Volume 11/12 Number 4/1

Winter 2002/Spring 2003

Focus: The Baltics: From Soviet Union to European Union

Estonian Euroskepticism: A Reflection of Domestic Politics?
Piret Ehin

Estonia has been widely recognized as one of the front-runners in the race for EU membership. Its achievements, during the transition process, are even more impressive, if we take into account its unfavorable starting position. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the only former Soviet republics that will be included in the first round of EU enlargement, expected to take place in 2004. While the Estonian political elite has been virtually unanimous in its pursuit of membership, the Estonian public does not seem entirely happy with its country’s image as the best student in the EU class.

Popular opposition to EU membership is widespread. According to the most recent Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (interviews conducted in September/October 2002), Estonia ranks as the most Euroskeptic of the candidate nations. According to such indicators as “support for membership” and “trust in the EU,” Estonia consistently lags behind other Eastern European countries. Although low levels of popular support have been a cause of concern to the government for several years, attention to public attitudes intensified in the final stage of accession negotiations, completed in December 2002. While all the other candidate countries, including Lithuania, will hold referenda in the spring or summer of 2003, Estonian and Latvian plebiscites will take place on September 14 and 20, respectively. According to the current domino theory,“yes” votes in countries with high levels of public support for accession will help relieve the hesitations of the more skeptical publics in Estonia and Latvia. It is interesting to note that before approving the above-mentioned referenda dates, Baltic politicians
considered the proposal that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania hold their plebiscites on August 23, the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which,
in 1939, assigned the countries to the Soviet sphere of influence.

The Estonian political elite has good reason to be nervous about the referendum outcome. According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey, 39 percent of the
Estonian public would vote in favor of accession, while 31 percent would vote against.This precarious distribution stands in stark contrast to the candidate-country
average of 69 percent in favor and 15 percent against, not to mention the almost negligible, single-digit opposition figures in some of the less successful applicant
countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania. Considering that Estonia has the highest share of potential referendum abstainers of any candidate country, one cannot
ignore the possibility that the public might veto accession despite a decade of costly reforms and complex political compromises in the name of EU membership.

Popular hesitations about EU membership
With over a decade of policies aimed at integration into Europe, public awareness about the EU in the candidate countries has increased.Throughout the first half of the 1990s, the attitudes of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) publics seemed to reflect a “permissive consensus” similar to that observed in Western Europe during the earlier decades of integration.To the extent that CEE electorates had any opinions at all on integration-related matters, the prevailing sentiment was overwhelmingly positive. This initial, unconditional Euroenthusiasm was quickly followed by a decline in public support, and, more importantly, increasing differences among countries.

Overall, the attitudes of the CEE publics continue to be positive. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in the fall of 2002, 61 percent of people in
candidate countries believe membership would be a “good thing,” while only 10 percent believe the opposite. Two-thirds think that their country would benefit
from membership, and 59 percent say that they generally trust the Union, its institutions, and policies. Support rates are considerably higher in the three
countries that will not be included in the first round of enlargement (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey), suggesting that, to an extent, cross-national variations in
public support reflect proximity to accession.

The Baltic states, together with the Czech Republic and Malta, have stood out because of their relative lack of public enthusiasm about EU accession. In particular, Estonia and Latvia currently compete for the title of the most Euroskeptic candidate country. Only a third of Estonian and Latvian respondents consider EU membership a good thing, compared with an average of 61 percent among the candidate countries. A third of Estonian and Latvian respondents think that their
nations would not benefit from membership. In both Estonia and Latvia, almost a third of respondents would vote against membership, while just 39 percent would
vote “yes” in Estonia and 45 percent in Latvia.The most recent Eurobarometer survey also warns about the dangers of abstention. Barely more than half (54 percent) of the citizens of the would-be member countries plan to vote, and only one in four would definitely vote. According to the survey, Estonia has the highest
number of potential abstainers.As the recent Irish referendum experience vividly demonstrates, abstention can lead to unexpected outcomes even in those countries
most optimistic regarding the EU.

Party-based Euroskepticism
Public-opinion research has shown that public attitudes toward the EU are strongly affected by domestic political dynamics. Because the EU remains distant and
can be incomprehensible to many European citizens, voters often use the domestic political context as a compass for orienting themselves on the unfamiliar terrain of European-level politics.The repeated finding that support for the EU is correlated with trust in domestic political institutions—and, specifically, with support for the incumbent government—confirms this argument.

Yet despite the link between attitudes toward the EU and domestic politics, popular Euroskepticism appears to be only weakly linked with party politics. Mainstream political parties in most member states are strongly pro-Europe, and open opposition to EU membership is voiced only by radical protest parties at
the fringe of the political spectrum.These extraparliamentary groups gain few votes in national elections even in those countries where popular hesitations
about the EU are widespread. This state of affairs has been attributed to the fact that in both national and European elections, European issues cannot compete
with domestic concerns for voter attention and political priority. The relative absence of the European dimension from party politics adds fuel to debates on
legitimacy as it suggests that the existing channels of popular representation fail to translate popular preferences into policy decisions.

