquidations took control of the company, stating that the bank's account was blocked because it failed to pay the first installment of excess-profit tax by the required deadline. The law was adopted in the summer of 2001 to deal with people who had used special benefits to increase their wealth during the Milosevic era. (See Yugoslavia Update, EECR, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 2001.) Although the government wanted to give the impression of cracking down on profiteers, the taxes collected in the last quarter of 2001 were rather meager. On January 23, the bureau charged with this task announced it had managed to collect a windfall of only 27 million euros, out of expected 135 million.

On January 4, the Yugoslav National Bank also announced the closure of the four largest state banks-Investbanka, Jugobanka, Beobanka, and Beogradska Banka. The four had gone bankrupt because of unsound banking practices in the past-they had extended credits to state-run companies that never repaid the loans. An estimated 9,000 people, who lost their jobs because of the closures, threatened action and initially refused to leave the banks' premises. After about a week of protests, most of employees gave up. After the closings, the federal finance minister resigned in protest. The national bank governor presented a revised banking strategy in the hopes that new banking institutions would emerge, including a development bank, an export bank for small and medium-sized firms, and a large national savings bank. And, indeed, on January 14, a national savings bank was opened. In addition, on January 12, the International Monetary Fund approved disbursement of $63 million of a $252 million loan to Yugoslavia, lauding the country for its "courageous decision" to liquidate the four large banks.
In other economic matters, on December 28, the Serbian government announced three important privatizations. In the first major venture of this sort since the overthrow of the Milosevic regime, Lafarge, a French company, paid $50.89 million for a 70 percent stake in the Beocin cement plant; the Swiss company Holcim put up $52.5 million for the Novi Popovac cement plant; and Titan Cement, a Greek company, laid out $35.5 million for the Kosjeric cement plant. On January 10, the government announced its privatization plan for 2002, which projects the sale of 80 firms and is expected to generate $300 million in revenue.

On February 12, The Hague war-crimes tribunal began its landmark trial of Slobodan Milosevic on 66 counts, including genocide and crimes against humanity. Just before the trial began, the appeals chamber ruled that the three indictments-on Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia-could be joined in one trial, which is expected to last at least two years. Milosevic, who was trained as a lawyer at the University of Belgrade, refused to appoint defense counsel and is undertaking his own legal battle. He is attacking the prosecution on multiple levels, claiming that his arrest in Belgrade was illegal, that the tribunal itself is illegitimate, and that the prosecution has so biased the court that it is impossible for him to receive a fair trial. In addition to these attacks on the basis of the trial, many of which have been defeated by Judge Richard May, he is simultaneously proceeding with the trial itself, cross-examining witnesses. Some observers have commented that May is allowing Milosevic too much leeway and permitting him to use an overly aggressive tone with witnesses, in the words of journalist Mirko Klarin, to mount a cross-interrogation rather than cross-examination. Many have stated that Milosevic is not examining the witnesses regarding their own testimony but rather for his own purposes-in order to discuss "NATO aggression" and KLA "terrorism," validating fears that he is using the trial as a political soapbox. Various commentators, back home in Belgrade, have lamented that the proceedings, which had been broadcast live (the government finally pulled them from the air, presumably because they were not having their intended cathartic effect), have only bolstered the voices of those who argue that the tribunal is biased and anti-Serb, rather than forcing people to face up to Milosevic's deeds. (See the article by Vojin Dimitrijevic in this issue.)

Although the negotiations involving the structure of the federal state were certainly the center of political debate in Podgorica, the government continued to deal with other matters, including corruption allegations. During August 2001, in response to diminishing revenues, the government announced a crackdown on corruption. Montenegro has long been regarded as a haven for smugglers and money laundering. There are reputed to be 500 offshore banks in Montenegro, a fairly large number for a country with a population of just 700,000. People are permitted to move money in and out of the country without specifying its origins. As a part of the recent crackdown, citizens were offered an amnesty if they reported and paid past duties and taxes. The crackdown also brought into focus just how many unregistered goods there are in the country and the conspicuous lack of legal mechanisms for legitimate imports.

