Volume 10 Numbers 2/3

Spring/Summer 2001

Feature: The Future of the Former Yugoslavia

The International Community and the Former Yugoslavia
Rusmir Mahmutcehajic

Note: This is a much-abridged version of the original article.

The current situation in the former Yugoslavia can be defined as a peace, established and maintained by the international community, that is the outcome of the dissolution of the federal Yugoslav state. There is peace, despite the absence of the rule of law and human rights over most of the territory. The entire region of southeastern Europe has inherited centuries of shifting demarcations between various political and military forces, internal and external. One could say that on either side of the symbolic Ploce-Tallin line, the long-lasting divisions of politics and power are continually advancing and retreating. All of this affects the region's religious, cultural, and political particularities. They are interconnected in a complex fashion that the simplifying ideologies of the modern era have almost always ignored or denied. This situation has also produced the current attitudes toward the recent disintegration- and toward the violence and upheaval accompanying it. The international community has proven unable either to mobilize a rapid and effective response or to develop a model of understanding that could help recast political forces in accordance with the principles that underpin a harmonious and stable relationship between unity and diversity.

The dominant perception-underlying the policies pursued by the international community- of the former Yugoslavia was of its unity, accompanied by simplistic or dismissive views of its internal complexity. It was regarded as an integral state that simply had lapsed into a serious crisis. Its emergence from a state of crisis was understood within the context of Eastern Europe's democratization; its complexity and divergence from these other patterns in Eastern Europe was, for the most part, ignored. But when its dissolution began to be understood as a separate and complex process, the international community began to realize and understand the situation's complexity. In this setting, the different diplomatic approaches of the various powers evolved, all in light of the different histories and situation in each country. As is known, in most countries, official policies are based on that country's perception of the situation and its own special interests. In addition, these policies may be maintained over a long period, while simultaneously undergoing different tactical adjustments. Furthermore, changing circumstances in the wider arena may also lead to shifts in political orientation. In the case of Yugoslavia's dissolution, such phenomena are at the root of the political attitudes and involvement of almost all the key actors of the international community.

Britain
Until the war flared up, the presence of international troops in the former Yugoslavia was based on the idea that Yugoslavia was integral, even though its fragmentation into several components was already clear. While Yugoslavia was derived from earlier and more enduring political and historical elements, the nature and significance of its state republics were viewed with disdain. The only legal solution to the federation's dissolution was to restore sovereignty to the republics from which the sovereignty of the federal state had been derived. This view was confirmed by the Badinter arbitration committee of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia. The British public, from the very start of the war, was markedly inclined toward more-decisive military involvement to halt the aggression of Serbia and Croatia. Certainly Serbia wanted to deny the republics' sovereignty in order to produce, by weakening them, the territory needed for a Greater Serbia-but with the qualification that this conduct was interpreted as the "protection of Yugoslavia, the defense of Serb national interests, and opposition to secession," and so on. However, in practice, British national policy was based on a preference for Serbia and its interests, as defined by the Milosevic elite. There is simply no other way of interpreting the British negotiators' insistence on the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a prerequisite for the establishment of peace and stability. The peace talks and the concomitant disregard of the fact that the war was continuing even as the talks went on, were, in fact, a cover-up of the truth about the murder and expulsions conducted by the government elites of Serbia and Croatia-in fact, the very people sitting at the negotiating table.

Zbigniew Brzezinski has addressed this issue, describing those who promoted such policies as "negotiators whose basic concept of dealing with thugs is to talk endlessly, while assuring the aggressors that their use of force will not be matched by counterforce. Not surprisingly, the result has been that mass murderers have been propitiated and 'ethnic cleansings' not to speak of mass rapes, tolerated. . . . The recently offered 'peace plan' for the complex cantonization of Bosnia . . . can only be viewed as a thinly disguised screen for continued fighting and ethnic cleansing. To work effectively, a plan of such stunning complexity would require an almost angelic willingness of all parties to compromise, something perhaps feasible in a country as peaceful and levelheaded as Switzerland-but not in Bosnia, with its passionate hatreds and fresh wounds. That is why the plan is both a political and a moral shame" ("Bombs and Blather: The Strategy Deficit," Washington Post, January 17, 1993, p. C 1). It is not surprising, therefore, that so much that was criminal was tolerated. This policy, in effect, supported the annihilation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To convince Bosnian political leaders that his concept of partition was the only solution, David Owen stubbornly emphasized to them that they had lost the war and that his role was the administration of that defeat. Milosevic and Tudjman understood this as support for their points of view and for the accomplishment of the objectives that formed the basis of their concord and of the war they led.

