

MECHANISMS OF NEIGHBORHOOD SELECTION: WHY AND HOW POOR FAMILIES MOVE¹

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Abstract

Research on neighborhood selection and residential segregation has neglected to account for why families move and how they find subsequent housing. Drawing on new data from a survey of low-income renters in Milwaukee, this study finds that families who experience an eviction or other forced move and those who rely on network ties to locate housing are much more likely to live in disadvantaged neighborhoods. These findings advance our understanding of residential mobility among the urban poor by documenting the importance of previously overlooked mechanisms—those that push families out of old neighborhoods and pull them into new ones—for explanations of how families end up in distressed neighborhoods.

Keywords

Neighborhood selection, Urban poverty, Residential mobility, Concentrated disadvantage

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MECHANISMS OF NEIGHBORHOOD SELECTION

“The slum,” for Jacob Riis (1998 [1902]: 1, 7), “is as old as civilization ... [and] the enemy of the home.” So it is no surprise that since the earliest days of American sociology, urbanists have tried to understand how families end up in the slum and how they break out of it; how residential opportunities—always in lockstep with social and economic ones—are extended to some and denied to others; and how neighborhoods change and persist in interconnected ways. Yet despite over 100 years of research on residential mobility in the American metropolis, sociologists largely have neglected to examine why and how poor families move, resulting in large gaps in our knowledge about the mechanisms of neighborhood selection. We examine the reasons low-income families move and the methods by which they locate subsequent housing. Drawing on new survey data of low-income renters in Milwaukee, this study finds that families who experience an eviction or other forced move and those who rely on network ties to find housing are much more likely to live in disadvantaged neighborhoods. These findings advance our understanding of residential mobility among the urban poor by documenting the importance of previously overlooked mechanisms—those that push families out of old neighborhoods and pull them into new ones—for explanations of why some families end up in severely distressed neighborhoods while others avoid them.

THE CITY FOR SENTIMENTS AND FOR STRIVING

Robert Park (1925*a*) and other sociologists of the Chicago School came to view the spatial organization of the city as the result of the cultural organization of its denizens. Once a cultural order imposed itself on the geography of the metropolis, geography would in turn impose itself back on the segregated group’s culture, “physical and sentimental distances [reinforcing] one another” (p. 10). A neighborhood, then, was understood primarily as a “moral region,” with its own language and customs. “Associations with others of their own ilk,” Park wrote in an uncharacteristically purple passage, “provides ... not merely a stimulus, but a moral support for the traits they have in common which they would not find in the less select society. In the great city the poor, the vicious, and the delinquent, crushed together in an unhealthy and contagious intimacy, breed in and in, soul and body, so that it has often occurred to me that those long genealogies of the Jukes and the tribes of Ishmael would not show such a persistent and distressing uniformity of vice, crime, and poverty unless they were peculiarly fit for the environment in which they are condemned to exist. We must then accept these ‘moral regions’ ... as part of the natural, if not the normal, life of a city” (p. 45). Harvey Zorbaugh (1929, pp. 13, 151) likewise would speak of different neighborhoods resembling “little world[s] ... absorbed in [their] own affairs” and would treat the slum not as an economic but as a “social phenomenon.” And Gerald Suttles (1968, pp. 5, 23) saw poor ethnic neighborhoods as being “morally isolated” from each other and wider society and characterized life in those areas as “extremely provincial.”²

² As Katznelson (1994, p. 20) has observed, Park, Wirth, and other standard-bearers of the Chicago School of urban ecology were deeply influenced by Simmel’s notion that “particular social groups became anchored to distinctive territories.” Wirth (1925, p. 219) would call “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” “the most important single article on the city from a sociological viewpoint.”

For the Chicago School, the city primarily was a space of sentiments and its pattern of physical and social segregation primarily the result of tens of thousands of individual decisions (conscious or subconscious) based on where one best fits. “In the long run,” wrote Park (1925*a*), “every individual finds somewhere among the varied manifestations of city life the sort of environment in which he expands or feels at ease; finds, in short, the moral climate in which his peculiar nature obtains the stimulations that bring his innate dispositions to full and free expression” (p. 41). The sentimental neighborhood, like the plant habitat on which the urban ecology perspective was based, becomes for all purposes sentient, drawing to it those that belong. “From the mobile competing stream of the city’s population,” Zorbaugh thought (1926, p. 223), “each natural area of the city tends to collect the particular individuals predestined to it.” R.D. McKenzie (1925, p. 78) would explain residential sorting as being steered by “a selective or magnetic force [emanating from various neighborhoods] attracting to itself appropriate population elements and repelling incongruous units, thus making for biological and cultural subdivisions of a city’s population.”

The clearest direct modern descendant of the Chicago School’s perspective on residential migration and neighborhood selection is work on residential preferences. This research has been concerned primarily with neighborhood dissatisfaction and racial tolerance and intolerance. Sociologists advancing the neighborhood dissatisfaction perspective explain residential mobility as a function of individuals’ growing intolerance for neighborhood crime or perceived disorder (Sampson 2012), housing problems (Speare et al. 1975), or as a response to life-course events, such as marriage or the birth of a child (Rossi 1980 [1955]). Research on racial preferences, based primarily on vignette studies asking respondents to articulate their willingness to live in neighborhoods with varying racial compositions, repeatedly has found whites to have the strongest preference to live alongside same-race neighbors, while blacks exhibit the weakest (for reviews, see Charles 2003; Pattillo 2005). Farley’s (1994) well-known studies have found that the neighborhood that most blacks would want to move to (one with an even balance of whites and blacks) is the one that the majority of whites said they would not even enter. If these preferences remain stable, racial integration becomes a forever fleeting achievement because, as Schelling (1971) argued, blacks’ model neighborhood composition surpasses whites’ tolerance for integration. The asymmetric distribution of preferences for integration leads whites to move once the neighborhood has become (from the perspective of blacks) ideally integrated. Yet recent research (e.g., Bruch and Mare 2006) has found that race preferences alone do little to explain the high degree of racial segregation that has come to characterize many an American city.

The most influential research on residential mobility—that which is informed by the residential attainment model—also is deeply influenced by the Chicago School’s vision of mobility and neighborhood sorting. But those working within this tradition substitute the Chicago School’s emphasis on sentimentality and morality with one focused on instrumentality and economic advancement. The residential attainment model perceives mobility as the result of social climbing and views the city, not as a patchwork of isolated moral worlds, but as a geography of advantage and disadvantage: dangerous streets and safe ones, good schools and failing ones. According to the residential attainment perspective, when people move, they try to move up, parlaying economic capital for residential capital. Spatial location, then, is understood to be the outcome of an “individual-level attainment process” involving members of minority

communities and immigrants “upgrading from central-city slums to working-class neighborhoods to suburbs” (Logan and Alba 1993: 243, 244). Such upgrades often involve moving closer to white communities, a kind of “spatial assimilation” understood to be essential to the general process of assimilation itself. Those who participate in the spatial assimilation process tend to be those of higher socioeconomic status, who move to predominantly white neighborhoods peopled with residents of a similar class background (Massey and Mullan 1984; South and Crowder 1997).

When it comes to transforming economic or educational gains into locational ones, however, the exchange rate is much steeper for African Americans. Even after adjusting for socioeconomic status, blacks are far less likely than other racial or ethnic groups to reside in safe, racially integrated, and economically prosperous neighborhoods (Logan and Alba 1996; South and Crowder 1997). The fact that human capital attributes alone cannot explain racial segregation and neighborhood-based inequality has led scholars to focus on structural impediments to residential mobility. Garnering support for what some have called the “place stratification model,” analysts have demonstrated that characteristics of the housing market and racial discrimination prevent many blacks from escaping segregated neighborhoods (Charles 2003; Massey and Denton 1993).

THREE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

To understand people’s movement across the city, then, sociologists have designed laboratory experiments and computer simulations to assess how much racial preferences matter, have followed neighborhood turnover and charted the movement of racial groups in and out of neighborhoods, have theorized about locational attainment and spatial assimilation, and have emphasized the importance of barriers to neighborhood entry. But despite the vast literature on residential mobility, by and large researchers somehow have neglected to investigate *why* families actually move and *how* they do so. Perhaps as a consequence, they have had little to say about the considerable *variation* in neighborhood context among the urban poor.

Why Do Poor Families Move?

In concentrating exclusively on questions of *who*, *what*, and *where*—as in certain groups (who) relocating to or remaining in (what) certain neighborhoods (where)—the literature on neighborhood selection largely overlooks the crucial question of *why*. In the residential mobility research, what typically passes for the “why” question are studies that compare individual attributes of city-dwellers (white) with the characteristics of their neighborhood (% white) to examine how aggregate patterns of racial segregation may be explained by individual migration flows. Here we find studies examining, for example, white and Latino flight from neighborhoods with a growing black population (Sampson and Sharkey 2008; Quillian 1999) or the resistance of whites or blacks to move into multiethnic neighborhoods (Crowder et al. 2012). Families’ reasons for moving—e.g., racial intolerance—are derived from aggregate patterns of neighborhood turnover. This research is essential to our understanding of migration patterns and enduring racial segregation, but in terms of explaining residential mobility, it comes with several

limitations. First, an ecological approach cannot disentangle movers' possible aversions to, say, black neighbors from other aspects of the neighborhood: e.g., crime rate, property values (Harris 2001). Second, in focusing on neighborhoods most relevant to explaining the resiliency of racial segregation—those that experienced sizeable racial turnover—this research focuses on an important, but nonetheless small and selective subset, of moves. Third and most important, studies that explain residential mobility by comparing individual and ecological attributes simply have not bothered to ask movers to articulate their reasons for moving. Movers have not provided us a motivation for their move; we have chosen one for them.