Such was the overall topic of the allegations printed in the Croatian weekly Nacional in May, which further reported that President Djukanovic was involved in the cigarette-smuggling racket. Indeed, many suspect that the government, generally, as well as customs officials are involved in smuggling and other illegal business activities. Djukanovic's party repeatedly dismissed the controversial media reports, and, to fend off the allegations, it proposed the formation of a parliamentary committee, on June 10, to investigate the charges (this, at the same time the opposition parties submitted the same demand). In early November 2001, the committee issued its report, or rather nonreport, stating that it had not been able to substantiate the allegations but noted that its work had been obstructed. For example, Deputy Prime Minister Zarko Rakcevic, who earlier had stated that the government lost between 40-50 million deutsche marks annually because of cigarette smuggling, refused to testify to the committee, asserting that smuggling was no longer a problem. At the same time, the opposition proposed that the committee's work be extended for another three months. The government parliamentarians banded together to reject this proposal, prompting opposition deputies to storm out in protest.
Although it is not in the euro zone, Montenegro adopted the euro on January 1 to replace the deutsche mark, which has been its official currency since 1999. A dual-currency system will continue until March 31, at which time the euro will become the sole currency of the republic. Montenegrins flocked to banks to exchange their marks, to an extent far exceeding what anyone had expected. As of the end of February, about 240 million euros had gone into circulation. Despite initial fears that there were not enough euros in the country, supply has kept up with demand. According to unofficial information carried by the Podgorica media, though, Montenegrin companies were putting only small amounts of euros in the bank, suggesting that most of the money was ending up under people's mattresses and in company safes, the latter obviously keeping their liquid assets outside of legal cash flows to avoid paying taxes. Companies, some of them state run, allegedly withdrew euros to pay December salaries, but actually paid their workers in marks, thus converting the money illegally. This practice has additionally complicated estimates of the amount of money circulating both legally and illegally in Montenegro.

The introduction of the euro has brought certain economic benefits to Montenegro such as a stable exchange rate, increased price stability, and strengthened financial and fiscal discipline. The government's 2002 economic plan is fairly ambitious-with reforms promised in 2002 for fiscal, banking, commercial law, and of both the accounting system and the trade and investment regimes. Ongoing economic restructuring, increased voucher privatization, and the development of the small and medium-size business sector will, it is hoped, encourage direct foreign investment and promote increased tax revenues. The additional funds will certainly be needed for the social expenditures in the 2002 budget-which is set at $350 million, a 40 percent increase from 2001. The government also hopes to regulate the activity of Podgorica's aluminum factory and the State Montenegrin Electricity company, which together comprise some 50 percent of Montenegrin economic activity, both of which are posting huge economic losses.

On February 27, after more than three months of stalemate, a political agreement was reached between the major Albanian parties in Kosovo on who would fill the top posts in the new government. Elections for the legislative assembly were held to wide acclaim, on November 17, but political wrangling among the three major Kosovar Albanian parties-the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), the Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AFK)-stalled the selection of a president and prime minister. After a protracted political struggle, the presidency went to DLK leader Ibrahim Rugova and the premiership to DPK moderate Bajram Rexhepi.

In the November elections, DLK had won a clear plurality, with 47 of the 120 seats in the assembly, though not by a sufficient margin to form a government on its own, necessitating a power-sharing arrangement. Possible coalition partners consisted of DPK, in second place with 26 seats; AFK with 8 seats; and the Serbian Povratak ("return") coalition, with its 22 seats. However, joining with the Serbian coalition was always a long shot, since any Serb participation in government would have been premised on the Albanian parties renouncing the goal of an independent Kosovo, obviously unacceptable to all three Albanian parties. Despite a lack of clear policy differences, cooperation between the Albanian parties was frustrated by long-standing discord and distrust-a legacy of the different roles each played in the armed struggle. DLK insisted that, with its large margin of victory, it should name both the president and prime minister. DPK argued that without a majority in the assembly, DLK should not hold both top positions. Nonetheless, agreement on who should fill the major posts was, at long last, achieved.
According to the Constitutional Framework adopted under UN auspices in May, the main institutions, which the legislative assembly is charged with filling, are the president of Kosovo, the president of the assembly (or parliament), and the seven-member presidency of the assembly. The assembly president presides over assembly sessions and, in cooperation with the seven-member presidency, sets the legislative agenda. The president nominates a prime minister, who then appoints nine cabinet ministers, one of whom must be Serbian and another of whom must be from one of the smaller ethnic minorities.

At the assembly's inaugural meeting, on December 10, a Pristina University chemistry professor, Nexhat Daci (DLK), was elected assembly president and four of the other six positions comprising the presidency of the assembly were filled. The seven positions are allocated according to the distribution of assembly seats, with one reserved for a representative of the smaller ethnic minorities. Given the present configuration in the assembly, two posts each go to DLK, DPK, and the Serbian coalition. The DLK and the Serbian positions were filled at the first assembly session, as was the ethnic minority position, which went to a member of the United Roma Party, Hadzizulfi Merdza.

However, in a sign of the frustrations that lay ahead, DPK refused to submit candidates for its two spots. The first meeting was disrupted by the abrupt departure of Hashim Thaci and the DPK deputies, when then-UN chief Hans Haekerrup refused to allow Thaci to speak. At the assembly's second session, on December 13, a bid for the presidency by DLK leader Ibrahim Rugova failed, when he received only 49 of the 80 votes required for the presidency in the first-round vote. A second and third unsuccessful vote was held at the next assembly session, on January 10. In the second vote, Rugova received 50 of 80; and in the third, where according to the Constitutional Framework the threshold of victory is lowered to a simple majority, he garnered only 51 of the required 61.