France
Even a superficial glance would suggest that France had the least consistent approach to the war in the former Yugoslavia. The events in Yugoslavia were interpreted in French official policy depending on "whether they coincided with various French principles and objectives. Foremost among these, apart from 'humanitarianism,' was to promote France actively (along with the UK), through various international bodies. For France, the two most important ones were the UN and the WEU. Its initial enthusiasm for military intervention in support of the Belgrade authorities was motivated by a traditional French desire to give life to the WEU as opposed to NATO, thereby diminishing American influence" (James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will [New York 1996], pp. 158-66). In addition, in their endeavors to follow a different policy from the Americans, British, and Germans, the French leadership saw the dissolution of Yugoslavia in terms of the primacy and centrality of the state, aware that the breakup of Yugoslavia had implications for France with regard to Corsica. French support for the Serb side during summer and autumn 1991 "became an express attempt to counter what was seen increasingly as German support for Slovenia and Croatia" (ibid., pp. 159). At the end of 1991, France realized that it could no longer justify its support for a united Yugoslavia and began to support the use of force on humanitarian and security grounds and in the light of UN credibility. At the same time, France made a diplomatic offer to Belgrade to reduce sanctions progressively in exchange for an end to the conflict (ibid., pp. 159-60).

Changes in the administration in Paris and the arrival of a more resolute foreign minister, Alain Juppé, contributed to a shift toward the use of force. An added factor in this was the recognition by French military experts that the Serbs were overwhelmingly responsible for what was happening and that greater military force was required to end the humanitarian nightmare. With time, the French inclination toward the use of force, along with a rapprochement with NATO, brought France closer toward cooperation with the United States rather than Britain. Nonetheless, the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state in which diverse religious and national groups were lasting historical presences was never acceptable to the French position. A passive stance, regardless of whether it manifested itself as humanitarian involvement or as a contribution to "keeping the peace," always meant implicit support for those whose agenda was the destruction of Bosnian society and state. The presence of French troops in some areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina was always regarded as a sort of shield for Serb military structures and actions. This is evident in the fact that Serb leaders, many of whom have been accused of war crimes, are living principally in areas where there is a French military presence.

Germany
Not long after the first shots were fired in Slovenia, Germany achieved a reasonably precise diagnosis of the nature of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Its public was inclined to favor the Slovenian and Croatian claim to the right to independence. This is not surprising, since the reunification of Germany, in 1990, had "revived the notion of self-determination in a European framework" (Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, pp. 166-67). The Germans clearly saw the conflict for what it was, "a war of aggression by communist-led Serbia . . . against the emerging democracies in Slovenia and Croatia" (ibid., pp. 167-68). On December 23, 1991, Germany announced that it would recognize Slovenia and, on January 15, 1992, Croatia.

Germany's decisiveness provoked much criticism from its European partners, who argued that its moves would lead to the war's spreading. Bonn was also confronted with accusations by Serb apologists that Germany was carrying out its centuries-old plan to achieve hegemony over the Balkans and what Milosevic would later call a policy "in the interests of the German-Catholic alliance." Given these charges, it is important to recall that troops under the direct command of the Serbian elite had razed Vukovar and shelled Dubrovnik, in the autumn of 1991, even as paramilitary reservist units were being sent into eastern Herzegovina. This was before the Germans made their announcement, and thus accusations that Germany's recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence fueled the war seem unfounded. Consider, too, that Bosnian Croat municipalities had established the parastate known as Herzeg-Bosnia in November 1991, and the parliament of the Bosnian Serbs, a breakaway group of members of the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had proclaimed the formation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 21-all this before the German announcement on December 23.

Initially, the German public was also opposed to the Vance-Owen peace plan but seemed finally to accept it, though with reservations. As Owen put it, "They were now sensitive to any possible partition, particularly of Sarajevo. Their initial stridently anti- Serb, pro-Muslim stance had been somewhat toned down as the complexities and the difficulties of finding a solution became increasingly apparent. But in the German government the voices of Foreign and Defence Ministries were at times sharply at variance over former Yugoslavia, most markedly over the extent to which it was constitutionally possible for the German armed forces to become involved" (David Owen, Balkan Odyssey [London, 1996], pp. 186-88).

