Volume 11 Numbers 1/2

Winter/Spring 2002

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Romania - The Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR) continues to govern, while in the minority but without any significant opposition, because of the ongoing support of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). On January 29, the two parties officially renewed their cooperation agreement for another year, after some speculation that they might enter into a government coalition instead. As part of the agreement-which stipulates that the DAHR will not support no-confidence motions against the government-PSDR pledged to submit new legislation to parliament, within three months, on the restitution of church property; to establish additional faculties that teach in Hungarian at Cluj University of Babes-Bolyai and Targu Mures Medicine Faculty; and to resume Hungarian-language television broadcasts from Targu Mures. The expansion of the faculties at existing universities represents, in part, a change in strategy for DAHR, away from demands for a separate Hungarian-language state university. (See Romania Update, EECR, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 2001.) In a related matter, on February 19, parliament adopted-with the votes of DAHR and PSDR-a new police law, which stipulates that in localities where minorities constitute at least 20 percent of the population, the police force must also include individuals who speak the language of the minority group.

However, the relationship between PSDR and DAHR has been strained over much of the last year by the Hungarian-minority question, and was only exacerbated by the recent passage in Hungary of the so-called status law, granting special rights to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries. The Romanian government objected to several points in the law, the most controversial of which was the law's granting of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries the right to seek work for a three-month period in Hungary. The Romanian government, along with some international bodies, stated that this discriminated against non-Hungarian Romanians. To quell the growing diplomatic controversy, as well as criticism from Western Europe, on December 22, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban concluded a memorandum of understanding with Prime Minister Adrian Nastase that stipulated that any Romanian could seek temporary work in Hungary. While that measure created much controversy in Hungary, it seemed to appease Bucharest. (For more on this and the law, see the Hungary Update in the previous two issues as well as the current issue.)

In November, an incident occurred that focused attention on the counties of Harghita and Covasna in eastern Transylvania and further confounded the already difficult ethnic relations. In early November, the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) issued a report suggesting that the central government in Bucharest was losing control over the counties of Harghita and Covasna, where ethnic Hungarians form a majority. The report, first made public by Ion Stan, the chairman of the parliamentary commission responsible for RIS oversight, concluded that the two counties were "on their way to autonomy," citing the establishment of an independent educational system. The opposition parties, the National Liberal Party (NLP) and the Greater Romania Party (GRP), were quick to respond to the allegations, demanding that Prime Minister Adrian Nastase formally report to parliament on the situation and appealed to President Ion Iliescu to investigate the matter. For their part, DAHR demanded that PSDR explain what role their members may have played in issuing the inflammatory report. Nastase dismissed the report, rejecting its suggestion of ethnic balkanization by pointing out that Romania suffers from a more general problem of local disregard for the rule of law, and that this is by no means specific to counties with large Hungarian populations. Even so, cooperation between DAHR and PSDR threatened to break down, on November 26, when DAHR supported an ultimately unsuccessful simple motion by NLP that challenged the government's health-care policies. (A simple motion is described in Art. 111 of the Constitution. These motions are not the same as motions of censure or no-confidence and are basically a criticism of the government and its policies. A successful motion would require the government to change its policies.)

The issue of national unity was also raised by a memorandum to parliament sent by 11 intellectuals from Transylvania, on December 10, calling for the formation of a "regional state." The document advocates limited autonomy and local administration for Transylvania-on the model of Scotland, Catalonia, or Bavaria. It argues that such a model is the best way to integrate regions with different histories and levels of economic development into the EU's federated system. The regionalization proposal was strenuously rejected across the political spectrum in Romania, further increasing tensions around the minority issue.

The opposition parties attempted to exploit these conditions of heightened ethnic tension in order to destabilize the PSDR government. On December 10, the chairman of the far-right GRP, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, announced his intention to try to persuade a Bucharest court to outlaw DAHR, namely, on the grounds that it was an ethnic association rather than a political party and that, therefore, its representation in parliament was unconstitutional. On December 17, senators from the Democratic Party (DP), NLP, and GRP put forward a motion, which was defeated 72 to 50, criticizing the loss of authority in Harghita and Covasna. And, on December 18, the opposition parties put forward another motion, called "Cold and Hunger," which asserted that the government was incapable of defending the national interest in the face of "the most serious economic and social crisis since 1989." That motion was easily defeated, three days later, by a margin of 283 to 178. The spate of motions from the opposition, including one accusing local governments of corruption and another accusing the government of being unable to solve the problem of increasing heating costs, continued, although all were easily defeated by PSDR and its allies. The opposition's efforts only served to highlight its inadequacy as a serious political alternative.

