Volume 10 Number 4

Fall 2001

Focus: A Symposium on Bulgaria

The Bulgarian Ethnic Model
Antonina Zhelyazkova

Bulgaria lies at a crossroad of peoples and civilizations, where different customs, religious beliefs, political systems, and cultural stereotypes coexist in a turbulent mixture. In that sense, it is no different from the neighboring Balkan states. On the other hand, there is something unusual or special about the modes of ethnic cohabitation that have traditionally dominated Bulgarian political life. In their everyday interactions, the major ethnic and religious groups (Christians, Muslims, and Jews) were able to establish and preserve relations marked by open-mindedness and mutual respect. At a constitutional level, ethnic and religious diversity has been recognized, although actual political practices at times have resulted in the violation of the rights of minorities. And while Bulgaria's postwar history was punctuated by occasional outbursts of assimilationist sentiment, it would be fair to say that the historically developed modes of acceptance and appreciation of the others, as "other," remain embedded in the social fabric and constitute an organic part of the culture of toleration that has evolved in the ethnically mixed regions.

Minorities under communist rule
Like the rest of Eastern Europe, after the end of the Second World War, Bulgaria found itself in the iron grip of a communist dictatorship. Inevitably, the policies launched during that period had a momentous impact on ethnic relations. In accordance with orthodox Marxism, religion was denounced and religious practices banned. All religious communities were exposed to relentless atheistic propaganda, and the leading members of their churches were harassed and imprisoned. Simultaneously, the ruling party was striving to spread the "spirit of communism" among ethnic minorities. Children of non-Bulgarian background were subject to communist indoctrination in their parochial schools, and minority-language newspapers were used as venues for disseminating communist ideology. Ethnic Turks, Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarians who had adopted Islam at various times in the past), Roma, Jews, and Armenians were actively recruited into the party nomenklatura; in return, these cadres carried out the policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party directed toward their compatriots.

At the beginning of the '50s, the policy of the Communist Party took a dramatic turn toward greater repression and restriction of minority rights. The struggle against "expressions of nationalism and religious fanaticism among the local Turks" was proclaimed one of the party's top priorities. In addition, in the course of the violent drive toward collectivization of agriculture, many Turks and Pomaks were deprived of their land. As a result, more than 150,000 Muslims emigrated to Turkey in 1950-51. This campaign culminated in the forceful renaming of the Pomaks (in 1972-74) and of ethnic Turks (the winter of 1984-85). The professed goal of communist authorities was to obliterate the cultural-religious specificity of these minorities and erase their ethnic identity. In the pursuit of this goal, a variety of inducements were used, from administrative punishments to economic blackmail to sheer violence. In some of the villages and small provincial towns, ethnic Turks responded with organized peaceful resistance. These regions were sealed off by army and police detachments, and the blockade continued until the last villager was assigned a new Bulgarian name. Thousands of Bulgarian Turks were detained and subsequently sent to prisons or camps, often without any charge or after a quick legal procedure held in camera. It should be pointed out that, within the context of the Muslim religion, renaming is a dramatic act of sacrilege because, according to Islam, a person's name is a vital attribute of personhood. Without his proper name, the Muslim cannot introduce himself to Allah after his death, since Allah calls people by their names and only then decides whether to take them to Paradise assuming they had lived in a proper way.

Upon the completion of the "renaming campaign," the assimilationist drive continued unabated. The propaganda machine of the Bulgarian Communist Party bombarded both Bulgarian public opinion and the members of the Turkish minority with pseudoscientific theories supposedly confirming the Bulgarian origin of Turks in Bulgaria. Scientific teams consisting of historians, specialists in Ottoman studies, ethnographers, and folklorists went to enormous lengths in their dubious attempts to find conclusive evidence about the Bulgarian genesis of all Muslim communities in the Bulgarian lands.