As a result, we are left with an areal view of the city without an accompanying ground-level picture of the everyday mechanisms that explain residential mobility and neighborhood sorting. Why are families moving in the first place? How might their reasons for moving determine where they end up? And how might where they end up, in turn, matter for our understanding of how people enter into distressed neighborhoods and, more broadly, the legacy of racial segregation and concentrated poverty? Those who have adopted the residential-attainment perspective avoid these questions by treating the motivation behind all moves as singular and self-evident: “residential mobility is understood as a direct reflection of individual advancement and acculturation” (Logan and Alba 1993: 244).³ The puzzle to be explained, then, is not *why* people move per se but *why they do not* move to better neighborhoods. To the extent that structural barriers are brought into the model, they enter as barriers to neighborhood entry (e.g., discrimination) or processes of de-integration (e.g., white flight). Families may be prevented from moving where they wish, but they are free to move when and how they wish.

Much work on residential mobility, then, treats all moves as voluntary and similarly motivated. But not all moves are created equal. While middle-class families may exert a good deal of control and intentionality over their mobility decisions, poor families often are forced from their homes. *Why Families Move?* (1980 [1955]) generally is remembered for explaining residential mobility as the result of life cycle changes, but Rossi also wrote a fair deal about forced moves. “There are moves that are ‘induced’ or precipitated by eviction,” he wrote, “by dwelling units destruction through fire, other hazards, or demolition; or by conversion to nonhousing uses. ... [Each year] thousands of households are evicted for one reason or another from their dwellings.” Rossi classified *fully 39%* of the moves in his study as forced, the majority of which were due to eviction, building demolition, or severe income loss (pp. 33, 185). That Rossi chose to emphasize voluntary moves brought about by changes in life stages over forced moves, and that most work on residential mobility has followed suit by treating residential mobility as the result of the degree to which individual preferences can be realized, was a curious, consequential, and, we think, unfortunate development in urban sociology.

Today, low-income families are involuntarily displaced from their homes by urban renewal or the demolition of public housing (Goetz 2011; Newman and Wyly 2006). And recent research has shown inner-city neighborhoods to have high rates of eviction. Analysts have estimated the number of American families evicted each year to be in the several millions

³ Until recently, national data collection efforts also have placed heavy emphasis on volitional moves, overlooking involuntary displacements. The American Housing Survey only has asked respondents if they have moved because of an eviction since 2005. Before that, the only types of forced moves the survey recorded were those attributed to disaster (fire), government order (eminent domain), changes or repairs to the unit, or the owner moving into the unit.

(Hartman and Robinson 2003). In Milwaukee, the setting of this research, roughly 16,000 adults and children are evicted through the court system annually. In Milwaukee's predominantly black inner city, one renter-occupied household in fourteen is evicted each year (Desmond 2012a). Tenants evicted through the court system bear the blemish of eviction on their records. After noticing that a prospective tenant recently has been evicted—information widely available through state-sponsored digitized record keeping or by cheap tenant screening services (Kleysteuber 2006)—landlords often turn them away (Desmond 2012a). A court-ordered eviction is but one type of forced move that low-income families may experience. Tenants also may be forced to relocate through informal evictions, as when a landlord simply tells a family to go or changes its locks. A landlord going into foreclosure or the city condemning a unit as unfit for human habitation also can provoke a forced (and sometimes unexpected) move. A forced move carried out under critical and even traumatic circumstances clearly is guided not by the aspiration to “move up in the world” but simply by the need to move somewhere else. When survival is at stake, moving into a better neighborhood falls a distant second to the pressing priority of finding subsequent housing for oneself and one's children. For all these reasons, we offer the following hypothesis: *Families who have undergone a forced move will live in more disadvantaged neighborhoods than those who have relocated voluntarily.*

How Do Poor Families Move?

In addition to treating the question of why families move as a given, not as an empirical question, conventional accounts of neighborhood selection also have overlooked *how* families move. That is to say, they have not investigated the multiple ways in which movers locate subsequent housing, the *modus operandi* through which they select into neighborhoods. Instead of addressing this question head on, analysts have expended considerable effort trying to get around the fact that families actually do select into neighborhoods. This avoidance strategy is due to debates within the neighborhoods effects literature that has treated neighborhood selection as a source of bias (Mayer and Jencks 1989). Ludwig and collaborators (2008, p. 150, 176) have spoken of “the curse of omitted-variable bias owing to neighborhood selection. ... More often,” they write, “we do not know exactly what is driving the selection process, and we should worry that selection could occur in part on the basis of factors that are not well understood or easily measured.” To address this problem, the authors champion experimental studies that are able to isolate “aspects of the treatment process.”

But we can study directly “what is driving the selection process,” treating neighborhood selection as a sociological process and a valuable topic of inquiry in its own right. “In examining the sources and social consequences of residential sorting,” Sampson (2008, p. 217) has argued, “we need to conceptualize neighborhood selection not merely as an individual-level confounder or as a ‘nuisance’ that arises independent of social context. Instead, neighborhood selection is party of a process of stratification that situations individual decisions within an ordered, yet constantly changing, residential landscape.” Perhaps the biggest source of omitted variable bias in sociological accounts of residential sorting and mobility, then, is the glaring omission of quotidian mechanisms of neighborhood selection: the why and the how.

As with the reasons for moving, relocation strategies are meaningfully diverse. Some

movers may undertake a search independently, searching the newspaper, local media sources, or the Internet for housing options. Others may rely on state, municipal, or nonprofit social services agencies. Still others may rely on network ties, relocating to neighborhoods because a family member or friend told them about a unit coming available or referred them to a landlord.⁴ Could the precise way families find housing influence the kind of neighborhood into which they eventually select? If any parallelism exists between search methods used to find housing and those used to find jobs, then there is good reason to expect as much. A longstanding finding in economic sociology and economics is that job seekers who rely on network ties to gain employment are significantly more productive at securing job offers (Granovetter 1974; Holzer 1986) and, once on payroll, at advancing within the company (Podolny and Baron 1997). In a similar way, families who find housing by relying on social networks may have better luck relocating to stable and safe neighborhoods than those who undertake the search by themselves or who rely on social services. Small-scale landlords, in fact, traditionally have recruited tenants through social or kin networks (Krohn et al 1977), an arrangement that typically enables tenants to benefit from lower rents and higher housing standards—and perhaps enhanced neighborhood quality (Gilderbloom and Appelbaum 1987). This train of thought presents the following hypothesis: *Families who locate housing by relying on social networks will live in less disadvantaged neighborhoods than those who rely on other search methods.*

What Explains Neighborhood Variation Among the Urban Poor?

Research on residential mobility has focused almost exclusively on what might be called *major moves*, those characterized by large and significant shifts in ecological context. Studies have examined moves between high- and low-poverty areas (South, Crowder, and Chavez 2005); those between neighborhoods with significantly different racial compositions (Quillian 1999); or moves that take families from the city to the suburbs (Massey and Denton 1988). Studies evaluating racial differences in the locational return to human capital center their analyses upon the neighborhood quality of whites, comparing the residential advantage of nonwhites to that of whites with similar socioeconomic characteristics (Logan and Alba 1996, p. 245). This informative line of work has shown racial segregation to be propelled by a twinned dynamic involving blacks' lack of mobility out of the ghetto and their heightened mobility into it (South, Crowder, and Chavez 2005).

But the ghetto is not everywhere the same. Crime and gang activity; neighborhood composition and family types; an area's civic engagement and its spirit of neighborliness; the quality of the housing stock; the amount of litter and graffiti; street prostitution, public drunkenness, and other forms of "public disorder"; how the street is used and by whom—all these things can vary drastically from one inner-city block to the next (e.g., Sampson 2012; St. Jean 2007). As Du Bois (1996 [1899], p. 310) observed over a century ago, "There is no surer way of misunderstanding the Negro ... than by ignoring manifest differences of condition and power in the 40,000 black people of Philadelphia. And yet well-meaning people continually do this. They regale the thugs and whoremongers and gamblers of Seventh and Lombard streets with congratulations on what the Negroes have done in a quarter century, and pity for their

⁴ Here, again, the neglected sections of Rossi's (1980 [1955], pp. 207-10) study prove useful. Rossi focused on how movers located subsequent housing, finding that low-income families relied more heavily on social ties.

disabilities; and they scold the caterers of Addison street for the pickpockets and paupers of the race. ... The law-abiding, hard-working inhabitants of the Thirteenth Ward are aroused to righteous indignation when they see that the word Negro carries most Philadelphians' minds to the alleys of the Fifth Ward or the police courts." There is a rich and meaningful microeconomy of differences among poor, segregated neighborhoods. City spaces presented as unchanging in satellite images or Census aggregations can immediately appear, from the ground level, alive with diversity. From 30,000 feet the Amazon Forest, too, is but a single canopy, a green sea of sameness.

In directing our full attention to movers making large leaps across racial and economic divides, we have failed to turn our ear toward the soft shoe falls of millions of families taking smaller steps across the urban landscape, inching toward the edges of the slum or sliding deeper into it. In neglecting to explore *incremental moves* involving more muted and subtle changes in neighborhood context, current theories of residential mobility cannot explain the considerable *diversity* of neighborhood context among the urban poor, among those who confront similar structural barriers to upward mobility. Why do some low-income families live in much worse neighborhoods than others who share the same racial identity and monthly paycheck? Investigating why and how poor families move, the mechanisms of residential mobility, allows us to begin gaining some purchase on this question.