The distinction between party-based and popular Euroskepticism is also evident in the candidate countries. During most of the 1990s, CEE political elites were virtually unanimous in their support of rapid accession. Because no force of any great political significance opposed accession, European integration appeared to be one of the least controversial issues on the political agenda.Yet over time, complete unanimity among candidate-country political elites has given way to some degree of differentiation within elite attitudes and party positions. This differentiation is evident in two parallel trends, the Euroskeptic positions, on the one hand, adopted by radical fringe parties, and the increasingly Eurorealist views put forward by several mainstream political forces, on the other.

As used here, Euroskepticism refers to openly anti-Europe, antiaccession positions, while Eurorealism denotes conditional or cautious support for accession. In
the Eastern European context, Euroskepticism among the fringe parties can be explained by an attempt to appeal to those segments of the population perceived as
losers in the intertwined processes of postcommunist transition, European integration, and globalization. Even though these parties have a very limited circle of
followers, their ability to mobilize the public is clearly related to the gravity of socioeconomic difficulties associated with the experience of transition and integration.
In fact, Euroskepticism can be regarded as just one of several manifestations of the “rebellion of underachievers” who protest the direction and consequences
of the extensive changes that postcommunist countries have experienced over the past decade.

This general model seems to describe the Estonian context quite well. All parliamentary parties across the ideological spectrum support EU accession; serious
Euroskepticism remains a phenomenon of the fringe. According to one observer, opposition to EU membership has become a trademark of “loser politicians” and
“eternal outsiders” of all shapes and colors. Euroskeptic fringe parties include the Social Democratic Labor Party, a successor to the Communist Party, which warns against the adverse effects of EU accession on social solidarity as well as Estonia’s national interests. These interests would include, for example, better relations with Russia. Right-wing Euroskeptic groups build on even more marginal ideologies: the Estonian Independence Party, for instance, promotes a doctrine of “Estonia as a neoautarkic geopolitical space” based on rather peculiar ideas of Estonian “exceptionalism” and an associated geopolitical imperative of neutrality
between the East and the West. Opposition to membership has also been voiced by the Christian People’s Party and the Republican Party, a lesser-known fringe group that regards European “socialism” as a threat to Estonian economic liberalism.

While the explicit rejection of EU accession remains limited to obscure political groups, increasing Eurorealism among mainstream political forces may represent a potentially more important development. Although Eurorealists do not reject EU membership, their rhetoric emphasizes championing national interests and urging a tough negotiating stance.They stress the conditionality of accession and call for national debates on the costs and benefits of enlargement. Not surprisingly, Eurorealism is more prevalent among opposition parties that bear no responsibility for the pace and outcome of accession negotiations. Cautious Eurorealism helps opposition forces distinguish themselves from the incumbents, provides an avenue for criticizing the government, and is part of the broader strategy of appealing to discontented voters.

In Estonia, Eurorealist mainstream parties include the populist, left-leaning Center Party, the promarket Reform Party, and the agrarian People’s Union. Predictably, all three parties have been more vocal while in opposition. Once in power, their rhetoric has quickly subsided. The prime example of such opportunistic Eurorealism is the populist Center Party, which won a quarter of the votes in the 1999 parliamentary elections. While in opposition, the party emphasized the need to defend Estonia’s national interests and criticized the government for its excessive willingness to give in to EU demands.The party’s program claimed that Estonia must take a proactive stance in negotiations to achieve a good “starting position.” In addition, it emphasized the need to carry out comprehensive studies on the costs and benefits of accession. In 2001, the Center Party’s presidential candidate called for a “time-out” in accession negotiations until the government explained the logic of Estonia’s negotiating positions to the general public. However, in early 2002, after forming a new government with the Reform Party, the Center Party quickly abandoned its critical rhetoric and focused on the task of completing accession negotiations.

Explaining Estonian Euroskepticism
A number of interesting hypotheses have been advanced about the causes of Estonian Euroskepticism. None of these,however, can be regarded as a sufficient explanation by itself. The first hypothesis suggests that the political history of the Baltic states has given rise to a deeply rooted distrust of alliances and unions of any sort. The legacy of a half century of Soviet occupation is responsible for the resonance of the Euroskeptic cliché of going from “one union to another union” and comparing the delegation of authority to Brussels with subordination to Moscow.1 Uncontrolled immigration from the East in Soviet times and the resulting demographic changes (particularly dramatic in Latvia and Estonia) have led to a heightened sensitivity regarding the preservation of identity, culture, and language. A second explanation argues that Estonian Euroskepticism must be viewed in the context of a broader North–South division shaping public perceptions of the EU. Popular hesitations about EU membership are seen as part of Estonia’s selfproclaimed Nordic identity derived from geographical proximity to and close economic and cultural ties to the Scandinavian countries.

