Volume 10 Numbers 2/3

Spring/Summer 2001

Feature: The Future of the Former Yugoslavia

Regional Integrations? The Wars that Came and Might Yet Come
Nenad Canak

Let me begin with a question: Why did Yugoslavia break up along familiar lines? I thought about this a great deal and, in 1993, presented my conclusions in a book titled The Wars Are Yet to Come. Unfortunately, the wars really came. They are not taking place now because of the presence of international troops, because of exhaustion, and attempts to talk things out. But if something is not done, violence will return, sooner or later, in the next year, the next five years, the next ten or twenty years, but it will come back. Because of that, the problems that were swept under the rug in the last fifty or sixty years must be solved. They must be solved in a democratic, lasting way.

Socialist Yugoslavia had three integrative institutions. The first was the Yugoslav People's Army; the second was the League of Communists; the third was Marshal Tito. They disappeared one by one. Marshal Tito died first. Then, the League of Communists broke up, subverted internally by Milosevic. Finally, the Yugoslav People's army turned into an army of destruction, led by Serbian officers. But why did this army wish to change the external borders of Yugoslavia in 1991?

The answer occurred to me when I went through a 1941 memorandum by the Chetnik ideologist Stevan Moljevic. Moljevic's goal was a "compact Serbia, which should include the entire ethnic territory on which Serbs (Serbian people) live." Moljevic's Greater Serbian idea was illustrated with a map in which Serbian ethnic territory extends as far west as Gospic and Pakrac in Croatia. The point is that Serbian nationalism always understood Yugoslavia to be an expanded Serbia, which was a reward for victory in the First World War. So everything is actually Serbian, except Slovenia and a few municipalities of Croatia. Moljevic's map became very popular at the beginning of the 1990s as Serbian nationalists dreamed of preserving Greater Serbia under the false name of Yugoslavia. They would thereby take under their control even those areas that are by no means exclusively populated by Serbs, or where Serbs are not even a majority.

Of course, there is an alternative vision, well illustrated by the partition of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers in 1941. Here, the largest portion of Yugoslavia went to the so-called Independent State of Croatia, governed by a fascist regime, and which, in fact, did not realize the maximalist plan for a Greater Croatia because that plan actually included the areas of Baranja, Backa, and the Sandzak. The concept of Greater Croatia, too, included all Croats, even in the areas where they are not a majority. Finally, there have been in recent years calls for a Greater Slovenia that would include the whole of Istria and much of the Croatian littoral.

With this knowledge, one can combine the maps of expansionist claims to obtain curious results. The uncontested areas of Greater Serbia are east of the Tisa and Drina Rivers. Uncontested Greater Croatia is only the district around Zagreb. All other areas have competing claims. And in the center is Bosnia, where you had the center of hell. That is the way it was. The areas of overlapping claims pointed to the future war zones. In Backa and in Srem (both in Vojvodina), we had ethnic cleansing of Croats and Hungarians. In the Sandzak, where Croat nationalists made proxy claims against Muslims, and in precisely the same way as Serbian nationalists had, there were arrests of Muslims and resettlement of Croats, while the Serbs were pushed east. That was a sort of exchange of population.

What was happening in real life? I watched television every night, and I saw the answer to my question in the weather reports. This is not a joke. The map that Television Serbia showed every day, at the end of the 7:30 P.M. news, combined the territory of Serbia and
Montenegro with that of Karadzic's Republika Srpska in Bosnia and the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia. It is terribly reminiscent of Moljevic's map. Because this
map was shown every day, people began getting the idea that such a country actually existed. Only Macedonia was missing. Other than that, all the "Serbian lands" were united. But when I compared this map with that of Moljevic a new problem emerged. Albanians contested the parts of Greater Serbia that were not contested by Croats. During the Second World war Italian-sponsored Greater Albania included most of today's Kosovo, as well as a piece of western Macedonia, and a portion of western Montenegro. It also included the three districts of Presevo, Medveda, and Bujanovci, currently in Serbia. At the same time, the northern parts of Kosovo were connected to [Milan] Nedic's puppet Serbia. Curiously, this line of partition, whereby northern Kosovo went to Serbia along with the three districts to Kosovo, resembles the seventh electoral unit of Serbia, as devised by Milosevic's gerrymandering specialists for the December 1993 elections. It can be concluded that Milosevic was prepared to consider abandoning these areas as early as 1993.