Throughout this period, the international community failed to exert coherent diplomatic pressure or to aggressively guide the political process. As the head of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Haekerrup had lost credibility in Kosovo after signing an agreement with Belgrade in the lead-up to the November elections. Arguably, the agreement was only symbolic, making no real policy concessions, and was necessary to ensure Serb participation in the elections-essential to the election's legitimacy. But it fatally compromised Haekerrup in the view of the Albanian majority in Kosovo, rendering him ineffectual in the postelection political crisis, and he formally resigned on December 28. An administrative vacuum was thus created, with no clear leadership at UNMIK and still no functioning government institutions in place.

On January 21, German diplomat Michael Steiner, who has extensive experience in the Balkans, was named the new UNMIK chief. Steiner has a reputation for being headstrong and aggressive and was hailed as the right person to break the Gordian knot of Kosovo's transition to self-government. Upon taking office on February 14, he declared his intention to meet with all local leaders to bring the matter of negotiating a political settlement to a prompt conclusion. As a gesture of progress, on February 19, Steiner announced September 21 as the date for local elections.

Finally, at the end of February, an agreement was reached giving the premiership to DPK, while excluding the hard-line party leader, Hashim Thaci. Instead, the moderate DPK member Bajram Rexhipi became the compromise candidate. (Other possible compromises had included the publisher Veton Surroi, the US favorite in the negotiations.) Rexhipi, a medical doctor, had been a DLK member in the 1990s and treated KLA wounded in the mountains during the war. After the conflict, he became the first mayor of Mitrovica, where, despite joining DPK, he gained the respect of all the Albanian factions. Currently, he is perhaps in the best position of any Kosovar politician. The popularity of both Rugova and Thaci suffered in the protracted political standoff, as each appeared to put their own interests ahead of the goal of reaching a resolution. As a result, there is a strong possibility that the major political parties will fragment after the government is formed.

With an agreement in place, the process of creating the government can continue, with UNMIK's 20 administrative departments consolidated into nine ministries. Still, UNMIK will retain certain competencies-including security, international affairs, and fiscal authority. In addition, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), formed in 1999 as a repository for recently demobilized KLA fighters and granted the mandate of a civil-emergency force, will remain under UNMIK's jurisdiction. The problem of what to do with the KPC, many of whose 5,000 members were to have been decommissioned by this time, remains complicated. While an indigenous security force is sorely needed to gradually relieve KFOR troops of their duties, KPC members have been suspected of involvement in organized crime, ethnic violence, and war crimes.

In contrast, there has been considerable progress toward the creation of an indigenous, multiethnic police force to relieve the more than 4,400 UNMIK police officers who were still performing the bulk of the policing duties in early 2002. In January, UNMIK announced a targeted strength of 10,000 police officers for the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The high-level police work, including arrests for war crimes and ethnic violence, is still handled exclusively by the UNMIK police force, which will soon be headed by Stefan Feller, presently the chief of police in Dusseldorf, Germany.

Beginning late last year, the international community stepped up its enforcement efforts against suspected criminals. In November, UNMIK police arrested Gani Ymeri, a KPC regional commander, charging him with crimes of ethnic violence against Serbs. And in the largest action by the international police, on January 28, three Kosovar Albanians were arrested for alleged war crimes. The three men-Letif Gashi, Naim Kadriu, and Nazif Mehmeti-were all, at one time, members of the KPC. Kadriu was a DPK party secretary at the time of his arrest. UNMIK emphasized that these were arrests of individuals for specific crimes and that the organizations were not being targeted. Nonetheless, the arrests, signaling a tougher stance by the international community on rampant crime and gangsterism in Kosovo, were met with a wave of violent protests, culminating in a 5,000-strong demonstration in central Pristina, organized by the Association of KLA Veterans. The protesters attacked UNMIK police officers and shouted anti-UNMIK slogans such as "UNMIK is Serbia." It is by no means clear, however, that these extreme elements have the sympathy of the broader population, nor does this show of force by hard-liners seem to have shaken UNMIK's resolve. The international police force responded to the violent protest by instituting tough, new laws on street demonstrations.

On December 18, the Kosovo Supreme Court ordered the release of three suspects in the bombing of a bus, on February 16, 2001, in which 11 Serbs were killed. The three men-Avdi Behluli, a former KLA member, and Cele Gashi and Jusuf Veliu, members of the KPC-were first arrested in March 2001. Later, on March 27, a panel of international judges on the Pristina's District Court released the men on grounds of insufficient evidence. However, Haekerrup, UNMIK chief at the time, issued an executive order the next day extending their detention for a month, the first of six such orders. These extrajudicial detentions were based on secret evidence, which could not be released in open court for fear of compromising its source. Kosovo's Supreme Court ultimately released the suspects because under Yugoslavia's Criminal Code, which is still applicable in Kosovo, covert evidence is inadmissible. This incident highlights the problem of a still-inadequate criminal-justice system as well as the tension between the nascent rule of law and UNMIK's extrajudicial powers. A revised criminal code, to replace the amalgam of former Yugoslav law and ad hoc UNMIK regulations that has been in force since 1999, is expected soon.

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