A NEW MODEL OF NEIGHBORHOOD SELECTION

Studying residential mobility without examining why families move is something akin to studying employment transitions without wondering if workers changed jobs because they were recruited, promoted, downsized, or fired. And studying neighborhood selection without examining how families actually select into neighborhoods is something akin to studying employment without ever inquiring about how workers find jobs. Overlooking why families move and how they relocate to new areas has resulted in a vastly underdeveloped theory of neighborhood selection and residential inequality. By addressing the why and the how of residential mobility, this study offers a new model of neighborhood selection. Whether focusing on life-course events, neighborhood dissatisfaction, spatial assimilation, or how racial minorities are denied mobility opportunities, most sociologists conceptualize residential mobility as the result of movers, possessing a set of attributes, acting to realize their (generally stable and homogenous) mobility preferences while confronting structural opportunities (for whites) and obstacles (for nonwhites). The causal arrow, as it were, is only ahead of actors, who seem uniformly to step from their houses with intentionality and purpose (see Figure 1).

<< **Figure 1 about here** >>

The model presented in this paper, by contrast, places causal arrows in front of *and* behind actors. Instead of taking for granted a family's reason for moving, it treats it as important question to be empirically investigated. This involves, first, reserving our judgment of moves being self-actuated and intentional until such a condition is validated through analysis and, second, expanding our typology of mobility to include moves that are involuntary and reactive. The role of structural forces, too, have a larger role to play in our model, as they are understood

as helping to determine not only where families end up but also why they move in the first place. Reasons for moving, in turn, shape families' residential preferences. Those executing a voluntary move take as an alternative their old neighborhood or residential unit and thus may strive for a better neighborhood or better unit. But the alternative for those forced involuntarily from their homes is homelessness and thus their residential preferences are drastically attenuated based on the exigencies of the situation. Last, our model understands neighborhood selection as being influenced in part by the precise way a family locates subsequent housing. How movers navigate the housing market, we hold, helps to determine what corner of the city they call their own. Our proposed model does not replace conventional models that emphasize residential attainment of place stratification, as Figure 1 shows; rather, it incorporates fully the insights of these perspectives into an expanded model of neighborhood sorting. In this way it builds upon, but goes considerably beyond, previous work on residential mobility.

THE CITY FOR SALE AND FOR SOCIAL RELATIONS

There is something at stake here more fundamental and significant than a revised theory of residential mobility. What is at stake is how we should view the city. Our proposed model of neighborhood sorting views city dwellers, not as individual strivers seeking to maximize residential advantage, but as people regularly affected by *market forces* and deeply embedded in *social relations*, both of which help determine when and why one moves and where one ends up living.

Neighborhoods are Markets

The history of the city is a history of the commonwealth losing control of communities to the interests of landed capital. As Mumford has documented in his magisterial *The City in History* (1961, pp. 426, 422-23), “the city, from the beginning of the nineteenth century on, was treated not as a public institution, but a private commercial venture to be carved up in any fashion that might increase the turnover and further the rise in land values. ... Urban land, too, now became a mere commodity, like labor: its market value expressed its only value. ... This was a new kind of urban order, in which business took precedence over every other kind of activity.” And accounts of twentieth century urban America attest to the centrality of market actors—landlords, real estate brokers—to city dwellers' residential mobility and attainment (e.g., Spear 1967; Satter 2009).

Yet one cannot help but be struck by how minute and muted a role the market plays in the writings of the Chicago School.⁵ Passing references to land values are vastly overshadowed by

⁵ “The modern city,” Park (1925*b*, p. 9) would observe in his American Sociological Society Presidential address, “differs from the ancient in one important respect. The ancient city grew up around a fortress; the modern city has grown up about a market.” What Park failed to understand was that in both ancient and modern cities, the land itself functioned as a market. In ancient times, it was able to do so precisely because the city functioned as a fortress. Around the late fifteenth century, advances in weapon technology forced people off the land and into fortified city walls. Cities grew vertically—Edinburgh boasted of twelve-story tenements—and urban landed capital grew rich, the competition for space driving up land value and rents (Mumford 1938: 82-86).

an emphasis on the cultural and ethnic.⁶ Logan and Molotch (1987, p. 4) have criticized the Chicago School of human ecology for being “so deeply immersed in free market reasoning that its practitioners seem not to have been aware that there was even an alternative approach.” Our only issue with this critique is that it is too generous (Castells 1977). What one sees in the writings of the Chicago School is a city governed by morality, not markets. To a lesser degree, the intellectual descendants of the Chicago School have inherited its predecessor’s penchant for viewing neighborhoods as “communities” somewhat immune to market forces (Sampson 2012, p. 45). Conventional perspectives tend to see the housing market imposing itself on movers only when it comes to residential attainment, in the form of discrimination or costing out. If only poor families were so lucky.

Much research on neighborhood selection, then, from the Chicago School on down, tend to downplay the fact that while a neighborhood may indeed function as a moral region or a site of residential attainment, it is before all else *a market*, bought and sold, developed or destroyed or discarded. To us, the neighborhood should be seen foremost as a commodity and largely owned, in the case of the slum, by those who do not live within its borders or even its city. Consequentially, market actors in general, and landlords in particular, should be viewed as central actors in our theories of neighborhood selection and mobility. “Mobility may not be *intrinsic* to urbanism,” wrote the authors of *Urban Fortunes* (1987, pp. 33-34), “but instead contingent on the market mechanisms that induce, or coerce, mobility. ... The stranger to fear may not be the man of different ethnicity on the street corner, but a bank president or the property management executive of irrelevant ethnicity far from view.”

Neighborhoods are Networks

A market-based perspective promotes a very different understanding of the city than that inherited from the Chicago School of urban ecology. What the Chicago School got absolutely right, however, was the fact that neighborhoods are not *just* markets. We wish here to retain this crucial insight—but to update it, viewing the neighborhood not as a “moral region” but as an “embedded region.” That is, we substitute the Chicago School’s fuzzy and largely unsubstantiated focus on sentimentality for one examining the geography of social networks.

Many sociologists of the city see neighborhoods as aggregations of various indicators of advantage or disadvantage: % black, % violent crime, % poverty, % joblessness. But city dwellers often see neighborhoods through networks. When fieldworkers ask residents about their neighborhoods, for example, the latter tend to reply by mentioning people. Mary Pattillo-McCoy (1999: 188-89, 191) asked longtime Groveland resident Terri Jones to describe her Chicago neighborhood and received this response: “I know a lot of people. I walk to the store I talk to people. And I visit, like you know, I do have my neighborhood people. ... And then my sister didn’t move too far. ... I wanna live in the black community. ... Wanna live close to my mother.” To Ms. Jones and many other urbanites, a neighborhood is, before anything else, before its crime rate or segregation index or moral landscape, its people.

⁶ Among the Chicago School urban ecologists, Burges (1925) was the one who most clearly recognized—but resisted theorizing—the determining role of the housing market with respect to city dwellers’ mobility patterns.

Learning why people live where they do may have more to do with the size and location of their social network than with anything else. Yet most models of residential attainment begin and end with the autonomous striver who moves through the city disconnected, alone and ambitious, containing neither history nor extended family. Understanding how social ties affect residential mobility and sorting, and how they attenuate or actuate neighborhood effects, would advance and complicate our knowledge of the city and its enduring problems. Conventional wisdom and conventional sociological accounts hold that people chose neighborhoods. Recent revisionist accounts have argued the opposite: that neighborhoods chose people (Sampson 2012: 327). Both positions may be off. Many people might not chose neighborhoods at all. What they might choose is people. When it comes to neighborhood selection, then, preferences based on residential attainment and neighborhood characteristics might be secondary to the pull of kin and friends. Most basically, understanding why people select into the kinds of neighborhoods they do may begin with understand what their neighborhood means to them: where it starts and stops, the streets they inhabit or avoid, and the people in their locale that enrich or complicate or vitiate their lives.

DATA AND METHODS

The Milwaukee Area Renters Study

This paper draws on—and introduces—the *Milwaukee Area Renters Study* (MARS). An original survey of 1,088 tenants in Milwaukee’s private housing sector, MARS was designed to collect new data on housing, residential mobility, eviction, and urban poverty. To bolster response rate and data quality, surveys were administered in-person by professional interviewers at tenants’ places of residence. They were conducted in English and Spanish. One person per household was interviewed. Interviewers asked to interview an adult leaseholder or, should a leaseholder be unavailable, an adult knowledgeable about household financial matters. Interviews were conducted in 2009, 2010, and 2011.

MARS employed a multi-stage stratified probability sample of households, selected from high- and low-poverty census blocks. Households were stratified at the block level by race and ethnicity and by poverty level. Additionally, a probability score was assigned to each block based on the perceived likelihood that the block contained persons who had been evicted during the previous two years. This score was derived by drawing on court records and mapping evictions that occurred in Milwaukee between 2006 and 2007. Thus a stratified sample of blocks was randomly selected with probability proportional to the likelihood of eviction measure; and these blocks were in turn subsampled to produce a sample of blocks. When a block was selected into the sample, interviewers visited every household in the selected blocks, saturating the targeted areas. They conducted on-the-spot listing of addresses to account for all households in a selected block, so as to complete the sample frame. Because the sample is limited to renting households, interviewers screened out all individuals who lived in owner-occupied dwellings. MARS also includes an oversample of 100 recently evicted tenants, who were randomly selected from closed Milwaukee eviction cases that occurred 12 to 24 months prior to the final fielding of the survey. After data collection, the sample was weighted to facilitate estimates generalizable to Milwaukee’s general rental population.

