Volume 10 Number 4

Fall 2001

Constitutional Watch
     A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR

Croatia - The splintered Croatian government has managed to hold on to power amid internal struggles, a vote of confidence, and the departure of one party from the coalition. Just before the May 20 local elections, the Istrian Democratic Forum (IDF), a member of the ruling coalition, initiated a vote on the new Statute of Istrian County, a sort of bylaw for the local-government unit. Istria, which is the most developed region in Croatia and a major source of revenue for the country, only became part of Croatia during the Second World War, after the Italian capitulation. Until then, it was a part of either the Italian or Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Approximately 10 percent of its population is ethnic Italian. (For more on the local elections, see Croatia Update, EECR, Vol. 10, Nos. 2/3, Spring/Summer 2001.)

In an apparent attempt to assure the backing of the Italian minority in the local elections, IDF adopted a new statute legalizing the extensive usage of the Italian language, and, in some cases, requiring the use of Italian as a second language in local administrative matters. The government reacted immediately, suspending the law and arguing that it was not within the county's purview to adopt such legislation. On May 22, the government asked the Constitutional Court to determine whether 13 provisions of the statute were in compliance with the Constitution. In turn, IDF's government members, Minister of European Integration Ivan Jakovcic (president of IDF) and a deputy minister of tourism, Rajko Ostojic, resigned from the government, arguing that it had taken action on the law without consulting them. Unofficially, many speculated that IDF was trying to capitalize on antigovernment sentiment brought about by recent cuts in social benefits and the poor economic situation in the country. Since their retreat from the government, IDF has become a "constructive opposition" party, backing many government proposals while not a formal member of the coalition.

Dissension and tension continued within the government concerning the investigation of more than 30 former officials (including the son of late president Franjo Tudjman) in relation to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The situation reached a breaking point after The Hague Tribunal requested the transfer of generals Rahim Ademi and Ante Gotovina at the end of June. Ademi, an ethnic Albanian, who had come to the Croatian Army from the Yugoslav Peoples' Army, and Gotovina are perceived as war heroes by many Croatians. The government, which more or less agreed on the need to cooperate with The Hague, was set to vote on the transfers in early July. The only exception was Drazen Budisa and his Croatian Social Liberal Party (CSLP), the second largest party in the coalition, which opposed the transfers.

Yet in the vote on July 7, only two of CSLP's five ministers voted against the transfers while Minister Alojz Tusek and Deputy Prime Minister Goran Granic approved and one minister abstained. Tusek was subsequently thrown out of the party, and Granic offered his resignation. After it became clear that the government would approve the transfers, the three other ministers tendered their resignations as well. In response, Prime Minister Ivica Racan called for a vote of confidence in the government (Art. 113.2). The situation seemed to imply CSLP's exit from the coalition. Unexpectedly, on July 11, Budisa resigned as the party chairperson, stating that he could no longer play a role in Croatian politics. Since Budisa was the strongest opponent of the transfers, his departure basically allowed the party to remain in the government, and the resignations were never put into effect. On July 15, the government survived the vote of confidence, which was supported by 93 deputies and opposed by 36 (mainly the Croatia Democratic Union [CDU]). Many CSLP deputies abstained from the vote. As it turns out, Budisa's resignation could actually strengthen the government. Under his rule, CSLP has been a constant thorn in the side of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the largest party in the government, blocking reform and slowing the adoption of certain laws.

Budisa named Jozo Rados, the minister of defense, acting chair of CSLP. At that time, it seemed that Rados, as the anointed heir, would continue to lead the party along the path chosen by Budisa-a more nationalist-oriented program, opposed to the tribunal, and open to the possibility of cooperation with the nationalist CDU. By the end of October, however, it seemed that Budisa wanted to regain power in the party and that Rados had become the leader of the centrist wing, which does not oppose cooperation with The Hague. While many had surmised that these recent intracoalition tensions presaged the government's demise, it seems that Racan's SDP has been able to hold on to power while CSLP is fragmenting into two factions, centered around Budisa and Rados respectively.

After the transfer requests by The Hague, Ademi met with President Stipe Mesic and expressed his willingness to appear before the tribunal, insisting that this would clear his name. Gotovina, however, was nowhere to be found. When it seemed that the government would have to take action to find him, the situation heated up as veterans groups threatened to barricade roads-potentially causing a major nuisance during Croatia's lucrative tourist season. The government finally concluded that Gotovina probably had fled the country before the transfer request was made public. His disappearance cast a shadow on Croatia's relationship with the tribunal, which alleged that the authorities did not try hard enough to find him and did not want to cause problems during the tourist season.