Indeed, none of the opposition parties have managed to mount a serious challenge to PSDR, though NLP is attempting to become the other pole in Romanian politics by swallowing up smaller, extraparliamentary factions. On January 19, NLP officially merged with the extraparliamentary Alliance for Romania (AR), according to an agreement signed on November 9. Theodor Melescanu, AR chairman, was appointed first deputy chairman, with Valeria Stoica remaining as chairman of the new NLP. Also, NLP is rumored to be discussing the possibility of merging with two other parties, the Party of Romanian Nationalist Unity and the Union of Right-wing Forces. There was further consolidation of extraparliamentary liberal parties, on December 11, when the National Liberal Party-Campeanu, the NLP-Traditional, and the Liberal Democratic Party joined to become the Council for National-Liberal Unification.

The other parliamentary opposition party, the far-right GRP, reelected Tudor as party chairman on November 24. Soon thereafter, on November 29, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to strip Tudor of his parliamentary immunity so he can face charges of disseminating false information and damaging Romania's international reputation under Art. 168 of the Penal Code. Tudor had made public allegations, during earlier terms in government, from 1990 to 1996, that PSDR had knowingly allowed Hamas militants to train in Romania. A criminal conviction for Tudor would considerably damage GRP's chances of making further gains in the next election. In late February, investigators conducting the investigation dismissed Tudor's request to call Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon as witnesses in the case.

The struggle for control of the Christian Democratic-National Peasants' Party (CD-NPP)-the only party other than PSDR to have led a government-was officially concluded in December, when a Bucharest city court approved the merger of CD-NPP and the Christian Democratic National Alliance (CDNA), overturning an earlier decision to invalidate the union. A breakaway faction of the CD-NPP, which had earlier opposed the merger, officially founded a new party-the Popular Christian Party (PCP)-at an inaugural congress on December 15. (See Romania Update, EECR, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 2001.) Vasile Lupu, former deputy chairman of CD-NPP, was elected party chairman and Calin Catalin Chirita, former CD-NPP secretary-general, was elected to the same post in PCP. The new party's statutes declare it to be a center-right, reformist party. At the time of the controversy, CD-NPP had already lapsed into insignificance, not even mustering sufficient support to cross the electoral threshold for parliamentary representation in the 2000 elections. It is not at all clear whether either of the new formations will be able to become a potent political force.

PSDR managed to submit a budget proposal within the time frame mandated by law, the first time that any government has done so since 1989. The budget was approved on November 15 in a joint session of parliament by a margin of 270 to 154. It was supported by PSDR and DAHR and opposed by NLP, GRP, and DP. The NLP threatened a Constitutional Court challenge on the grounds that the budget did not meet the minimum requirements for funding scientific research (a fixed percentage of GDP), as stipulated in the Law on Scientific Research.

In order to meet the 3 percent deficit targets imposed by an IMF agreement, the budget excluded many of the wage increases demanded by unions. As a result, labor unrest increased in November and December, with major protests organized by Cartel-Alfa, one of Romania's largest unions with one million members, and the National Syndicate Bloc (NSB). On November 14, the NSB announced that it had unilaterally nullified the social accord reached with the government in early 2001, giving as its reasons the 2002 budget and the government's failure to meet its promises of increased pensions. On November 12, teachers and civil servants also staged a protest outside the Senate building against the austerity budget. They have threatened to strike if demands for wage increases are not met. Labor unrest is likely to be a major problem for the government in the months ahead, making it unlikely that the government will be able to maintain the deficit targets stipulated in the budget. On March 3, the government concluded a new social pact with three of the five major unions in the country (both Cartel-Alfa and the NSB refused to sign the agreement), which promised a 25 percent increase in the minimum wage, a 4 percent increase in real wages, and the creation of 100,000 new jobs.

In an effort to reduce the number of people living at or below the poverty line (the number has doubled since 1995), the government introduced a minimum-income guarantee, satisfying one of its key campaign promises of the last election. Parliament swiftly enacted the policy with Law No. 416 on July 18, 2001. Beginning in 2002, government grants will supplement the actual income of a family to meet the guaranteed minimum level. There is a supplementary heating allowance and a substantially increased child-care allowance. The minimum-income guarantee integrates a number of social benefits (such as income support, burial support, and emergency relief), which are funded from local budgets, with child allowances and allowances for the wives of conscripts funded from the central budget. The income support will continue to be administered by local governments, but some 80 percent of the required funds are expected to come from the central government through targeted grants.