Especially among low-income populations, it is important to garner high response rates. Survey respondents that are most difficult to reach often are in some important ways different from those that are easiest to interview. A higher response rate means that more peoples' experiences are represented in the data, including (crucially) those of hard-to-reach populations: the poorest and most vulnerable of the urban poor. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) offers several ways to compute a response rate. The most conservative calculation (*AAPOR Response Rate 1*) places in the numerator only fully completed interviews and in the denominator all cases of unknown eligibility. According to this metric, MARS's has a response rate of 83.4%. An alternative calculation places in the denominator the proportion of unknown eligibility cases that is equal to the proportion of eligible cases for all known eligibility cases. By so doing, it estimates what the response rate would have been if we had been able to screen all of the unknown eligibility cases. The percentage of eligible cases in the sample is estimated by: $1 - (\text{Ineligible cases} / [\text{All fielded cases} - \text{unknown eligibility}])$. This metric is known as *AAPOR Response Rate 3*, and for MARS it is 91%. These response rates reflect data of a high quality and allow us to base our estimates on a broader, more representative population.

The MARS instrument was comprised of more than 250 unique items. Questions ranged from those inquiring about housing problems and neighborhood trust to those collecting information on social networks and demographics. Full adult and child rosters were obtained for each household. The centerpiece of the MARS questionnaire was a housing roster that collected a two-year residential history from each respondent.⁷ To do so, interviewers employed a memory prop, a two-year calendar, to help respondents recall important landmarks and features of their residential experience. Respondents were asked to list all the places they "lived or stayed for at least a month," including other people's houses, shelters, and correctional facilities. Respondents were asked to provide the address or crossroads of their previous residences. This information was geo-coded using ArcGIS and an associated road network database. It was then possible to assign each current and past residence to a census block group—our neighborhood metric—and to import aggregate population estimates from the 2010 U.S. Census, the American Community Survey (2006-10), and crime records from the Milwaukee Police Department.

Analytical Strategy

For the purpose of these analyses, we focus only on tenants' most recent move, the move that brought them to their current neighborhood. We exclude all moves that occurred prior to two years of being surveyed. This reduces the sample to 580 households.

Our main outcome variable is neighborhood disadvantage, a measure created via factor analysis. Seven characteristics loaded onto a single factor and were included in our neighborhood disadvantage scale: median household income; violent crime rate; and the percentages of families below the poverty line, of the population under 18, of residents with less than a high school education, of residents receiving public assistance, and of vacant housing units. All neighborhood-level variables were drawn from the Census, with the exception of the

⁷ Housing history was restricted to the previous two years primarily because a two-year recall period does not significantly reduce data quality, unlike the next salient reference category of five years.

percentage of families below the poverty line, which was drawn from American Community Survey rolling averages, and the violent crime rate, which is based on data from the Milwaukee Police Department. A neighborhood's violent crime rate reflects the sum of all counts of homicide, kidnapping, assault, arson, robbery, and weapon-related incidents (these categories being based on Incident Based Reporting codes), per 100 people.

We predict neighborhood disadvantage by applying multivariate analyses to the MARS data. Our primary explanatory variables have to do with reasons for moving and housing search strategies.

Primary Explanatory Measures

Reasons for Moving. Asking why someone moved is no simple task. As the first author of this paper learned during fieldwork in low-income Milwaukee neighborhoods, tenants may often provide the explanation for a move that maximizes their own volition. If a single mother was evicted from a rundown apartment, for example, she is more likely to tell you she moved because her landlord did not fix anything than because she was evicted (Desmond 2012a,b). Simply asking people, in a survey or an interview, to name why they moved produces poor data. And asking about eviction, for its part, comes with its own set of complications, as tenants tend to have strict (and often misguided) conceptions of eviction. Take Rose and Tim. A couple of eleven years, they were forced to leave their trailer after Tim sustained a back injury at work. Rose and Tim did not go to court but undeniably were evicted. (Their names appear in the eviction records.) Nevertheless, they do not see it this way. "When you say 'eviction,'" Rose explained, "I think of the sheriffs coming and throwing you out and changing your locks, and Eagle Movers tosses your stuff on the curb. That's an eviction. We were *not* evicted." If Rose and Tim were asked during a survey, "Have you ever been evicted?," they would have answered no.⁸ And if they were asked, "Why did you move?" they likely would not have mentioned the eviction.

The MARS Reasons for Moving Module was designed in light of these considerations (see Figure 2).⁹ It begins by asking a series of yes/no questions about eviction, both formal (e.g., "Did you, or a person you were staying with, receive an eviction notice while living at this place?") and informal (e.g., "Did you move away from this place because your landlord told you, or a person you were staying with, to leave?") (Hartman and Robinson 2003). If a respondent answers no to all the eviction questions, then she or he is asked if other factors provoked the move (e.g., the city condemned the property, the landlord raised the rent, the house went into foreclosure). If the respondent answers no to all these questions as well, she or he is finally asked, "I see that none of these reasons fit your case. Why did you move away from this place?" To arrive at the open-ended question, a tenant had to answer no to nine previous questions about

⁸ Material hardship surveys (e.g., Mayer and Jencks 1989) that have posed this question, then, have underestimated considerably the number of poor families who experience eviction.

⁹ Here we see the value of ethnography to survey methodology. The MARS instrument was informed deeply by Desmond's fieldwork among low-income tenants and landlords in Milwaukee. As a result, questions were designed to align with categories and vernaculars of the survey population, instead of relying on the (often confusing, often poleaxing) categories of the analyst.

reasons for moving. We believe this approach, however cumbersome and time consuming, yielded the best survey data possible regarding the drivers of residential mobility. This Module was repeated for all units in which respondents lived during the previous two years.

<< **Figure 2 about here** >>

We organized tenants' reasons for moving into three categories: forced, responsive, and voluntary moves. *Forced moves* are initiated by landlords or city officials (e.g., code inspectors) and involve situations in which tenants have no choice other than to relocate (or think as much). These include formal and informal evictions, foreclosures, and housing being condemned. *Responsive moves* are motivated by housing or neighborhood conditions. These include rent hikes, a deterioration in housing quality, escalating violence in the neighborhood, domestic violence, and relationship dissolution. *Voluntary moves* are intentional and unforced relocations, often carried out to gain residential advantage. These include moves to be closer to kin or friends, school, or work, as well as housing and neighborhood upgrades.

Housing Search Strategies. Tenants were asked how they found their current and previous residences. We organized their responses into three categories: *network-based searches* that relied on kin, friend, or other social ties; *agency-based searches* that relied on the Housing Authority or another agency; and *individual searches* in which tenants located housing themselves by relying on print media, the Internet, or by calling on a "For Rent" sign.

Controls

Housing Quality. Recent research on residential mobility decisions among low-income families has found evidence of "housing and neighborhood tradeoffs." After interviewing MTO voucher-holders in Baltimore, for example, Rosenblatt and DeLuca (2012: 254) found that families "often sacrificed neighborhood quality for dwelling quality in order to accommodate changing family needs." To assess the degree to which tenants are selecting into disadvantaged neighborhoods to obtain decent housing, we control for the number of lasting housing problems a tenant has experienced since moving into her or his unit. Tenants were asked if they had experienced nine types of problems: broken appliance, broken window, broken door or lock to the outside, pests, exposed wires or electrical problems, no hot water, no heat because the main heating equipment broke, no running water, and stopped up plumbing. A problem was classified as "lasting" if it lasted more than 3 days or, in the case of no heat, no water, and blocked plumbing, more than 24 hours. Additionally, we control for rent and whether tenants receive housing assistance. Housing assistance was measured by the question: "Is the federal, state, or local government helping to pay your rent, for example, through the rent assistance program?" It is operationalized as a binary variable.

Demographics. Because it long has been established that African Americans are more likely to reside in disadvantaged neighborhoods (South and Crowder 1997), we account for tenants' race. And because previous research has linked one's ability to escape or avoid disadvantaged neighborhoods to their socioeconomic status, we control for household income as well as tenants' education. Housing discrimination against children and families remains

widespread today—roughly 20% of all HUD complaints allege discrimination based on family status (HUD 2010)—and families with children (female-headed households in particular) have been identified as being at especially high risk of eviction (Desmond 2012a, Desmond et al. 2012). Accordingly, we control for single-mother households and for the number of minor children living at the tenants’ current address. We also control for the mark of a criminal record, which could seriously limit tenants’ housing and neighborhood options (Pager 2007; Thacher 2008). We assign to tenants the value of 1 if they ever have been convicted of a crime. Because residential advantage is thought to increase over the life course (Rossi 1980 [1955]), we also control for age.

