Jules L. Coleman is Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of Philosophy at Yale Law School. Educated at Brooklyn College with Ph. D. in philosophy from Rockefeller University and M.S.L. from Yale Law School, Professor Coleman teaches in the areas of philosophy of law, torts, law, language and truth, political philosophy, and rational choice. He is a leading figure in analytical legal philosophy and modern positivist jurisprudence and his books include Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge 1998), Risk and Wrongs (Cambridge, 1992), the Practice of Principle: the Clarendon Lectures in Law (Oxford, 2001) and two edited collections Hart’s Postscripts: Essays on the Postscript to “The Concept of Law” (Oxford, 2001) and the Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and the Philosophy of Law with Scott Shapiro (Oxford, 2002).
David Dyzenhaus is a Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, where he is also Associate Dean of Graduate Studies. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. Professor Dyzenhaus hold a doctorate from Oxford University and law and undergraduate degrees from the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. He is the author of numerous articles and his books include Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy ( Oxford, 1991), Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order ( Oxford, 1998). He has published two edited collections of essays, Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism (Duke, 1998) and Recrafting the Rule of Law: the Limits of Legal Order ( Oxford, 1999). In 2004 he gave the JC Smuts Memorial Lectures at Cambridge University. These will be published by Cambridge University Press in 2006 under the title The Constitution of Law.
Leslie Green is a leading scholar in the analytic philosophy of law. Educated at Queens’s University, Canada, and at Nuffield College, Oxford, he is author of the Authority of the State and co-editor of Law and the Community: The end of Individualism? He has published many papers in jurisprudence and political theory, on topics including the nature of law, legal obligations, freedom of expression, minority rights, language rights, and the philosophy of gender and sexuality. Professor Green is co-editor of the journal Legal Theory and of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for jurisprudence. In June 2006, he was elected to the Professorship of Philosophy of Law at Oxford University. Professor Green also serves as a part-time faculty member at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University in Toronto.
Nicola Lacey is Professor of Criminal Law and Legal Theory at the London School of Economics. She is also an Adjunct Professor at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra and a member of the Global Law School Faculty of New York University. She was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2001 and has recently been awarded a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship to run for three years from October 2006. Professor Lacey is the author of an outstanding biography, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream ( Oxford, 2004) which was awarded the Swiney Prize and was shortlisted for the James Tait Black Memorial Prize for Biography and for the British Academy Book Prize.
Liam Murphy was educated in Melbourne, Australia and has a Ph.D. from Columbia University. He is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law at New York University, and specializes in legal, moral, and political philosophy, and in the application of these inquiries to various branches of the substantive law. Professor Murphy’s publications include, The Myth of the Ownership: Taxes and Justices, co-authored with Thomas Nagel (Oxford, 2002), Moral Demands in Monideal Theory (Oxford, 2000), “The Political Question of the Concept of Law” in Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscripts to “The Concept of Law” (Oxford, 2001), “Benefice, Law, and Liberty: the case of Required Rescue,” (Georgetown Law Journal 2001), and “ Institutions and the Demands of Justice” (Philosophy & Public affairs 1998).
Frederick Schauer, Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Former Academic Dean, focuses on constitutional law, freedom of speech and press, international legal development, and the philosophical dimensions of law and rules. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship. His books include Free Speech-A Philosophical Enquiry ( Cambridge, 1982); Playing by the Rules ( Oxford, 1993); and Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard, 1982). Professor Schauer has worked on legal and constitutional development throughout the world, and his scholarship has been the subject of a book and five special issues of law journals.
Jeremy Waldron is University Professor at the New York University School of Law. Waldron holds a B.A. (1974) and a LL.B (1978) from the University of Otago, New Zealand, and a D. Phil (1986) from Oxford University. He also taught at the University of California, Berkeley and (until 2006) at Columbia law School (1997-2006). Professor Waldron was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1998. His publications include Theories of Rights ( Oxford, 1994), The Right to Private Property ( Oxford, 1988), Liberal Rights: Collected Papers ( Cambridge, 1993) The Dignity of Legislation ( Cambridge, 1999), Law and Disagreement ( Oxford, 1999) and God, Locke and Equality ( Cambridge, 2002).
Benjamin Zipursky teaches law at Fordham Law in New York City. He received his J.D. from NYU Law School and his Ph. D. in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh in 1982. Professor Zipursky is the author of a number of important articles in tort theory and jurisprudence, including “the Moral of MacPherson,” co-authored with John Goldberg (Pennsylvania Law Review, 1998), “A Theory of Punitive Damages” (Texas Law Review), and “Legal Obligations and the Internal Aspect of Rules” (Fordham Law Review, 2006), and “The Philosophy of Private Law” in the Oxford Hardbook of Jurisprudence and the Philosophy of Law (Oxford, 2002)