Long before the tragic events of September 2001, Afghanistan presented one of the rare cases of American and Russian cooperation on a regional-security problem. US-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan was a notable exception in the general context of the countries’ relations, which have remained problematic in many areas-from strategic-arms control to human rights to regional-conflict management, especially in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and in the post-Soviet space, where the list of disagreements sometimes seemed longer than during the Cold War. Yet US-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan has been intensifying as well as taking different forms: from seeking to force the Taliban to change their policies on terrorism and narcotics through UN sanctions to forming a bilateral working group with a focus on terrorist threats coming from Afghanistan. Several years before the events of September 2001 and their political and military aftermath, this atypical US-Russia cooperation on a regional-security problem had provoked both political and academic interest in the factors influencing this process.

Recent policies in Afghanistan

Against the widespread image of the US’s neglect of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, it could be argued that the US’s continued political and military support of the mujahideen forces confronting the secular government of Ahmadzai Najibullah contributed to its collapse in 1992. The resultant anarchy was followed by the rise of Islamic fundamentalists as Afghanistan’s central authority, embodied by the Taliban forces that captured Kabul in 1996. It was only after the fall of Najibullah’s regime that the US temporarily washed its hands of Afghanistan, where low-scale internecine warfare was seen as endemic, and radical Islam was still an abstraction.

What appeared to stimulate the revival of US policy on Afghanistan was the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Africa, allegedly instigated by Osama bin Laden and resulting in US missile attacks against presumed terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. In the following three years, what often seemed a single-minded “get bin Laden” approach on the part of America, can be understood only through the prism of wider US security interests and concerns, with international terrorism emerging as one of the important post-Cold War substitutes for more traditional security threats (and, as it turned out later, as the most realistic one). The diffused and fragmented nature of this new threat, not always easy to grasp and target, has created a strong imperative for searching for a single mastermind-a role effectively filled by bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

But the US’s symbolic focus on bin Laden did not usurp wider policy and security purposes in its dealings with Afghanistan. Although for internal reasons it was problematic for the Taliban to surrender bin Laden, the United States, until September 2001, did not consider the Taliban a terrorist organization and maintained semiofficial contacts with Afghanistan’s de facto rulers. In fact, apart from the counterterrorist aspect, the US approach to the situation in Afghanistan prior to the September 2001 terrorist attacks seemed to be rather flexible and balanced. The US did not have an official relationship with any government in Afghanistan, and maintained contacts with all the factions, including both the Taliban and the opposing Northern Alliance, as well as representatives of the former Afghan king and other groups outside Afghanistan. While applying pressure to the Taliban, the US (unlike Russia) did everything to engage Afghanistan’s fundamentalist rulers in a serious dialogue. Even before the September 2001 events and their aftermath, this balanced approach, coupled with US diplomatic and military potential, allowed Washington to seek common ground with almost all the other regional players (Pakistan, Iran, Russia, India, the Central Asian states). American policy on Afghanistan was subordinate to a broader regional-policy framework-for example, to ensure the internal stability and to avoid the “Talibanization” of Pakistan, which still wielded considerable influence over the Taliban; to use whatever shared interest the US and Iran might have regarding Afghanistan as an instrument for improving relations with Tehran; to help strengthen transition processes in the Central Asian states; and so forth. In a wider international context, it seemed that the US diplomatic push on Afghanistan worked best when exercised indirectly through the UN Security Council, thus demonstrating-among other things-the continuing relevance of the Council for the US.

Russia has also declared the struggle against international terrorism one of its top foreign policy priorities, viewing the consolidation of extremist forces along the southern flank of the former Soviet Union, particularly in Afghanistan, as the primary source of terrorism. While in Russian official discourse “international terrorism” and “Islamic extremism” were used almost interchangeably, Russia’s political-military leadership was aware of the difference. Nonetheless, Moscow’s official claims-that the Chechen conflict was part of an international battle against Islamic terrorists-supported the government’s political strategy of presenting the threat to Russia’s territorial integrity as the main rationale for the war (while internal reasons for the conflict were often neglected). As the focus moved to Central Asia, one of the typical interpretations of Russia’s active use of antiterrorist rhetoric, much of it targeted against the Taliban, was Moscow’s alleged interest in driving Central Asian states closer to Russia.

For Russia, the successful offensives by the Taliban in northern Afghanistan in late summer and early fall of 2000 raised immediate questions as to, first, whether this fundamentalist movement presents a genuine security threat to neighboring states; second, its expansionist potential; and third, whether there is any threat of its moving northward. At the time, however, the only answer to the question “Will the Taliban cross the Tajik-Afghan border?” was negative. The Taliban government, constrained by the need to solidify control over Afghanistan, as well as by international sanctions, could hardly afford a full-scale cross-border military attack into the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Also, the ethnically Pashtun character of the movement set objective limits to the Taliban’s advance. As soon as Taliban forces would move to territories populated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks, the Pashtun factor would work against them. From this perspective, the Taliban were more interested in strengthening rather than undermining Afghanistan’s borders with Central Asian states.