When I realized that Milosevic would give up that part of Kosovo and permit Macedonia to be temporarily independent, I understood that the current version of Greater Serbia is pretty much the same as Moljevic's, except for parts of Dalmatia, central Bosnia, Kosovo, and western Macedonia. Why am I including the rest of Macedonia within the revised Greater Serbia? In 1993, during an early clash on the streets of Tetovo, Serbia's Ministry of the Interior offered to send police from Serbia to support the democratic government in Macedonia against the Albanians. The point is that the idea of Greater Serbia is not yet dead. It is very much alive, and Mr. Kostunica, ideologically speaking, is no better than Milosevic. And because he shares Milosevic's ideas, we have to expect plans for the partitioning of Kosovo. The promotion of such a plan will be the signal for the partitioning of Bosnia, meaning that Serbia will demand Republika Srpska as compensation for the loss of Kosovo. The partition of Bosnia inevitably will reawaken Croatian aspirations for parts of Bosnia. This will provoke a new chain of wars, probably not as bloody as the wars of the 1990s, but there is no doubt that a new flood of refugees will be engendered.

Can an idea of regional integration prevent the development of new wars? Nowadays, in Vojvodina, we are trying to create a project of regional cooperation. We are trying to cooperate with Osijek, Croatia, and with Tuzla, Bosnia. The reasons are very simple. Our borders are suffocating the people who live on both sides. No one wants to live in a zone where buses turn around and go back in the opposite direction. No one wants to live at the last train station. And because of that, business is dying and there is no life. That is the reason why we regionalists are trying so hard to promote the strongest possible regional cooperation. And that is the reason why the central governments are obstructing our activities. Because if we start with regional cooperation, that will be the end of the centralizing concept of government, which you have at an equal level of intensity in Belgrade, in Zagreb, in all the former federal units of Yugoslavia. Centralism was the only power that could destroy Yugoslavia and actually did so. Now the successor states have a similar system: no power except at the center. And that is what we are fighting against.

The people of the border areas suffered most. Vukovar is on the border with Vojvodina. In Vukovar, especially in the city of Vukovar, 98 percent all houses were destroyed in 1991. That is simply total destruction. You had vast destruction, too, in Baranja and Srem, to the tune of $6.2 billion. Despite all of that, the border peoples want cooperation and soft borders. They want to live, not together, but side by side, as good neighbors to people on the other side. They know that tolerance is the cheapest way of life. Regionalists know that. Localists know that. That is why regional integrations cannot succeed without greater self-rule for the historical regions.

Teuta Arifi: Mr. Canak told us that one of the integrative elements of Yugoslavia was the Yugoslav Army. I think that an important aspect of potential integrations in southeastern Europe is the umbrella of security-the NATO umbrella. The second aspect, which is also crucial, is the democratization of our societies. I would like to underline that economic support, too, is necessary for any integration, that is, the projects of the World Bank, the free flow of ideas. The integration of the region should be looked at in a broader way, not as the integration of the former Yugoslavia, but as the integration of the other countries in the region, because for us, as Albanians, it is very important to have a region where we will communicate without problems with each other.