Social Network. Last, we control for the size, locality, and socioeconomic status of tenants’ social networks. Using a name generator, tenants were asked to record the initials or first names of their close friends and family members. Once they did this, interviewers asked a series of question about the people respondents named. For these analyses, we generated three network variables. The first measures the number of tenants’ close friends and family members that live in Milwaukee. Tenants who are embedded in large networks might enjoy a degree of residential advantage vis-à-vis those who are fairly isolated or whose close ties live outside of the city. Second, we account for the percentage of renters’ close ties who live in her or his neighborhood. Whereas the number of one’s social ties in the city measures how many people from which one could seek help, the percentage of ties in one’s neighborhood is a measure of network locality and spatial embeddedness. If a high percentage of renters’ social ties are concentrated in a small geographic area, that may help explain why families select into certain neighborhoods. Third, we account for the socioeconomic status of tenants’ networks. Tenants were asked how many of their listed close friends and family members (a) owned their own home, (b) graduated from college, (c) had a full-time job, and (d) had a part-time job. It was then possible to calculate the proportion of close friends and kin who possess these four attributes. These proportions were pooled and averaged to generate a measure of network socioeconomic status that ranges from 0 (in which case none of the tenant’s network ties possess the four middle-class markers) to 1 (in which case all of them do). The degree to which tenants are embedded in resource-laden networks might influence their ability to select into more advantaged neighborhoods. Table 1 summarizes these statistics in a weighted sample.

<< Table 1 about here >>

RESULTS

Milwaukee’s African-American renters lived in much more disadvantaged neighborhoods than did its Hispanic and white renters. Table 2 displays neighborhood characteristics for the average black, white, and Hispanic renter in our sample. We estimate that the average black renter lives in a neighborhood where 16% of families live below the poverty line, compared to 9% for the average white renter and 12% for the average Hispanic renter. Differences in neighborhoods’ violent crime rates are even starker. At 20 violent crimes per 100 people, the violent crime rate of the average black renter’s neighborhood is almost twice that of the average Hispanic renter’s and 2.5 times that of the average white renter’s. These differences are statistically significant.

<< **Table 2 about here** >>

These findings support those of previous research showing that blacks are far more likely to reside in areas with heightened levels of crime and concentrated poverty (South and Crowder 1998). Comparisons across racial groups, however, flatten significant amounts of within-group variation when it comes to neighborhood quality. Figure 2 displays the distribution of African Americans and Hispanics by neighborhood-level poverty. We estimate that among renters who had relocated during the two years prior to being surveyed, roughly 53% of Hispanics and 51% of blacks moved into neighborhoods in which more than 40% of families live below the poverty line. But nontrivial percentages of black and Hispanic renters also moved into low-poverty areas. Roughly 20% of Hispanics and 17% of blacks relocated to neighborhoods in which only 10% of families were in poverty. In fact, Figure 2 shows that across the city black and Hispanic renters live in qualitatively different neighborhoods when it comes to concentrated poverty. We find similarly shaped distributions when evaluating variation in violent crime rates or our concentrated disadvantage scale. What explains this variation? Why do some, say, black renters relocate in low-poverty, low-crime neighborhoods while others move into the heart of the ghetto? To gain traction on these questions, we examine the multiple reasons families relocated in the first place as well as the multiple ways they searched for subsequent housing.

<< **Figure 3 about here** >>

Leaving a Home

Renters moved for a wide variety of reasons. We estimate that 14% of Milwaukee renters were forced to relocate; 40% experienced a responsive move; and 46% undertook a voluntary move, relocating to a bigger apartment or an area closer to work. As reported in Table 3, we estimate that roughly 1 in 12 white renters was forced to move from their previous dwelling. The same was true for almost 1 in 7 black renters and more than 1 in 4 Hispanic renters. Because these figures are weighted to enable estimates about the entire rental population of Milwaukee, they are conservative with respect to moves among low-income families. If we examine the unweighted data, we find that 20% of renters most recently had moved because they were forced to, with roughly 1 in 4 black and Hispanic renters, and over 1 in 8 white renters, experiencing a forced move.¹⁰

<< **Table 3 about here** >>

Although responsive movers had more choice in the matter than those forced out of their homes on account of an eviction order, landlord pressure, or failed code inspection, their relocation remains a primarily reactive response to rent hikes, neighborhood crime, deteriorating housing conditions, relationship dissolution, or other factors. We estimate that roughly 40% of white renters, 32% of black renters, and 42% of Hispanic renters moved in response to such changes. In the end, then, voluntary moves constituted just slightly over half of all moves undertaken by white and black renters and less than a third experienced by Hispanic renters.

¹⁰ These unweighted estimates exclude the oversample of recently evicted households.

Forced Moves. Table 4 increases the magnification, displaying the multiple types of moves that make up forced, responsive, and voluntary relations. The most common type of the forced move in our sample (35%) was informal evictions: landlord-initiative involuntary relocations that occur beyond the purview of the court. This implies that estimates of the frequency of eviction based on court records, estimates that themselves suggest eviction to be commonplace in poor neighborhoods (Desmond 2012a), have undershot the mark considerably. A quarter of forced moves were either formal or near formal evictions. Tenants who experienced a formal eviction received a court order to vacate the premises. Those who experienced what we are calling “near formal evictions” received an eviction notice and either moved before going to court or entered into a court-supervised agreement with a landlord (formally known as a stipulation agreement) that later resulted in eviction. An additional 27% of forced moves involved the foreclosure of rental property, owing to landlords falling behind on their mortgage payments, and a handful involved the property being condemned by city inspectors as unfit for human habitation or families falling behind in rent and moving in anticipation of a forthcoming eviction notice.

<< **Table 4 about here** >>

There are meaningful differences in the forced moves experienced by white, black, and Hispanic renters. The majority of white renters who experienced a forced move (68%) were informally evicted. An additional 16% experienced a formal or near formal eviction. Among blacks forced from their previous residences, 24% were evicted informally and 38% experienced a formal or near formal eviction. Roughly 22% moved after foreclosure of their rental property and an additional 15% after their housing was condemned. Half of Hispanics forced to move did so because their landlord went into foreclosure. Roughly a third experienced a formal or near formal eviction, and an additional 10% were evicted informally. Although each of these types of forced moves results in involuntary relocation, formal evictions are accompanied by an additional disadvantage: the mark of eviction on one’s record. Landlords often turn away recently evicted tenants, and formal evictions can have consequences on one’s credit score. Moreover, a court-ordered eviction renders tenants who receive Section 8 ineligible for federal housing assistance and, for new applicants, serves as a strike that can result in denied services (Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennessy forth.). For these reasons, the forced moves most common among white and Hispanic renters (informal evictions and foreclosures) may be less consequential and damaging than those most common among black renters (formal evictions).¹¹

Responsive Moves. The most common type of responsive move was that initiated by a housing problem (29%). Many tenants spoke of the need to leave units after their condition deteriorated. As one respondent explained, “The basement flooded and the mold took over. ... I have asthma problems, and I had to move out.” Thirteen percent of responsive moves were motivated by real or perceived neighborhood danger. Renters moved when they felt unsafe (“you can’t sit on the front porch”), perceived a growing gang presence, or were victimized by

¹¹ By and large, journalists, policy makers, and social scientists alike have focused primarily on how the foreclosure crisis has affected homeowners and mortgage markets (e.g., Hartley 2010; Mian et al. 2011). Most have failed to investigate the impact of the crisis on rental markets and renting families. Yet in some states, as many as one in three foreclosures is a rental property, and in some metropolitan areas—Los Angeles is but one example—nearly half of foreclosed units have been renter occupied (Treves 2011).

crime. In the words of one respondent, “*Nos robaron. Las puertas me rompieron.*” (“They robbed us. They broke down my doors.”) Another moved after her car was stolen; still another after her husband was murdered. One tenant reported moving because “three people got shot three blocks from my house, and I didn’t want to come home late.” Eleven percent of families moved after their landlord increased their rent, and additional 9% relocated owing to a dispute with their landlord, citing, e.g., the owner being “mean” or “greedy” or “coming into the house even when [they] were sleeping.” Relationship dissolution or domestic violence, situations in which respondents wore out their welcome at temporary arrangements, and disputes with roommates or neighbors each respectively accounted for an estimated dozen responsive moves.

After housing problems—the most common motivation for a responsive move among white, black, and Hispanic renters—significant portions of African Americans’ responsive moves were due to neighborhood crime (21%) and rent hikes (23%). Among Hispanics, twenty-two percent of responsive moves were motivated by neighborhood crime and 14% by financial difficulties (e.g., job loss). Less than 5% of responsive moves among whites were due to neighborhood crime. Sixteen percent were attributed to landlord disputes (versus less than 2% and 0% of responsive moves among blacks and Hispanics, respectively) and 10% to rent hikes.

Voluntary Moves. If housing problems were the most common motivation for responsive moves, housing upgrades were the most common reason for voluntary moves. While responsive moves due to housing problems are motivated by a negative impulse—the need or desire to leave behind pests, caved in ceilings, broken heating systems, or other dangerous or degrading conditions—voluntary moves seeking housing upgrades are motivated by a positive one, namely a desire for residential amenities, especially more living space. After those seeking housing upgrades, the most common type of voluntary move was that which was motivated by a desire for “independence” (19%). These cases involved renters striking out on their own, leaving their parents or friends’ places for their own unit. As one respondent said, “It was time for me to move. Get out of my mom’s place. It was time for a change, and I was pregnant, too.” Another reflected that it was “time for [him] to grow up and venture out on [his] own.” Several simply stated the need to have their “own place.” While 20% of voluntary moves were propelled by multiple factors or motivations too idiosyncratic to categorize, 15% were undertaken out of a desire to be closer to friends and kin. An additional 7% were meant to put workers close to their place of employment or students closer to their schools, and 4.5% were motivated by a desire to save money. Only 3% of voluntary moves were explained by an explicit desire to obtain residential advantage (again, a positive impulse in contrast to the negative one to leave behind dangerous streets).¹²

The desire to upgrade living conditions was the most common reason given for voluntary moves among white and black renters, accounting for 26% and 39% of their respective intentional moves. Housing upgrades accounted only for 5% of voluntary moves executed by Hispanic households. Roughly half of the voluntary moves undertaken by Hispanic households were attributed to multiple motivations; 15% were motivated by a desire for independence; and 11% were undertaken to save money. Roughly 20% of whites’ and blacks’ voluntary moves were motivated by a desire for independence. Of households that relocated voluntarily, 13% of

¹² A handful of renters expressed a desire to “move back to where they were born” or to “go back home.” We referred to this type of voluntary move as one based on “sentimental location.”

black households did so to be close to kin or friends, compared to 19% of white and 7% of Hispanic households. Eleven percent of voluntary moves by white renters were driven by a desire to be close to work or school, compared to 6% of Hispanic and 2% of black renters. Five percent of voluntary moves undertaken by white families were driven by a desire for residential improvement. No black household relocated voluntarily on the basis of neighborhood improvement.