The use of the Turkish language in public was forbidden, Muslims were banned from wearing their traditional attire, and the celebration of Muslim religious holidays and rituals was proscribed. Muslim cemeteries were either destroyed or the names of the deceased were replaced by Bulgarian names. The Turkish Philology Department at Sofia University was closed down. At the same time, the entire propaganda machine of the state was mobilized to spread calumnies against the Turks (for example, describing them as "terrorists" or as the "fifth column of a hostile country") and to stoke fears and distrust toward neighboring Turkey with its purportedly aggressive plans. Under this enormous pressure, relations between the two communities, Bulgarian and Turks, sharply deteriorated, and historically established patterns of communal life almost broke down.

Reacting to these policies, the Turkish community mobilized its cultural and religious resources in order to preserve its identity. Previously forgotten traditions, customs, family legends, and myths were resurrected. All ethnomarkers that had faded or been obliterated by modern trends and the socialist unification were purposively restored. This spiritual and intellectual mobilization produced tangible results. The community closed in upon itself and restored various patriarchal, premodern, cultural and social characteristics in order to preserve its Turkish and Muslim character.

During the spring and summer of 1989, the Bulgarian Turks undertook mass protest actions in northeastern and southern Bulgaria demanding the restoration of their original names. This led to clashes with the army and police and resulted in several hundred casualties. Importantly, the grassroots resistance of the Turkish minority was supported by numerous informal dissident groups in Sofia (which, as a rule, were composed mainly of ethnic Bulgarians and Jews). Once again, the repressive policies of Bulgarian communists triggered a large-scale exodus of Muslims from the country: between June and August 1989, 350,000 Bulgarian citizens poured into Turkey, a phenomenon characterized by international humanitarian organizations as the largest group migration of people after the Second World War. After the fall of communism, approximately 120,000 of those individuals returned to Bulgaria; the majority, however, chose to make Turkey their permanent home.

Democratization and ethnic relations in the postcommunist period
Arguably, the most significant aspect of the political transformation in Bulgaria after the collapse of the communist regime in November 1989 is that the historically prevalent patterns of peaceful coexistence among ethnically diverse groups were swiftly restored. Of course, to describe Bulgaria as an ethnic idyll would be too simplistic and misleading. At the same time, the relatively high level of religious toleration and open-mindedness with regard to minority issues may be considered the main characteristic of the so-called Bulgarian ethnic model, setting Bulgaria apart from its troubled neighbors. The common sense of people living in the ethnically mixed regions, as well as the dominant traditional values embraced by Bulgarian society as a whole, rendered possible the peaceful regulation of ethnic relations during a period of excruciatingly hard economic and social change.

The rise of Bulgarian democracy was marked by a popular mobilization behind demands for more "freedom," "equality," and "rights." Against this ideological background the view that the grievances of Bulgarian Turks should be quickly and comprehensively addressed gained widespread support, even among the post-Zhivkov leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Many ethnic Bulgarians shared a sense of collective shame stemming from the fact that no attempts were made to save the Turks and Pomaks. There was a pervasive feeling that the moral capital the nation had gained as a result of the saving of Bulgarian Jews during the Holocaust had been squandered.

In late 1989, a Committee for National Recon-ciliation was established, which united mainly intellectuals and representatives of all ethnic and religious groups in the country. The committee declared that its primary purpose was to restore the tradition of toleration and to facilitate the process of ethnic reconciliation; it unequivocally supported the demands of Bulgarian Turks. Perhaps the desire to impress Europe and end the de facto international boycott imposed on the country in the aftermath of the renaming campaign also played a role, at least in elite circles. It is a fact, however, that the first truly democratic act of the new Bulgarian authorities was intended to rectify the wrongs inflicted on ethnic Turks and Pomaks-on December 29, 1989, the Council of Ministers issued a decree restoring the original names of Bulgarian Muslims. This act was followed by the passage of two laws-in March and November 1990-that set up special procedures and provided further opportunities for seeking redress for the violations of the rights of these Bulgarian citizens. Until the spring of 1991, the requests for restoring the names of about 600,000 Muslims were granted. In some regions this process sparked the organized resistance of local communist authorities, but eventually the protests fizzled out. Political prisoners detained during the events of 1984-89 were amnestied, and legal guidelines adopted, in June 1991, ensured the official rehabilitation of all Bulgarian citizens who were sentenced during the renaming process. In addition, the heirs of ethnic Turks who were killed during the civil unrest of 1989 were indemnified and granted hereditary pensions. The property claims of Bulgarian citizens who returned from Turkey were also accommodated by means of a special law.