No progress has been made in the trials, being held in Croatia, of Tihomir Oreskovic, Mirko Norac, and others for the alleged murders in Gospic in 1991. (See Croatia Update, EECR, Vol. 10, Nos. 2/3, Spring/Summer 2001.) Even a year after the proceedings were initiated, their attorneys are still using procedural issues to postpone the trial. Some have commented that the lack of progress may force The Hague to request the transfer of the indicted men in order to try them at the tribunal. At a court hearing in early November, Norac physically attacked Oreskovic, apparently because he did not approve of Oreskovic's line of defense. In another matter, regarding crimes committed in Pakracka Poljana, the case was reopened after the Supreme Court found material and procedural errors. Even though they were already found innocent, four Croatian soldiers accused of the murder of another Croatian soldier and the torture of Serb civilians in 1991 will be tried again. A trial was also recently initiated for war crimes perpetrated by the Yugoslav Army and Serb rebels when Croatian civilians were murdered in Skabrnja in 1991.

Another issue tackled during summer was the relationship between Slovenia and Croatia. Prime ministers Racan and Janez Drnovsek of Croatia and Slovenia met, on July 9, and worked on an agreement resolving a number of disputes between the two former Yugoslav republics that have lingered since independence in 1991. The package covered delineation of borders on land and sea (the land border was partially established under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia although there never was an attempt to create a sea border); the problem of Slovenian Ljubljanska Bank; and the nuclear energy power plant in Krsko, Slovenia, built during the communist era jointly by Croatia and Slovenia. According to the agreement, Slovenia is granted a corridor to the sea through the Gulf of Piran, the Krsko nuclear power plant will have joint management, and four disputed villages will remain Croatian. (For more on the agreement, see the Slovenia Update in this issue.)

Croatia has been frustrated for years by Slovenian requests for a corridor to the sea, while, as many believe, dragging its own feet on the issue of Croatian capital frozen in Ljubljanska Bank and the power plant ownership. In this recent agreement, many Croatians feel that Racan made huge concessions regarding the border delineation in return for Slovenia's agreeing to free up Croatian funds in Ljubljanska Bank, which many Croatians had thought was not open to negotiation since the money rightfully belonged to their country. The agreement has not resolved the troubled relations between the two countries since only SDP, in Croatia, is willing to approve it, and Slovenia is not willing to negotiate further. This was very much apparent during Slovenian president Milan Kucan's visit to Zagreb, on November 27, and in recent comments in the Slovenian press.

However successful the tourist season was this summer, fall brought economic instability. Unemployment currently stands at around 22 percent, nearly half of which represents war veterans. The budget for 2001 had to be redrawn because of lower than expected revenue from privatization. Not even the privatization of an additional 16 percent of the shares of Croatian Telecommunications (35 percent had already been sold to Deutsche Telekom in 1999) helped. The public was put off by the deal, since the funds were not reinvested in the economy but immediately spent paying back a short-term international loan. With the sale, Croatia lost its majority shareholder position, retaining only 49 percent of the company, which will be further split into several parts, partially for a public offering and partially to be offered to former and present employees of the company and war veterans.

Soon thereafter, the privatization of several banks was initiated, but that also failed to fill the budgetary holes. In autumn, cuts in benefits for war invalids, war veterans, and the families of war victims had to be performed, causing much social unrest. The government faces a dire economic situation and must perform massive cuts in social benefits to meet IMF requirements for credits. In another attempt to prune the budget, on August 7, the government dismissed 3,800 policemen in a single day (although many were shifted from the police force to other positions in the civil service such as the customs agency). The police force is looked on as particularly bloated, soaking up 10 percent of the overall budget before the recent changes, far surpassing the European standard of 2-3 percent. The government has also announced its intention to dismiss several thousand active soldiers in early 2002.

The terrorist attacks in the United States, on September 11, reached Croatia as well. The right-wing nationalist parties used the terrorist attacks to justify Croatian involvement in the war in Bosnia, arguing that Bosniac Muslims are a destabilizing force in the Balkans and that Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina were merely defending themselves against expansionist Bosniac aggression. The arguments were also used vis-à-vis the Serbs, whose actions in the war were portrayed as terrorism against Croatia, an internationally recognized state. For their part, political moderates and the present government advocate a strong role for Croatia in the antiterrorist coalition, without relating the recent events to the Balkans. In fact, both President Mesic and the government see the struggle against terrorism not merely as a military action but as a proactive policy to aid poorer nations and have made this one of the top priorities of Croatian diplomacy.

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