But despite its misgivings on this point, Germany continued to play an important role in international efforts and remained unwavering on the issue of the independence of the republics. In addition, Germany went on to make significant contributions to the military structures of UNPROFOR and NATO.

Russia
The Russian Federation initially saw Yugoslavia in terms of its own experience in the Soviet Union's breakup, although it regarded Yugoslavia as an "antimodel." Moscow supported the EC's efforts to establish a stabilizing framework for the republics that had proclaimed their independence from the former Soviet Union, which had (in turn) become the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia compared its own efforts to develop such a framework with similar aspirations on the part of Belgrade (Owen, Balkan Oddessy, p. 151). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev believed that cooperation with the West would help him with the reform of moribund Russian political and economic institutions.

Russian policy, as a whole, went through three phases. "In the first, Moscow's policy broadly shadowed and supported other international efforts; the second covered a transitional period in which expansive support for Western approaches was in question, but cooperation continued with Russia increasingly seeking to play a more prominent role and moving towards an independent, assertive line; and the third was characterized by Russian assertiveness, clearly based on the importance of promoting Russia as a 'great power'" (ibid., p. 192).

The first phase ended in May 1993, following criticism from within the country and with Washington's rejection of the proposed Vance-Owen plan. During the remainder of 1993, Russia supported international diplomatic efforts to find a new plan for Bosnia as a "union of republics." Russia, together with France and Britain, also sought to counter pressure from the United States for air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. The December 1993 elections resulted in an antireformist majority in parliament, which did an about-face and moved toward an uncompromising and seemingly neoimperialist foreign policy. Although not all forms of cooperation were broken off in this more intransigent phase, the message coming from Russia was that it must be treated with the same degree of esteem as other countries. In February 1995, Moscow announced that it proposed to violate UN sanctions against Serbia in exchange for Belgrade's diplomatic recognition of the former Yugoslav republics. Clinton administration officials accepted the proposal.

The United States
The Bush administration began by greeting Serb intransigence with a shrug of the shoulders. Its basic, and accurate, diplomatic assessment was that only military force could prevent Milosevic and Tudjman from carrying out their intentions. But its basic, and inaccurate, political assessment was that such intervention could never be justified to the American people. As a result, President Bush did nothing, claiming that the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not relevant to US interests. However, in the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton criticized Bush's realpolitik stance, claiming that the American democratic-liberal response should be resolute action to halt the genocide; to bring war criminals to justice; and to pursue tolerance and a multiethnic nation state, liberal nationalism, and the use of European and international institutions. There is no doubt that the war could have been stopped as early as the first half of 1993 if President Clinton had fulfilled his campaign promises, lifted the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and launched air strikes. It was then that Clinton sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Europe to find out what the attitude was toward a "lift and strike" policy. The European allies opposed becoming more decisively involved in the war, claiming that this would put UNPROFOR troops at risk, and would only support Bush's policy of inaction, thus reinforcing and accelerating Milosevic and Tudjman's efforts to destroy and divide Bosnia.

The idea of a union of three republics, on which agreement was reached in summer 1993, was reshaped into a plan for partition into two entities. In early 1994, the Washington Agreements, understood by Tudjman as allocating half of Bosnia and Herzegovina to him with a mandate to "pacify and civilize" the Muslims, were signed. Because the problem remained unresolved and, even under the eye of UNPROFOR troops, the three armies still existed and were fighting, the entire drama remained highly complex, with no prospect of resolution in the near future. It was under these circumstances that, in summer 1995, massacres occurred in Srebrenica and Zepa, both of which were enclaves under UNPROFOR protection. As a result, UNPROFOR was humiliated in the worst possible way, prompting European allies to speak more firmly about pulling out of the morass of blood and suffering in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Withdrawal of the existing forces, however, required the involvement and support of NATO's major military forces, which meant the United States. Some senior American officials, including Madeleine Albright, at the time US Ambassador to the UN, and Anthony Lake, national security adviser, began-since US troops were already heading for Bosnia and Herzegovina-to suggest that the administration should strive to achieve success rather than accept defeat. It was then that Richard Holbrooke's peace mission began, in August 1995.

