Volume 10 Number 4

Fall 2001

Focus: A Symposium on Bulgaria

Electing a Czar: The 2001 Elections and Bulgarian Democracy
Ralitsa Peeva

Throughout the post-1989 period, Bulgaria was one of the more unpredictable and controversial instances of postcommunist transition. Perhaps the greatest surprise is that the country-confounding the pessimistic expectations of Western pundits-has established a functioning political system and working democratic institutions. Despite the difficulties confronted at each stage of the transition, Bulgaria now has a stable party system and viable political institutions all in a region where violence and ethnic conflicts have marred the democratic process. One is justified, therefore, in asking why the political evolution of Bulgaria-a country not economically prosperous, without a favorable democratic record or traditions or a strong and coherent dissident movement, but with an explosive ethnic-minority situation and controlled by a very disciplined Communist Party-resembles more the postcommunist trajectory of Poland and Hungary than that of Yugoslavia and Romania. One possible answer is that the mode of political change itself-a transition based on roundtable negotiations-contributed significantly to the success of democratic transformations in Bulgaria.

In Western academic literature, the Bulgarian Roundtable talks are routinely depicted as a well-planned scheme devised by the Communist Party in an attempt to retain its power and stall the process of democratization. In fact, these talks generated their own political dynamic and brought the participants into a genuine dialogue that resulted in the creation of several key institutions, such as parliament, the presidency, and a competitive party system. Ironically, the significance of Bulgaria's Roundtable talks is reflected in the fact that this idiosyncratic institution was repeatedly invoked by the politicians and commentators wrestling with the question of who is to blame for the ills plaguing Bulgarian society after 1989. For example, the compromise reached at the roundtable in 1991 was denounced by the 39 radical members of the opposition who resigned from the Constituent Assembly and held a hunger strike against the new constitution. Subsequently, the roundtable negotiations were also blamed for the collapse of the first noncommunist government in 1992 and the electoral victory of the former communists in 1994. In 1997, when the country was engulfed by a profound political crisis, the issue of the allegedly sinister roundtable compromises was brought up again.

The various controversies, such as whether the agreements at the roundtable helped to generate normal political debate, influenced Bulgarian political culture in a positive way, and preserved the ethnic peace in a potentially explosive region or, on the contrary, hampered democratic processes and slowed down reforms, will not be settled soon. These are questions to be answered by future generations. One thing is clear, however: the most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17, 2001, rendered the compromise between the communist and postcommunist elites obsolete. These elections marked the latest, particularly curious twist in the Bulgarian political process, a twist that has put the country back in the headlines and attracted the attention of political analysts from around the world. The reason is one person: former Bulgarian czar Simeon II Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.

The czar, who was expelled by the communist authorities in 1946 at the age of nine, has traveled to Bulgaria regularly since 1996. It was not until 2001, however, that he revealed his political ambitions openly and forced the country's political class to watch him closely. Initially, he seemed to covet the presidency but had to abandon this ambition when an interpretative decision of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court effectively rendered him ineligible for the post. According to the Constitution, only Bulgarian citizens who have lived permanently in the country for at least five years prior to the elections are eligible to be elected presidents. Simeon, who had his Bulgarian citizenship restored, lived in Spain until early 2001. In February, the Constitutional Court delivered an interpretative judgment ruling out the possibility of Simeon's running for president.