Finding a Home

With respect to locating new housing, half of all Milwaukee renters found their housing through social networks, and 45% conducted the search by themselves, applying for units advertised on the Internet, in local media, or through “For Rent” signs. Only about 5% of renters found housing through the Housing Authority or another social service agency.

As with reasons for moving, we found significant racial differences with respect to finding a home. While roughly 58% of black renters found housing through social networks, the same was true for 50% of Hispanic renters and only 41% of white renters. The majority of white renters (54%) and 49% of Hispanic renters located housing through an independent search. Roughly 34% of black renters relied solely on a self-guided search. Only small shares of renters—roughly 5% of white renters, 8% of black renters, and less than 1% of Hispanic renters—relied on agencies. In sharp contrast to research on finding employment that suggests that black job seekers receive less help from social ties than other groups (e.g., Smith 2007), we found that black house seekers receive more. When analysts studying job seeking have found blacks to help less than Hispanics and whites, they often marshal those findings to advance claims about the state of trust among low-income blacks writ large. Smith (2007: 53), for example, wonders why “poor blacks’ interpersonal relationships [are] characterized by pervasive distrust, which feeds noncooperation.” Our findings suggest that noncooperation among African Americans may characterize some variants of social mobility (like job seeking) but not others (like house seeking). The majority of black families in our study did not approach their housing search as lone individualists, but relied heavily on their social networks when deciding where to move.

<< Table 5 about here >>

The vast majority of tenants who located housing through network ties relied on kin and friends. Fifteen, however, found housing through work or church contacts as well as through their previous landlord. Whites were almost twice as likely to rely on friends than on family members. Blacks and Hispanics were just as likely to rely on kin as they were on friends. Among tenants who found housing independently, we identified significant racial differences in housing search method. Roughly 48% of whites who found housing on their own relied on the Internet, and 33% found housing after spotting a “for rent” sign. Only three Hispanic households who undertook a self-guided housing search used the Internet. The majority of them (55%) found housing through rent signs. That Hispanics rely heavily on sign postings may reflect the geographically compact and contained Latino district located on the near south side of Milwaukee. Only 15% of black households who executed an independent search relied on the

Internet. A third found housing through rent signs, and an additional third through the newspaper or other print media, like glossy advertisements distributed for free in many of the city's inner-city bodegas. With the exception of white renters, then, looking for housing in the low-income rental market is largely an un-digital affair.

Mechanisms of Neighborhood Selection

We have seen that a significant portion of renters were forced from their homes or moved in response to an undesirable or unaffordable set of circumstances. Additionally, we have learned that roughly half of renters found subsequent housing through network ties, with slightly less than the other half undertaking a self-initiated search. Do these push and pull factors help determine the types of neighborhoods families eventually move into? We can begin to address this question by plotting neighborhood disadvantage by move type and housing search strategy, as we have in Figure 4. Our neighborhood disadvantage measure runs from -1.38 to 3 (the weighted mean being -.5). Larger values indicate more disadvantage. An intuitive way of interpreting Figure 4, then, is to view the bars as measuring neighborhood quality: with higher bars signaling higher quality.

<< Figure 4 about here >>

With respect to types of moves, renters who relocated voluntarily as well as those who undertook a responsive move on average live in much better neighborhoods than those who experienced a forced move. On average, renters who relocated on account of a forced move live in neighborhoods with roughly *triple* the level of disadvantage, compared to those who relocated voluntarily. With respect to housing search methods, renters who locate housing through an agency or network ties on average live in more disadvantaged neighborhoods than those who conducted self-initiated searches. Because so few families found housing through agencies, the key distinction here is between independent and network-based searches. Contrary to our initial hypothesis, the average family who relied on social networks to locate housing lives in a neighborhood with twice the disadvantage of those looked for housing on their own.

We now turn to our multivariate analyses to examine whether these patterns hold after controlling for a number of additional factors. Table 6 displays the results of four models. Model 1 documents a significant and positive association between a forced move and neighborhood disadvantage. Renters who experienced a forced move are estimated to live in neighborhoods with a disadvantage level .4 points higher than those who moved voluntarily. This effect remains significant, and its magnitude stable, when housing search methods are introduced in Model 2. Compared to those who conducted self-initiated searches, renters who located housing through agencies as well as those who did so by relying on kin, friends, and other social ties live in neighborhoods with significantly higher levels of disadvantage.

<< Table 6 about here >>

The effects of experiencing a forced move and those of locating housing through networks remained after we incorporate housing quality controls in Model 3. Lower housing

quality and lower rents were associated with lower neighborhood quality. Model 4 includes several demographic measures and variables for renters' social networks. With an R^2 of .31, our full model explains slightly less than a third of the variance in neighborhood disadvantage. Even after accounting for renters' age, race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, family structure, criminal record, and social networks, the effects of a forced move and of a network-based housing search remain positive and significant. In fact, the magnitudes of these two effects are nearly identical. All else equal, renters who were evicted or otherwise forced to move are expected to live in neighborhoods with a disadvantage level .27 points higher than those who move voluntarily. The same is roughly true for renters who found housing by activating network ties.

With previous research, we also found African Americans to live in neighborhoods with significantly higher levels of disadvantage, even after accounting for socioeconomic status. All else equal, Hispanics also lived in neighborhoods with higher levels of disadvantage than whites, though the association is only marginally significant. Renters with lower household income and those who did not graduate from high school were predicted to live in worse neighborhoods. Movers who had a criminal record were not significantly different from their peers in terms of neighborhood disadvantage. With respect to social network characteristics, the number of renters' close friends and family members living in Milwaukee and the percentage of close ties who live in renters' neighborhoods were both positively associated with higher levels of neighborhood disadvantage. Intuitively, network socioeconomic status and neighborhood disadvantage are negatively correlated, although the effect only rises to marginal significance.

To gain a deeper understanding of our finding regarding the link between network-based housing search strategies and neighborhood disadvantage, we returned to descriptive statistics. We wanted to know, first, if it was the case that renters who moved under duress were more likely to rely on their social networks to find housing. We found little evidence that this was the case. As reported in Table 7, 55% of renters who experienced a forced move found housing through networks; the same was true of 53% of voluntary movers.¹³ Next, we examined whether the social networks of renters who found housing through ties were qualitatively different than others. Although renters who located housing through social networks on average had virtually the same number of ties in Milwaukee as those who found housing independently, a larger percentage of the former's ties lived in their neighborhood: 27 versus 20%, a statistically significant difference ($p < .001$). Additionally, a slightly higher percentage of those who undertook a network-based housing search lived in a neighborhood with at least one close friend or family member. We included in our regression model three interaction terms, interacting the variable for a network-based search strategy with renters' number of Milwaukee ties, the percentage of ties in their neighborhood, and network socioeconomic status. Each interaction was insignificant and excluded from our final model. We are left, then, with a bit of a murky interpretation of our finding regarding network-based search strategies. The fact that the social networks of renters who used this strategy are slightly more concentrated in their neighborhoods suggest that the former were pulled into the community by the latter. But this finding is far from unambiguous: the data do not allow us to observe if renters' friends and kin who live in their neighborhood were the ones on whom renters relied to find housing. Moreover, almost a third of

¹³ In supplemental analyses (not shown), we compared the time it took to locate housing between moves by housing search methods, finding no substantive differences.

tenants who used a network-based search strategy had no close ties in their neighborhood. For these renters, and perhaps for many others as well, finding housing through social ties might be less an active and intentional approach designed to move closer to loved ones than a slapdash search strategy that results in their relocating to a worse neighborhood. What is more unequivocal, however, is our finding that families who are both forced from their homes and rely on network ties to seek housing are doubly disadvantaged when it comes to selecting into distressed neighborhoods.

<<< Table 7 about here >>>

Explaining Within Group Variation in Neighborhood Disadvantage

To investigate if families' reasons for moving or housing search strategies explain within-group variation with respect to neighborhood quality, we ran our full model on separate samples of black, white, and Hispanic renters, effectively interacting all variables with renters' racial or ethnic identity. Table 8 reports the results of a stepwise regression, displaying for ease of interpretation only variables that were significant in one or more groups. Focusing separately on white, black, and Hispanic renters reduces the sample sizes of each model and in so doing reserves statistical significance only for large effects.