Ivo Banac: There are a couple of things that I think need to be said, here, so that we steer the discussion in the direction that Zdravko Grebo introduced at the end of the previous session. You will remember that he asked, Why do we have to divide first before we talk about integration? This has to do with the notions of equality. But, once you achieve equality, and there are a number of plans that are floating about on this issue, you have to do something that will make that independence as relative as it has become in Western Europe. I am happy that Ms. Arifi mentioned the question of borders, and, of course, it is all about borders. What is the meaning of borders? If they are meant to serve as a Chinese wall quite obviously that type of isolationist independence is not desirable. What I think we all want, when we envisage integrations, is some sort of very soft frontiers that are going to permit the free exchange of communications and people. In other words, integrations presuppose a certain framework. I am not necessarily referring to the liveliest one, which is increasingly called the Western Balkans, but there has to be some framework within which integrations are a possibility. And I note that the nature of the Albanian questions makes the inclusion of Albania an obvious necessity. It will be necessary, too, to eliminate preventive customs controls and tariffs that inhibit trade and make exchanges extremely difficult. And in addition, and something that the international community has been trying to do in Bosnia-to make sure that the existing controls, as minimal as they might be, are taken out of the hands of the criminal element. The customs control in Bosnia, and not just in Bosnia, has hitherto facilitated the smuggling of drugs and weapons and prevented the exchange of information, ideas, books, culture, and so on. Needless to say, the idea of local and regional autonomy must play an important role. So, those would be some of the most elementary aspects of future integrations, with or without a question mark.

Perhaps on a slightly more idealistic note, integrations could include not simply an idea of a customs union, but perhaps at some future date a common currency, or at least a fully interchangeable currency agreement. Let us not forget that we already have a sort of a common currency in Bosnia, where the convertible mark, which is tied to the German mark, is the official currency. In Montenegro, too, the official currency is the real German mark, not just a convertible mark. There is no other currency in Montenegro at the moment. Other currencies in the area, in one way or another, are connected with the German mark; this is really the only mutually agreeable means of exchange in all these countries. No other western currency is as present. As the European Union moves toward the euro, it makes southeast European currency integrations via the euro particularly desirable. This, of course, is not good news for people who conceive of independence as exclusion. If that is the goal of independence, we have to oppose it. If it is not, then, of course, we benefit from everything that is good about independence, most importantly, the safeguarding of equality, without the isolationist menaces that political independence all too often conveyed during the 1990s.

Ivan Zvonimir Cicak:We have two crisis spots in the Balkans at the moment. One is Bosnia and the other is the [regional] complex where Albanians live. Moreover, we have a new international crisis forming in the Middle East. The effects of this situation could impact on the situation in our area, among the Muslims. There are also stories, in the event of Kosovo's independence, that Serbia would be compensated with Republika Srpska. Should that happen, Croatia would try to take a part of Bosnia. For Croatia, the most strategic point and most important part of Bosnia is the Cazin-Bihac area. Four years ago, the Croatian consulate in Bihac gave 17,000 Croatian passports to the local Muslims. This could be used as an excuse to protect the inhabitants with Croatian passports. They are Muslims, but they declare themselves as citizens of Croatia. So, that could be how things explode.

As for the Albanians, their actions directly influence several locales in the area. Should Montenegro become independent, who can guarantee that it would not start the process for the separation of Montenegrin areas with Muslim Albanian majorities? The Albanians of Kosovo want independence, perhaps unification with Albania. Should that be realized, who could oblige the Albanians of Macedonia to eschew an identical course? That could lead to the partitioning of Macedonia and the involvement of other countries with territorial aspirations to Macedonia. That could explode the whole area.

Miodrag Perovic: After the presentation of Mr. Canak, I think that I can answer Mr. Grebo's question. What is the difference between European integrations and the common state that today embraces both Montenegro and Serbia? The essence of European integrations is the maintenance of the mosaic of peoples. Such integrations are based on common interests. In such integrations, you do not ask if the Montenegrins are Serbs or not; do Montenegrins have culture or not; whether Serbian culture is also Montenegrin culture; was Njegos a Montenegrin poet or a Serbian poet; and so on. We say Njegos was our ruler, the head of our state. The Serbs say he is not your writer, he is a Serbian writer, and so on. There is no end to such discussions. The Muslim problem, too, becomes much weaker if we follow the course of European integrations. Albanians make up only 5.5 percent of the population in Montenegro, and until this moment no minority in Montenegro has asked for separation from Montenegro because the tradition of our relationships, internal relations among the people, are different from those in the surrounding former Yugoslav republics. So, I conclude that for the first time in history, European-style integrations do not imperil anybody's identity. That is why European integrations can solve many of the problems that we have in the Balkans.