In April, Simeon announced that he would participate in the upcoming general elections as the leader of a new political formation, National Movement Simeon II (NMS). (For a more detailed account, see Bulgaria Update, EECR, Vol. 10, Nos. 2/3, Spring/Summer 2001.) The former czar generally avoided specifics regarding his future plans. Only three concrete policy objectives were articulated in his public statements: fixing the economy in 800 days, introducing "a higher morality in national politics," and granting a greater role to women in policymaking. Despite the ambiguity of its electoral message, NMS won 43 percent of the vote and gained 120 seats in the 240-member National Assembly, just one seat short of an absolute majority. The ruling Union Democratic Forces (UDF) gained only 18 percent of the vote and 51 seats; the Coalition for Bulgaria led by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) won 17 percent of the vote and 48 seats, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a party representing the Turkish minority, received 7 percent of the vote and 21 seats. Although predicted by pollsters, the victory of the czar's movement had one truly surprising characteristic: the movement appealed to voters from all social groups and all geographical regions in the country. What is the key to Simeon's success? There are three reasons for the sweeping victory of Simeon's fledgling movement. The first has to do with the failures and, paradoxically, the achievements of the outgoing UDF government. Catapulted to power as a result of massive public demonstrations against BSP's destructive policies in 1997, UDF took over a country in the midst of deep economic crisis, with an average monthly inflation rate of 300 percent, a collapsed banking sector, and almost complete international isolation. The UDF government launched a series of comprehensive macroeconomic and structural reforms, introduced a currency board, intensified the privatization process, and revamped the tax system. The cabinet, led by UDF chairman Ivan Kostov, was fairly successful in the pursuit of these policies and thus became the first postcommunist government that managed to complete its full term in office.

However, the harsh economic reforms also had a negative impact on family budgets, which boded ill for the reformers' electoral prospects. Moreover, the successes in the economic sphere were not replicated in other policy domains: crime rates did not diminish, the protracted reform of the judicial system was not completed, and allegations of corruption and clientelism dogged the UDF administration. These factors obviously contributed to UDF's electoral debacle. Overall, however, it would be fair to say that UDF's political fortunes followed a pattern easily discernible in countries like Poland and Hungary; governments that achieve macroeconomic and financial stabilization are subsequently repudiated at the polls.

The second reason for the success of the former czar is his popular charisma. Simeon's savvy and his peculiar appeal as a nonpolitical politician help to explain why the reactive vote, inclined to punish UDF, benefited his political formation and not the already discredited former communists. Furthermore, Simeon was the logical focus for the strong antiparty sentiment in the country. He left Bulgaria very young, and the dramatic circumstances surrounding his departure are still very much alive in the memory of the older generations. The former monarch embodied two very different images that apparently affected various segments of the electorate. On the one hand, Simeon is still considered by the public an innocent victim of the communist regime. On the other hand, he is viewed as a successful and influential Bulgarian, who has established himself in the West but has never severed his connections with the fatherland. These two images-the "little Simeon" and "His Majesty"-had an enormous impact on the Bulgarian public. His enigmatic style and aristocratic manners convinced the majority of the voters that only the former king is qualified to resolve the economic hardships that plague their everyday lives. Simeon's popularity was institutionalized in the new movement, and the candidates nominated by him won their electoral contests on his coattails. One might also add that Simeon succeeded in filling a palpable moral void created as a result of the discrediting of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Mired in ugly infighting and ongoing scandals, the church has effectively forfeited its claim to articulate a higher morality, a circumstance that allowed Simeon to don the mantle of an ethical authority and to come across as a figure that unifies the nation.

The third reason that the expected electoral lurch benefited NMS, rather than the Socialists as in other East European countries, was BSP's failure to reform itself. In the aftermath of the 1989 changes, the party remained intact and did not undergo any serious splits or internal fracturing. In the recent past, the nostalgic vote twice returned BSP to power, in 1990 and 1994, and twice the party failed to keep its majority. The conflicting interests and clientelistic aspirations of the nomenklatura simply paralyzed the will for reform. The economic catastrophe of 1997 was the final proof that the unreformed former communists were simply unable to promote the welfare of their constituencies. As a result, BSP held little appeal for the protest vote that all the pollsters registered six months prior to the recent elections. It would be fair to conclude that the sole beneficiary of the Socialists' failure to reform and to read the message of the electorate was Simeon II Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.