<< Table 8 about here >>

Looking first at African-American renters, we find that those who experienced a forced or responsive move lived in neighborhoods with higher levels of disadvantage than those who carried out a voluntary move. We also found that blacks who relied on networks to find housing lived in neighborhoods with higher levels of disadvantage than those who conducted self-driven searches. Reasons for moving and housing search strategies appear essential, then, for understanding why some African-American renters live in worse neighborhoods than others, even after accounting for socioeconomic status and social network characteristics. Hispanic renters who found housing through network ties also were more likely to live in distressed neighborhoods than those who executed independent searches. The relationship between a forced move and neighborhood quality was not statistically significant in the model limited to Hispanic renters. Hispanic renters with lower levels of education and more disadvantaged networks also lived in neighborhoods with higher levels of disadvantage. Although variation in neighborhood quality among white renters was not explained by examining their reasons for moving, the association between network-based search strategies and neighborhood disadvantage was significant. All three models, then, associate a network-based search—and the percentage of ties in one's neighborhood—with higher levels of neighborhood disadvantage.

Changes in Neighborhood Quality

We have seen that renters who experience a forced move and those who rely on their social ties to find housing on average live in neighborhoods with higher levels of disadvantage. But up to this point we have left unexplored questions of neighborhood change. Do renters forced from

their homes, as well as those who rely on social networks to find housing, generally experience a *downward move*—a relocation to an area with higher levels of disadvantage than their previous neighborhood—or a *lateral move*, shuffling between neighborhoods with relatively equal levels of disadvantage? To address this question, we first created a measure of change in neighborhood disadvantage renters experienced between moves by subtracting the amount of concentrated disadvantage of renters’ previous neighborhood from that of their current neighborhood. Positive values indicate neighborhood improvement; negative values, a dip in neighborhood quality.

As Figure 5 shows, variation in moves by neighborhood change follows a relatively normal distribution. Nearly a quarter of our sample experienced a minor move with respect to neighborhood change (in either direction), the difference in disadvantage between neighborhoods being no larger than .2. And 31% experienced a major move, upwards or downward, their change exceeding one standard deviation of neighborhood disadvantage. That means that roughly half the renters in our sample experienced an incremental move, characterized by substantively small but most likely noticeable changes in neighborhood quality.

<<<Figure 5 about here>>>

Roughly 40% of our sample underwent a downward move, the remaining 60% enjoyed an improvement in neighborhood quality or experienced no change. To investigate what explains neighborhood change, we apply multivariate models using the same variables as our full model above—only this time we take neighborhood change as our outcome. Two models are displayed in Table 9, the results of the full model on the full sample and the results of the full model applied only to a sample of black renters.¹⁴ Although the search strategy variables yielded no significant effects in either model, a forced move was associated with a significant decrease in neighborhood quality in both the full sample and the sample of African-American renters. This suggests that eviction and other forced moves result in a downward move. In both samples, single motherhood and the percentage of one’s social ties in one’s neighborhood also are associated with a drop in neighborhood quality between moves. Having a criminal record to be associated with residential improvement, which may reflect a kind of upward climbing that occurs several moves removed from prison reentry.¹⁵ Being nonwhite also was associated with neighborhood improvement, a finding that likely more reflects the relatively low levels of disadvantage in whites’ sending neighborhoods than in blacks’ or Hispanics’ receiving neighborhoods.

<< Table 9 about here >>

¹⁴ Exclusively white and Hispanic samples were too small for separate analyses of neighborhood change.

¹⁵ In other words, the kinds of neighborhoods in which one first must live after release may be so extreme in their disadvantage that subsequent moves, perhaps years after reentry, see substantial improvements in neighborhood quality. On the other hand, recent research has found that blacks and Hispanics on average do not live in worse neighborhoods after prison than they did prior to incarceration (Massoglia, Firebaugh, and Warner 2013).

DISCUSSION

One puzzle that motivated this study had to do with trying to understand the diversity in neighborhood contexts among low-income households, to better grasp why some poor families end up in decidedly worse neighborhoods than others. Drawing on novel data to explore this puzzle, we found that why families move and how they locate subsequent housing are decisive in explaining neighborhood selection among the urban poor.

Push factors matter. According to our estimates, a remarkably high number of moves are forced. We estimate that the most recent move for almost one in eight Milwaukee renting households was an eviction or other kind of forced move. The ratio is even higher for black and Hispanic renters. These findings demonstrate that one reason low-income families move so much is simply because they have no other choice. The considerable frequency with which low-income renters in general, and black and Hispanic renters in particular, are forced to find new housing (not to mention the high rates of responsive moving among low-income families) casts considerable doubt on the locational attainment model and its many offshoots that treat all moves as voluntary and motivated by social climbing.

This study has shown that families who experience a forced move relocate to neighborhoods with significantly higher levels of disadvantage than those who experience a responsive or voluntary move, even after controlling for a number of relevant factors. Reasons for moving seems especially important for understanding why some African Americans with similar incomes, educations, and family structure live in distressed neighborhoods while others live in fairly stable areas. The experience of a forced move was much more important to explaining variation in neighborhood disadvantage among black renters than were human capital characteristics. Our findings, then, lend strong support to the hypothesis that families who have undergone a forced move live in more disadvantaged neighborhoods than those who relocate voluntarily. This finding aligns with previous ethnographic research (Desmond 2012a) showing that eviction often results in a relocation to a poorer or more dangerous part of the city. The trauma of being forced out of one's home, the blemish of eviction that follows renters who were evicted through the court system, and the taxing rush to locate any new housing likely combine to push families who relocate involuntarily deeper into the slum.

Pull factors matter too. But not in the way we expected. We hypothesized that families who locate housing by relying on social networks will live in less disadvantaged neighborhoods than those who rely on other search methods. But we found precisely the opposite: renters who located housing through a network tie were significantly more likely to live in a disadvantaged neighborhood than were those who found housing on their own. In fact, all else equal, the effect of securing housing through family, friends, or other social ties on neighborhood disadvantage was found to be relatively equivalent to the effect of experiencing a forced move. Within-group analyses showed that African Americans, whites, and Hispanics who relied on social networks to locate housing lived in more disadvantaged neighborhoods than their peers who found housing independently. When it comes to explaining neighborhood selection, it might not be the “pull of the slum”—but the pull of family and friends within it—that matters (cf. Zorbaugh 1929; Sampson 2008: 213). That the effect of network-based housing search strategies remained positive and significant after accounting for social network controls suggests that the effect is not

reducible to network size, locality, or socioeconomic status. When it comes to predicting selection into disadvantaged neighborhoods, then, what matters is not simply network composition and capital, but whether networks are mobilized to locate housing.

What might explain this finding? As we cautioned above, a network-based search may or may not result in a network-related outcome. That is, a nontrivial minority of renters who relied on social ties to locate housing live in neighborhoods in which none of their close friends or kin reside. Conducting a network-based search may simply be a less efficient and less thorough way of locating housing than one conducted independently. If movers who relied on ties *do* do so to move closer to loved ones, then perhaps they do not consider thoroughly the qualities of their new neighborhoods because their desire to be closer to friends or kin overshadows those considerations. Or perhaps those who live in disadvantaged areas do their part to improve the quality of their surroundings by actively pulling friends and family members into their neighborhood as opportunities arise. From the point of view of movers, the relationship between network-based search methods and neighborhood selection is negative. But from the point of view of residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods who may help to secure for their loved ones a nearby unit previously occupied by, say, drug dealers, these dynamics can be interpreted in a more positive light.

This study responds to the policy need to understand the *prevalence* and *consequences* of eviction and other forms of forced moves. Because the frequency and the consequences of forced moves among low-income renters were previously unknown, policymakers have been at a loss when attempting to assign importance to, say, anti-eviction policies vis-à-vis other priorities. How big of a problem is forced relocation? Should municipalities and community organizations devote more attention (and resources) to preventing eviction, or should they focus on other matters? Our study provides insight into these questions by offering a careful estimate of the frequency of forced moves among low-income renters as well as an assessment of the degree to which forced moves are implicated in placing families in disadvantaged neighborhoods. This research, then, underscores the need for policymakers to focus their attention on forced relocation, treating it as an important social problem implicated in the reproduction of urban poverty and concentrated disadvantage. Because our study found forced moves to be both prevalent and consequential, one implication is that policymakers should devote more resources to keeping families in their homes.

And what might be the policy implications of our findings related to housing search methods? Because search methods matter for determining the types of neighborhoods into which families select, municipalities should consider devoting more resources to helping low-income families locate affordable housing in stable and safe neighborhoods. It is apparent from our data that the vast majority of low-income movers are relying either on themselves or on their networks to find subsequent housing. Only 5% relied on a city or nonprofit agency, and those who did were placed in more disadvantaged neighborhoods than their peers. Cities could provide free and accessible information to low-income movers—via call centers, websites, or drop-in services—about the characteristics of certain neighborhoods. Doing so might expand families' vision of relocating possibilities. Resources also could be dedicated to funding “placement agents” who help low-income families find new housing and negotiate with landlords. That those who relocated voluntarily land in more advantaged neighborhoods suggest

that low-income families, to the extent that they are able, strive to escape distressed neighborhoods and that those who do select into such neighborhoods do so under conditions of duress. And our findings related to housing search methods suggest that families may be selecting into areas without fully exploring other options or considering the conditions of their new neighborhood. Both sets of findings imply that offering renters free and accessible relocation services could effectively steer them away from unsafe and impoverished areas.