A third explanation links exceptionally high levels of skepticism with Estonia’s status as one of the most radical reformers in Eastern Europe.The speed of transition
has bred social disorientation and created a wide gap between transition winners and losers. For the losers in the transition, this disparity has given rise to a
political alienation that manifests itself in the distrust of the “power elite” and of its policy priorities, including European integration. Many transition winners, in
contrast, oppose the EU on the grounds that joining the EU is a step back toward socialism. EU accession would force Estonia to abandon the progressive,
promarket policies—such as low tariffs, flat income tax, and no tax on reinvested corporate income—that underlie its ultraliberal economic system.

Indeed, the domestic political and social context provides many clues for understanding the dynamic of attitudes toward the EU in Estonia.There is a clear correlation between trust in the EU and the popularity of the incumbent government.Support for EU accession was at its lowest in 2000 and the first half of 2001, when the government’s popularity itself was particularly low due to several scandals that eventually led to the disintegration of the center-right governing coalition. In the second half of 2001, public support for the EU increased significantly. This improvement has been attributed to the unexpected results of the presidential election held in September 2001,when voting in the electoral college led to the victory of Arnold Ruutel, a Soviet-era politician associated with rural interests. Ruutel’s popularity among rural constituents and the so-called transition losers has contributed to the legitimacy of the EU project among less competitive social groups. The formation of a new governing coalition in January 2002 also helped change popular attitudes. Both coalition partners, the populist Center Party and the promarket Reform Party, had previously resorted to Euroskepticism while in opposition. Once in government, however, both parties abandoned anti-EU rhetoric and focused on finishing the negotiations for accession.

Eurobarometer survey results provide additional insights into the reasons underlying Estonian Euroskepticism. A survey conducted in the spring of 2002 shows that, in contrast to other candidate countries, the Estonian public thinks that integration is proceeding too fast. Surprisingly, compared with other Eastern Europeans, Estonian respondents also feel less informed about EU policies and institutions. Half of the Estonian respondents believe that they are poorly informed with regard to integration-related issues, and only 3 percent feel “very well informed” (Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002). This finding is puzzling in light of Estonia’s high education levels, its well-developed internet infrastructure, and the flood of EU-related information produced and disseminated daily by the media, the government, and EU institutions. Most likely, the self-reported low levels of information do not reflect meaningful differences in the substance and extent of the information provided to the Estonian public as compared with that available to the citizens of other candidate countries. Instead, the perceived inadequacy of information more likely reflects the overall quality of domestic political discourse and the preexisting distrust of the institutions and public figures seen as the main sources of EUrelated information.

While links between EU attitudes and domestic political dynamics have been widely documented, some events influencing public perception of the EU seem to remain beyond the grasp of “ordinary” socialscience theories. One such example was the soaring popular support for EU membership immediately after Estonian contestants won the Eurovision song contest in May 2001. Although the song contest had nothing to do with integration politics, it was regarded by many as a breakthrough, signaling “a new acceptance of Estonia by Europe.”2

Conclusions
Popular Euroskepticism in Estonia appears to be a function of the domestic political context and internal social dynamics. Estonia’s radical reforms and promarket policies have bred social disorientation, contributing to the social stratification and polarization exemplified by the distinction between “the first” and “the second” Estonia that has become part of the general vocabulary.Among transition losers, political alienation manifests itself in popular distrust of elite-crafted integration plans. However, opposition to EU membership is not limited to the less competitive segments of the population. Many transition winners cherish the idea of Estonian exceptionalism associated with its radical reform policies and detest the “creeping socialism” of the EU.

The impact of domestic political cleavages on public attitudes toward the EU is likely to become stronger as the accession referendum approaches. Referenda constitute an interesting political device.On the one hand, they are hailed as a particularly promising means of enhancing popular participation and legitimacy. On the other hand, a referendum is an instrument peculiarly well equipped to expose the divisions between the electorate and political elites. Because political alienation has become a generally recognized problem in Estonian society, the government’s chances of ensuring a positive outcome might depend on its ability to avoid unpopular decisions, to build a broad-based coalition for the “yes” campaign, and to reduce the overall “trust deficit.” While the inclusion of former opposition parties in the government seems to have helped to legitimize European integration among many voters, the parliamentary elections of March 2003 might produce an entirely new political setting for the accession referendum.

Piret Ehin is deputy director of the EuroCollege at the University of Tartu. She has published extensively on Baltic public opinion regarding the EU in the European Journal of Political Research.

NOTES
1. Evald Mikkel and Andres Kasekamp,“Emerging party realignment? Party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia” (paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop “Opposing Europe: Euroscepticism and Political Parties,”Turin, Italy, March 22–27, 2002).
2. Mikkel and Kasekamp, p. 17.

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