For both Russia (indirectly) and the Central Asian states (directly), the greatest challenge, related to the situation in Afghanistan, was not an unlikely cross-border military attack by the Taliban. Rather, it was the so-called Islamic threat-the potential of Taliban successes to stimulate the rise of radical Islam in Central Asia, thus aiding such radical movements as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut Tahrir) in challenging local regimes. The infiltration of IMU groups into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2000 fully demonstrated the pertinence of the creeping-aggression scenario for the Central Asian states.

There are, however, at least two factors not fully taken into account by Russia-let alone the Central Asian governments-in their ostensible fight against Islamic extremism and terrorism in the region. First, although the Taliban certainly support radical Islamic movements in Central Asia and host their bases (they have, for instance, given refuge to the IMU leader Namangani), it has to be remembered that the Taliban have inherited most of these bases-along with much of the country’s territory-from Afghanistan’s previous mujahideen rulers, most of whom are now united in an amorphous Northern Alliance. Second, and more important, it has to be recognized that an upsurge of activity on the part of radical Islamic groups in the Central Asian states is generated at least as much by internal factors as by outside influences. Radical Islam finds fertile soil in social discontent arising out of disastrous economic conditions, impoverishment, and the semifeudal nature and repressive policies of local regimes. By underestimating the internal causes of instability in Central Asia, Russia risks repeating one of its fatal mistakes in Chechnya.

The basis for cooperation in Afghanistan

Both Russia and the US have been crucial international players in the region, a fact reflected in their presence in the UN-sponsored “6+2” group as the only two outside powers not bordering Afghanistan; both have used Afghanistan (the Soviet Union directly, and the US indirectly) as a Cold War playground; and both have been seriously pondering the terrorist threat coming from that country. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the two countries have been the most active advocates of sanctions against the Taliban, despite disagreements with some members of the Council. And, even before the September 2001 terrorist attacks, both have resorted or threatened to resort to the use of force against targets in Afghanistan, if necessary, with the US bombing Osama bin Laden’s bases in 1998 and Russia threatening missile attacks in 2000. The disparity between the two states’ international weight and influence was partly compensated for by Russia’s vast experience in and relative proximity to the region and a more pressing and immediate, although far from critical, security concern presented by the civil war in Afghanistan for the Russian forces in Tajikistan.

Both Moscow and Washington have had a vested interest in the Northern Alliance maintaining control over an important segment of Afghanistan’s territory. The resistance of Afghanistan’s Tajiks, led by the charismatic Ahmed Shah Massoud before his assassination in September 2001, against the Pashtun-dominated Taliban served, for Russia, as an important instrument for the stabilization of Tajikistan and, for the US, as one of the hedges against the revival of Pakistan’s Pashtun problem. The US-Russia interaction was not, however, limited to pursuing some common interests related solely to the situation in Afghanistan. It was on the wider counterterrorism aspect of the problem, with its important foreign policy and domestic implications for both states, that cooperation has been the closest, with presidents Clinton and Putin agreeing in 2000 to form a bilateral working group on Afghanistan to complement US and Russian counterterrorist efforts.

With the start of the US military retaliation campaign in October 2001, the question of whether US-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan is a specific phenomenon or a litmus test of Russia’s future cooperation with the West (both in confronting terrorism and in resolving other conflicts across Eurasia) has become more relevant than ever. An answer to this question, however, largely depended on the character and scale of the US retaliatory campaign focused on Afghanistan, as well as on its international political and legal framework. (Notably, it is almost certain that provoking a massive US military operation against predictable targets in Muslim-dominated regions of the world was one of the attackers’ primary goals.) Any disproportionate and inaccurate US military action against supposed culprit states had the potential of creating still more security problems, and stimulating a backlash of aggressive acts from other forces hostile to the US. This could lead, in turn, to the erosion of the wide international consensus in favor of the US, and to further destabilization not only of the states under attack, but adjacent regions as well.

Most of these concerns have been met by the US retaliation campaign in a rather satisfactory manner: the military part of the counterterrorist operation has been more careful, restrained, and surgical than expected and the likelihood of a massive ground campaign in Afghanistan remained low even as a number of limited special operations are taking place. Moreover, in the context of the US-Russia interaction in Afghanistan, the unexpectedly rapid retreat and disintegration of the Taliban in November 2001 has removed the main stumbling block-the problem of including Taliban “moderates” in the transitional government. (The US, concerned about including Pashtuns in the government as well as taking into account Pakistan’s interests, has not excluded this possibility, while Russia has insisted that there is no such thing as Taliban “moderates.”)