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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Milwaukee Area Renters Study (Weighted)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Neighborhood Disadvantage Scale	-.50	.76	-1.38	3.00
Types of Moves				
Forced	.14		0	1
Responsive	.40		0	1
Voluntary	.46		0	1
Housing Search Strategies				
Network-Based	.50		0	1
Agency-Based	.05		0	1
Individual	.45		0	1
Housing Quality				
Number of Lasting Housing Problems	.86	1.15	0	8
Monthly Rent (\$100s)	6.82	3.36	1	61.25
Receives Housing Assistance	.03		0	1
Demographics				
White	.41		0	1
Black	.35		0	1
Hispanic	.17		0	1
Other	.07		0	1
Age	33.26	10.60	16	91
Criminal Record	.07			
Socioeconomic Status				
Less than High School	.14		0	1
High School or GED	.40		0	1
Some College	.29		0	1
College Degree +	.18		0	1
Monthly Household Income (\$100s)	26.89	18.67	0	116.67
Family Structure				
Single Mother Household	.19		0	1
Number of Minor Children in Household	1.07	1.41	0	13
Social Networks				
Number of Milwaukee Ties	5.50	4.38	0	30
Percentage of Close Ties in Neighborhood	.24	.27	0	1
Network Socioeconomic Status	.36	.14	0	.75

N = 580

Table 2. Neighborhood Disadvantage by Race and Ethnicity, Means Reported (Weighted)

	Racial Identity of Renter			Mean Comparison Statistic (<i>t</i>)		
	White	Black	Hispanic	Black/White	Black/Hispanic	White/Hispanic
Disadvantage Scale	-.80	-.15	-.40	9.60	2.67	4.94
Violent Crime Rate	.08	.20	.11	11.57	5.96	3.36
Family Poverty Rate	.09	.16	.12	4.64	1.79	1.57

N = 551

Table 3. Types of Moves by Race and Ethnicity, Percentages Reported (Weighted)

	Racial Identity of Renter			Mean Comparison Statistic (<i>t</i>)		
	White	Black	Hispanic	Black/White	Black/Hispanic	White/Hispanic
Forced Move	8.25	15.34	28.72	2.28	2.97	4.33
Responsive Move	39.22	32.04	41.95	1.59	1.91	.40
Voluntary Move	52.53	52.63	29.33	.08	4.28	3.40

N = 515

Table 4. Types of Moves in Detail (Weighted)

Forced Moves (N = 74)	N
Informal Eviction	26
Landlord Foreclosed	20
Formal Eviction	12
Near Formal Eviction	7
Condemned Property	6
Anticipatory Eviction	2
Responsive Moves (N = 211)	
Housing Problems	61
Neighborhood Danger	37
Rent Hike	23
Other / Multiple Reasons	19
Landlord Dispute	18
Financial Problems	15
Temporary Arrangement	13
Family Breakup or Violence	12
Neighbor Problems	8
Roommate Dispute	5
Voluntary Moves (N = 245)	
Housing Upgrade	73
Other / Multiple Reasons	49
Independence	45
Proximity to Kin or Friends	37
Proximity to Work or School	18
Save Money	11
Neighborhood Upgrade	7
Sentimental Location	3
Find Work	1
Approved for Rent Assistance	1

Table 5. Housing Search Strategies by Race and Ethnicity, Percentages Reported (Weighted)

	Racial Identity of Renter			Mean Comparison Statistic (<i>t</i>)		
	White	Black	Hispanic	Black/White	Black/Hispanic	White/Hispanic
Network	41.14	57.67	49.89	3.48	1.43	1.32
Agency	5.39	8.29	.91	1.23	2.95	1.74
Self	53.47	34.03	49.20	4.15	2.89	.63

N = 563

Table 6. Predicting Neighborhood Disadvantage

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Forced Move	0.397*** (0.100)	0.386*** (0.096)	0.287** (0.098)	0.269** (0.098)
Responsive Move	0.047 (0.070)	0.057 (0.069)	0.034 (0.070)	0.038 (0.077)
Voluntary Move (ref)				
Network-Based Search		0.374*** (0.065)	0.354*** (0.067)	0.264*** (0.072)
Agency-Based Search		0.536*** (0.149)	0.447** (0.151)	0.220 (0.154)
Individual Search (ref)				
Number of Lasting Housing Problems			0.117*** (0.028)	0.076* (0.030)
Monthly Rent (\$100s)			-0.023* (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)
Receives Housing Assistance			0.649*** (0.186)	-0.005 (0.195)
Age				0.007* (0.003)
Criminal Record				-0.171 (0.131)
Black				0.387*** (0.095)
Hispanic				0.177+ (0.101)
Other				-0.237 (0.165)
White (ref)				
Monthly Household Income (\$100)				-0.004+ (0.002)
Less than High School				0.220* (0.110)
Some College				0.125 (0.090)
College Degree +				0.162 (0.108)
High School or GED (ref)				
Single Mother Household				0.083 (0.099)
Number of Children in Household				0.015 (0.026)
Number of Milwaukee Ties				0.018* (0.008)
% Ties in Neighborhood				0.450** (0.145)
Network Socioeconomic Status				-0.550+ (0.300)

Intercept	-0.599*** (0.048)	-0.810*** (0.058)	-0.739*** (0.096)	-1.123*** (0.210)
N	520	520	471	419
R-squared	0.031	0.099	0.157	0.311

Standard errors in parentheses
 + $P < .10$
 * $P < .05$
 ** $P < .01$
 *** $P < .001$

Table 7. Housing Search Strategies by Types of Moves and Network Characteristics (Weighted)

	Type of Move		
	Forced (%)	Responsive (%)	Voluntary (%)
Network-Based Search	.55	.41	.53
Individual Search	.42	.50	.45
	Social Network Characteristics		
	% Ties in Nhood (Mean)	N of City Ties (Mean)	One or More ties in Nhood (%)
Network-Based Search	.27	5.47	.69
Individual Search	.20	5.43	.65

Note: Percentages reported unless otherwise indicated.

N = 530

Table 8. Stepwise Regression Predicting Neighborhood Disadvantage by Racial Group

	Black	Hispanic	White
Forced Move	0.600*** (0.153)	-0.153 (0.161)	0.125 (0.149)
Responsive Move	0.514*** (0.143)	-0.275+ (0.164)	0.028 (0.087)
Network-Based Search	0.356** (0.126)	0.476** (0.144)	0.259** (0.084)
Agency-Based Search	0.049 (0.214)	1.143+ (0.659)	0.173 (0.194)
Number of Lasting Housing Problems	0.078+ (0.045)	0.161** (0.054)	0.077+ (0.043)
Monthly Household Income (\$100s)	-0.008+ (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004+ (0.002)
Less than High School Education	0.209 (0.158)	0.612*** (0.172)	0.406+ (0.244)
Some College	0.080 (0.141)	0.056 (0.178)	0.158 (0.113)
College Degree +	0.131 (0.299)	-0.029 (0.285)	0.096 (0.111)
% Ties in Neighborhood	0.779** (0.257)	0.474+ (0.268)	0.443* (0.202)
Network Socioeconomic Status	0.462 (0.497)	-1.926** (0.590)	-0.103 (0.402)
Intercept	-0.873*** (0.198)	-0.218 (0.275)	-1.031*** (0.203)
N	234	81	133
R-squared	0.208	0.618	0.254

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $P < .10$

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

Table 9. Predicting Change in Neighborhood Quality

	Full Sample	Blacks Only
Forced Move	-0.433** (0.158)	-0.800*** (0.222)
Responsive Move	-0.141 (0.131)	-0.769*** (0.219)
Voluntary Move (ref)		
Network-Based Search	-0.014 (0.122)	-0.272 (0.206)
Agency-Based Search	0.049 (0.251)	0.259 (0.330)
Individual Search (ref)		
Number of Lasting Housing Problems	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.079 (0.071)
Monthly Rent (\$100s)	-0.023 (0.051)	-0.023 (0.072)
Receives Housing Assistance	0.070 (0.287)	0.343 (0.335)
Age	-0.012* (0.005)	0.003 (0.009)
Criminal Record	0.848*** (0.209)	0.886** (0.291)
Black	0.643*** (0.162)	- -
Hispanic	0.400* (0.188)	- -
Other	1.316*** (0.268)	
White (ref)		
Monthly Household Income (\$100)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.025** (0.009)
Less than High School	-0.024 (0.175)	0.016 (0.248)
Some College	0.034 (0.150)	0.088 (0.213)
College Degree +	-0.317 (0.196)	-1.004* (0.489)
High School or GED (ref)		
Single Mother Household	-0.808*** (0.165)	-0.798*** (0.218)
Number of Children in Household	0.023 (0.040)	0.113+ (0.064)
Number of Milwaukee Ties	-0.049*** (0.013)	-0.038 (0.028)
% Ties in Neighborhood	-0.555* (0.242)	-1.275** (0.416)
Network Socioeconomic Status	-0.125 (0.513)	-0.739 (0.762)
Intercept	1.246***	1.751**

	(0.343)	(0.580)
N	335	190
R-squared	0.272	0.316

Standard errors in parentheses

- + $P < .10$
- * $P < .05$
- ** $P < .01$
- *** $P < .001$

DRAFT: DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE

Figure 1. Conventional and New Models of Neighborhood Selection




Figure 2. MARS Reasons for Moving Question Tree




Figure 3. Distribution of African Americans and Hispanics by Neighborhood Pover





Figure 4. Neighborhood Quality Index by Reasons for Moving and Housing Search Methods, Means Displayed (Weighted)



Note: Solid bars represent reasons for moving; striped bars represent housing search strategies.

Figure 5. Distribution of Change in Neighborhood Quality between Moves