Religious freedoms were restored almost immediately after the collapse of the Zhivkov regime. Prayer houses opened their doors to all believers. New mosques were built, and the old religious buildings were repaired. The High Islamic School in the town of Shumen was restored, and the Islamic Theological Institute was opened in Sofia. Religious literature was massively published and circulated freely. Newspapers that specifically targeted Armenian, Jewish, Turkish, and Muslim readerships began to appear on a regular basis. Some nongovernmental organizations (for example, the International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, established in 1992) supported these minority initiatives financially.
In 1991, Bulgarian public schools began to offer classes in minority languages, and in September 1994 the Council of Ministers adopted Decree No. 183 according to which four hours of training in the study of native languages were included in the curricula from the first to eighth grades in schools of general education. Turkish philology departments were established in the universities of Sofia and Shumen, which demonstrates the genuine effort being made to meet the educational needs of the Turkish minority.

It should be pointed out that these measures never galvanized a nationalist backlash. In fact, the absence of extreme nationalism is among the most conspicuous peculiarities of the Bulgarian transition. The small parties with nationalistic and antiminority platforms that sprang up in 1990 and 1991 did not gain any popularity in society. Very soon they were marginalized and, at present, carry no weight in political life.

To the extent that it does exist, Bulgarian nationalism is anti-Turkish and anti-Roma in its purposes. Bulgarian nationalists often use "Islamic fundamentalism" as a bogeyman, even though Muslims living in Bulgaria have traditionally repudiated religious extremism in all its forms. More importantly, anti-Turkish nationalism is usually projected outside the country-it is Turkey, and not the Bulgarian Turks, that is singled out as the menace to the Bulgarian nation. Over the last decade, when bilateral relations with Turkey have become friendly and even cordial, and as new and more palpable threats sprang up in the Balkan region, the appeal of such negative attitudes sharply decreased.

The process of ethnic reconciliation was stimulated positively when the political organization of Bulgarian Turks, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (established in 1990) consolidated its presence on the national political scene. This process was by no means smooth and easy; on at least two occasions various nationalists affiliated with the former communist party (the Bulgarian Socialist Party, or BSP) petitioned the Constitutional Court to declare this organization unconstitutional. (Article 11.4 of the Bulgarian Constitution declares political parties "formed on [an] ethnic basis" unconstitutional. However, in 1991 the Court offered such a strict interpretation of this provision that its effect has in practice been nil. At least so far, this controversial constitutional norm has not been applied.) In their landmark decision, the justices affirmed the constitutionality of MRF. It is doubtful, however, whether the strategy of judicial challenge was propelled by genuinely nationalistic considerations. More realistically, the attacks against MRF were used-not very successfully-as a public relations device to boost the political fortunes of the former communists. Furthermore, the leaders of BSP have been more than willing to form a coalition with MRF in order to gain access to power (for example, in 1992-94, when an MRF-BSP parliamentary majority supported the antireformist cabinet of Ljuben Berov, and in the present parliament, where both parties are junior partners in a coalition with the National Movement Simeon II).

The establishment of a separate party by the Bulgarian Turks-a party that attracted a considerable number of Roma Muslims as well-alleviated the concerns of ethnic minorities in the country. It demonstrated that they may successfully defend their rights and are entitled to participate actively in Bulgarian political and economic life. MRF's success in the parliamentary elections, as well as in the local elections, set before them new and important responsibilities and eased the tension in the ethnically mixed regions. All sociological surveys starting from 1992 until today show a sharp decrease of the negative stereotypes toward Turks and Pomaks. The fact that they are represented in public life by an independent political organization finally legitimized them in the eyes of Bulgarian society. They are accepted as an integral part of the nation and full-fledged members of the political community.