The Washington Agreements clearly confirmed that Tudjman was responsible for Bosnia's destruction and also that he was accepted as a key player in the search for a solution. At the very start of his peace mission, Richard Holbrooke did the same with Milosevic. He almost wholly excluded the Bosnian Serbs from the negotiating process, thereby confirming that the tragedy of Bosnia and Herzegovina had, in essence, been in Milosevic's hands from the very start. This also supported the stance of the European allies, who recognized Milosevic and Tudjman as responsible for the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the end of 1995, the Dayton Accords were signed. Their form-and enforcement-were underwritten by the United States, but their essence was based on the original notion of the European negotiators regarding the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was simply a fig leaf to cover the disgrace of partition, one which recognized the perpetrators of aggression and genocide.

The liberal elements of Dayton-the Council of Ministers as Bosnia's government, dealing with war criminals, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and so on-will remain meaningless as long as there is no determination to implement them. The elites, their ideologies, and organizations devoted to destruction (together with the perpetrators of the atrocities backed by the agendas of those elites), all of which were instigated, established, and supported by Milosevic and Tudjman, remain and are accepted as legally protected components of Dayton in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is simply not possible to implement liberal elements by accepting and retaining, in their current roles and positions, these elites and their ideologies, organizations, and apparatus of destruction.

A multiethnic democracy that would include the dominant political parties based on individual ethnopolitical ideologies is not appropriate to the unity of the society and state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least as far as experience so far has shown. For as things are now, these parties claim that they are the sole political representatives of religious and political communities, displaying a tendency to convert that representation into territorialization with all the elements of statehood. Since this is impossible, they retreat into extrastate and parastate forms of action that have their most radical expression in the spread of corruption and the formation of political alliances that destroy even the existing constitutional order.

The United Nations
In order to evaluate the role of the United Nations, it is important to take into consideration its entire structure, and, in particular the position and attitude of its Secretary General. Although the Security Council adopted crucial resolutions, problems arose in enforcing them, particularly in connection with the powers constituting the UN troops. The unenterprising Boutros Boutros-Ghali seemingly regarded the UN's involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a rich man's war in Europe's backyard, distracting attention from more-important issues that the organization should have been addressing in the underdeveloped world (Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, pp. 94, 97). The UN's inabilities and difficulties, here, were various. For example, the national troops that made up UNPROFOR were all under UN command but frequently acted according to the orders received from their own governments. Commanding officers on the ground noticeably failed either to understand or to apply many of the UN injunctions. They treated the Bosnian side as "one of three warring factions" and not as the legitimate government of Bosnia and Herzegovina as recognized by the UN. Many UNPROFOR troops expressed direct support for the Serbs and were openly anti-Muslim. Western nations supported the UN humanitarian mission so as "to ensure that international clamour for something to be done was met, while ensuring that no effective political or military help would reach the Bosnian government" (Quintin Hoare and Noel Malcolm, eds., Books on Bosnia [London 1999], p. 97). Commanding officers, such as Sir Michael Rose, persisted in treating their mission as a peace-keeping operation, although what circumstances demanded was an end to the war, which finally came about only with the arrival of IFOR/SFOR, when the extent of Bosnia's destruction had reached what are, most likely, irreversible dimensions.

NATO
The entry of NATO/IFOR, in December 1995, was a major advance by comparison with UNPROFOR. Disciplined troops, looking altogether more serious and battle-ready, arrived. Their very appearance had a deterrent effect. The problem was how to make use of them. Their commanding officers opted for a minimalist interpretation of their responsibilities to "avoid doing police work." Admiral Leighton Smith, who interpreted the role of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina "as narrowly as imaginable," provided an IFOR military escort for the Bosnian Serb forces that were left "on the other side" of the Dayton dividing line. In his first appearance in the local media, Admiral Smith stressed that he did not "have the authority to arrest anybody," which meant that Karadzic was able to slip past NATO units. In fact, IFOR imposed partition-not unification. There were no attempts to arrest Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, although it was known where they were living during the first six months. Despite these failings, IFOR/SFOR did ensure a more or less peaceful environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; but it was not a just peace, nor can it justifiably be regarded as reasonable, without fundamental internal modifications to the final circumstances of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was a crossroads, certainly, but even now, five years after it was imposed, it is not clear which road it will go down in the future.

Conclusion
It is sometimes claimed that the first condition for remedying the current agony of southeastern Europe is to transform the world's prevailing knowledge. That assertion can easily be seen as epistemic immodesty that is, itself, an obstacle both to tolerance and to rectifying the existing knowledge. But the situation in which the people, society, and governments in this region find themselves testifies to the reasonableness of this assertion.