Zdravko Grebo: The main problem with the international community's involvement in the region, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is that the whole concept of integrations is questionable. First of all, the concept of human rights is questionable. European integration is questionable. Of course, I would like to see Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Council of Europe, the European Union, and NATO. But the main problem is how do we define the concept of integration. You will find that, locally, among the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in the Bosniac community, that many would say that the whole concept of human rights as a precondition for European integration is somehow Eurocentric-that it is a one-sided concept. The same applies for civil society. So, if it is argued that Kosovo's independence will lead to Serbia's acquisition of Republika Srpska, and that this, in turn, will lead to Croatia's acquisition of Bihac or the whole former Herzeg-Bosna, maybe the final design will be something that some of the Muslim nationalists secretly dream about-a small, rump Bosnia, really a Muslim state. This would be a completely new development, and unprecedented, not only in Europe, but in the Balkans, too. This would be a small state in the center of Bosnia-Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica. The only way to accomplish this is if the Serb and Croat extremist nationalists destroy Bosnia. There is no other way to create a Muslim state in the heart of Europe. It is one of the scenarios for the future. Integration based on human rights is an alternative. Maybe I, too, am an integrationist. There are a lot of people in Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, maybe in Macedonia-I don't know, who are disappointed with the role of Europe in the whole process. Why should Europe be an ideal?

Srdja Popovic: We are talking about the reintegration of the Balkans. I think that both cooperation between these new states and their integration and their coming together under a security umbrella of NATO, as well as the returning of refugees, will be greatly enhanced if first the war criminals are sent to The Hague.

Radha Kumar [from the audience]: I am really intrigued by what Nenad Canak and Miodrag Perovic suggested-the idea that you can simultaneously devolve while you create some sort of regional cooperation as a counterpart. Well, I am really intrigued by this, and I would like to know more about how you see that process. Can you really imagine a situation in which you could contemplate autonomy for Vojvodina, independence for Montenegro and Kosovo, Macedonia remaining as it is, Albania respecting the border, within some form of regional conference, or a stability pact? How do you see it happening?

Nenad Canak: First, the misunderstanding between Novi Sad and Belgrade is very simple. We want our money, and they want our money. So, the main and basic question is to whom our money belongs. When we have a clear answer to that question, other things can be solved. Will there be a referendum? Will there be street demonstrations? Will there be parliamentary decisions for autonomy? Will there be new elections? Do you know who has the power to decide on elections in Vojvodina? I do. So, I would call new elections, if I were forced into it. So, there would be some new tools of political struggle, whereby violence could be avoided. That is also very important in Montenegro. I personally would favor a federation with Montenegro, if we could create such a federation. But you cannot. The nature of federation is the nucleus of this conflict, Montenegro being eighteen times smaller than Serbia. If you were sharing diplomats, if your appointments are one-toone, Serbia would be frustrated. If your representation is one-to-eighteen, Montenegro does not have its own foreign policy. So, it cannot be done that way. The point is to create something like a Southeast European Union, which in the future would be collectively linked to the European Union. I think this can be accomplished only by further dissolution. Why an independent Montenegro? Why special status for Kosovo? Because the elements-the subjects of integration, which create a union-are terribly important. You cannot make subjects from the remnants of former countries because that would be equivalent to considering Austria a part of Germany, based on Hitler's Anschluss. No, you must go back to the beginning, and the beginning for our country is the Constitution of 1974.

Miodrag Perovic: I agree with Mr. Canak. Just one point: an independent Montenegro, simultaneously, would be far from Serbia and close to Serbia. All Serbian interests-access to the Adriatic, plant ownership in Montenegro, economic activity, everything that Serbia has today-would continue in the future. But Serbia would not have the right to dictate. Never again would Serbia dictate our cultural policy, foreign affairs-push us into a war against Croatia, etc. Our traditions with regard to minorities are very different from those of Serbia. So, there are problems that cannot be solved appropriately if our policy is made in Belgrade. On the other hand, Serbia would lose its imperial identity. Serbia needs Montenegro if it wants to maintain the identity of a regional military power-from the Danube to the Adriatic.