Thus the seemingly extraordinary victory of Simeon lends itself to an ordinary explanation: the former czar won the 2001 elections because he attracted the votes of a citizenry unhappy with harsh, unpopular, yet inevitable economic reforms. Under similar circumstances, voters in Poland and Hungary returned former communists to power; in Bulgaria, however, this alternative was exhausted. The former king managed to unite the protest vote and to convince the electorate that his movement was the only viable option. This electoral outcome effectively marked the end of the compromise enshrined in the roundtable talks. Who are they? Simeon's dramatic entry into national politics attracted to his movement a slew of controversial political entrepreneurs: lobbyists for various economic groups, television personalities, actors, and even fashion models. NMS's questionable selection of candidates, however, did not hurt the movement's electoral chances, because Simeon found an effective weapon that allowed him to diffuse criticisms of incompetence-and that weapon was the support of young, Western-educated Bulgarian financiers. Still in their thirties and enjoying successful careers in major banks in London, these individuals were the former monarch's key backers.

Ironically, this same group first began to come together in April 2000, when Prime Minister Kostov (UDF) initiated a meeting of young Bulgarians with notable achievements and successful careers abroad. Unfortunately, the intention of the premier to start a long-term collaboration with these individuals met with resistance from the bureaucracy and party cadres, and the former's ideas and comments were never seriously considered by the UDF administration. Instead of turning into an informal but effective job market, the meeting only exacerbated the frustration of these ambitious, well-connected, and well-educated professionals. A year later, a number of these same Bulgarians who had come to consult with the UDF government embraced Simeon as the champion of their political vision. The older generation was enchanted by the fact that for the first time since 1989 young people with successful careers and expertise were returning to rather than leaving Bulgaria. The younger electorate was fired by the ambition of the London experts to help revive the country's economy. As a result, the generation of 1966, as this group of young professionals came to be known, captured several key ministries in Simeon's government and is at present the driving force behind the former czar.

A former monarch as prime minister The creation of a coalition government was another example of the new politics characteristic of the recent developments in Bulgarian democracy. NMS's sweeping victory put two issues on the agenda: the identity of the future prime minister and the new government's structure. In his typically enigmatic style, Simeon evaded the former issue for several weeks after his victory at the polls but finally announced that he would accept the job.

Despite the fact that NMS was in control of 120 seats in the 240-member parliament, the new formation also tried desperately to establish a coalition government so as to not confront massive opposition in the legislature. Given this strategic objective, the formation of the new government should be characterized as the second (after his electoral triumph) notable success of the former czar. Following several rounds of negotiations, NMS and MRF signed an agreement to govern the country together. As a result, for the first time since 1989, the ethnic minority, which numbers approximately one million, will have ministers in the cabinet. Simeon also managed to appease the potentially most outspoken enemy of such a coalition-the Bulgarian Socialist Party-by inviting two mayors elected with BSP's help and closely associated with the party to take key positions in the new cabinet. As a result, UDF remains as the only true opposition in parliament. The formation of the broad coalition is bound to boost Simeon's claim that he is a politician who seeks to unify the nation behind him. The effect The surprising outcome of the elections displays several important characteristics. First of all, there has been a radical change among the Bulgarian political elite. For the first time since 1989, not a single minister has participated in a previous government. Indeed, 80 percent of the newly elected deputies from NMS do not have any political experience. Moreover, the communist/anticommunist rhetoric, which, until recently, dominated public discourse seems exhausted. The elites that habitually articulated this dichotomy seem to have been marginalized. The former king's charisma has only helped to institutionalize this new state of affairs.

A second novelty is the appearance of a new generation of Bulgarian politicians with Western education and experience. Although their lack of administrative background is often cited as a problem, their perspective and position as outsiders might, in fact, facilitate their efforts to eliminate corruption and introduce new standards in politics. The international experience of these technocrats could help bring a new vision to key ministries and stimulate necessary investments in an already stabilized economy. Although their ambition to run the country as a business will almost certainly cause some problems, the young reformers' strategic goals of introducing clear rules and promoting the interests of the middle class may help improve living standards in the long run.

A third consequence is that NMS's victory eliminates the risk of a reversal of the radical reforms launched by the previous government. A real achievement of the outgoing cabinet was its success in making a priority of accession talks with the European Union and NATO and in uniting all political forces behind this cause. Although NMS's immediate goals are still quite unclear, there is little doubt that the new administration will retain the international priorities of the previous government.