To shift the responsibility for the current situation solely onto the people within this agonized world would be similar to expecting a person suffering from a life-threatening disease to treat himself. To see the issue in these terms is to fail to meet the responsibility for a situation that is the concern of everyone. For though the current state of affairs in the former Yugoslavia does not directly pose a threat to individuals and governments in either the West or the East, this does not mean that relinquishing it will not open up a rift in which, sooner or later, such an attitude will give rise to the same effects that are now evident in the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It does no harm, therefore, to repeat what has already been said in this regard.

The entire geopolitical region of southeast Europe is economically, culturally, and politically destroyed, hamstrung, and bureaucratized. This situation can be illustrated through the terror imposed by the elites, their ideologies and organizations, whose most visible external manifestations are corruption and crime, themselves the other side-or underside- of fake messianic missions and prophetic bigotries. These terrorizing models of thought and action, which are only incompletely reflected in their communist and nationalist aspects, developed over a long period and have been relocated and deployed amid the destruction, obstruction, and bureaucratization of the region. Almost all Balkan universities, school systems, and scientific and cultural structures, as well as religious organizations, are participating in this today. The illusion is created that all the elements required for constructive change are present. However, the situation is completely different. The organizational forms that are present are illusions skillfully designed to hide these elites and their ideological projects, which are so opposed to the goal of the Stability Pact.

The question remains, How can we resist the structure-those models of thought and action, taken as a whole-that was developed and maintained for such a long time and imprinted on the prevailing sentimentalism and moralism? Understanding this structure is the first prerequisite for answering this question. This structure can never and will never understand itself. It needs an alternative to confront it. This does not imply just political opposition to the ruling forces. The opposition that exists today, in all its variety, does not include major components that could be defined in any other way except as only nominally different responses to the ruling terror, responses that, for the most part, remain in principle identical to what gave rise to them. This is why the alternative, which cannot become an operative policy in the near future, means, above all, a critical and skeptical revision of our understanding of all the circumstances of the Balkan tragedy. The stereotypical interpretation, according to which the Balkan mosaic is predestined for tensions and conflicts, does not correspond either to the truth or to this revisionary goal. The religious, ethnic, and cultural differences in this geopolitical region are neither the sole a priori motivation nor the intrinsic basis for the phenomena that today constitute the dominant experience of the Balkan people. Beyond this picture and this experience, it is possible to find the real reasons for the harmony that is the condition, or precondition, for the survival of the world as a whole.

Srdja Popovic: I would only slightly disagree with Mr. Mahmutcehajic's thesis that Bosnia was at the center of Yugoslavia's dissolution. I would say that Yugoslavia's dissolution occurred because of the conflict between the Croats and Serbs. I could agree completely with Mr. Mahmutcehajic's descriptions of the reactions of the international community. As for the future of Bosnia, I think it depends, in the first place, on the policies of Croatia and Serbia. Mr. Stipe Mesic made the first important step when he actually acknowledged the suffering of Bosnia; the Serbian side has not made similar steps. No real change of policy toward Bosnia is possible either in Croatia or in Serbia before the crimes committed by the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia are punished. So, in my opinion, the pressure coming from the West toward Belgrade and Zagreb should be relentless.

Ivan Zvonimir Cicak: Was the war started by ourselves or was it a war imported from the outside? I hold that it was our war, and that war was a result of the agreement between two leaders-Milosevic and Tudjman. Later on, all sorts of international actors got involved, but international involvement was secondary. The war will be over only if we, the inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia, can find the solution to the problem. The war is not yet over. There are plenty of open issues-not only the question of relations among Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, but also the question of the south, where the Albanian population is increasing. We are mostly focused on the question of Presevo, but there are a lot of problems in Kosovo-the complete destruction of the social structure of Kosovo, corruption, drugs, and prostitution, which are all evidence of the disintegration of what was, until recently, a conservative patriarchal society.

Now I will speak publicly, for the first time, about a recent experience. In July 2000, I met Karadzic's wife and transmitted to Karadzic the message to come forward and surrender to The Hague Tribunal. I also requested an interview with Karadzic. She said it was not possible. I asked why, and she replied that he had promised Mr. Holbrooke that he will not give any interviews, that he will not write anything, and that he will not speak. And Mr. Holbrooke promised him that the Americans would protect him. For myself, Karadzic is the key. Not Mladic. Mladic is only a butcher. Karadzic is the man who negotiated with the international community.