On January 10, the government dissolved the Bucharest city council, known as the General Council, and announced new elections for that body, citing the fact that eight of the council's decisions in 2001 were overturned in Bucharest courts. A provision in the Law on Local Public Administration allows for a council's dissolution if only three of its decisions are annulled by the courts. However, this was most likely a formal pretext for dealing with corruption in the municipal government. An earlier government report had pointed to "severe irregularities" in the council's activities, noting that 39 of the 65 councillors have ownership interests or are associated with companies that have contracts with the mayor's office. However, the government's move to dissolve the council continues the practice of addressing corruption through direct government intervention rather than effective enforcement of regulations. The government itself had repeatedly delayed the enforcement of conflict-of-interest provisions in the Public Administration Law passed last spring. In other recent steps to combat corruption, on January 15, PSDR received recommendations that the government establish a special prosecution office, to be called the Office of National Anticorruption Prosecution.

Indeed, the government has been trying to step up its fight against the rampant corruption in Romania. On January 7, the prime minister asked the Ministry of Interior to provide an "assessment" of the activities of businessman Sorin Ovidiu Vantu. Vantu has been linked to the collapse of the National Investment Fund, the country's largest such fund. (See Romania Update, EECR, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 2000.) Another bank coowned by Vantu, the Romanian Bank of Discount, was put under the national bank's supervision in January after it was revealed that millions of dollars were missing from the accounts of Astra, a state-owned insurance company, and the post office. On January 28, Vantu and his former partner, turned enemy, Mihai Iacob, were ordered to remain in Romania until the investigation was complete. The investigation also suggested that several political leaders, as well as individuals in the secret service, were involved with the debacle at the bank. It was revealed that the head of the Romanian Intelligence Service, Radu Timofte, had been a guest on Vantu's yacht. Reports also alleged that former secret-service agents were employed in Vantu's company, Gelsor, which controlled the National Investment Fund, some of whom performed "illegal security activities" for Vantu. However, on February 6, the parliamentary commission overseeing the intelligence service concluded an investigation and announced that there was no evidence linking Vantu and Timofte. In early March, another of Vantu's banks, the Investment and Development Bank, came under scrutiny after its shareholders decided to halt all activity at the bank. This came just days after the national bank ordered that all withdrawals and deposits be suspended at the bank because of its "risky policies" and withdrew the banking licenses of some of the bank's personnel because of "inefficiencies." The police are investigating the source of the money used to set up the bank. The national bank, however, refused the shareholders' request that the bank be dissolved.

The pattern of subordinating public media to the government continued in November with a government ordinance that places the state news agency Rompres under the control of the Ministry of Public Information. Civil-society groups vehemently criticized the move and pointed to troubling signs of increasing control of the media by the governing party. The European Commission also issued a statement critical of the government's handling of Rompres. The government's move follows on its earlier attempts to bring the media under control, including the replacement of directors at TVR, the major state television broadcaster, and the entire board at the state radio station.

In a symbolic boost to Romania's status in Europe, on December 7, the European Commission lifted visa requirements for Romanian citizens traveling to all 15 EU countries except Britain and Ireland. The change is largely formal, however, as certain restrictions, prohibitive for most Romanians, will be imposed. Before departing the country, Romanians will be required to have medical insurance, to possess a return ticket, and to have a minimum of 100 euros for every day they plan to spend abroad.

The conclusions of the fall report of the European Commission on Romania's progress toward EU accession brought few surprises. The Commission reported no significant progress in any area; some progress in restricted areas, such as minority rights (due to the implementation of the first phase of a national strategy on behalf of the Roma); limited progress in the fields of administrative and judiciary reform; and no progress with regard to environmental issues. The report does, however, acknowledge that Romania finally has a government capable of moving legislation through parliament, and it is optimistic about the country's capacity to implement reforms.

Among the countries currently seeking membership in the EU, Romania has the fewest number of chapters of the acquis communautaire opened and the fewest closed of the 12 applicant countries (not including Turkey), at 17 and 9 respectively, and is one of two countries (Bulgaria being the other) that is presently excluded from the ten-country, big bang accession in 2004. However, in December, Romania submitted position papers for negotiations on 6 more chapters of the acquis: agriculture, the free movement of goods, the free movement of people, services, regional policy, and financial and budgetary provisions.

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