Volume 11 Numbers 1/2

Winter/Spring 2002

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Poland - Poland came out of the postelection period faced with the tough tasks of aiding an economy in decline and pursuing negotiations with the European Union. By February, unemployment stood near 17 percent, the highest since 1989. In its opening report, the new government noted that during the previous government's tenure, "the annual growth rate fell from 7 to 1 percent, industrial-production growth was one quarter of that in preceding years, enterprise profitability declined to almost nil, unemployment grew by one million . . . and society came to feel a dramatic division into 'them,' those in power, and 'us,' that is, those bearing the cost of economic changes." Against the backdrop of this continuing economic decline, Poland's relations with the EU have taken a critical turn. As the Union's exclusionary practices and discriminatory negotiating tactics seem to become more blatant to most Poles, there has been a noticeable decline in support for EU membership and, for the first time, the government's stability seems threatened by the negotiating process.

After the elections that ousted Electoral Action Solidarity, the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) and Labor Union (LU), with 216 seats in the 460-seat legislature, joined with the Polish People's Party (PPP), an agrarian party (42 seats), to form a government. The PPP, although not opposed to EU membership, could make some trouble for the government in its negotiations with Brussels. In addition to PPP, even more staunchly Euroskeptic parties made large strides in the elections-the populist Self-Defense (SD), led by firebrand Andrzej Lepper, received 53 seats and the League of Polish Families (LPF), 38 seats. These parties are both in the opposition. With these loud voices poised to criticize any negotiations with the EU and threaten the coalition's popularity, the government is in an awkward position. This was not made easier by the EU's annual report, released in November, which, although generally positive about the country, noted that Poland was lagging behind in harmonization, second to last among the current ten first-wave candidates (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) slated for membership in 2004. A drop back to the second tier of countries-including Romania and Bulgaria-would obviously be a major failure for the new DLA government led by Prime Minister Leszek Miller.

Poland has always been more problematic for the EU than the other countries seeking membership. The largest among the first-wave countries, with a population of nearly 40 million, it also has the largest steel and agricultural sectors. Estimates are that approximately 20-30 percent of the working population is engaged in agriculture, compared to a European average of 5-7 percent. The three main issues needing to be worked out were: 1) the sale of Polish land to foreigners; 2) EU subsidies for Polish farmers; and 3) access of Polish workers to the EU labor market. Analysts predict that it will cost approximately 25 billion zlotys ($6 billion) by 2003 to adjust Polish agriculture to EU standards. Without a substantial share of EU subsidies for Polish farmers, a portion of this would have to come from the central budget. (Another expensive measure for Poland relates to its place at the EU's eastern frontier. The country will not only have to introduce visas for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine but it also has announced plans to install a surveillance system of cameras and sensors to monitor illegal border crossings on its eastern border.) As to foreign ownership of land, and in spite of the fact that the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia all agreed to much shorter transition periods, Poland clung to a demand of 18 years, noting "special historical, social, and political conditions." Brussels seemed a bit surprised by Warsaw's insistence on such a long period, noting that EU member states have antispeculation laws, which Poland could adopt as well.

Not long after the government had been formed and the day after the EU report had been issued, Poland's European Integration Committee recommended that the government soften its position and accept a two- to seven-year transition period on the movement of labor (the exact duration depending on bilateral negotiations with the different member states); give up the transition period on the purchase of land for investment purposes; and accept a 12-year transition for the purchase of land for purposes other than investment. The committee also noted that Poland was on the verge of considerable progress toward accession and could close many of the 11 chapters currently open. According to the government's plan, work on the most difficult chapters-agriculture, budget and public finance, and regional policy-will start in the latter part of this year.

Already facing opposition in Poland regarding these concessions, the political situation intensified after Minister of Foreign Affairs Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz (DLA) traveled to Brussels to negotiate these points and conceded even more, agreeing that non-Polish farmers who would work the land themselves (in other words, individuals or small farms, not large agribusiness concerns) could buy farmland after leasing it for three years (the 12-year period would still apply to those who buy land and do not farm it themselves). Cimoszewicz agreed further that noncitizens could also buy land for recreational purposes after a seven-year transition period. After some expressions of outrage from the opposition parties, the government noted that certain negotiations must be confidential but added that all points should have been announced in Poland first. Whether or not the government actually knew about these further concessions is unclear, but parliament certainly had not been briefed before Cimoszewicz agreed to them in Brussels.

Coalition member PPP was not pleased with the further concessions but stated that it would remain in the government. Other opposition parties, including SD and LPF, announced that they would seek a vote of no confidence against Cimoszewicz, who noted that it had been a mistake not to present all Polish positions in Warsaw before going to Brussels, adding that, in the future, all such positions would be presented to parliament in writing beforehand. On November 28, SD and LPF put forward a notion of no confidence in Cimoszewicz. (According to Art. 159 of the Constitution, parliament may "pass a vote of no confidence by a majority of votes of the statutory number of deputies, on a motion moved by at least 46 deputies.") When asked why they wanted his ouster, one deputy replied: "For land. We want to recall the minister for the sale of Polish land."