The fourth result of the elections is the clear political engagement of the former monarch. As prime minister, Simeon assumes political responsibility for the legislative activity of his allies and associates and for the policies of the new cabinet. In view of the fact that his political ambitions perhaps go further than the prime minister's post to a possible return of the monarchy, there is little doubt that he will make an effort to ensure the success of his economic policies and to abide by the rules of Bulgarian democracy. Finally, these last elections attest to the maturity of the Bulgarian democratic institutions. The political dialogue between the winning and the losing sides throughout the electoral process, the painless transfer of power in all key institutions, and the tolerant climate established both in the government and in the legislature prove that the larger transition in Bulgaria, beginning in 1989, has been more successful than most observers had expected and that the democratic framework established in the country is mature enough to function even in the event of a radical change of ruling elites. The challenges The first challenge facing the new elite is the resolution of the conspicuous incongruity of its populist platform set against the intentions of the new cabinet. Among the most basic reasons for the success of Simeon's movement was its declaration that it would dramatically improve the living standards of the population within 800 days. Despite the obvious inconsistencies, if not contradictions, in NMS's ambitions for tax cuts, a balanced budget, and an increase in salaries and pensions, the electorate preferred to believe the generous promises of the platform. The fact that the proposed tax cuts would benefit the rich rather than the indigent had no impact on the voters' choices. On numerous occasions, NMS appealed to the poor and unemployed, promising a quick resolution to their unfortunate situation. Now, however, the new administration will have to resolve the discrepancy between its electoral populism and its allegedly probusiness plans.

The most immediate challenge is posed by the high expectations of Simeon's supporters. A recent poll reveals that 69 percent of the electorate considers salary increases to be the new government's first task, followed by tax cuts (59 percent) and a decrease in unemployment (59 percent). Although Simeon's associates reiterated during the electoral campaign that all these desirable goals can be pursued easily and simultaneously, the first days of the new administration are revealing what analysts have long predicted: NMS has set itself conflicting targets, and therefore the priorities of the new cabinet must be clarified while the party is still riding the wave of its electoral victory.

The second potential challenge facing the government is the establishment of decision-making practices. Paradoxically, the professional experience of the young ministers, in this respect, appears to be a liability, not an advantage. Having thrived in the world of large consultancies, they may be tempted to run the country as if it were a project for just such firms, where they are given data and have to come up with advice. The risk with proceeding in this fashion is only increased by the monarchical style of decision making that Simeon already evinces. The problem, however, is that while consultants give advice actual decisions often require difficult trade-offs. Moreover, as consultants, they provide advice but, as political leaders, they take full responsibility for these decisions. It is only a matter of time before Simeon's reluctance to make the tough decisions combined with his desire to control the political game will bring him into conflict with the young ministers. The stability of the democratic institutions hinges on the capacity of the new political elite to realize what their political responsibility entails and to resolve their differences without disrupting the process of governance.

Another reason for concern is the expected pressure from different interest groups and so-called mafia organizations bent on using NMS for their own purposes. There is little doubt that the resolution and persistence of the new ministers to impose fair rules of the game will be tested repeatedly in the coming months. Indeed, the future of Bulgarian democracy depends significantly on the success or failure of the new administration to tame the ambitions of organized crime.

The last challenge to the political traditions of the young democracy is the probable future debate over the country's form of government. Although the former monarch is currently a prime minister, most observers explain his recent political engagement as an attempt to restore monarchy in Bulgaria. Simeon has not answered directly the question about his future intentions but also never denies that his political ambition is to be the czar once again. The Bulgarian Constitution, which has one of the most restrictive amendment rules in the world, provides that the form of government can be changed only by a Constituent Assembly especially elected for that purpose. Resolving debates about the future of republican rule within the limits of the Constitution will be a true test for the stability of Bulgarian democracy.

Perhaps this time the compromise of the roundtable is indeed dead but fortunately its most formidable legacy-the creation of a democratic framework that channels public dialogue and ensures political continuity-seems very much alive. One can only hope that the new political majority will not abrogate this special legacy of the recent past.

Ralitsa Peeva is a program director at the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, and was a political analyst in the presidential campaign of Petar Stoyanov in Bulgaria.

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