But the potential for regional destabilization remains considerable, especially in the long run. While the US’s primary concern has been the shaky political situation in Pakistan, the most critical factor for Russia’s policy on Afghanistan and in its cooperation with the US is the stability of Central Asia. The repercussions of the US retaliatory campaign for the Central Asian states, especially those that actively support the operation (such as Uzbekistan), could be dramatic indeed. If Uzbekistan previously had faced a rather limited threat from small groups of extremists supported from Afghanistan and had even tried to build semiofficial ties with the Taliban, now its direct association with the US campaign is likely to make it a prime target for Islamic radicals. Ironically, Uzbekistan’s participation in the US antiterrorist operation, which President Islam Karimov is counting on to ensure some protection for his own regime, could have the opposite effect, particularly if it entails sacrificing economic and political reform in the name of antiterrorism, breeding more Islamic extremism.

Russia understands that Uzbekistan’s concern for its own security and for preserving the secular character of its regime are the primary factors driving it closer to the US. But Tashkent’s wholehearted support of the US military campaign is also viewed in Moscow against the background of President Karimov’s ambition to dominate the region, coupled with Uzbekistan’s strained relations with most of its Central Asian neighbors, especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and its withdrawal from the CIS Collective Security Treaty. With an eye on preventing the postwar redistribution of power in the region, Russia wants to have a say in the postconflict settlement in Afghanistan, primarily by playing a balancing act with its closest regional partners, Iran and Tajikistan, and by trying to rely on various Tajik groups in the Northern Alliance. But in the long run, Russia remains concerned about the possibility of destabilization in Afghanistan sparking a conflict in Central Asia that, if followed by American disengagement in the region, would leave Moscow alone to clean up the mess.

All these considerations turn Russia’s general support for America’s limited retaliation campaign into a policy that could be labeled “conditional cooperation.” (Features of this policy include an intensifying cooperation between the special services concerned with counterterrorism, increased military and political support to the Northern Alliance, and a very restrained reaction to US growing military presence in Central Asia.) In exchange, Russia would undoubtedly like to have a say in the future political settlement in Afghanistan. Russia would also like due care to be taken not to destabilize Central Asia, particularly as regards the presence of US troops in these countries. If this conditional cooperation on Afghanistan proves to be fruitful, it could have a positive impact on the general climate in US-Russia relations. It is unrealistic, however, for Moscow to expect major concessions from the US on wider security interests unrelated to the situation in and around Afghanistan (such as the US national missile-defense program); in some issues less pressing for the current US administration, such as the Chechen problem, Russia’s interests might be somewhat accommodated. Indeed, we are already seeing such adjustments being made.

But even these limits are unlikely to turn Russia’s conditional cooperation into noncooperation. Pursuing a common goal, but guided by their different strategic priorities, America and Russia started to divide responsibilities by choosing their preferred clients within the Northern Alliance early in the campaign. Enjoying close support from Uzbekistan in its military campaign, the US (joined by Turkey) focused its support of the Northern Alliance on General Abdul Rashid Dostum’s ethnic Uzbek forces. While providing some assistance to Dostum, Russia (joined by Iran) focuses its support on the ethnic Tajik forces led by Massoud’s successor, General Mohammad Fahim. More broadly, the fact that US-Pakistan and emerging US-Uzbekistan ties are partly balanced by the Russia-Iran-Tajikistan link could and should help ensure a postwar balance of forces that will be an important factor in shaping the future political settlement in Afghanistan.

For the time being, the US and Russia, as well as most regional and local forces, seem satisfied with a vague and inclusive UN formula of “wide representation.” Russia’s position, however, is somewhat nuanced compared with that of the US. While publicly supportive of this formula and realizing the need for Pashtun representation, Moscow has chosen to deal with the Northern Alliance directly as the de facto authorities in Kabul. The US has warned this could be viewed by the alliance as “encouragement” for solidifying its power. A further preoccupation that Russia shares with Iran and the Northern Alliance is a concern with the arrival of new foreign military contingents.

But these differences should not be exaggerated. In spite of them, a general regional and international agreement has emerged that a relatively peaceful Afghanistan should be a loose association only (with limited prerogatives for a coalition government in Kabul), and that any postconflict arrangement must consider ethnic and tribal differences. The cementing force for even a loose association could be promises of large-scale financial support. (Concerns about local parties fighting over such funds do not seem justified, given the fact that most local forces realize that any hostilities will bring an end to financial assistance.) Apart from alleviating humanitarian needs and facilitating far-reaching political goals, financial aid should also serve the very concrete preventive purpose of “buying up” regional leaders from potential bin Ladens. In this, Moscow will have to rely on the US, which has something that Russia is critically lacking-financial resources.