At the same time, Lepper, well known for his outlandish tactics and outspoken remarks (and already facing various charges before he became a deputy), called Cimoszewicz a scoundrel. Cimoszewicz and DLA reacted with outrage, and motions were put forward to strip Lepper of his deputy-speaker post, which, on November 29, passed by a vote of 318 to 74 with 21 abstentions. During debate on the matter, Lepper went even further, stating that he had evidence that a handful of politicians-including Cimoszewicz, Defense Minister Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Andrzej Olechowski, Donald Tusk, and Pawel Piskorski-had all taken bribes. The procurator general's office requested that Lepper produce the evidence so it could investigate the matter, adding that if the allegations were unfounded, Lepper could be stripped of his parliamentary immunity (Art. 105 of the Constitution) to face charges of slander. (Already, since taking office in the fall, there had been moves to remove Lepper's parliamentary immunity or to determine what would happen in light of the many charges he faced before winning a mandate. To that end, in late November, the Constitutional Court ruled that parliamentarians can face charges in court if legal proceedings against them had begun before their election to the legislature.) Lepper's immunity was eventually lifted on January 25, by a vote of 281 to 87 with seven abstentions.

Although Cimoszewicz survived the no-confidence motion, on December 14, by a vote of 236 to 130, with 44 abstentions, problems in the coalition reignited when Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kalinowski, leader of PPP, announced that his party did not back the government's concession that EU farmers could buy Polish farmland after a three-year lease period. Days later, on December 18, PPP and DLA reached a compromise according to which farmers from the EU, who will cultivate the land themselves, can purchase land in the Warmia and Masuria regions, Pomerania, Lubusz, Lower Silesia, Opole, Wielkopolska, and Western Pomerania provinces after a seven-year lease period; in the rest of Poland's provinces, the three-year period stands. Supposedly, the EU accepted this proposal in early March although it was and is still unclear to many at what point the lease period begins-when a contract goes into effect or when Poland becomes a member of the EU. (A very limited number of foreigners currently have permits to own farmland.)

Those seven provinces and regions constitute roughly half of Poland's territory and correspond generally to the lands ceded to Poland from Germany after the Yalta conference in 1945. Poles have been worried that Germans would flock back to these regions and use the euro to reacquire the land that had belonged, at one time, to their families. Kalinowski also noted that legislation would be adopted to protect Poland's farmland. For example, foreign farmers wishing to purchase land would have to meet certain criteria, and farming licenses would be issued from an independent farmers' organization. In addition, the legislation could possibly include certain preemption rights for individuals who owned the land adjoining the land the non-Pole wished to purchase. The opposition parties also opposed the government's position on the lease periods. Lepper put it this way: "The Germans now quite simply want to take over these western and northern territories and the Warmia and the Masurian lakes. And we see this. What Hitler was not able to take with planes and tanks and rifles will, today, be taken by the euro, and before that by the mark." The government also noted that it would be easier for people to purchase land in those seven provinces because more progress had been made there with privatization, hence the greater need for further protective legislation. In addition, the land in those areas is of higher quality for farming. The final agreement on land ownership was seen, both in the EU and by the Polish government, as a victory for Poland, regardless of the fact that it continues to cause tensions domestically.

Although Poland has not closed the agriculture chapter, there has also been some movement in the EU on deciding on Poland's share-as well as that of the other countries seeking membership-in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), whose budget totals $35.2 billion. Along with regional subsidies, this represents 80 percent of all EU spending. On January 30, the EU announced its formula for access to CAP funds: in 2004, new member states will receive subsidies at 25 percent of the level enjoyed by existing member states. This will increase to 35 percent in 2006 and will be at 100 percent by 2013. Prime Minister Miller, who had pushed for full payments by 2006, when the CAP is up for review, noted the decision with disappointment. A Polish farmers' organization expressed immediate dismay, stating that Polish farmers would not support Poland's bid to join the EU on these terms. The Polish government could possibly work out a compromise on these figures in negotiations on the agriculture chapter. Some Polish experts have suggested that a complete overhaul of CAP, reducing direct payments to all EU farmers, would better benefit Poland, as it would protect the Polish market from being swamped by heavily subsidized Western agricultural products.

Whether or not the government can hold together in the face of continued difficult negotiations with the EU is unclear. In a poll taken in mid-March, the government's popularity had slid from 50 percent, when it took office, to just 35 percent. Among other things, the constant struggle surrounding these problematic points has certainly taken its toll. Moreover, Poles obviously did not feel rewarded for their concessions on foreign landownership by the EU's unwillingness to share the CAP funds more generously. PPP has already threatened to quit the government if DLA accepts the EU's plan on subsidies; it has also threatened that Poland could keep in place tariffs on EU agricultural goods if the subsidies were kept at such a limited level. Although roughly half of the population still favors EU membership, 44 percent said that the government is too complaisant in its dealings with the EU. For now, an opposition demand to hold a referendum on EU membership, along with local elections in the fall, has been put off by the ruling coalition, which prefers to hold it in 2003.

And all of these various difficulties have been played out against the backdrop of a continuing economic crisis. In November, Finance Minister Marek Belka stated that the government would-for the second time-increase the 2001 budget deficit by 3.8 billion zlotys ($930 million). On January 29, the government announced a four-year plan to spur economic growth. The plan projects 1 percent growth in 2002, 3 percent in 2003, and 5 percent in 2004. The government announced it would amend as many as 40 laws, such as the labor code, to reduce bureaucracy and red tape with the hope of encouraging investment and business activity. A few weeks later, on February 15, the government adopted its 2002 budget, which projected revenues at 145 billion zlotys ($34.8 billion), a deficit equal to 5 percent of the GDP, and an inflation rate of 4.5 percent. For his part, in late January, Miller asserted that "the threat of a financial crisis has been averted. Poland will avoid the fate of Argentina."

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