Ivan Lovrenovic: It seems to me that we are talking almost exclusively about the political, territorial aspects of disintegration and possible integrations. This discussion is a little bit abstract. This is because in life, in practice, down there-if that term is permitted-we have other terrifying examples of dissolution and destruction. The social disintegration of the whole area is horrifying. I can speak for days on this theme, perhaps especially on Bosnia, which in this case, too, is the most drastic example. But, of course, it is not only Bosnia. The most recent events in Croatia suggest the same type of social disintegration in Croatia, too. In Bosnia, for example, the sort of ethnic integration that we have is perhaps only a façade, or perhaps a barrier for deeper social disintegration. In Bosnia today, we have people living as Croats, Serbs, Bosniacs, with the clear intention of continuing in self-contained and isolated entities. You cannot grasp this by listening to Grebo and myself. But what each elite is doing, in a perfectly harmonious way, is petrifying the current political, spiritual, and cultural divisions. Let me finish with this seeming paradox: We still tend to speak about forms of possible future integration, which is certainly desirable, but we forget very frequently that in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia, within each of them, further disintegrative processes are at work. I can speak very authoritatively on the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The process of reintegration is going to be the most difficult task with the most modest prospects of success.

Slavko Perovic: Plainly said, the area of the former Yugoslavia is completely destroyed. This means that the area must be renewed in every respect. I would like to speak about the process of democratic renewal. Apart from the economic question, that is the foremost question. Whether we wish to acknowledge it or not, I think that the idea exists in all of us that the destruction of Yugoslavia was idiocy. That said, we have to acknowledge that the situation in Serbia disrupts the entire area. We all hope for and want to see and are working toward the amelioration of the situation in Serbia, so that Serbia truly becomes a beneficiary of democratic changes. We know, however, that the process is slow and that the changes are few and inadequate. The reason for the slowness is the strength of the Greater Serbia project.

That means that only after we accomplish our tasks in Montenegro, and only after Serbia accomplishes its tasks, and only when Croatia becomes a true democratic state, and if we can say that Slovenia has accomplished its tasks, and if something in that sense is also done in Macedonia, and if the existing international protectorate in Kosovo not only concerns itself with the Albanian national question but the improvement of the whole area, in the sense of constructing an open and democratic society, only then will we be able to speak about the reintegration of the area.

Drago Jancar: Considering the experience of the twentieth century, and particularly the new situation that is emerging from our tragic experience after the year 1990, it is possible to claim that nationalism will no longer be the prevailing force in this area, just as is the case elsewhere in Europe, at the end of the century. Political forces emphasizing the nation and its values, instead of social programs, will be marginalized. This can already be observed in Croatia and Serbia. The question of the future of the ex- Yugoslav area will no longer be the question of ethnic identity, but of democracy, economy, the rule of law, social programs, free press, and human rights. In the transition to postcommunism-which is and will remain the reality of all states on the territory of former Yugoslavia-the central issue will be political and economic oligarchies, which already have or are going to acquire great power through privatization processes. This power will be a major threat to true democracy. And only occasionally will nationalism serve the function of strengthening this power.

This is very true in the case of Slovenia, where, after the turbulent events in the period between 1988 and 1992, the social and economic situation is now normalized, and yet-in my opinion-Slovenia is still a long way from the democratic standards adhered to in Western Europe. Nationalism as a topic and content has almost disappeared from the political and cultural life of Slovenia. What remains is the debate about preserving cultural identity in the face of European integrations and integrative processes, which is, in fact, the public concern elsewhere in Europe. It seems to me that in Croatia, as well, the [nationalism] issue has been losing its former power: the Croatian flags waved in football stadiums and at the skiing triumphs of Janica Kostelic have little to do with the pathos of nationalism, and those acts no longer radiate the former aggressive or "self-defensive" energy. Perhaps it would have happened before, had not-in the communist era-declarations of national belonging and any difference that could have given rise to a political idea been forbidden and dangerous.