Ranko Risojevic: We heard two or three formulations that are very interesting, and it is very important to be clear about them so that we can resolve the situation in Bosnia. One formulation is that Bosnia and Herzegovina is Yugoslavia in miniature. That is absolutely wrong. And that was one of the leading reasons for the attempt to dissolve Bosnia and Herzegovina. One cannot view Bosnia and Herzegovina as a microcosm of Yugoslavia, since Bosnia and Herzegovina existed long before Yugoslavia. There exists a problem of undemocratic neighbors, Croatia and Serbia. Both countries are very far from democracy. I want to remind you of one of the thoughts of Mr. Mahmutcehajic, with which I happen to agree. After they ravaged Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia have the obligation to care for Bosnia. Only with a democratic Croatia and a democratic Serbia can we have a peaceful Bosnia.

Zdravko Grebo: We should not be focused on Bosnia alone. My main problem with the role of the international community, especially in Bosnia, is the definition of its mandate. As you probably heard, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) is the official protector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that this office, or the high representative himself, can impose any kind of resolution. It is an example of the direct involvement of the international community in the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main problem is, What are our expectations? Are there deadlines for the continuing presence of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina? And what is it doing to encourage the local or internal institutions to function? Nothing. So, the whole story about the comparison between Yugoslavia and Bosnia is not appropriate.

I want to remind you that, starting from 1992, there were some six or seven conferences on the constitutional structure of Bosnia, and after all those conferences things went in the wrong direction. So, my main problem is, What is the purpose of the presence of the international community in Bosnia? On the other hand, without the presence of the international community Bosnia and Herzegovina will simply disappear. It is a frustrating position to live in Bosnia and Herzegovina under international auspices. Besides, if we really want to discuss the role of the international community in both wars where international troops were present in the region, What is its plan, what is its strategy? We heard, for example, that the justification for the air strikes on Yugoslavia was the violation of human rights in Kosovo. This is, somehow, a radical change in the principles of international public law if violations of human rights justify intervention. If the new international order allows the international community to intervene in these countries, the question or reason-of justification- obtains. And, once again, how does the double standard play into this, who is to decide when to intervene, and not only militarily but also politically? I think that is the main problem for the future presence of the international community in the region.

Jovan Donev: In 1991, Macedonia found itself in a power vacuum. There was no power there. There was a state without an army, without anything. And immediately the regional powers started to fight each other in order to fill this vacuum. Turkey, Greece, Serbia as well. What is the interest of the regional powers today? Kostunica was the last one to visit Moscow; he recommended that it is necessary to have, again, a balance of power in the Balkans. This is, from my point of view, a very, very bad idea. It was the balance of power that contributed to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And if we continue to play the balanceof- power game and invite the Russians to return to the region, thereby refreshing some old alliances of the nineteenth century, the regional conflict would certainly arise again.

Nenad Canak: The crisis in Yugoslavia began at a very bad time, when nobody fully grasped that the Berlin Wall had collapsed and with it the Cold War strategies and balance of power. This presented an opportunity for the local muggers to create all these horrors. UNPROFOR, for example, was put in the areas that protected the borders of Greater Serbia. So, the international community, in the name of peace, actually supported the creation of expansionist projects like those of Milosevic. A lot of time passed before they did anything in Bosnia. The reaction in Kosovo was very bad and chaotic. A friend of mine told me-after ten days of NATO bombing in 1999- that he was scared to death. I asked him why now and not before, ten days ago, when the bombing actually began. Well, he said, in the beginning, I thought that they had some plan. Now I see that they are improvising. And that is exactly what happened. They thought that after three days of bombing Milosevic would surrender. He did not surrender. What now? If they withdraw, they lose face. If they continue, what then? They destroyed everything that they wanted to destroy in the first couple of days, and then bombed some wrecks and ruins repeatedly. Also, I must say that the struggle against Milosevic really started on March 24, 1999, because before that he was the man to be negotiated with, to be used as a tool of pressure; not a dangerous leader, just somebody whose positions should be softer, nothing more. So, the international community played a very nasty and even a dirty game with the opposition.