These findings are corroborated by anthropological research in the mixed regions. The level of religious tolerance in these regions is very high. Neither Christians nor Muslims seem convinced that their own religion should dominate public life to the exclusion of all others. To the question "How do you accept the people of different faith?" the majority of respondents flatly answered: "People are all the same." As for exceptions to this general goodwill, some intolerance is manifested by 3-5 percent of the Muslims and by 8-10 percent of the Christians. The large majority of those of both faiths are convinced that "there should be freedom of religion in Bulgaria." There are more emphatic demands for restrictions and prohibitions only as regards the nontraditional religions or religious views (some Christian and Muslim sects). (See the survey of opinions on ethnoreligious issues held by Christian and Muslim clergymen and by the representatives of local executive power, in Aspects of the Ethno-political Situation [Sofia, 1996]; see also, the fieldwork archives, in Sofia, of the International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations in Sofia.)

The data further demonstrate unambiguously that negative stereotypes about other ethnic groups are becoming less and less appealing, while positive attitudes among the ethnic and religious communities are increasing. This tendency was strengthened when Turks and Muslims were included in the new government after the parliamentary elections conducted in June 2001. The presence of two young, energetic, and well-educated Bulgarian-Turkish ministers, the minister of agriculture and forests and the minister of the permanent commission for protection of the population, as well as the participation of MRF in the government (including municipal governors and a great number of vice ministers), has provided an impetus to integrationist processes in Bulgarian society.

The downside of this process is the deepening of anti-Roma attitudes in Bulgaria. The Roma are increasingly perceived as a criminalized community whose members are unwilling to share the values of the broader community. Data released by the National Institute of Statistics reveal that the number of Roma juvenile delinquents is 15 times that of ethnic Bulgarians. Anti-Roma prejudices are growing deeper and more intense, and by 2001 have acquired a xenophobic nature. It is reasonable to assume that the Roma will be the primary target of any nationalistic excesses in the near future.

Conclusion
As I already pointed out, Bulgaria is not an ethnic idyll. The possibility that in the near future some political entrepreneurs will play the nationalist card and inflame ethnic passions cannot be excluded a priori. Moreover, the overall situation in the Balkans is by no means conducive to calm optimism; the fears and prejudices that spark ethnic violence in countries like Macedonia may easily spill over and disrupt the Bulgarian ethnic model as well.

Nevertheless, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that, so far, this model has functioned more or less successfully. Each of the numerous ethnic and religious communities in Bulgaria is able to maintain its own integrity, which is accepted by the others as necessarily different. The positive element in accepting ethnic and religious diversity stems from the centuries-long experience of cohabitation and is linked to generally stable informal relations among the different communities. "Otherness" is accepted calmly and without prejudice, as something known, as a familiar strangeness, which blends into everyday experiences and is therefore not perceived as threatening.

In sum, the principles of action and organization that underpin communal life in Bulgaria are rooted in an old tradition of peaceful coexistence among groups of people of different confessions, ethnic origin, and cultural traditions. This tradition manifests itself in revered patterns of continuous communication between communities and individuals for whom the cooperative effort to resolve local, mundane problems is often a strategy for neutralizing policies initiated at the highest national level and thus diffusing their potentially explosive and destructive impact. Bulgaria's historical experience yields numerous and captivating examples of how, in situations of extreme aggravation of the interethnic relations, the informal and formal relations between authentic local leaders and the intellectual elites of the different ethnic and religious communities begin to function very quickly and efficiently in order to preserve the ethnic equilibrium, civic peace, and the integrity of the public sphere. In other words, the ethnic subconsciousness of ethnic groups in Bulgaria is under control, so to speak; it is tamed by norms internalized by the multicultural community and is balanced in everyday life by the practice of a time-honored religious tolerance. The most distinct characteristic of the Bulgarian ethnic model is thus its democratism-it is generated and controlled from below, by people living in the contact zones. It is this democratism that has, at least so far, rendered the model impervious to the threatening interference of xenophobic rabble-rousers and fanatical ideologues.

Antonina Zhelyazkova works at the International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, where she is also chair of the board of directors. She is also a founding member of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee.

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