Neither will the question of our future be cooperation in this area (although many people think it will be); I am convinced that cultural and economic currents will be logically and necessarily intertwined. Any true culture is multicultural by definition, and no economy can today be self-sufficient. The central questions will therefore be: What kind of societies will emerge in this area, what will be their degree of democracy, of equal opportunity for all, and of political and media equality? Small national states in Central Europe, in the Balkans, and on the territory of the former Soviet Union, particularly on the Baltic sea (the entire issue is referred to by E. J. Hobsbawm as Kleinstaaterei), find their political systems in danger, and with legal and media outlets at risk of being subordinated to lobbyist groups, which will acquire- or have already acquired-enormous power through privatization processes. Timothy Garton Ash uses a Russian neologism, which is well understood in the Slavic languages: prikhvatizatsiia (prikhvatit = to take, grab). In the wild struggle for power and wealth the whole of Eastern Europe is using all means available- politics, the media, the old connections, particularly communist and economic connections. The ideological strife, which is on the surface of these processes, in Slovenia for instance, seems reminiscent of the Kulturkampf from the days of Austria-Hungary; in other words, of the strife between the liberals and the clericalists. But this is only a mask, a façade for the actual seizure of power and money. Thus, a paradoxical situation has emerged in Slovenia: owners of large companies and media houses, the boards of banks and capital companies, declare themselves left-wing, while it is clear that the right-wing originates from the circles that strive for the Catholic "reevangelization" of Slovenia.

The losing sides in this conflict are those citizens who did not have the power or the talent to find their place amid the new divisions, and they are in the majority. Another loser is democracy, as free and regular elections do not by themselves guarantee true democracy. There are many third-world states with elected parliaments and presidents, which are far from being democratic. Their political structure is neither democracy nor dictatorship, but something in between. I fear that all the states and societies on the territory of the former Yugoslavia are in danger of experiencing a similar fate, even after the fall of Tudjman and Milosevic. Everywhere, including in Slovenia, the division into the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of authority is still blurred and guided by private interests, while the media are on the side of the authorities and the capital, and thus do not perform their proper function-the supervision of authority. The movements of civil society are also disappearing, although in the 1980s they were quite strong in Slovenia. Participation of citizens is becoming increasingly weaker; bureaucratic state authorities now deal with everything from ecology to feminism, while citizens are left with nothing but elections, which-in small, media-driven environments- can easily be manipulated. A significant part of the former political and financial elites, with powerful connections dating to the communist period, was rapidly revitalized, which might also happen in the economy and the media of Serbia.

This reductio ad absurdum-as Hobsbawm calls the emergence of small states-therefore does not give rise to new nationalistic conflicts but creates a danger of small systems that culturally and economically cooperate but are controlled and ruled from within. Which inevitably has cultural consequences as well. After the emergence of the Slovenian state, I wrote that I feared the time when I would be forced to live surrounded solely by my narrow-minded and self-complacent fellow countrymen. And I also wrote that there might come a time when I would say of Slovenia what Friedrich Dürrenmatt once said of Switzerland: My only connection with this state is my passport and tax obligations.

Regardless of the differences in the development and situations within particular societies on the territory of former Yugoslavia, . . . the state of democracy will be that point in which critical intellectuals can find a common language. When I think back to the communist times, when-in a certain period-I was able to publish my texts only in Belgrade, when the American Newsweek proclaimed Slovenia the "island of freedom" in the middle of the communist world (and many Croat, Serb, and Bosnian writers were publishing their works in Slovenia), then I can say with certainty that this should be a useful guideline for the future. . . . I believe that everything will be all right if we pay attention to what is going on in other environments, and even better if we react with solidarity to the cases of controlled or limited democracy. This is the least we can do in order for the inhabitants of this area to have a different future.