In addition, mistakes were made regarding Milosevic-the diagnosis of him as the "last communist dictator" was wrong, and hence the cure was unsuccessful. And then, as before, we had a situation where supposedly we had to find someone strong, for example, a king, who could unite all the forces- Partisans and Chetniks-in Yugoslavia after Tito. So, all these cases were based on wrong concepts, and today, too, there is no concept of what has to be done. The international community wants to protect democracy. What is democracy, actually? What are we talking about here? Democracy is something you have to build on your own, you have to build it on a grassroots basis; democracy cannot be transplanted from one place in the world to the other. And nobody is talking about the "how" of building democracy, only about how much money should go to whom. Finally, the international community is still talking to the strongmen in the region. Once, there was only one, Marshal Tito, then there were a couple of them, and now there are many.

Slavko Perovic: I agree with an important idea of Mr. Mahmutcehajic. I would like to draw attention to the idea that the dissolution of Yugoslavia is not yet completed. When we look at the role of the international community, we can easily conclude that the international community did not perform a satisfactory role in the region. On the other hand, we also have to realize that the atrocities would probably have continued had it not been for the action of the international community.

We find ourselves in a very unusual situation today, and I am sorry that such is the case, but the international community has had some new experiences, thanks to us. We also came to understand that the international community often did not respect the basic tenets on which it presumably rests, when it attempted to solve this crisis. The problem that will soon come to the fore is that of Montenegro. The people there realize that an independent Montenegro could be a better solution to the numerous questions they are facing. But the big question is the attitude of the international community toward Montenegrin independence. Will it be understood that the agreement between Belgrade and Podgorica must be respected should an agreement be reached? If you ask me, I think that an independent Montenegro and an independent Serbia would be a very good answer to all of the questions facing us now. After the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, there is a chance that the separation of Montenegro and Serbia will occur in a peaceful and reasonable manner. After a passage of several years, such an outcome could serve as a good foundation for the necessary future reintegration of our area.

Miodrag Perovic: The peoples of the former Yugoslavia spent almost all of the twentieth century destroying the state they dreamed about during almost all of the nineteenth century. Yugoslavia, as a state and as an idea, died several times during the twentieth century. And every time the international community, the great powers, restored Yugoslavia, but always with the same concept. If they continue doing so today, it will come to the same end at some future date. The new Serbia is increasingly seen as the power in the central Balkans that can protect the interests of the international community. I find it difficult to see how the stillundemocratic Serbia can be promoted to such a role.

I think that Serbia could be supported in a different way, not as the regional military power of the Balkans, but as a center of culture and science that can accomplish a better life for everybody. But why help Kostunica to put pressure on Montenegro? He helped organize the celebrations of the so-called Serbian New Year in Montenegro, in Podgorica, but not in Belgrade. He helped organize the transfer of Jovan Ducic's remains, having the funeral cortege of this nationalist poet proceed for 48 hours along 48 kilometers of Montenegrin territory on the way to reburial in Trebinje, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He should have known that Ducic said Croats are famous not for being fearless, but for being shameless. If Montenegro is to survive as a modern nation, we have to get independence. With Kostunica, Montenegro will become anti-European. I do not understand, then, why Europe and the US now push Montenegro to help Serbia, and I certainly do not know what we can do to help Serbia or how to do it.

What the international community should do is to accept that Yugoslavia is a dead idea. We know that a degree of Balkan integration is necessary. It is natural to live together, but the international community should help us live together on equal terms and to have equal rights. So the formula for the Balkans is to regard the area as a part of Europe, in the context of European policy, and to direct the Balkans into European associations.

Zdravko Grebo: Let me ask a question. It concerns one of the main problems in our discussion, that is, How can you explain that we need to continue fragmenting ex-Yugoslavia, and, at the same time, that we agree that all the former Yugoslav republics want to participate in European integration?

Teuta Arifi: I would like to use the example of Macedonia to discuss the role of the international community, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Macedonia when it became independent without the benefit of an armed force. The UN troops guaranteed the integrity of Macedonia for two reasons. First, to keep Macedonia away from the grasp of Belgrade. This was very important. And second, to provide insurance that the Macedonian-Albanian cooperation has a future. The representatives of the international community were crucial in the negotiations between the Albanians and Macedonians.

Should Kosovo be divided, however, the real loser would be Macedonia. This is because the division of Kosovo would open up the question of western Macedonia. That is why it is very important for the Albanians and Macedonians to continue the tradition of cooperation that they started ten years ago. It is very hard to negotiate after the conflict, after blood has come between two nations. It is much easier, as the experience of Macedonia shows, to negotiate at the table and in parliament.

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