Ivan Zvonimir Cicak: It is time to sum up our discussions. It seems to me that most of us share the following conclusions:

o The Yugoslav crisis is not over. The conflagration of war can return in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia, except Slovenia.

o The international community, notwithstanding all the faults in its activity, succeeded in stopping the armed conflicts and in pacifying the larger part of the ex-Yugoslav area, transforming it into a (lasting?) cease-fire zone.

o The departure of the international community from this area would mean the beginning of a new conflagration that could engulf other southeast European states in a new-ethnically based-carnage.

o The resignation and fatigue of the international community, as well as the idea that the black hole of the Balkans ought to be abandoned, are increasingly noticeable and ought to be considered with utmost seriousness.

o On the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the last ten years were expended on national conflicts, while the basic problems of every society (economy, social policy, local administration, taxes, etc.) were relegated to the margins of state interest and that of civil society.

o The development of democracy, the rule of law, and civil society, as well as social relations in general, continue to worsen in the successor states of Yugoslavia. Deep divisions within these societies can lead to internecine armed conflicts, on a political-nonethnic-basis.

o In all of the states of the former Yugoslavia (except Slovenia), the social and economic situation is dramatic. Massive numbers of the poor and small groups of the extremely wealthy are becoming the norm.

o Hopelessness and lack of perspective are pervasive. This could occasion calls a for "firm hand" and dictatorship.

o All cultural and social values are in collapse, attended by quick enrichment, unscrupulous corruption, crime, the growing presence of drugs, alcoholism, and, in some areas, especially with concentrations of foreign troops, an enormous increase in prostitution.

o Although we are conscious that the war started as an internal and preagreed-upon conflict, no solution can be found without the presence of the international
community, since the role of international institutions and groups in the area has become predominant.

o The dissolution of the rump Yugoslavia, the exclusion of Yugoslav nomenclature as a negative remnant of the past, as well as the independence of Montenegro, a high level of autonomy for Vojvodina inside Serbia, and the establishment of an international
protectorate in Kosovo are the goals supported by most participants of this conference. These developments must be based on the electoral will of citizens, expressed in referendums, and in agreement with the conclusions of the Badinter commission of 1991 and the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974.

Ivo Banac: Since I admire Srdja Popovic's ceterum censeo, I am going to give him the last word.

Srdja Popovic: My last word is not going to be about The Hague. I listened to Grebo's reaction, and I must say, when Mr. Milosevic lost power, he made a speech in
which he said if he is destroyed by the NATO forces then Yugoslavia would fall-and he was right. Yugoslavia has no other resources than cheap labor. When capital comes to a country where there is only cheap labor, then you are under a certain pressure. If you want to have European standards, European investors, and, in general, the European way, pride will not be involved. It is a rational decision to accept the price for something that you want. And, finally, the only future for the whole region lies in European integration.

A number of institutions and individuals have contributed to the success of the Yale conference and the other attendant events. The council staff, notably Rosemarie Hansen and Dr. Brian Carter, were especially helpful. The Yale Center for International Area Studies and the US Department of Education Title VI Grant provided the financial support for the conference. Follow-up meetings in New York City and Washington, DC, were financed by the Harriman Institute, the East Central European Center, and the Center for Historical Social Science, all of Columbia University, and the German Marshall Fund of Washington, DC. We are especially grateful to Professor Mark von Hagen, Dr. John S. Micgiel, and Gordon Bardos, all of Columbia University, and Phillip Henderson and Corinna Horst, of the German Marshall Fund. Thanks are also due to the responsible officials at the New Atlantic Institute and the National Security Council who received the conference participants in Washington, DC, and engaged them in an important exchange of ideas. Nor can we omit an obligation to Donald Levy and the Yale University Bookstore, which hosted a book party for Drago Jancar, as well as Professor Andrew Wachtel of Northwestern University, who introduced and read from Jancar's works. Most important, the organization of the conference and the publication of its proceedings, for which I am especially grateful to Professor Stephen Holmes and Karen Johnson, would not have been possible without the dedicated work of a group of Yale students, most notably Jasmina Besirevic Regan and Jovana Lazic, as well as Mato Meyer, Danilo Petranovic, Ana Vukov, and Dean Vuletic. They have my heartfelt thanks.

- Ivo Banac

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